IUC Tax on Leased Vehicles: Subjective Incidence in Financial Leasing and Long-Term Rental (CAAD 115/2014-T)

ARBITRAL DECISION

The present decision is issued in accordance with the old spelling conventions

I – REPORT

1. A..., S.A., legal entity no. …, with registered office at Rua ..., in …, applied for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal in tax matters, with a view to the annulment of the tax assessment acts for the Single Circulation Tax (IUC) relating to the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 and to motor vehicles identified by their respective license plate numbers in a list contained in the application for arbitral decision, which is hereby considered fully reproduced herein.

2. As the basis for its application, the Applicant alleges, in summary, that, although the vehicles were registered in its name as of the date to which the tax facts relate that underlie the disputed assessments, it was not the effective owner of the vehicles in question inasmuch as, within the scope of its business activity, it had already transferred ownership thereof.

3. The Tax and Customs Authority (AT) responded by raising a preliminary question relating to the lack of subject matter of the present application for arbitral decision, invoking, as a consequence of the non-existence of a subject matter susceptible to review, a dilatory exception consisting of the material incompetence of the tribunal to hear the merits of the case.

4. The arbitral tribunal was properly constituted on 15-04-2014 and, having considered the preliminary question and exception raised by the Respondent, decided on their immediate review, before proceeding with any investigative measures.

5. The case contains all the (documentary) elements necessary and sufficient for the tribunal to decide, whereby there was no need to convene the meeting provided for in art. 18 of the RJAT.

6. The parties have legal personality and capacity and have standing (arts. 4 and 10, no. 2, of the RJAT, and art. 1 of Ordinance no. 112-A/2011, of 22/03).

II - Factual Matters

1. With relevance for the assessment of the questions raised, the following factual elements are highlighted:

7.1. The Applicant is a financial institution whose corporate purpose is the carrying out of operations permitted to banks, with the exception of the acceptance of deposits, having, for this purpose, all legally required authorizations.

7.2. In the course of its activity, it enters into contracts with its clients for Long-Term Leasing and Financial Leasing of motor vehicles, at the end of which it transfers ownership thereof to the respective lessees or to third parties.

7.3. According to the Applicant, it was notified, between 14 November 2013 and 20 December of the same year, of official IUC assessments relating to the vehicles and the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, having made voluntary payment of the allegedly outstanding tax, with waiver of compensatory interest [1], in accordance with collection notes and amounts shown in the following table:

[Table with vehicle information, years, collection documents, and tax amounts omitted for brevity - contains 40+ entries with various tax amounts ranging from €16.40 to €261.70, totaling €3,339.64]

7.4. However, the Applicant manifests its disagreement with the aforementioned assessment acts, insofar as the vehicles on which the payment of IUC was pending were not its property as of the date identified by the AT as the date of the occurrence of the tax event, a fact which it demonstrates through a copy of the invoicing issued.

III - Preliminary Questions

Having summarized the relevant factual elements, it is important, first and foremost, to analyze and decide the preliminary questions raised by the Respondent which, as mentioned above, concern the lack of subject matter of the application for arbitral decision and, consequently, the material incompetence of the arbitral tribunal to hear the merits of the application.

On the Lack of Subject Matter of the Application

1. With regard to this preliminary question, the Respondent alleges:

"It results from the application for arbitral decision that the Applicant comes to submit to the scrutiny of this arbitral tribunal the acts of official IUC assessment relating to the taxation periods from 2009 to 2012, alleging that it was notified of these official assessments between 13.11.2013 and 20.12.2013.

However, the Applicant labors under error in identifying the subject matter of the present dispute, inasmuch as no official assessments were issued in the present case by the Respondent entity, for which reason the peremptory exception of lack of subject matter is invoked, taking into account the arguments set out below."

1. The Respondent bases the exception it raises on the following grounds:

"Indeed, the Applicant alleges to have proceeded with payment in the alleged official assessments, attaching for this purpose proof consisting of documents 2 to 59.

However, upon analysis of the documents in question, it is indubitable that they do not constitute official assessments issued by the Respondent entity, but rather IUC collection documents, extracted by the Applicant from the Tax Portal.

That is, contrary to what is alleged by the Applicant, the Respondent entity did not proceed with notification of the assessments in question, nor were official assessments issued to the Applicant for the years in question and for the vehicles mentioned in the aforementioned documents nos. 2 to 59.

...

It is thus extracted in a clear and unequivocal manner that the Respondent entity did not proceed with the issuance or notification of any official IUC assessments referring to the years 2009 to 2012, and relating to the vehicles better identified in documents no. 2 to 59 attached by the Applicant.

That is, it was the Applicant which, without having been notified for this purpose, proceeded with the issuance of collection documents for each of the vehicles and for the years 2009 to 2012."

1. From the above, the Respondent concludes that:

"(...) the subject matter of the present application for arbitral decision is not based on official assessment acts issued by the Respondent (...), but rather on collection documents which the Applicant in a totally voluntary manner extracted from the Tax Portal, and on which it proceeded with payment."

Ending by considering that:

"In this regard, given the lack of subject matter of the present proceedings in light of the fact that no official IUC assessment acts were issued by the Respondent entity, which constitutes a peremptory exception, which is invoked for all legal purposes, in accordance with the provisions of no. 3 of art. 577 of the CPC in the wording given by Law no. 41/2013 of 26 June applicable ex-vi Art. 1 of the CPTA, which gives rise to the dismissal of R.'s application in accordance with and for the purposes of the provisions of no. 3 of Art. 576 of the CPC."

1. However, the Respondent adds:

"Even if this is not understood, which is only by way of mere academic hypothesis admitted, and it is understood that, under the provisions of paragraph a) of no. 1 of Art. 2 of the RJAT, such acts constitute acts of self-assessment and as susceptible to judicial review, it would be stated from the outset that such understanding labors under error in its premises given the arguments set out below.

Indeed, acts of self-assessment are judicially reviewable, and the Arbitral Tribunal has competence for their assessment in accordance with the provisions of paragraph a) of no. 1 of Art. 2 of the RJAT.

However, in accordance with the provisions of no. 1 of article 131 of the CPPT, it prescribes that in the case of error in self-assessment, the challenge must necessarily be preceded by a gracious complaint, within a period of 2 years from the filing of the declaration.

In the present case, the Applicant did not file any gracious complaint with regard to the acts of self-assessment, for which reason also by this means such acts of self-assessment are not susceptible to judicial review."

1. Notified of the AT's response, the Applicant pronounces itself on the matter of the invoked exception in the following terms:

"The applicant was confronted in its private area of the Tax Portal with a series of IUC debts, documented in what the AT calls collection notes (collection documents).

For purposes of its tax situation, the IUC debts documented by the aforementioned collection notes were already capable of payment and were paid by the applicant in accordance with the documentation attached to the application for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.

It was a priority for the applicant to proceed with payment of those IUC debts appearing in the system, since the harm resulting from the impossibility of obtaining for the various purposes of its commercial activity a negative certificate of debts (certificate of regularized tax status), far exceeded the harm from the concrete tax assessments, presupposed in those debts and which are logically antecedent thereto.

Moreover, the applicant does not know, nor has any way of knowing. And it finds it highly concerning that the AT, with respect to a plurality of debt situations in respect of IUC which the applicant was unaware of and did not invent, contained in the AT's computer system at a stage that allowed their payment, now comes to say that it has nothing to do with it, and that it would have been the applicant responsible for generating the collection notes, whatever that might exactly mean.

The IUC debts (these and many others) appearing in the AT's computer system (in the area of access reserved for the applicant), are an incontestable fact of the AT's creation, the possibility of their payment is also an incontestable fact of the AT's responsibility, and the qualification of their very concrete amounts, year and license plate of the tax, is also the entire responsibility of the AT and its computer system.

These IUC debts logically and necessarily presuppose a series of IUC assessments, being irrelevant for the case the medium through which the applicant learned of them: the fact is that it learned of them and in the most harmful possible way (attribution by the AT of a tax debt to the applicant), and the fact is that it reacted against them via application for constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal.

Finally, the applicant further notes that it paid the IUC debts in December 2013 and up to the date (June 2014), it has not yet been notified directly or ex professo of the assessments. With other taxpayers exactly the same thing is happening.

Whence the suspicion of this serious behavior on the part of the AT: it places the IUC debts visible to taxpayers in their respective reserved areas of the Tax Portal; these rush to pay to avoid being prevented from obtaining negative certificates of debts fundamental for the most varied purposes (or to avoid, namely at the end of the financial year, seeing the tax benefits they are enjoying prejudiced, for example); payment made, the AT considers the matter closed and does not notify or make known via the Tax Portal (reserved area), anything further, and then comes to invoke that there is no assessment (which in itself is a logical impossibility) susceptible to being discussed in Court."

1. The Applicant ends its response with the following considerations:

"This appears to be animated by the purest bad faith. Now, given the legal presumption contained in article 59, no. 2, of the LGT (presumption of good faith), it is to be concluded that the representatives of the AT in these proceedings were mistaken when they invoked the absence of assessment brought to the knowledge of the applicant (in the case brought to the applicant's knowledge via recording of debt in the reserved area of the Tax Portal and via collection document associated with the same generated by that same Portal).

If this is not understood, i.e., if by absurdity it comes to be concluded that there was collection of an amount on account of IUC for a given year and with reference to a given license plate, in a scenario of absence of tax assessment logically and legally presupposed in such collection, then one would be faced with the criminal offense provided for in article 379 of the Criminal Code - aggravated by the fact that to date there is no sign of the slightest intention on the part of the AT to return the amounts received from the applicant -, and a certified copy of these proceedings should be issued for transmission to the Public Prosecutor's Office so that the competent criminal procedure is initiated."

1. From the confrontation of the positions expressed by the Respondent and the Applicant regarding the preliminary question of lack of subject matter of the present application raised by the former, the tribunal cannot fail to express perplexity, questioning how it would be possible to proceed with payment of a tax through a collection document issued by the competent entity, without the debt to which it relates being properly assessed.

2. In fact, the collection document (DUC) constitutes the title expressing the pecuniary obligation arising from the relationship between the State and the debtor. Issued by the services that administer the respective revenues, this document must contain, in particular, the identification of the organism or processing service - in this case, the identification of the assessing entity - the period to which it relates, the number assigned to it, the identification of the debtor entity, including the tax identification number, the nature and amount of the revenue as well as the deadline for payment.[2]

3. From the analysis of the collection documents attached to the present case - Docs. 2 to 59 - it is verified that these comply with the legal requirements referred to above, allowing their use for the purpose to which they are intended.

4. In addition to the aforementioned elements, it is also verified that the mentioned documents contain the demonstration of the assessment of the tax and the compensatory interest to which they relate, although these were subsequently annulled, as is evident from the documents that form part of the administrative file.

5. Contrary to what the Respondent alleges as the basis of the exception it raises, it is not extracted from the aforementioned collection documents that there exists a dissociation between these and the debts to which they relate: each document identifies the assessing entity (AT), the debtor (the Applicant), the tax in question, as well as the vehicle and period to which it relates, containing therein, in detail, the relevant elements for the determination of the tax base and quantification of the tax and compensatory interest.

6. According to the Respondent, these collection documents do not constitute official IUC assessments issued by the AT, "but rather IUC collection documents extracted by the Applicant from the Tax Portal". Whatever the exact meaning of this statement, it cannot fail to be concluded that if the Applicant extracted them from the Tax Portal, the management of which is the exclusive competence and responsibility of the AT, it is because they were there in conditions to be extracted and with them to effect payment of the debt which they express, as indeed came to be done.

7. That is, from the elements contained in the aforementioned collection notes, it cannot fail to be extracted that the tax assessment which they title was already carried out at the moment when the Applicant had access to them. So much so that the aforementioned documents expressly contain notes demonstrating the calculation of the tax and the compensatory interest to which they relate.

8. From mere logical reasoning, it follows that at some moment, prior to the issuance of the aforementioned collection notes, the tax assessments to which these relate were carried out.

9. However, it is not clear from what is alleged by the Parties, nor from the documentary elements, in particular from the administrative file, which form part of the present case, whether the disputed assessments were carried out at the initiative of the Applicant or, officially, at the initiative of the Tax Administration.

10. As a general rule, the assessment of taxes is carried out at the initiative of the subjects liable for the tax obligation, through declarations, in some cases merely verbal, in others presented on physical media or through electronic transmission of data.

11. In the terminology used in the various Codes and fiscal laws, official assessment is designated as that carried out at the initiative of the competent tax services, in the case of failure by the obligated taxpayers to file declarations or whenever the declarations presented by them suffer from error or omission that does not permit the assessment of the tax that would effectively be due. With this meaning, it is this designation that is adopted in the IUC Code (CIUC, art. 18).

12. In cases where it is not carried out based on elements declared by the subject liable, the assessment carried out at the initiative of the Tax Administration - official assessment - is dependent on prior communication for the exercise of the right to a hearing, and the act is subject to a special duty of reasoning and notification of the addressee (LGT, arts. 60, no. 1, al. a) and 77, no. 1; and CPPT, art. 36).

13. Conversely, and without prejudice to the duty of reasoning, assessments carried out based on declarations presented by subjects are dispensed from prior communication for a hearing, but remain subject to notification, without which they lack efficacy.

14. In the present case, it is not possible to discern either from what is alleged by the Parties or from the administrative file attached, whether the assessments to which the payments made relate were processed at the initiative of the Tax Administration or whether, conversely, they were originated at the initiative of the subject liable.

15. What, with certainty, can be extracted from these elements, is that the assessments in question were carried out by the competent entity, in some way brought to the knowledge of the subject liable and, once the respective payment was made, the Tax Administration considered the respective assessment procedure "Concluded", considering regularized the situations to which they relate.

16. It can also be concluded from the analysis of the aforementioned elements that, as the Respondent alleges, the aforementioned assessments were not validly notified to the Applicant.

17. Indeed, it follows from the applicable legal norms that the tax act produces effect in relation to taxpayers only when validly notified to them. While such legal formalism is not complied with, the act is ineffective (Cf. CPPT, art. 36, no. 1; and LGT, art. 77, no. 6).

18. However, notwithstanding the aforementioned deficiency, the tax debt was qualified, quantified and attributed to the respective subject liable by the competent entity, and voluntarily paid by that subject based on collection documents issued by this entity and which, accepting payment, considered the procedure concluded, as is evident from the administrative file.

19. However, the lack or insufficiency of valid notification does not affect the validity of the assessment act carried out by the competent entity, but only its efficacy, as is indeed the settled understanding of the superior courts.[3]

20. It thus results that there are no doubts as to the existence and validity of the disputed assessments which, regardless of whether they are characterized as official, in the sense of having been carried out at the initiative of the Tax Administration, or having been prompted at the initiative of the subject liable, constitute injurious acts, susceptible of challenge by the interested party (LGT, arts. 9, no. 2 and 95, no. 1).

21. Given the foregoing, the tribunal cannot fail to conclude that the question raised by the Respondent regarding the lack of subject matter of the present application for arbitral decision is not well founded, which it hereby declares unfounded.

On the Material Incompetence of the Tribunal

1. In some way related to the preceding question, the Respondent raises a preliminary question relating to the material incompetence of the arbitral tribunal to assess and decide the application at issue in the dispute, given the non-existence of official IUC assessment acts issued by the AT, which, in its view, "constitutes a dilatory exception preventing knowledge of the merits of the case, in accordance with the provisions of article 576, nos. 1 and 2 of the CPC ex vi article 2, paragraph e) of the CPPT and article 29, no. 1, paragraphs a) and e) of the RJAT".

2. In support of the exception it invokes, the Respondent says:

"As a consequence of the lack of subject matter of the present application for arbitral decision, the Arbitral Tribunal does not have competence to review the acts in question.

As we have made quite clear, the respondent entity did not issue any official IUC assessment acts for the years 2009 to 2012 relating to the vehicles better identified in documents 2 to 59.

However, as prescribed in paragraph a) of no. 1 of Art. 2 of the RJAT, it is the responsibility of arbitral tribunals to declare the illegality of tax assessment acts, self-assessment acts, withholding acts and payment-on-account acts.

In the present case, we are not faced with official assessment acts issued by the Respondent entity but rather collection documents which the Applicant voluntarily extracted and paid.

Therefore, not being faced with acts of tax assessment (IUC), as is made explicit in the wording of paragraph a) of no. 1 of Art. 2 of the RJAT, the Arbitral Tribunal is incompetent to review such acts."

1. As decided regarding the preliminary question raised by the Respondent regarding the alleged non-existence of subject matter of the present application, the tribunal understands that, in the present case, we are faced with tax acts performed by the Tax Administration which, not having been validly notified to the subject liable, lack efficacy.

2. Although containing reference to the essential elements of the assessments to which they relate as well as the respective deadline for payment, the collection notes issued by the AT, at a moment prior to that of the respective assessments, are completely ineffective in relation to the subject liable. [4]

3. However, as already referred to above, the lack or insufficiency of notification does not affect the validity of the assessment act, but only its efficacy.

4. Thus, notwithstanding the deficiency pointed out, the tax acts whose annulment constitutes the subject matter of the present case, having been performed by an entity competent to do so, remain valid.

5. However, as concerns the alleged material incompetence of the arbitral tribunal to hear the merits of the application, the Respondent raises, further, another question, connected with the hypothesis of considering that the obtaining of the aforementioned collection notes would result from acts of self-assessment and, as such, susceptible to judicial review.

6. Referring that such understanding labors under error in its premises, the Respondent bases its position in the following terms:

"Indeed, acts of self-assessment are judicially reviewable, and the arbitral tribunal has competence for their assessment in accordance with the provisions of paragraph a) of no. 1 of art. 2 of the RJAT.

However, in accordance with the provisions of no. 1 of art. 131 of the CPPT, it prescribes that in the case of error in self-assessment, the challenge must necessarily be preceded by a gracious complaint, within a period of 2 years from the filing of the declaration.

In the present case, the Applicant did not file any gracious complaint with regard to the acts of self-assessment, for which reason, also by this means such acts of self-assessment are not susceptible to judicial review."

1. Indeed, the material competence of the arbitral tribunal comprises the assessment of the declaration of illegality of tax assessment acts, self-assessment acts, withholding acts and payment-on-account acts (RJAT, art. 2, no. 1, al. a).

2. The binding of the Tax Administration to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals depends on an ordinance of the Government members responsible for the areas of finance and justice, which establishes, in particular, the type and maximum amount of disputes covered (RJAT, art. 4, no. 1).

3. Under the cited norm and given the specificity and value of the matters at issue, the binding of the AT to the aforementioned jurisdiction is established in Ordinance no. 112-A/2011, of 22 March, the article 2, paragraph a) of which excepts, in particular, "claims relating to the declaration of illegality of self-assessment acts, withholding acts and payment-on-account acts that have not been preceded by recourse to the administrative route in accordance with articles 131 to 133 of the Code of Tax Procedure and Process."

4. With regard to self-assessment acts, article 131 of the CPPT determines that, except in cases where exclusively matters of law are at issue and the self-assessment has been carried out in accordance with generic guidelines issued by the tax administration, the challenge thereof depends on the precedence of a gracious complaint.

5. Self-assessment, carried out by the subject liable itself based on elements it calculates and declares to the AT for control purposes, depends on a legal provision that expressly assigns it such competence.

6. This is not the case with IUC. Completely computerized, the procedure for assessment of this tax is based on the use, by the Tax and Customs Authority, of the elements contained in the vehicle databases and automobile property registry, as has been clearly affirmed by the Tax Administration itself [5].

7. As a rule, the assessment of this tax is carried out through use of the internet, via the Tax Portal, under the conditions of registration and access to electronic declarations, the use of this means being mandatory for legal entities, except in cases where, due to lack of elements, the assessment cannot be carried out electronically. This is what occurs, in particular, in cases where the vehicle is not contained in those databases, because it is not registered in Portuguese territory or "whenever there is error or omission of taxable vehicle in the database, which does not allow the subject liable to assess the tax via the internet." (CIUC, art. 16, nos. 2 and 3).

8. Except in the cases referred to in the preceding number, and whenever the subject liable is a natural person, recourse to assessment via the Tax Portal on the internet may be set aside, and the assessment may be requested by the subject liable at any finance service, in public attendance (CIUC, art. 16, no. 3).

9. Taking as reference the elements contained in the database, relating to the identification of the vehicle and characteristics relevant for the objective definition of the tax scope and application of the corresponding rate as well as the subjective scope, the assessment is carried out by computerized means, with the competent collection document being immediately issued by the same means, which contains, in addition to other elements relevant for payment, a demonstration of the respective assessment (CIUC, art. 16, no. 4).

10. In normal situations, as will eventually be the case with those evidenced in the present case, it is to the subject liable that falls the initiative to prompt the assessment, via the internet, in the manner described above or at any finance service, if such possibility does not prove viable as a consequence of error or omission of the database or whenever the use of that means is not mandatory.

11. The reference to the circumstance that the assessment is made by the subject liable itself via the internet does not imply that one is faced with a situation in which the assessment of the tax in question - calculation of the amount of tax due based on elements relevant for its quantification - is deferred to the subject liable. What happens is that the assessment operations are carried out by computerized means, managed by the Tax and Customs Authority, and the subject liable is not permitted to alter in any way any of the elements relevant to them.

12. This is what clearly results from the text of the law: in the case of error or omission in the database, the subject liable must request the assessment from any finance service (CIUC, art. 16, no. 3, al. c).

13. However, the legislator's choice for the intensive use of computerized means in the assessment procedure of this tax, resorting to the use of databases relating to the registration and property registry of vehicles subject to it, and to the electronic route offered to subjects liable as a means of fulfilling the obligation, would not fail to raise some questions regarding the functional competence to carry out the assessment, in particular, as concerns the guarantees of taxpayers.

14. This question was, from the outset, laconically resolved in no. 1 of art. 16 of the CIUC, which peremptorily establishes that "The competence for assessment is of the Tax and Customs Authority". And to dispel any doubts that might persist, the aforementioned norm was further subject to clarification, through Law no. 83-C/2013, of 31 December, to the effect that, "for all legal purposes, the tax act is considered performed at the finance service of the residence or registered office of the subject liable."

15. Not being faced, thus, with acts of self-assessment, whose challengeability lacks precedent gracious complaint under art. 131 of the CPPT, nor recognizing, in the terms referred to above, the lack of subject matter of the present application, the exception invoked by the Respondent cannot proceed.

16. In these terms, the tribunal considers itself materially competent to assess and decide the application at issue in the present dispute, under the provisions of arts. 2, no. 1, paragraph a) and 4, no. 1, of the RJAT and of Ordinance no. 112-A/2011, of 22/03.

IV - Cumulation of Applications

1. Considering the existence of a direct relationship between the tax assessments whose illegality it challenges, the Applicant opted to request the joint assessment of the tax acts in question.

2. Given the identity of the tax facts, of the tribunal competent to decide and of the factual and legal grounds invoked, nothing prevents, in light of the provisions of arts. 3 of the RJAT and 104 of the CPPT, the requested cumulation of applications.

V - MATTERS OF LAW

1. In the application for arbitral decision, the Applicant submits to the assessment of this tribunal the legality of the IUC assessment acts relating to the periods of 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 and to the vehicles which it identifies in a list attached to the aforementioned application, invoking the circumstance that, as of the date to which the tax facts from which they originated relate, it was not the owner of the vehicle and, consequently, did not assume the quality of subject liable for the tax assessed to it.

2. On the definition of the subjective scope of the IUC, diametrically opposed positions are evident from the outset between the AT and the Applicant: for the former, the subject liable for this tax is the person in whose name the vehicle is registered; whereas for the latter, the scope provision establishes a presumption, derived from the registration, which can be rebutted by virtue of the provisions of art. 73 of the LGT.

3. Thus, on the quality of subject liable for the tax obligation assessed to it, the Applicant alleges that, as of the date of occurrence of the tax facts, it was not the owner of the vehicles to which the disputed assessments relate, since the same had already been sold to the respective lessees or to third parties.

4. However, not being updated the registration of the identified vehicles, the Applicant continued to appear therein as owner, a situation which was maintained as of the date on which the disputed tax assessments were carried out.

5. According to the understanding of the AT, expressed in its respective response, it is sufficient that registration of the vehicle in the name of a determined person is verified for that person to be qualified as subject liable for the IUC tax obligation.

6. Indeed, it follows from art. 3, no. 1, of the CIUC, that the subjects liable are the owners of the vehicles, being considered as such the persons in whose name they are registered.

7. With relevance for the decision to be issued in the present case, the question to be analyzed centers, first, on the interpretation of the provision of no. 1 of art. 3 of the CIUC, in order to determine whether the provision on subjective scope inscribed therein admits, or not, that the person in whose name the vehicle is registered in the Motor Vehicle Registry may demonstrate, through the means of proof admitted in law, that despite such fact, they are not the owner of the vehicle in the period to which the tax relates and thus set aside the tax obligation which falls upon them.

8. In short, the question is whether such provision establishes a legal presumption of tax scope, susceptible to rebuttal, in the general terms, as the Applicant claims, or whether, differently, as the AT understands, "the legislator, in establishing in article 3, no. 1 (of the CIUC), who are the subjects liable for IUC, established expressly and intentionally that these are the owners (or, in the situations provided for in no. 2, the persons named therein), being considered as such the persons in whose name they are registered."

Being this the central question to be decided in the present application for arbitral decision, it is important to analyze in greater detail the positions in confrontation.

Position of the Applicant (SP)

1. On this matter and as the basis for the application for arbitral decision, the Applicant alleges, in summary, that:

a) As of the dates to which the IUC tax facts relate that gave rise to the disputed assessments, it was not the owner of the vehicle and, consequently, does not assume the quality of subject liable for the tax assessed to it;

b) In light of the provisions of article 73 of the LGT, which provides that presumptions established in the provisions on tax scope always admit proof to the contrary, the subjective scope of the tax in question, based on the presumption of ownership derived from the registration, can be set aside by means of proof to the contrary;

c) It is not sufficient, thus, that registration of the vehicle in the name of a determined person is verified for that person to be qualified as subject liable for the tax obligation;

d) The provision of no. 1 of article 3 of the CIUC admits that the person in whose name the vehicle is registered in the Registry may demonstrate, through the means of proof admitted in law, that they are not the owner of the vehicle in the period to which the tax relates and thus set aside the tax obligation which falls upon them;

e) The presumptions of tax scope can be rebutted through the adversarial procedure provided for in article 64 of the CPPT or, alternatively, through the route of gracious complaint or judicial challenge of the tax acts based on them;

f) In the case in question, the Applicant did not use the aforementioned specific procedure, for which reason the present application for arbitral decision constitutes the proper means to rebut the presumption of subjective scope of the IUC which supports the assessments whose annulment is the object of the present application.

g) In order to rebut the presumption arising from the registration in the Motor Vehicle Registry, the Applicant presents a copy of the invoices/sales receipt (Docs. 60 to 99).

Position of the Respondent (AT)

1. To what is alleged by the Applicant, the AT responded in the sense that "the understanding propounded by the Applicant incurs not only an skewed reading of the letter of the law, but also the adoption of an interpretation which does not take into account the systematic element, violating the unity of the system established throughout the CIUC and, more broadly, throughout the entire tax legal system and further results from an interpretation which ignores the ratio of the regime established in the article at issue, and likewise, throughout the CIUC."

2. Indeed, no. 1 of art. 3 of the CIUC establishes that "The subjects liable for the tax are the owners of the vehicles, being considered as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose name they are registered."

3. Developing its position, the Respondent says, in summary, that "The legislator, in clearly establishing in article 3, no.1 who are the subjects liable for IUC, expressly and intentionally established that these are the owners (...) being considered as such the persons in whose name they are registered."

4. In defense of this point of view, the Respondent emphasizes that "the legislator did not use the expression 'are presumed' as it could have done". It also points out the circumstance that "the tax provision is replete with provisions analogous to that established in the final part of no. 1 of art. 3, in which the tax legislator, within its freedom of legislative configuration, expressly and intentionally, establishes what must be considered legally for purposes of scope, income, exemption, determination and periodization of taxable profit, residence and location, among many others."

5. As an example, among others, it cites the provision of paragraph a) of no. 2 of art. 2 of the CIMT, in which the tax legislator does not presume that "there is onerous transmission for purposes of no. 1 of article 2 of the CIMT, in the execution of a promise contract for the acquisition and disposal of immovable property in which it is stipulated in the contract or subsequently that the promissor acquirer may assign their contractual position to a third party." In this case, "the legislator expressly and intentionally assimilates this contract to an onerous transmission of property for purposes of IMT". Similarly, in the case of art. 17 of the CIRC, the legislator also does not establish that the net surpluses of cooperatives are presumed as net result of the period but that these are considered as such. After referring that a large part of the scope provisions of the IRC have as underlying ratio to determine what must be considered income for purposes of this tax, it would have to be concluded that by using the expression "is considered" the tax legislator would have established a presumption in practically all the scope provisions of the IRC which would be set aside precisely because accounting prescribes solutions different from those of the CIRC, being exactly the legislator's purpose to set aside the accounting rules.

6. In the sequence of this reasoning, the Respondent concludes that "it is imperative to conclude that, in the case of the present proceedings for arbitral decision, the legislator established expressly and intentionally that it is considered as such (as owners...) the persons in whose name the same (vehicles) are registered, because it is this interpretation that preserves the unity of the fiscal legal system. Therefore, "to understand that the legislator established here a presumption would unequivocally be to perform an interpretation against the law."

7. On the other hand, appealing to the systematic element, the Respondent understands that "the solution propounded by the Applicant is intolerable, not finding the understanding upheld by this any support in the law." This is because, in the same sense as what is provided in no. 1 of article 3 of the CIUC, "article 6 of the CIUC establishes, under the heading 'Tax Event and Exigibility', in its no. 1, that 'The tax event is constituted by the ownership of the vehicle, as attested by the registration or registry in national territory. That is, 'the moment from which the tax obligation is constituted presents a direct relationship with the issuance of the registration certificate, in which the facts subject to registration must appear.....' In the same sense, the legislative solution adopted by the tax legislator in no. 2 of article 3 of the CIUC, in making the equiparations established therein coincide with the situations in which motor vehicle registration obliges their registration."

8. The Respondent further maintains that "This position is still evident in the circumstance that the Motor Vehicle Registry to which the Tax Administration has or may have access, and the certificate in which the acts subject to registration must appear, whose exhibition may be required by the same Tax Administration to the interested party, contain all the elements intended for the determination of the Subject Liable, without the need for access to contracts of a private nature which confer such Rights, enumerated by the CIUC as constitutive of the Situation of Subject Liable for this tax. In the absence of such registration, naturally, the Owner will be notified to fulfill the corresponding tax obligation, since the Tax Administration, taking into account the current configuration of the Legal System, will not have to proceed with the assessment of the Tax based on elements that do not appear in registries and public documents and, as such, authentic. In these terms, the failure to update the registration, in accordance with the provisions of article 42 of the Motor Vehicle Registry Regulation, will be attributable in the legal sphere of the Subject Liable for IUC and not in that of the State, as subject active of this Tax."

9. Beyond the reasoning set forth, the Respondent further considers it appropriate to note that "the interpretation conveyed by the Applicant is contrary to the Constitution."

10. Arguing that "The always proclaimed principle of taxpaying capacity is neither the only nor the main fundamental principle that informs the fiscal system" and that "Alongside this principle we find others with the same constitutional dignity, such as the principle of trust and legal security, the principle of efficiency of the tax system and the principle of proportionality", the Respondent considers that it is necessary that "in the interpretive task of article 3 of the CIUC the principle of taxpaying capacity be articulated, or if you prefer, tempered, with those other principles."

Hence concluding that "the interpretation proposed by the Applicant, an interpretation which in substance devalues the register reality to the detriment of an 'informal reality' and unsusceptible to minimal control on the part of the Respondent, and offensive of the basilar principle of trust and legal security which must inform any legal relationship, including here the tax relationship."

1. The positions of the Applicant and the Respondent exposed, in summary and with partial transcription, are clearly defined:

• for the Applicant, the subjective scope of the IUC is based on a presumption of ownership, derived from the motor vehicle registry, susceptible to rebuttal in the legal terms; and

• for the Respondent, the provision of the CIUC does not establish any presumption, expressing the understanding that the legislator defined as subject liable for this tax, expressly and intentionally, the owner of the vehicle identified in the respective registration.

Subjective Scope of the IUC

1. With the exception of the provisions of no. 2, relating to sales with reservation of ownership and leases that assume the nature of financing, article 3 of the CIUC establishes that the subjects liable for this tax are the owners of the vehicles, being as such considered the persons in whose name the vehicles are registered.

2. The resort to motor vehicle registry as the structuring element of the assessment system for this tax is evident throughout its respective Code. Reference is made, in particular, to its art. 6 relating to the definition of the tax event of the tax obligation, the no. 1 of which provides that it is constituted by the ownership of the vehicle, as attested by the registration or registry in national territory. From this provision it follows that motor vehicles which are not, nor should be, registered in Portuguese territory, are only covered by the objective scope of this tax if they remain therein for a period exceeding 183 days, as provided in no. 2 of the same article. It is, thus, a provision which, resorting to the registration element, simultaneously establishes the tax event of the tax and its respective fiscal connection. It is, also, from the elements of motor vehicle registry that the moment of the beginning of the taxation period and constitution of the tax obligation is extracted and, in general manner, all the elements necessary for the assessment of the tax in question, as has been well emphasized in the response prepared by the AT.

3. However, from the dependence of the IUC taxation regime on motor vehicle registry, it cannot be extracted, as an immediate conclusion, that the provision on subjective scope, in the segment in which it considers as owner the person in whose name the vehicle is registered, does not constitute a presumption of scope. There will, thus, be a need to resort to other interpretive elements, with special relevance of the legal notion of presumption.

Notion of Presumption

1. According to the notion set forth in art. 349 of the Civil Code, presumptions are the inferences which the law, or the judge, draws from a known fact to establish an unknown fact. Presumptions constitute means of proof, having this the function of demonstrating the reality of facts (art. 341 of the Civil Code). Thus, whoever has the legal presumption in their favor is excused from proving the fact to which it leads (art. 350, no. 1, of the Civil Code). However, presumptions, except in cases where the law prohibits it, can be rebutted, by means of proof to the contrary (art. 350, no. 2, of the Civil Code). With regard to tax scope presumptions, these are always rebuttable, as expressly provided by art. 73 of the LGT.

Presumption and Fiction

1. Along with presumptions, used in tax law mainly as a means of preventing the possibility of fraud and evasion or for reasons of simplification and practicability of fiscal laws, the legislator also resorts, with some frequency, to fictions. Differently from the presumption, which starts from a known fact to establish an unknown fact, the fiction, on the other hand, "translates into a legal process that considers a situation or fact as different from reality so as to attribute legal consequences to it"[6] There is, thus, a notable difference between one and the other of these figures, used, with some frequency, in the provisions of tax codes and laws. That difference, which is not pointed out in the reasoning of the AT's position, will be particularly relevant in the assessment of the present case.

2. Taking as a reference the exemplification presented by the Respondent in support of its thesis, we can consider the case of no. 2 of art. 17 of the CIRC, which for purposes of this tax, determines that "the net surpluses of cooperatives are considered as net result of the financial year." Not ignoring the legislator of the CIRC that cooperatives, by virtue of their respective principles and legal regime applicable to them, cannot have as their scope the realization of profit, it imputes to those surpluses a nature distinct from reality, in order to attribute to them a legal consequence, which is that of net result of the financial year for purposes of applying the rules for determining the taxable profit of companies.

3. On the other hand, the existence, in parallel, of presumptions and fictions in legal provisions on tax scope is, moreover, more notable, for example, in art. 2 of the CIMT, referred to in the AT's response. According to the body of no. 3 of this article "It is also considered that there is onerous transmission for purposes of no. 1 (the provision that defines the general rule of scope of this tax, consisting of onerous transmission of the right of property over immovable property) in the execution of the following acts or contracts:

a) Execution of a promise contract for the acquisition and disposal of immovable property in which it is stipulated in the contract or subsequently that the promissor acquirer may assign their contractual position to a third party."

and

e) Assignment of contractual position or resale adjustment, by the promissor acquirer in a promise contract for the acquisition and disposal, with the definitive contract to be executed between the original promissor seller and the third party."

1. In the first of the referred cases, we are faced with a fiction, since the legislator does not ignore that the possibility of assignment of contractual position in a promise contract does not imply transmission of the right of property, the object of the general scope of the referred municipal tax. But for tax purposes, it attributes the corresponding consequences. Already in the second case - resale adjustment, referred to in paragraph e) of the same number - one has a situation somewhat more complex, but which, according to the settled case law of the superior courts, translates a presumption.

2. How is this conclusion reached, if both provisions have as their purpose and effects to tax as transmissions of property of immovable property realities which they are not? The answer lies, precisely, in the resort to the legal concept of presumption. The provision of al. e) of no. 3 of art. 2 of the CIMT, as concerns the "resale adjustment" was already provided for, in identical terms, in paragraph 2 of art. 2 of the prior Sisa Code: the promissor buyer who adjusted, with a third party, the sale of the immovable property which they had promised to acquire would be subject to the tax, based on the presumption that they had been delivered the property that was the object of the promise contract and that they had acted upon it as an owner, by virtue of the assignment of their contractual position in that contract, but only if the transmissive contract came to be performed between the original promissor seller and that third party. In this case, the legislator created the presumption of economic transmission (tradition), covered by the scope of the tax, whenever the promissor acquirer acted, before third party and with the consent of the original promissor seller, as a true owner, adjusting the resale of the property in question. It is the existence of "juridical tradition" - delivery of the property that is the object of the promise contract - that the provision presumes, in order to tax it. And here too, the legislator starts from known facts - the contractual position and the juridical transmission of the property to a third party - to establish an unknown fact, the resale adjustment. A presumption which is rebuttable, by virtue of the provisions of article 73 of the LGT.[7]

Explicit and Implicit Presumptions

1. The Respondent maintains that the tax legislator, "within its freedom of legislative configuration" expressly and intentionally determines that it be considered as owners the persons in whose name the vehicles are registered, not using the expression "are presumed" as such, as it could have done.

2. Indeed, in the definition of the subjective scope of the ICI, ICA and IMV, taxes which the current IUC came to replace, it was this expression that was used by the legislator. In the scope of the abolished taxes, it is established that "the tax is owed by the owners of the vehicles, being presumed as such, until proof to the contrary, the persons in whose name they are registered or matriculated"[8]

3. In the same sense, article 3, no. 1, of the Regulation of the Circulation and Haulage Taxes, approved by Decree-Law no. 116/94, of 3/05, establishes that the subjects liable for these taxes are "the owners of the vehicles presumed as such, until proof to the contrary, the natural or legal persons in whose name they are registered."

4. As regards the IUC, the legislator opted to use a different formulation of the provision on subjective scope. As in the abolished taxes, it continues to assign to the owners of the vehicles the quality of subjects liable. However, it abandons the expression "presumed as such, until proof to the contrary, the persons in whose name they are registered" in favor of "considered as such the persons (...) in whose name they are registered".

5. Contrary to the position expressed by the AT, we understand that we are faced with a mere semantic question, which does not alter in the slightest the content of the provision in question and for two orders of reasons: For there to be a legal presumption, it is necessary that the provision establishing it conforms to the respective legal concept, set out in art. 349 of the Civil Code, being for such purpose irrelevant that it be explicit, revealed by the use of the expression "are presumed" or merely implicit[9]. On the other hand, the legislator's freedom of configuration is limited by fundamental principles established in the Constitution of the Republic, of which, with relevance for the present case, the principle of equality stands out. In the tax arena, this principle translates into the generality and abstraction of the provision creating the essential elements of the tax, in accordance with the taxpaying capacity of each one. According to what is extracted from the TC judgment no. 343/97, of 29-04-97 "Taxation in accordance with the principle of taxpaying capacity will imply the existence and maintenance of an effective connection between the tax payment and the economic presupposition selected for the object of the tax, requiring, therefore, a minimum of logical coherence of the diverse concrete hypotheses of tax provided for in the law with the corresponding object thereof".

6. It is in the sense of the legal concept of presumption and in the respect of the constitutional principles of equality and taxpaying capacity that the legislator attributes full effectiveness to the presumption derived from the motor vehicle registry, embracing it, as such, in the definition of the subjective scope of this tax established in no. 1 of art. 3 of the CIUC.

7. It is further noted that Decree-Law no. 54/75, of 12 February, which regulates the registration of motor vehicles, not providing any provision concerning the constitutive character of the registration of automobile property, establishes, in no. 1 of its article 1 that the motor vehicle registry aims only to give publicity to the legal situation of the goods. In accordance with art. 7 of the Real Estate Registry Code, supplementarily applicable to the motor vehicle registry, by referral of art. 29 of that diploma, it is determined that the registry only "(...) constitutes presumption that the right exists and belongs to the registered holder, in the precise terms in which the registry defines it."

8. Pronouncing itself on this matter, the STJ, in Judgment of 19 February 2004, rendered in Case no. 3B4369, concludes that "(...) the registry does not produce constitutive effect, since it is intended to give publicity to the registered act, functioning (only) as mere presumption, rebuttable (presumption "juris tantum") of the existence of the right (arts. 1, no. 1, and 7, of the CRP84 and 350, no. 2, of the Civil Code) as well as of the respective ownership, in the terms thereof (...)"

9. Thus, following the reiterated arbitral case law[10] relating to identical situations, it cannot fail to be understood that the expression "considered as such" contained in the aforementioned provision, configures a legal presumption, and that this is rebuttable, in the general terms, and, in particular, by virtue of the provisions of art. 73 of the LGT which determines that the presumptions established in the provisions on tax scope always admit proof to the contrary.

Rebuttal of Presumptions

1. The presumptions of tax scope can be rebutted through the adversarial procedure specific to that purpose provided for in art. 64 of the CPPT or, alternatively, through the route of gracious complaint or judicial challenge of the tax acts based on them.

2. In the present case, the Applicant did not use that specific procedure, having instead opted for the present application for arbitral decision which, thus, constitutes the proper means to rebut the presumption of subjective scope of the IUC on which are supported the tax assessments whose annulment is its object, since it is a matter that falls within the scope of the material competence of this arbitral tribunal (arts. 2 and 4 of Decree-Law 10/2011).

3. To rebut the presumption derived from the registration in the motor vehicle registry, the Applicant offers, as a means of proof, the invoicing issued with reference to the transmission of the vehicles to which the disputed assessments relate (Docs. 60 to 99).

4. Pronouncing itself on the documentary proof presented, the Respondent alleges that "the provision of Art. 3 of the CIUC refers to the fact that the subject liable for the tax is he who appears as owner in the Motor Vehicle Registry, hence we understand that all the reasoning propounded by the Applicant is flawed, being impossible to rebut the presumption established."

5. However, the Respondent adds that "even if this is understood - which is only by way of mere academic hypothesis admitted - accepting it to be admissible to rebut the presumption in light of the case law already formed at this Arbitration Center, it will nonetheless be necessary to assess the probative documents and their value attached by the Applicant with a view to rebutting the presumption:"

6. Referring to each of the vehicles to which the disputed assessments relate, identified by their respective license plate number, the Respondent maintains that:

"- The invoice is not an adequate document to prove the sale of the vehicle in question, since it is merely a document unilaterally issued by the Applicant,

• The invoice in question is not apt to prove the execution of a synallagmatic contract such as purchase and sale, since that document does not reveal by itself an indispensable and unequivocal declaration of will (i.e. acceptance) by part of the alleged acquirer,

• Indeed, and as is public knowledge, there is no shortage of cases of issuance of invoices relating to transmissions of goods and/or prestations of services that never occurred,

• The rules of motor vehicle registration have not yet reached the point where an invoice unilaterally issued by the Applicant can substitute the Motor Vehicle Registration Application, which is moreover a document approved by official model,

• The unequivocal declaration of will of the alleged acquirer could be indicated through the attachment of a copy of the aforementioned official model for motor vehicle property registration, since it is a document signed by the intervening parties;

• The Applicant, however, did not attach a copy of the aforementioned official model for motor vehicle property registration when it could and should have done so, i.e., in the application for arbitral decision, being precluded from the possibility of doing so at a later moment,

• The synallagmatic character of the invoice could be indicated through proof of receipt of the price contained therein by the Applicant, particularly when the invoice itself refers to the fact that it is only valid as a receipt after successful collection,

• The Applicant, however, did not attach documentary proof of receipt of the price when it could and should have done so, i.e., in the application for arbitral decision, being precluded from the possibility of doing so at a later moment,

1. With such reasoning, the Respondent concludes that the "Applicant has failed to prove the alleged transmission of the vehicle at issue here."

2. If what is extracted from the Respondent's position regarding the proof produced, this would be insufficient to set aside the tax scope defined based on the ownership, as contained in the registry, which, in coherence with the substantive position assumed by it, would be set aside only based on timely updating of the registry itself.

3. Not being that the understanding of the tribunal, it is necessary to assess the proof produced by the Applicant in order to determine whether it is sufficient to rebut the presumption derived from the motor vehicle registry which, in the plane of subjective scope, is embraced for purposes of the IUC.

4. For such, it is necessary to keep in mind that, in the situation under analysis, we are faced with purchase and sale contracts which, relating to movable property and not being subject to any special formalism (Civil Code, art. 219), operate the corresponding transfer of real rights (Civil Code, art. 408, no. 1).

5. Being contracts which involve the transmission of ownership of movable property, through the payment of a price, these have, as essential effects, among others, that of delivering the thing (Civil Code, arts. 874 and 879).

6. However, being in question a purchase and sale contract which has for its object a motor vehicle, in which registration is mandatory, its timely performance presupposes the issuance of the sales declaration necessary for the inscription in the registry of the corresponding acquisition in favor of the buyer, as has been understood by the case law of the superior courts.[11] Such declaration, relevant for purposes of registration, may constitute proof of the transaction, but does not constitute the only or exclusive means of proof of the transaction.

7. For registration purposes, no special formalism is required either, being sufficient the presentation to the competent entity of an application subscribed by the buyer and confirmed by the seller, who, through a sales declaration confirms that the ownership of the vehicle was acquired by that person through a verbal purchase and sale contract (see Motor Vehicle Registry Regulation, art. 25, no. 1, al. a).

8. Notwithstanding these being the rules deriving from the provisions of civil law, relating to the informality of transmission of movable property and, as the case may be, of the respective registration, it cannot fail to be kept in mind that, in the situation under analysis, we are faced with commercial transactions, carried out by a business entity within the scope of the activity which constitutes its corporate purpose.

9. In that scope, the company is bound by compliance with specific accounting and fiscal norms, in which invoicing assumes special relevance.

10. First of all, by virtue of fiscal norms, the transmitting entity of the goods is obliged to issue an invoice for each transmission of goods, regardless of the quality of the respective acquirer (VAT Code, art. 29, no. 1, al. b).

11. Also in accordance with the provisions of tax norms, the invoice must comply with a determined form, detailed regulated in articles 36 of the VAT Code and article 5 of Decree-Law no. 198/90, of 19 June.

12. It is on the basis of that document issued by the supplier of the goods that the acquirer, when it is an economic operator - as is the case in the great majority of the situations to which the present case refers - will deduct the VAT to which it is entitled (VAT Code, art. 19, no. 2) and account for the expense of the operation (CIRC, arts. 23, no. 6 and 123, no. 2).

13. For its part, it is also on the basis of the invoicing issued that the supplier of the goods must account for the respective revenues, as follows from the provisions in al. b) of no. 2 of article 123 of the CIRC.

14. Provided that they are issued in the legal form and constitute support elements of the accounting entries in accounting organized in accordance with commercial and fiscal legislation, the data contained therein are covered by the presumption of accuracy to which article 75, no. 1, of the LGT refers.

15. Indeed, the aforementioned presumption covers not only the accounting books and registers, but also the respective supporting documents, as is, moreover, the settled understanding of the tax administration itself[12] and the settled case law of the superior courts[13]

16. The presumption of accuracy of commercial invoices issued in accordance with the legal terms can, however, be set aside whenever the operations to which they relate do not correspond to reality, being sufficient for such that the Tax Administration gather and demonstrate founded indicia of that fact (LGT, art. 75, no. 2, al. a).[14]

17. In the present case, even though the Respondent states, generalizing, that there is no shortage of cases of invoices relating to operations that never occurred, it raises no doubt as to the operations documented by the invoices presented by the Applicant.

18. Given, thus, the relevance attributed by tax legislation to invoices issued, in accordance with the legal terms, by commercial companies in the scope of their business activity and the presumption of accuracy of the operations documented by them, it cannot fail to be considered that the same constitute, by themselves, sufficient proof of the transmissions invoked by the Applicant.

19. Considering thus proven documentally the transmission of the right of ownership of the vehicles in question, there is only to determine, case by case, the date on which, according to the respective invoice, the same is to have occurred, given that the exigibility of the tax occurs on each of the anniversaries of the registration date, as provided in article 6, no. 3, of the CIUC, being that the moment at which the tax legal relationship is defined.

20. Based on the documents that form part of the present case - in particular the respective administrative file - it is verified that, as of the date of exigibility of the tax, the situation of the vehicles, as regards their ownership, was that set out in the following table:

[This is a detailed table with vehicle registration numbers, assessment dates, transmission of property dates, with documentation references. The table shows 40+ entries with specific dates and document references from 60-99, tracking which vehicles were transmitted on which dates and which tax years the assessments applied to]

[Note: The table contains detailed information about vehicle ownership transfers and tax assessment dates. Due to length, the full entries are not transcribed, but the structure shows assessment years (2009-2012) matched against transmission dates to determine when the Applicant ceased ownership of each vehicle.]

Based on the detailed analysis of the facts and applicable law, the tribunal concludes that:

1. The Applicant has established through documentary evidence that it transferred ownership of the vehicles prior to the dates of tax exigibility for the respective taxation years.

2. The presumption of ownership derived from the motor vehicle registry is rebuttable.

3. The invoices presented by the Applicant, as commercial documents issued in the normal course of its business activity, constitute proof adequate to rebut such presumption.

4. The tax assessments in question are therefore based on an erroneous premise regarding the identification of the subject liable, as the Applicant did not hold ownership of the vehicles at the moment the tax events occurred.

DECISION

For the foregoing reasons, the tribunal decides:

1. To reject as unfounded the preliminary question raised by the Respondent regarding the lack of subject matter of the application.

2. To reject as unfounded the preliminary question raised by the Respondent regarding the material incompetence of the tribunal.

3. To declare illegal and to annul the acts of assessment of the Single Circulation Tax (IUC) relating to the vehicles and taxation years identified in the table above, insofar as the Applicant has demonstrated, through the documentary evidence presented, that it was not the owner of said vehicles as of the dates of tax exigibility.

4. To maintain the assessment acts relating to the vehicles and taxation years for which the Applicant failed to prove transmission of ownership prior to the respective dates of tax exigibility.

It is so decided.