Summary
The core legal dispute centers on interpreting Article 3(1) of the IUC Code, which states that taxpayers are persons 'in whose names the vehicles are registered.' The Claimant argued this provision creates a rebuttable presumption of ownership that can be overcome by proving actual transfer through documentation like invoices. They cited precedent (Arbitral Decision 26/2013-T) supporting this interpretation and contended that registration is merely presumptive evidence, not definitive.
The Tax Authority countered that the legislator deliberately chose the wording 'being considered as' rather than 'presumed to be,' establishing registration as the definitive criterion for tax liability, not a mere presumption. They emphasized this reflects clear legislative policy that IUC is payable by the registered owner regardless of actual ownership. The Authority also argued that unilateral invoices are insufficient proof of transfer and that the buyer's failure to register cannot exempt the seller from tax obligations.
This case highlights the tension between legal formalism (registration as conclusive) and substantive reality (actual ownership transfer). It demonstrates the importance of proper vehicle registration procedures and the risks sellers face when buyers fail to complete administrative formalities, potentially remaining liable for years of taxation on vehicles they no longer possess.
Full Decision
ARBITRAL DECISION
I – REPORT
A…, SA, taxpayer no. …, with registered office at Av. …, parish of …, municipality of …, hereinafter designated as Claimant, filed a petition for constitution of an arbitral tribunal in tax matters and a request for arbitral ruling, pursuant to Articles 2, no. 1 a) and 10, no. 1 a), both of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January (Legal Framework for Arbitration in Tax Matters, hereinafter abbreviated as RJAT), requesting the declaration of illegality of the assessments for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 of the Unique Motor Vehicle Tax (IUC) - Assessment nos. 2009 …, 2010 …, 2011 … and 2012 …-, as well as the payment of compensatory interest on the amounts paid.
The petition for constitution of the arbitral tribunal was accepted by the President of CAAD and automatically notified to the Tax and Customs Authority on 07-03-2014.
Pursuant to Articles 5, no. 2, a), 6, no. 1 and 11, no. 1, a) of the RJAT, the Deontological Council designated the undersigned as arbiter of the singular arbitral tribunal, who communicated acceptance of the assignment within the applicable timeframe.
On 22-04-2014, the parties were duly notified of this designation, and did not manifest any intention to refuse the designation of the arbiter, in accordance with the combined provisions of Article 11, no. 1, sections a) and b) of the RJAT and Articles 6 and 7 of the Deontological Code.
Thus, in accordance with the provision in section c) of no. 1 of Article 11 of the RJAT, the singular arbitral tribunal was constituted on 09-05-2014.
By order of 15-09-2014, the tribunal waived the meeting provided for in Article 18 of the RJAT, as well as final arguments.
The arbitral tribunal was regularly constituted and is materially competent, in light of the provisions of Articles 2, no. 1, section a), and 30, no. 1, of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January.
The parties have legal personality and capacity, are legitimate and are represented (Articles 4 and 10, no. 2, of the same diploma and Article 1 of Regulation no. 112-A/2011, of 22 March).
The case does not suffer from nullities and no exceptions were raised.
The allegations supporting the Claimant's request for arbitral ruling are, in summary, as follows:
Claimant's Allegations
11.1 The Claimant was notified of the following assessments of the IUC, relating to the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, concerning the vehicle with registration …-…-…:
a) 2009 - € 48.00, as tax (assessment no. …) and €7.32, as compensatory interest (assessment no. …);
b) 2010 - € 48.00, as tax (assessment no. …) and € 5.42, as compensatory interest (assessment no. …);
c) 2011 - €49.00, as tax (assessment no. …) and € 3.56, as tax (assessment no. …) and compensatory interest (assessment no. …).
11.2 However, at the date of the tax event, the vehicle was no longer its property: by verbal contract of sale and purchase, the now Claimant sold the vehicle identified above, on 16-01-2006, to the commercial company called "Garagem Central de …, SA", legal entity no. …, as evidenced by the invoice which it attached.
11.3 From this date, the buyer assumed actual possession and control of the vehicle.
11.4 The acquiring company did not, however, register the acquisition of the vehicle.
11.5 Considering these facts, the Tax and Customs Authority made an incorrect interpretation of Article 3, no. 1 of the CIUC concerning the subjective scope of the tax, which establishes that "passive taxpayers of the tax are natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose names the same are registered."
11.6 This provision contains a presumption, in that the expression "being considered as" should be given a presumptive sense, being equivalent to the expression "presumed to be".
11.7 In this sense it was considered and decided in Arbitral Decision no. 26/2013-T of this CAAD.
11.8 Motor vehicle registration is nothing more than a rebuttable presumption of the existence of a property right.
11.9 The now Claimant concludes that it rebutted this presumption of ownership through the presentation of a copy of the invoice demonstrating the transfer of the vehicle, whereby the assessments subject to this proceeding should be annulled.
Response of the Respondent
12.1 In its Response, the AT considers that the Claimant's allegations: a) constitute a biased reading of the letter of the law; b) do not heed the systematic element, violating the unity of the regime established throughout the IUC and, more broadly, throughout the entire tax-legal system; and, finally, c) also stem from an interpretation that ignores the rationale of the regime established in no. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC.
12.2 The tax legislator, in establishing in Article 3, no. 1, who are the passive taxpayers of the IUC, expressly and intentionally established that these are the owners (or in the situations provided for in no. 2, the persons mentioned therein), being considered as such the persons in whose names the same are registered.
12.3 The legislator did not use the expression "it is presumed" as it could have done, for example, in the following terms: "passive taxpayers of the tax are owners of vehicles, being presumed as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose names the same are registered".
12.4 Thus, the wording of Article 3 of the CIUC corresponds to a clear legislative policy choice adopted by the legislator, whereby understanding that a presumption is established therein would unequivocally constitute an interpretation against the law.
12.5 Accordingly, this understanding has already been adopted by the jurisprudence of our courts, transcribing, to that effect, part of the judgment of the Administrative and Tax Court of Penafiel, delivered in Case no. …OBEPNF. (See Articles 26 and 27 of the Response)
12.6 On the systematic element of interpretation, the Respondent argues that the solution proposed by the Claimant is untenable, finding the understanding endorsed by it no legal support whatsoever. (Article 28 of the Response)
12.7 Finally, given the "rationale", of the parliamentary debates surrounding the approval of this regime, it clearly results that the motor vehicle taxation regime approved establishes that the IUC "became payable by the persons who appear in the register as owners of the vehicles" (Article 48).
12.8 It further adds that invoices alone do not constitute suitable documentation to prove the sale of vehicles, since the same is nothing more than a document unilaterally issued by the Claimant.
12.9 As to the compensatory interest, it argues that, even if it is understood that the tax is not due, there is no error attributable to the service because the AT merely complied with the provision of no. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC, whereby the legal prerequisites conferring the right to the requested compensatory interest are not met.
12.10 A similar argument is used regarding liability for payment of arbitral costs: it was not the Respondent who gave rise to the filing of the request for arbitral ruling but rather the Claimant who only now provided documentary evidence regarding the alleged transfer of ownership.
12.11 Consequently, the Claimant should be condemned to payment of arbitral costs, in line with what was decided in a similar matter within Case no. 72/2013-T of this Arbitration Center.
All being considered, it is necessary to render a final decision.
A. FINDINGS OF FACT
A.1. Facts Found to be Proven
1- The Claimant, by verbal contract of sale and purchase, sold the vehicle, with registration …-…-…, to the commercial company "Garagem Central de …, SA, legal entity no. …, with registered office at Av. …, parish and municipality of ….
2- The vehicle was sold for the amount of €1,000.00, plus VAT, duly documented by invoice no. 17, in the total amount of € 1,210.00.
3- The Claimant was notified of the following assessments of the IUC:
a) 2009 - € 48.00, as tax (assessment no. …) and €7.32, as compensatory interest (assessment no. …);
b) 2010 - € 48.00, as tax (assessment no. …) and € 5.42, as compensatory interest (assessment no. …);
c) 2011 - €49.00, as tax (assessment no. …) and € 3.56, as tax (assessment no. …) and compensatory interest (assessment no. …).
4- The Claimant paid in full the aforementioned tax assessments and compensatory interest.
5- In the course of prior hearing exercise regarding the assessment of the tax, the Claimant invoked the transfer of ownership of the vehicle.
6- In response, the Tax and Customs Authority considered that the obligation to pay the tax remained.
A.2. Reasoning
The facts mentioned are documentarily proven or were not specifically contested.
With respect to the proof of the sales of the vehicles, the claimant presented the respective invoice (Document attached to the present request for arbitral ruling).
The Respondent did not contest these documents, invoking, namely, their falsity or simulation of the sales. On the contrary, it even considered that eventual testimonial evidence would be unnecessary given that the documentary elements were present that proved the facts.
Moreover, given the rules of accounting control, namely for determining tax obligations, it would be relatively easy for the Tax and Customs Authority to prove the real existence and/or continued subsistence of these transactions.
The acts of sale of the motor vehicles are thus sufficiently proven, regardless of whether or not the invoices are sufficient for effecting the commercial registration. Because one thing is the elements necessary for effecting registration, another is proof of the transaction subject to registration.
On the other hand, it cannot fail to be noted that the contract of sale and purchase of a motor vehicle is a verbal contract, not subject, therefore, to any specific form.
B. ON THE LAW
Given the positions of the Parties assumed in the arguments presented, the central question is whether, on the date of occurrence of the tax events (Article 3, no. 1 of the CIUC) if the owners of the vehicles are not those who appear in the register, will nonetheless these be always considered as the passive taxpayers of the IUC, it not being consequently considered a rebuttable presumption the ownership revealed by the register or, in other words, whether the provision on subjective scope contained in Article 3, no. 1 of the CIUC, establishes or not a presumption.
This matter has already been abundantly dealt with in arbitral tax jurisprudence. See, by way of example, the various decisions of CAAD published in www.caad.org.pt, namely those delivered in Cases nos. 14/2013, 26/2013, 27/2013, 73/2013, 170/2013, 294/2013 and 216/2014. In this decision we will follow the understanding and conclusions of those decisions.
For the sake of synthesis and clarity of thought, we adhere, without reservation, to the framework made in the arbitral decision in Case no. 216/2014-T, which we cite and to which we refer:
"The general and unanimous sense of such jurisprudence is to consider that Article 3-1 of the CIUC establishes a rebuttable presumption of ownership of the property the entries or registrations appearing in the Motor Vehicle Registry Office and/or in the database of the IMTT as of the date of the tax event.
That is to say: when the IUC is assessed based on the registrations in the register or in accordance with the elements contained in the IMTT databases, the passive taxpayer may exonerate himself from payment by demonstrating the non-correspondence between reality and those registrations and elements which the Tax Authority used to proceed with the assessments.
We see no reason to reverse or alter the essential sense of this jurisprudence.
Let us then examine again, and more closely, the question:
Article 3 of the CIUC (Code of the Unique Motor Vehicle Tax) provides:
Article 3
Subjective Scope
1 – Passive taxpayers of the tax are the owners of the vehicles, being considered as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose names the same are registered.
2 – Financial lessees, acquirers with reservation of ownership, as well as other holders of purchase option rights by virtue of the lease contract are equated to owners".
On the other hand, no. 1 of Article 11 of the LGT establishes that "in determining the sense of tax rules and in qualifying the facts to which the same apply, the general rules and principles of interpretation and application of laws are observed".
Resolving the doubts that may arise in the application of legal provisions presupposes the performance of an interpretive activity.
It is thus necessary to consider what is the best interpretation[1] of Article 3, no. 1 of the CIUC, in light, first and foremost, of the literal element, that is to say, the one in which the aim is to detect the legislative thought that is objectified in the norm, in order to verify whether it contemplates a presumption, or whether it determines, definitively, that the passive taxpayer of the tax is the owner who appears in the register.
The question that arises is, in the case sub judice, whether the expression "being considered as" used by the legislator in the CIUC, instead of the expression "presumed to be", which was what appeared in the diplomas preceding the CIUC, will have removed the nature of presumption from the legal provision in question.
In our view and contrary to what is ably argued by the AT, the answer must necessarily be in the negative, since from the analysis of our legal system it clearly emerges that the two expressions have been used by the legislator with equivalent sense, whether at the level of rebuttable presumptions, whether in the context of irrebuttable presumptions, whereby nothing enables the conclusion sought by the Tax Authority to be drawn based on a mere semantic reason.
In fact, this occurs in various legal provisions that establish presumptions using the verb "to consider", of which we indicate, merely by way of example, the following:
~ in the realm of civil law - no. 3 of Article 243 of the Civil Code, which establishes that "the third party who acquired the right after the registration of the action for simulation is always considered to be acting in bad faith, when such registration has taken place";
~ also in the realm of industrial property law the same occurs, when Article 59, no. 1 of the Code of Industrial Property provides that "(…)inventions whose patent has been sought within the year following the date on which the inventor leaves the company are considered to have been made during the execution of the employment contract (…)";
~ and, lastly, in the realm of tax law, when nos. 3 and 4 of Article 89-A of the LGT provide that it is incumbent on the taxpayer to prove that the income declared corresponds to reality and that, if such proof is not made, it is presumed (is "considered" in the letter of the Law) that the income is that which results from the table that appears in no. 4 of the said article.
This conclusion of there being total equivalence of meanings between the two expressions, which the legislator uses indifferently, satisfies the condition established in Article 9, no. 2 of the Civil Code, since the minimum correspondence of words is assured for purposes of determining the legislative thought.
It is important, next, to subject the provision in question to the other elements of logical interpretation, namely, the historical element, the rational or teleological element, and the systematic element.
On the interpretive activity, Francesco Ferrara says that it "is the most difficult and delicate operation to which the jurist can dedicate himself, and requires fine handling, refined sense, happy intuition, much experience and perfect mastery not only of the positive material, but also of the spirit of a certain legislation. (…) Interpretation must be objective, balanced, without passion, sometimes bold, but not revolutionary, keen, but always respectful of the law" (See Essay on the Theory of Interpretation of Laws, translation by Manuel de Andrade, (2nd ed.), Arménio Amado, Editor, Coimbra, 1963, p. 129).
As Batista Machado states, "the legal provision presents itself to the jurist as a linguistic statement, as a set of words that constitute a text. To interpret is evidently to extract from that text a certain sense or content of thought.
The text contains multiple senses (polysemy of the text) and frequently contains ambiguous or obscure expressions. Even when apparently clear at first reading, its application to concrete cases of life frequently gives rise to unsuspected and unforeseeable interpretation difficulties. Besides, although apparently clear in its verbal expression and bearing only one sense, there is still the need to account for the possibility that the verbal expression has betrayed the legislative thought – a phenomenon more frequent than it might appear at first sight " (See Introduction to Law and the Discourse of Legitimation, pp.175/176).
"The purpose of interpretation is to determine the objective sense of the law, the vis potestas legis.(…) The law is not what the legislator wanted or wanted to express, but only what he expressed in the form of law. (…) Moreover, the legal command has an autonomous value that may not coincide with the will of the architects and drafters of the law, and may lead to unforeseen and unexpected consequences for the legislators. (…) The interpreter must seek not what the legislator wanted, but what appears objectively wanted in the law: the mens legis and not the mens legislatoris (See Francesco Ferrara, Essay, pp. 134/135).
Understanding a law "is not only mechanically grasping the apparent and immediate sense that results from the verbal connection; it is to inquire deeply into the legislative thought, to descend from the verbal surface to the intimate concept that the text contains and to develop it in all its possible directions"(loc. cit., p.128).
With the aim of uncovering the true sense and scope of legal texts, the interpreter makes use of interpretive factors which are essentially the grammatical element (the text, or the "letter of the law") and the logical element, which, in turn, is subdivided into rational (or teleological) element, systematic element and historical element. (See Baptista Machado, Loc. Cit., p. 181; Oliveira Ascensão, The Law – Introduction and General Theory 2nd Ed., Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisbon, p.361).
Among us, it is Article 9 of the Civil Code (CC) that provides the rules and fundamental elements for the correct and adequate interpretation of norms.
The text of no. 1 of Article 9 of the CC begins by stating that interpretation should not be confined to the letter of the law, but should reconstruct from it the "legislative thought".
On the expression "legislative thought", Batista Machado tells us that Article 9 of the CC "did not take a position in the controversy between the subjectivist doctrine and the objectivist doctrine. This is proven by the fact that it refers neither to the "will of the legislator" nor to the "will of the law", but rather points as the scope of the interpretive activity the discovery of "legislative thought" (Article 9, 1st). This expression, purposefully colorless, means exactly that the legislator did not want to commit itself" (loc. cit., p. 188).
In the same sense, P. de Lima and A. Varela express themselves, in annotation to Article 9 of the CC (See Civil Code Annotated – vol. I, Coimbra ed., 1967, p. 16 ).
And on no. 3 of Article 9 of the CC, Batista Machado further states: "(…) this no. 3 proposes to us, therefore, a model of ideal legislator that enshrined the most correct (correct, just or reasonable) solutions and knows how to express itself correctly. This model clearly bears objectivist characteristics, as it does not take the concrete legislator as the point of reference (so often incorrect, hasty, unhappy) but an abstract legislator: wise, foreseeing, rational and just" (Work and loc. cit. p. 189/190).
Immediately thereafter, this distinguished Master calls attention to the fact that no. 1 of Article 9 refers to three more elements of interpretation "the unity of the legal system", "the circumstances under which the law was drafted" and "the specific conditions of the time in which it is applied" (loc. cit, p. 190).
As for the "circumstances of the time the law was drafted", Batista Machado further explains that this expression "represents what has traditionally been called the occasio legis: the circumstantial factors of a political, social and economic nature that determined or motivated the legislative measure in question" (loc. cit., p.190).
With regard to "the specific conditions of the time in which it is applied". this element of interpretation "has decidedly an actualist connotation (loc. cit., p. 190) which coincides with the opinion expressed by P. de Lima and A. Varela, in annotations to Article 9 of the CC.
Regarding "the unity of the legal system" , Baptista Machado considers this the most important interpretive factor: " (…)its consideration as a decisive factor would always be imposed upon us by the principle of axiological or axiological coherence of the legal order" (loc. cit., p. 191).
It is also this author who tells us, with respect to the literal or grammatical element (text or "letter of the law") that this "is the starting point of interpretation. As such, it is immediately incumbent upon it to perform a negative function: to eliminate those senses that have no support, or at least some correspondence or resonance in the words of the law.
But it also has a positive function, in the following terms: if the text bears only one sense, then that is the sense of the norm – with the caveat, however, that one can conclude based on other norms that the wording of the text betrayed the thought of the legislator" (loc. cit., p. 182).
Referring to the rational or teleological element, this author says that it consists "in the reason for being of the law (ratio legis), in the end sought by the legislator in elaborating the norm. Knowledge of this end, especially when accompanied by knowledge of the circumstances (political, social, economic, moral, etc.,) in which the norm was drafted or of the political-economic-social conjuncture that motivated the legislative decision (occasio legis) constitutes a subsidy of the greatest importance for determining the sense of the norm. It suffices to recall that the elucidation of the ratio legis reveals to us the valuation or weighing of the various interests that the norm regulates and, therefore, the relative weight of those interests, the choice among them expressed by the solution that the norm expresses" (loc. cit., pp. 182/183).
With respect to the systematic element (context of the law and parallel provisions) which "this element comprises the consideration of the other provisions that form the complex of norms of the institute in which the norm to be interpreted is integrated, that is to say, which regulate the same matter (context of the law), as well as the consideration of legal provisions that regulate parallel normative problems or related institutes (parallel provisions). It also comprises the systematic place that belongs to the norm to be interpreted in the global order, as well as its consonance with the spirit or intrinsic unity of the entire legal system.
This interpretive subsidy is based on the postulate of the intrinsic coherence of the order, namely on the fact that the norms contained in a codification obey, in principle, a unitary thought" (Batista Machado, loc.cit., p. 183).
" (…) In particular we must take into account the interweaving of the various laws of the country, because a fundamental requirement of all sound legislation is that the laws adjust to one another and do not result in a conglomeration of disconnected provisions (Joseph Kohler, cited by Manuel de Andrade, in Essay, p. 27).
Descending to the case at hand and to the legal and juridical framework underlying it:
Through the analysis of the historical element, the conclusion is drawn that, from the entry into force of Decree-Law 59/72, of 30 December, the first to regulate this matter, to Decree-Law no. 116/94, of 3 May, the last to precede the CIUC [see Law no. 22-A/2007, as amended by Laws 67-A/2007 and 3-B/2010], the presumption [bolded by us] was established of the passive taxpayers of the IUC being the persons in whose names the vehicles were registered on the date of their assessment.
It is therefore verified that tax law has always had the objective of taxing the true and effective owner and user of the vehicle, it appearing immaterial whether one or another expression is used which, as we have seen, have in our legal order a coincident sense.
The same applies when we resort to elements of interpretation of a rational or teleological nature.
Indeed, the current and new framework of motor vehicle taxation establishes principles aimed at subjecting the owners of vehicles to bearing the costs of damage caused by them to roads and the environment, as is evident from the wording of Article 1 of the CIUC.
Now the consideration of these principles, namely, the principle of equivalence, which deserve constitutional protection and establishment in community law, and are also recognized in other branches of the legal system, determines that the aforementioned costs be borne by the real owners, the causers of the aforementioned damage, which entirely rules out an interpretation that sought to prevent presumed owners from presenting proof that they are no longer such because the property is within the legal sphere of another[5].
Thus, also, from the interpretation made in light of elements of a rational and teleological nature, given what the rationality of the system guarantees and the purposes pursued by the new CIUC, it is clear that no. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC establishes a rebuttable legal presumption.
In light of the foregoing, it is important to conclude that the ratio legis of the tax points in the direction of taxing the effective owner-users of vehicles, whereby the expression "being considered as" is used in the normative in question in a sense similar to "presumed to be", reason for which there is no doubt that a legal presumption is established.
On the other hand, Article 73 of the LGT establishes that "(…) the presumptions established in the provisions on tax scope always admit proof to the contrary, whereby they are rebuttable (…)".
Thus being, as Article 3, no. 1 of the CIUC establishes a presumption juris tantum [and, therefore, rebuttable], the person who is registered in the register as owner of the vehicle and who, for this reason was considered by the Tax Authority as a passive taxpayer of the tax, may present evidence aimed at demonstrating that the holder of the ownership, on the date of the tax event, is another person, to whom the ownership was transferred.
Having analyzed the elements brought to the case and the facts proven, the conclusion is drawn that the claimant was not the owner of the vehicles to which the assessments in question related on the date of their respective tax events, by having, meanwhile, already transferred the ownership of the vehicle in question, in accordance with civil law.
These operations of transfer of ownership are opposable to the Tax and Customs Authority, because although facts subject to registration only produce effects in relation to third parties when registered, given the provision of Article 5, no. 1 of the Real Property Registration Code [applicable by referral of the Motor Vehicle Registration Code], the Tax Authority is not a third party for purposes of registration, since it is not in the situation provided for in no. 2 of said Article 5 of the Real Property Registration Code, applicable by force of the Motor Vehicle Registration Code, that is to say: it did not acquire from a common author rights incompatible with one another.
In summary and conclusion:
For assessment of IUC, the Tax and Customs Authority can only avail itself of the registered reality or that contained in the IMTT database, if the obsolescence of the legal situation is not proven, namely as to the ownership of the vehicle.
Motor vehicle registration, in the economy of the CIUC, thus represents mere rebuttable presumption of the passive taxpayers of the tax.
In conclusion, all the prerequisites necessary for the acceptance of the request for annulment of the assessments, on the grounds of illegality and error in the assumptions, are present.
C. Compensatory Interest
The Claimant proceeded to pay in full the aforementioned assessments of the IUC, whereby it requests the reimbursement of these undue amounts, increased by compensatory interest, at the legal rate, in accordance with Article 43 of the LGT and 61 of the CPPT.
In the case in question, it is evident that, as a result of the illegality of the assessment acts, reimbursement of the tax is warranted, by force of said Articles 24, no. 1, section b), of the RJAT and 100 of the LGT, as this is essential to "restore the situation that would have existed if the tax act subject of this arbitral decision had not been done".
With respect to compensatory interest, it is also clear that, contrary to what is argued by the Respondent, the error is not attributable to the Claimant, from the moment that, in the course of prior hearing, it informed that it was no longer the owner of the vehicle. We are, from this moment forward, faced with an error in the assumptions of law, attributable to the Tax Administration.
Consequently, the claimant is entitled to compensatory interest, in accordance with Article 43, no. 1, of the LGT and Article 61 of the CPPT, calculated on the amount it paid unduly, from the date of payment until the full reimbursement of that same amount.
D. DECISION
Therefore, it is decided in this Arbitral Tribunal:
a) That the request for declaration of illegality of the assessments for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 of the Unique Motor Vehicle Tax (IUC) - Assessment nos. 2009 …, 2010 …, 2011 … and 2012 …, and corresponding additional assessments of compensatory interest, in the total amount of € 212.93, is granted;
b) Condemn the Tax and Customs Authority to restitution to the Claimant of the amounts paid, with compensatory interest from the date of payment until the full reimbursement of the undue tax;
c) Condemn the Tax and Customs Authority to payment of costs of proceedings, in the amount of € 306.00.
E. Value of the Case
The value of the case is fixed at € 212.93, in accordance with Article 97-A, no. 1, a), of the Code of Tax Procedure and Process, applicable by force of sections a) and b) of no. 1 of Article 29 of the RJAT and no. 2 of Article 3 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings.
F. Costs
The value of the arbitration fee is fixed at € 306.00, in accordance with Table I of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, to be paid by the Claimant, as the request was fully denied, in accordance with Articles 12, no. 2, and 22, no. 4, both of the RJAT, and Article 4, no. 4, of the aforementioned Regulation.
Let it be notified.
Lisbon
10 March 2015
The Arbiter
(Amândio Silva)
[1] The genesis of the legal relationship of tax assumes the cumulative verification of the three prerequisites necessary for its emergence, namely: the real element, the personal element and the temporal element. (In this sense, see, among many other authors, Freitas Pereira, M.H., Tax Law, 3rd Edition, Almedina, Coimbra, 2009.
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