Summary
Full Decision
ARBITRAL DECISION
I. - REPORT
A - PARTIES
A, Legal Entity No. ..., with registered office at ..., hereinafter referred to as "Claimant", submitted a request for constitution of an arbitral tribunal, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph a) of No. 1 of Article 2 and Articles 10 et seq. of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January (Legal Regime for Arbitration in Tax Matters, hereinafter referred to as "RJAT"), with a view to the assessment of the following claim against the Tax and Customs Authority (which succeeded, inter alia, the Directorate-General for Taxes) hereinafter referred to as "Respondent" or "TA".
B - CLAIM
1 - The request for constitution of the arbitral tribunal was accepted by the Honorable President of CAAD on 12 March 2014 and notified to the TA on 14 March 2014.
2 - The Claimant did not proceed to appoint an arbitrator, and therefore, pursuant to the provisions of No. 1 of Article 6 of the RJAT, the signatory, on 30-04-2014, was designated by the Deontological Council of the Centre for Administrative Arbitration as arbitrator of a Single Arbitral Tribunal, having accepted in accordance with legal provisions.
3 - The Parties were, on 30-04-2014, duly notified of such designation, and neither expressed the will to refuse it, in accordance with the combined provisions of paragraphs a) and b) of No. 1, Article 11 and Articles 6 and 7 of the Deontological Code.
4 - In such circumstances, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph c) of No. 1 of Article 11 of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January, in the wording introduced by Article 228 of Law No. 66-B/2012, of 31 December, the arbitral tribunal was regularly constituted on 16/05/2014.
5 - On 20 October 2014, the Arbitral Tribunal, pursuant to Article 16, paragraph c) of the RJAT, following a request formulated by the Respondent, raised with the Claimant the question of waiving the hearing provided for in Article 18 of the same diploma, considering both the circumstance that the subject matter of the dispute fundamentally concerns a matter of law, and the absence of defences to be assessed and decided, and that the parties had not requested any autonomous proof procedures, with the pertinent documents being present in the file and the administrative case file attached to the proceedings, and accordingly, such hearing was waived on 03-11-2014.
6 - The now Claimant requests that the present Arbitral Tribunal:
a) - Declare the illegality and consequent annulment of the assessment acts relating to the Unique Circulation Tax (hereinafter referred to as IUC), for the years 2009 to 2012, as identified in the proceedings, namely in the Table attached as Annex I to the request for arbitral decision, relating to the vehicles, likewise identified in the proceedings, in the aforementioned Table and Annex, which are hereby fully reproduced;
b) - Condemn the Tax and Customs Authority to payment of the costs borne by the Claimant with the request for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.
C - CAUSE OF ACTION
7 - The Claimant, in the substantiation of its request for arbitral decision, states, in summary, the following:
8 - That it is a Financial Credit Institution that is engaged, among other activities, in the conclusion of financial lease contracts, having as subject matter motor vehicles.
9 - That, on 26 November 2013, it was notified electronically, in accordance with No. 9 of Article 38 of the CPPT, of various ex officio IUC assessment acts, for the years 2009 to 2012, based on paragraph c) of No. 1 of Article 2, combined with Articles 3, 4, 6 and 11, all of the Code of Unique Circulation Tax (CIUC).
10 - That in the context of its commercial activity, it concluded various lease contracts, which had as subject matter motor vehicles, whose registrations are identified in a proper Table attached as Annex I to the request for arbitral decision.
11 - That, at the end of the lease contracts or even during their term, the said vehicles were, all of them, sold to the taxpayers identified in the sales invoices, copies of which are attached as Annex II to the request for arbitral decision, such vehicles ceasing to be its property from the dates of the corresponding sales.
12 - That, consequently, on the dates to which the exigibility of the IUC corresponds, to which the assessments in question relate, it was no longer the owner of the vehicles, nor responsible for payment of the tax, given that the acquirers of the vehicles in question, as identified in the Table attached to Annex I, were, by then, the taxpayers of the IUC.
13 - That the provision in No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC, in using the expression "considering themselves as such", establishes a legal presumption, which, like all presumptions inscribed in the norms of tax incidence, is, in view of the provisions of Article 73 of the LGT, rebuttable.
14 - That, during the month of August 2013, it was notified to exercise its right of Prior Hearing, before the assessment of the IUC, relating to the years 2009 to 2012, relating to the vehicles identified in the proceedings, and that, on 11 October 2013, it exercised such right, at which time it made known to the Tax Administration the reasons of fact (namely the sales invoices of the vehicles) and of law, for which it considers that it has no subjective responsibility for payment of the tax.
15 - That, despite this, the TA, understanding, in particular, that the tax is due by the holder of the registration, until the same is altered, and that, in the database of the Institute of Registration and Notary, the vehicles are registered in the name of the Claimant, determined the continuation of the ex officio assessment process.
16 - That, although the transmission of the right of ownership of the vehicles is subject to registration, the same does not have constitutive effect, being certain, however, that, for such property to be invoked against third parties, it must be registered, only being considered, however, as third parties those who have acquired from a common author incompatible rights.
17 - That, in view of the legal notion of third party, the Tax Authority is not (nor can be) considered third party for registration purposes, the transmission of property being able to be invoked against it, regardless of whether or not it is registered.
18 - That it was not (nor can be considered) the owner of the vehicles referred to above in the years to which the tax in question relates, nor did it maintain with such vehicles any legal relationship that could enhance the exigibility of the same.
19 - That there is an erroneous qualification of the subjective incidence of the tax in question, with respect to the fiscal years above identified, in accordance with the combined provisions of Articles 3 and 19 of the CIUC with paragraph a) of Article 99 of the CPPT.
D - RESPONSE OF THE RESPONDENT
20 - The Respondent, Tax and Customs Authority (hereinafter referred to as TA), presented its Response on 23-06-2014, having requested, on 24-09-2014, the attachment to the proceedings of the Arbitral Decisions rendered within the scope of Proceedings Nos. 150/2014-T and 220/2014-T, which was admitted by the tribunal.
21 - In the said Response, the TA understands that the allegations of the Claimant cannot proceed at all, insofar as they make an interpretation and application of the applicable legal norms, notoriously wrong in the case, in that, from the outset,
22 - It is a misconceived understanding in which the Claimant incurs, translated not only in a biased reading of the law, but also in an interpretation that does not heed the systematic element, violating the unity of the regime enshrined throughout the IUC and, more broadly throughout the entire legal-fiscal system, further stemming from an interpretation that ignores the ratio of the regime enshrined in the said article. (See Article 10 of the Response)
23 - It refers that the tax legislator, in establishing in Article 3, No. 1, who are the taxpayers of the IUC, expressly and intentionally established that these are the owners (or in the situations provided for in No. 2 the persons therein mentioned), being considered as such the persons in whose name they are registered. (See Article 15 of the Response)
24 - It emphasizes that the legislator did not use the expression "it is presumed" as it could have done, for example, in the following terms: "the taxpayers of the tax are the owners of the vehicles, being presumed as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose name they are registered". (See Article 16 of the Response)
25 - It considers that the wording of Article 3 of the CIUC corresponds to a clear option of legislative policy adopted by the legislator, whose intention, within its freedom of legislative form, was that, for purposes of IUC, those who appear as such in the vehicle registration be considered owners, and therefore to understand that a presumption was established therein would unequivocally be to effect an interpretation contra legem. (See Articles 23 and 24 of the Response)
26 - It refers that the aforementioned understanding has already been adopted by the Jurisprudence of our courts, transcribing, for such purpose, part of the judgment of the Administrative and Tax Court of Penafiel, rendered in Proceedings No. -…/13.OBEPNF. (See Article 25 of the Response)
27 - On the systematic element of interpretation, it considers that the solution proposed by the Claimant is intolerable, the understanding championed by it finding no legal support. (See Article 27 of the Response)
28 - On the disregard for the "ratio" of the regime, the TA considers that, in light of a teleological interpretation of the regime enshrined throughout the Code of the IUC, the interpretation proposed by the Claimant, in the sense that the taxpayer of the IUC is the effective owner regardless of whether such quality does not appear in the vehicle registration, is manifestly wrong, in that it is the very ratio of the regime enshrined in the CIUC that constitutes clear proof that what the tax legislator intended was to create a tax based on the taxation of the owner of the vehicle, as shown in the vehicle registration. (See Article 46 of the Response)
29 - It adds that the CIUC carried out a reform of the regime for taxation of vehicles in Portugal, substantially altering the regime for vehicle taxation, with the taxpayers of the tax becoming the owners shown in the property registration, regardless of the circulation of vehicles on public roads. (See Article 47 of the Response)
30 - In this sense, it refers that this is the understanding inscribed, in particular, in Recommendation No. 6-B/2012. Proceedings No. R3478/10, of 22/06/2012, of the Ombudsman addressed to the Secretary of State for Public Works, Transport and Communications.
31 - The interpretation conveyed by the Claimant is also, beyond what has already been stated, non-conforming with the Constitution, in particular because, among other things, it violates the principle of efficiency of the tax system, which has constitutional dignity, in that it generates additional administrative costs for the Respondent and the obstruction of the performance of its services, as well as the "uselessness of registry information systems".
32 - It adds further that the Claimant did not prove the facts it alleges regarding the transmission of ownership of the vehicles identified in the proceedings, given that the invoices attached to the proceedings do not constitute suitable documents to prove the sale of the vehicles in question and to provide proof of the transmission of their ownership (See Articles 72 to 75 of the Response).
33 - It likewise refers that, following the thesis proposed by the Claimant as to the fact that Article 3 of the CIUC establishes a rebuttable presumption, it would then be necessary to conclude that the "functioning of that article (i.e., the rebuttal of the presumption)" depends on compliance with the provisions of Article 19 of the CIUC, given that, in the matter of financial leasing, the Claimant could only be exonerated from the tax in question, had it complied with the obligation inherent in the said article, which did not occur. (See Articles 79 and 80 of the Response)
34 - It adds also that it was not the Respondent who gave rise to the request for arbitral decision, but rather the Claimant, and consequently the Claimant should be condemned in the arbitral costs "in accordance with Article 527/1 of the New Code of Civil Procedure ex vi Article 29/1-e) of the RJAT". (See Articles 98 and 99 of the Response)
35 - Finally, it considers that, in view of all the arguments it has adduced, the request for arbitral decision underlying the present proceedings should be judged unfounded, with the tax assessment acts challenged remaining in the legal order, and the Respondent entity being absolved accordingly.
E - QUESTIONS TO BE DECIDED
36 - It follows, therefore, to assess and decide.
37 - In view of the foregoing, with respect to the positions of the Parties and the arguments presented, the main questions to be decided are whether:
a) The norm of subjective incidence contained in Article 3, No. 1 of the CIUC establishes or does not establish a presumption.
b) What is the legal value of vehicle registration in the economy of the CIUC, particularly for purposes of the subjective incidence of this tax.
c) If, on the date of occurrence of the taxable event, the vehicle has already been previously alienated, although the right of ownership thereof remains registered in the name of its former owner, for purposes of the provisions of Article 3, No. 1 of the CIUC, the taxpayer of the IUC is the former owner or the new owner.
F - PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
38 - The Arbitral Tribunal is regularly constituted and is materially competent, in accordance with paragraph a) of No. 1 of Article 2 of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January.
39 - The Parties have legal personality and capacity, are legitimate and are legally represented (see Article 4 and No. 2 of Article 10 of Decree-Law No. 10/2011 and Article 1 of Ordinance No. 112/2011, of 22 March).
40 - The proceedings do not suffer from defects that invalidate it.
41 - Taking into account the documentary evidence attached to the proceedings, it is now necessary to present the factual matter relevant to understanding the decision, which is fixed in the following terms.
II - SUBSTANTIATION
G - SUBSTANTIATION OF FACTS
42 - With respect to relevant factual matter, this tribunal holds the following facts as established:
43 - The Claimant is a Financial Credit Institution that is engaged, among other activities, in the conclusion of financial lease contracts, having as subject matter motor vehicles.
44 - In the context of its commercial activity, the Claimant concluded various lease contracts, which had as subject matter motor vehicles, whose registrations are identified in a proper Table attached as Annex I to the request for arbitral decision.
45 - At the end of the lease contracts or even during their term, the said vehicles were, all of them, sold to the taxpayers identified in the sales invoices, copies of which are attached as Annex II to the request for arbitral decision, such vehicles ceasing to be the property of the Claimant from the dates of the corresponding sales, which occurred on a date prior to the dates to which the exigibility of the IUC relates,
46 - The Claimant was, during the month of August 2013, notified to exercise its right of Prior Hearing, before the assessment of the IUC, relating to the years 2009 to 2012, relating to the vehicles identified in the proceedings.
47 - The Claimant, on 11 October 2013, exercised the said right of Prior Hearing, at which time it made known to the Tax Administration the reasons of fact, namely copies of the sales invoices of the vehicles, in which the amount of VAT assessed is set out, and of law, for which it considers that it is not responsible for payment of the tax.
48 - The Respondent understood that the invoices presented within the scope of the Prior Hearing procedure and attached to the proceedings do not constitute suitable documents to prove the sale of the vehicles in question and to provide proof of the transmission of their ownership.
49 - The Tax Administration understood that the tax is due by the holder of the registration, and that, in the database of the Institute of Registration and Notary, the vehicles are registered in the name of the Claimant, having determined the continuation of the ex officio assessment process.
50 - The Claimant, on 26 November 2013, was notified electronically, in accordance with No. 9 of Article 38 of the CPPT, of various ex officio IUC assessment acts, for the years 2009 to 2012, based on paragraph c) of No. 1 of Article 2, combined with Articles 3, 4, 6 and 11, all of the Code of Unique Circulation Tax (CIUC).
SUBSTANTIATION OF PROVEN FACTS
51 - The facts held as proven are based on the documents mentioned, with respect to each of them, insofar as their correspondence to reality was not questioned.
FACTS NOT PROVEN
52 - There are no facts held as not proven, given that all facts deemed relevant for the assessment of the claim were proven.
H - SUBSTANTIATION OF LAW
53 - The factual matter has been established, and it is now necessary to proceed to its legal subsumption and determine the law applicable to the underlying facts, in accordance with the questions to be decided enumerated in No. 37.
54 - The essential question in the present proceedings, with respect to which there are absolutely opposed understandings between the Claimant and the TA, is translated into whether the norm of subjective incidence contained in No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC establishes or does not establish a rebuttable presumption.
55 - The positions of the parties are known. Indeed, for the Claimant, the provision in No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC, in using the expression "considering themselves as such", establishes a legal presumption, which, like all presumptions inscribed in the norms of tax incidence, is, in view of the provisions of Article 73 of the LGT, rebuttable.
56 - The Respondent, for its part, considers that the wording of Article 3 of the CIUC corresponds to a clear option of legislative policy adopted by the legislator, whose intention was that, for purposes of IUC, those who appear as such in the vehicle registration be considered owners, and therefore to understand that a presumption was established therein would unequivocally be to effect an interpretation contra legem.
I - INTERPRETATION OF THE NORM OF SUBJECTIVE INCIDENCE CONTAINED IN NO. 1 OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CIUC
57 - It should be noted, first of all, that it is settled understanding, in doctrine, that in the interpretation of tax laws the general principles of interpretation apply fully. This is an understanding that, moreover, has been adopted in Article 11 of the General Tax Law.
58 - It is commonly accepted that, with a view to grasping the meaning of the law, interpretation makes use of various means, and it is first important to reconstruct the legislative thought through the words of the law, which means seeking, from the outset, its literal sense. The said sense, as is also settled, corresponds to the lowest degree of interpretive activity, and it is therefore important to evaluate and gauge it in light of other criteria, which then involve the so-called elements of a logical nature, whether of a rational (or teleological) sense, of a systematic character or of a historical order.
59 - With regard to the interpretation of tax law, it is important to recall, as jurisprudence has been pointing out, in particular in the Judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court (STA) of 05/09/2012 and 06/02/2013, Proceedings Nos. 0314/12 and 01000/12, respectively, available at: www.dgsi.pt, the importance of the provision in Article 9 of the Civil Code (CC), as a fundamental rule of legal hermeneutics, which, in this context, cannot fail to be considered.
60 - Interpretive activity is, therefore, not avoidable in resolving doubts raised by the application of the legal norms in question.
61 - In the view of FRANCESCO FERRARA, in Interpretation and Application of Laws, translation by MANUEL DE ANDRADE, (2nd ed.), Arménio Amado, Editor, Successor - Coimbra, 1963, p. 131, the said interpretive activity "[...] is unique [and] complex, of a logical and practical nature, as it consists in inducing from certain circumstances the legislative will", adding, ibidem, p. 130, that "Aiming at the practical application of law, legal interpretation is of its nature essentially teleological".
62 - The purpose of interpretation, the said author tells us, ibidem, pp. 134/135, is "[...] to determine the objective meaning of the law [...]". The law, being the expression of the will of the State, is a "[...] will that persists autonomously, detached from the complex of thoughts and tendencies that animated the persons who contributed to its enactment". Hence the activity of the interpreter should be to "[...] seek not what the legislator wanted, but what in the law appears objectively intended: the mens legis and not the mens legislatoris".
63 - For MANUEL DE ANDRADE, citing FERRARA, in Essay on the Theory of Interpretation of Laws, p. 16 (2nd ed.), Arménio Amado, Editor, Successor - Coimbra, 1963, "Interpretation seeks the voluntas legis, not the voluntas legislatoris [...], and seeks the actual will of the law, not its will at the moment of application: it is not, therefore, a will of the past, but a will always present as long as the law does not cease to be in force. It means that the law, once formed, detaches itself from the legislator, gaining autonomous consistency; and, more than that, becomes a living entity, not merely an inanimate body [...]".
ON THE LITERAL ELEMENT
64 - It is in this framework that it is important to find an answer to the questions to be decided, particularly to the one aimed at knowing whether Article 3, No. 1 of the CIUC establishes or does not establish a presumption, beginning precisely by the literal element.
65 - Given that the literal element is the first that is important to use, in search of the legislative thought, it is necessarily by there that one should begin, seeking to reach the meaning of the expression considering themselves as such the persons inscribed in the said Article 3, No. 1 of the CIUC.
66 - No. 1 of the said Article 3 of the CIUC provides that "The taxpayers of the tax are the owners of the vehicles, considering themselves as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose name they are registered." (underscore ours)
67 - The formulation used in the said article, it is important to note, at the outset, makes use of the expression "considering themselves", which raises the question of whether to such expression can be attributed a presumptive sense, thus equating it with the expression "being presumed". These are expressions frequently used with equivalent meanings, as is apparent in various situations of the Portuguese legal system.
68 - In truth, there are countless norms that establish presumptions, combining for such purpose, moreover, the verb consider in various ways. It is not, therefore, difficult to identify situations, in various areas of law, in which the expression "considering" or "being considered" is used with a meaning equivalent to the expression "being presumed" or "presuming", expressions to which, whether at the level of irrebuttable presumptions, or within the framework of rebuttable presumptions, a meaning is frequently conferred as equivalent.
69 - Since it does not seem pertinent to again reference examples revealing such situations, given that such examples are abundantly set out in some of the decisions of tax arbitral tribunals, of which examples are those rendered within the scope of Proceedings Nos. 14/2013 - T, 27/2013 - T and 73/2013 - T, we hereby consider them fully reproduced.
70 - In such circumstances, given that the said expressions are recurrently used with a purpose and equivalent meaning, it can be concluded that it is not only the use of the verb "presume" that places us before a presumption, but also the use of other terms can serve as a basis for presumptions, as, in particular, occurs with the expression "considering themselves", which, in our view, is precisely what occurs in No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC.
It is thus an understanding that, not appearing to correspond to a biased reading of the letter of the law, as the TA considers, proves to be in harmony with the provision in No. 2 of Article 9 of the CC, in that it ensures, to the legislative thought, the minimum verbal correspondence required therein.
71 - In the literal perspective, in view of what has been stated, there is no doubt that the interpretation which considers a rebuttable presumption to be established in No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC has full support in the formulation there enshrined, in view of the said equivalence between the expression "considering themselves as such" and the expression "being presumed as such".
The linguistic element, as referred to above, being the first that should be used in search of the legislative thought, should, however, in order to find the true meaning of the norm, be subjected to the control of the other elements of interpretation of a logical nature. (whether such elements are of a rational (or teleological) sense, of a systematic character or of a historical order).
72 - In fact, as is apparent from the work of MANUEL DE ANDRADE, cited above, p. 28, "[...] the purely linguistic analysis of a legal text is merely the beginning [...], the first degree [...] or the first act of interpretation. In other words, it merely furnishes us the probable legislative thought and will [...] or, rather, the grammatical delimitation of the possible consistency of the law [...], the framework within which its true content resides".
73 - Thus, let us then examine the rational (or teleological) element.
ON THE HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL (OR TELEOLOGICAL) ELEMENT
74 - Having regard to elements of interpretation of a historical nature, it is important to recall what is expressly set out in the preamble to the Bill No. 118/X of 07/03/2007, underlying Law No. 22-A/2007 of 29/06, when it states that the reform of vehicle taxation is implemented through the displacement of part of the tax burden from the moment of vehicle acquisition to the circulation phase and aims to "form a coherent whole" which, although intended for the collection of public revenue, intends for the same to be collected "in the measure of the environmental costs that each individual causes to the community", adding, with regard to the tax in question and the different types and categories of vehicles, that "as a structuring and unifying element [...] the principle of equivalence is established, thus making clear that the tax, in its entirety, is subordinated to the idea that taxpayers should be burdened in the measure of the cost they cause to the environment and to the road network, this being the raison d'être of this tax figure".
75 - In this framework, it seems clear that the logic and rationality of the new system of vehicle taxation can only coexist with a taxpayer of the tax, on the assumption that this, and not another, is the real and effective subject causing the road and environmental damage, as follows from the principle of equivalence, inscribed in Article 1 of the CIUC.
76 - The said principle of equivalence, which informs the current Unique Circulation Tax, has, at least in the part in which it specifically concerns the environment, underlying it the polluter-pays principle, and embodies the idea inscribed in it, that whoever pollutes should therefore pay. The said principle which, in some way, has constitutional grounding, in that it represents a corollary of the provision in paragraph h) of No. 2 of Article 66 of our Constitution, also has consecration in the context of community law, whether at the level of primary law, which has been the case since 7 February 1992, when the Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht, in whose Article 130-R, No. 2, the aforementioned principle came to be included as a support for Community policy in the environmental field, whether at the level of secondary law.
77 - What is sought to be achieved through the said principle is to internalize negative environmental externalities, which, after all, in the case at hand, means nothing more than ensuring that the damages that accrue to the community, stemming from the use of motor vehicles, are assumed by their "owner-economic-users", as costs that only they should bear.
78 - Returning to the said principle of equivalence, it can be said that it has, in the economy of the CIUC, an absolutely structuring role, with the normative edifice of the Code in question being founded on it. The said principle cannot therefore fail to be a purpose that is legally intended to be pursued, embodying, in that measure, a light of considerable brightness that, constantly and continuously, cannot fail to illuminate the path of the interpreter.
79 - With respect to the said principle, it is important to note what Sérgio Vasques tells us, when, in Special Consumption Taxes, Almedina, Coimbra, 2001, p. 122, with regard to the technical implementation of that principle, considers that "In obedience to the principle of equivalence, the tax should correspond to the benefit that the taxpayer derives from the public activity; or to the cost that the taxpayer imputes to the community by its own activity".
80 - Addressing the IUC specifically, the said author adds, op. cit., that "Thus, a tax on automobiles based on a rule of equivalence will be equal only if those who cause the same road wear and the same environmental cost pay the same tax; and those who cause different road wear and environmental cost, pay different tax also", adding that the implementation of the said principle "[...] dictates further requirements with respect to the subjective incidence of the tax [...]".
81 - In view of what has just been stated, it is clear that the taxation of the real and effective polluters corresponds to an important purpose sought by the law, in this case by the CIUC, a purpose which, in the words of Francesco Ferrara, in Interpretation and Application of Laws, 2nd Edition, Arménio Amado, Editor, Successor, Coimbra, 1963, p. 130, should always be before the eyes of the jurist, given that, as the said author states therein, "[...] legal interpretation is of its nature essentially teleological".
82 - Thus, it should be noted that, whether in view of the said historical elements, or in light of the elements of a rational or teleological character of interpretation that are herein referenced, it is equally necessary to conclude that No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC can only establish a rebuttable presumption.
83 - It is also important to consider the systematic element of interpretation.
ON THE SYSTEMATIC ELEMENT
84 - On the systematic element, BAPTISTA MACHADO tells us, in Introduction to Law and Legitimizing Discourse, p. 183, that "this element comprises the consideration of the other provisions that form the normative complex of the institute in which the norm to be interpreted is integrated, that is, that regulate the same matter (context of the law), as well as the consideration of legal provisions that regulate parallel normative problems or related institutes (parallel places). It also comprises the systematic place that corresponds to the norm to be interpreted in the global legal system, as well as its consonance with the spirit or intrinsic unity of the entire legal system".
85 - It is known that a legal principle, in this case the principle of equivalence, does not exist in isolation, but is linked by an intimate nexus with other principles that integrate, at a more global level, the respective legal system, in this case, with the other principles embodied in the system of the IUC. In that sense, each article of a given legal instrument, in this case of the CIUC, will only be understandable if we place it before the other articles that follow or precede it.
86 - The CIUC, moreover, beyond naturally aiming at the collection of public revenues, is a Code specially designed for the pursuit and implementation of environmental purposes - which embody fundamental values and objectives - thus requiring a coherent articulation among the various norms that integrate it, having as a primary element what is provided for in its Article 1.
87 - In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the system inscribed in the said CIUC, as occurs in any other legal system, should be coherent and free of contradictions in the axiological and teleological elements that inform and shape it, and cannot, in this measure, tolerate the understanding that No. 1 of its Article 3 does not establish a legal presumption.
88 - With respect to the systematization of the CIUC, environmental concerns were decisive in ensuring that the said principle of equivalence was, from the outset, inscribed in the first article of the said Code, which necessarily leads to the subsequent articles, in that they are based on such principle, being influenced by it. This occurred, in particular, with the tax base, which came to be composed of various elements, particularly those relating to levels of pollution, and with the rates of the tax, established in Articles 9 to 15, which were influenced by the environmental component, and, naturally, also with the subjective incidence itself, provided for in Article 3 of the CIUC, which cannot escape the said influence.
89 - The systematic element of interpretation and the interaction among the various articles and principles that integrate the system inscribed in the CIUC, also call for the understanding that what is established in No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC cannot fail to embody a presumption.
90 - No. 1 of Article 9 of the CC provides that the search for the legislative thought should have "[...] above all in account [...] the unity of the legal system, the circumstances in which the law was drafted and the specific conditions of the time in which it is applied", circumstances and conditions which, today more than ever, are sensitive to the environment and respect for issues related to it.
In this context, the considerations formulated on the said elements of interpretation, whether of a literal character or of a historical nature, whether of a rational or systematic nature, point to the understanding that Article 3 of the CIUC establishes a presumption, or rather, the ratio legis of that norm, as the reason or purpose that should reasonably be attributed to it, cannot fail to view the expression "considering themselves as such", used in the said article, as revealing the establishment of a presumption, which means that the taxpayers of the IUC, being, in principle, the owners of the vehicles, considering themselves as such, the persons in whose name they are registered, may, in the end, be others.
It can indeed be said that the establishment of a presumption in the said norm would correspond to the interpretation most compatible, in particular, with the principle of equivalence, aforementioned.
91 - Having reached this point, it is important to recall the provision in Article 73 of the LGT, when it establishes that "The presumptions established in the norms of tax incidence always admit proof to the contrary", (underscore ours), which means that the legal presumption, which appears to be established in No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC, will necessarily be rebuttable.
92 - In this framework, the taxpayers of the tax are, presumptively, the persons in whose name the vehicles are registered, or, the said taxpayers are, in principle, and only in principle, the persons in whose name such vehicles are registered.
93 - In fact, if the owner in whose name the vehicle is registered, comes, as occurs in the present proceedings, to indicate and prove who was the owner or the lessee of the vehicles in question, nothing justifies, in our understanding, that either the former owner or the lessor be held responsible for the payment of the IUC that may be due.
94 - In addition, this interpretation of No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC is the one which, in our opinion, best fits the principles to which the TA should subordinate its activity, namely the inquisitorial principle, in order to discover material truth.
95 - With respect to the said inquisitorial principle, it is important to allude to the teachings of Diogo Leite Campos, Benjamim Silva Rodrigues and Jorge Lopes de Sousa, in General Tax Law, Annotated and Commented, 4th Edition 2012, Writing Meeting, Lda, Lisbon, p. 488/489, when, in annotations to the cited Article 58, they state that the administration has a dynamic role in collecting elements relevant to the decision, adding that the "[...] lack of procedures deemed necessary for the construction of the factual basis of the decision will affect it not only in the case of being mandatory (violation of the principle of equality), but also if the materiality of the facts considered is not proven or if, in that basis, facts relevant facts alleged by the interested party are lacking, due to insufficiency of proof that the Administration should have collected [...]".
The inquisitorial principle, add the said authors, op. cit, "[...] has to do with the powers (-duties) of the Administration to conduct the investigations necessary to the knowledge of the essential or determining facts for the decision [...]".
96 - Material truth, is embodied, in the present case, in the circumstance that the vehicles identified in the request for arbitral decision have, in their entirety, been sold by the Claimant on a date prior to the date of exigibility of the tax, or, as of the date from which the tax creditor could enforce, against the debtor, its right to payment of the tax, was, in view of the administrative proceedings, within the knowledge of the TA.
97 - In fact, within the scope of the prior hearing procedure, the Claimant presented to the TA, copies of the sales invoices of the vehicles in question, with a view to demonstrating that such vehicles no longer belonged to it, as of the date of the assessments of the corresponding IUC, although it appeared as its owner in the database of the Institute of Registration and Notary.
98 - The prior hearing is, moreover, the proper forum to seek the material truth of the elements essential to the assessment of the tax, among which will be the knowledge of the true taxpayers of the tax, as the first elements of the legal tax relationship.
99 - The right that the taxpayer has to be heard, conducted within the scope of the prior hearing, should correspond to and translate into the possibility granted to individuals of having a useful participation in the procedure, and should not transform itself into an inconsequential and routine practice, as well noted by José Manuel Santos Botelho, Américo Pires Esteves and José Cândido de Pinho, in Code of Administrative Procedure, Annotated and Commented, 4th Edition, Almedina, Coimbra, 2000, annotation No. 8 to Article 100.
100 - With respect to the right of prior hearing, it is important to recall the understanding of jurisprudence on the matter, inscribed, in particular, in the Judgment of the STA of 24-10-2012, Proceedings 0548/12, from which it is apparent that under the penalty of the said right becoming an innocuous ritual, the arguments and documents presented by the taxpayer cannot be viewed with haughty indifference, requiring their analysis by the administration, so as to make it visible that the decision of the procedure results from a transparent weighing of the elements of fact and law submitted to its consideration.
101 - Let it not be said, as the TA does, that the establishment of a presumption in Article 3 of the CIUC generates additional administrative costs for the Respondent and the obstruction of the performance of its services, as well as the "uselessness of registry information systems". (See Articles 66 and 68 of the Response)
The efficiency of the Administration in general, or of the TA in particular, in the current sense, would correspond to the capacity/work methodology oriented towards the optimization of the work executed or the services provided, which would mean producing the maximum, in quantity and quality, with the minimum of costs, having nothing to do with the observance of legally enshrined principles and respect for the rights of citizens, whether in the quality of taxpayers or not.
102 - In a technical sense, it can be said that the principle of efficiency of the tax system is, commonly held, in the field of tax procedure, as a corollary of the principle of proportionality, which as is known, requires an adequate proportion between the legal purposes and the means chosen to achieve those ends, or, as Diogo Leite Campos, Benjamim Silva Rodrigues and Jorge Lopes de Sousa refer, in General Tax Law, Annotated and Commented, 4th Edition 2012, Writing Meeting, Lda, Lisbon, p. 488, in annotations to Article 55 of the LGT, it is a principle that requires "[...] the tax administration to refrain from imposing on taxpayers obligations that are unnecessary to the satisfaction of the purposes it intends to pursue".
In this framework, the said principle of efficiency of the tax system would mean the capacity to achieve the legally fixed objectives in relation to the available means, or rather, with the minimum of means, which will also have nothing to do with respect for the rights of citizens, nor with the need to observe the principles to which the tax administration should subordinate its activity, in particular the inquisitorial principle and the discovery of material truth, and obviously the application of the said principle of efficiency cannot be carried out to the detriment of the rights of citizens.
103 - On the other hand, it is important to note that the importance, value and utility of information systems are in no way diminished by force, in particular, of the presumption established in Article 3/1 of the CIUC. The information systems in question, whether that relating to the IRN, or that managed by the IMTT, have, moreover, a fundamental role, in particular, for purposes of the system inscribed in the CIUC, allowing their use, in this context, the immediate and preliminary, but not necessarily definitive, identification of the owners of the vehicles, as shown in the registry, which indicates to us that in principle the owners of the vehicles are the persons who, as such, appear in those registries.
104 - Such circumstance, however, will have nothing to do with the right that such owners have, within the scope of the said presumption, to demonstrate that the ownership of the vehicles no longer resides in their legal sphere, but in that of another person to whom it was transferred and whom it identifies, which means that, given that, on the one hand, there are no doubts about the relevance of such information, it is certain, on the other hand, that it does not constitute a definitive truth, nothing preventing the due and appropriate treatment of such information, and it is even necessary, in some cases, to carry out such treatment.
J - ON THE ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP OF THE VEHICLE AND ON THE VALUE OF REGISTRATION
105 - First and foremost, it should be added, in view of what will be expressly stated below on the value of registration, that the acquirers of the vehicles become owners of those same vehicles through the conclusion of the corresponding purchase and sale contracts, with registration or without it.
106 - There are three articles of the Civil Code that are important to take into account, with respect to the acquisition of ownership of a motor vehicle. These are, first and foremost, Article 874, which establishes the notion of a purchase and sale contract, as being "[...] the contract through which the ownership of a thing, or another right, is transmitted, in return for a price"; Article 879, in whose paragraph a) it is established, as essential effects of the purchase and sale contract, "the transmission of the ownership of the thing or the holding of the right" and Article 408, which is headed as contracts with real effect, and establishes in its No. 1, that "the constitution or transfer of real rights over a determined thing occurs by mere effect of the contract, except in cases provided for by law". (underscore ours)
We are, in fact, in the domain of contracts with real effect, which means that their conclusion produces the transmission of real rights, in this case, motor vehicles, determined by mere effect of the contract, as expressly follows from the norm previously mentioned.
107 - With respect to the said contracts with real effect, it is important to note the teachings of Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, when, in annotations to Article 408 of the CC, they tell us that "From these contracts called real (quoad effectum), because they have as an immediate effect the constitution, modification or extinction of a real right (and not merely the obligations tending to that result), are distinguished the so-called real contracts (quoad constitutionem), which require the delivery of the thing as an element of their formation (see Articles 1129, 1142 and 1185)".
We are thus before contracts in which the ownership of the thing sold is transferred, without more, from the seller to the buyer, having, as cause, the contract itself.
108 - Also from jurisprudence, in particular from the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice (STJ) No. 03B4369 of 19/02/2004, available at: www.dgsi.pt, it is apparent that, in view of the provision in Article 408, No. 1, of the C. Civil, "the constitution or transfer of real rights over a determined thing occurs by mere effect of the contract, except in cases provided for by law". This is the case of the contract for the sale and purchase of a motor vehicle (Articles 874° and 879 para. a) of the C. Civil), which does not depend on any special formality, being valid even when concluded verbally - see Judgment of the STJ of 3-3-98, in CJSTJ, 1998, year VI, Volume I, p. 117". (underscore ours)
109 - Having the purchase and sale contract, in view of what is stated above, a real nature, with the aforementioned consequences, it is necessary to also consider the legal value of vehicle registration, the subject of that contract, in that the transaction of the said good is subject to public registration.
110 - It is established, in fact, in No. 1 of Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 54/75, of 12 February, relating to the registration of motor vehicles, (amended various times, the last of which through Law No. 39/2008, of 11/08), that "The registration of vehicles has essentially for its purpose to give publicity to the legal situation of motor vehicles and their trailers, with a view to the security of legal commerce". (underscore ours)
111 - Given clear, in view of the said norm, what is the purpose of registration, there is, however, no clarity, within the scope of the said Decree-law, on the legal value of that registration, and it is important to consider Article 29 of the said legal instrument, relating to the registration of motor vehicle ownership, when it provides that "The provisions relating to property registration are applicable, with necessary adaptations, to the registration of motor vehicles, [...]". (underscore ours)
112 - In this framework, so that we can reach the sought knowledge on the legal value of motor vehicle registration, it is important to take into account what is established in the Property Registration Code, which, approved by Decree-Law No. 224/84, of 6 July, and amended last by Decree-Law No. 125/2013, of 30 August, provides in its Article 7 that "the definitive registration constitutes a presumption that the right exists and belongs to the registered holder, in the precise terms in which the registration defines it". (underscore ours)
113 - The combination of the provisions in the articles previously mentioned, in particular what is established in No. 1 of Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 54/75, of 12 February and in Article 7 of the Property Registration Code, allows consideration, on the one hand, that the fundamental function of registration is to give publicity to the legal situation of vehicles, allowing, on the other, to presume that the right exists and that such right belongs to the holder, for whose benefit the same is registered, in the precise terms in which it is defined in the registration.
114 - Thus, the definitive registration constitutes nothing more than the presumption that the right exists and belongs to the registered holder, in the exact terms of the registration, but a rebuttable presumption, admitting therefore counterproof, as follows from the law and jurisprudence has been pointing out, and in this regard, reference can be made, inter alia, to the Judgments of the STJ Nos. 03B4369 and 07B4528, respectively, of 19/02/2004 and 29/01/2008, available at: www.dgsi.pt.
115 - The function legally reserved for registration is thus, on the one hand, to publicize the legal situation of goods, in this case, of vehicles and, on the other hand, to allow us to presume that there exists a right over those vehicles and that it belongs to the holder, as such inscribed in the registration, which means that registration does not have a constitutive nature with respect to the right of ownership, but only declarative, hence the reason that registration does not constitute a condition of validity of the transmission of the vehicle from seller to buyer.
116 - It should be noted, however, that if it is true that the non-existence of registration has the relevance that was mentioned above, it is equally true that its non-existence prevents the full effectiveness of the purchase and sale contract. In this regard, it is important to note the provision in Nos. 1 and 4 of Article 5 of the Property Registration Code, applicable to the registration of motor vehicle ownership by force of the provision in Article 29 of Decree-Law No. 54/75, of 12 February.
117 - No. 1 of Article 5 of the said Property Registration Code provides that "The facts subject to registration only produce effects against third parties after the date of the respective registration", establishing, for its part, No. 4 of the same article that "Third parties, for purposes of registration, are those who have acquired from a common author incompatible rights".
118 - In such circumstances, it will be easy to conclude that the TA, given that it did not acquire, from the same seller, rights over the vehicle, incompatible with the rights of the buyer, does not meet the concept of third parties for purposes of registration, as legally established, and therefore cannot avail itself of the absence of updating of the registration of the right of ownership to challenge the full effectiveness of the purchase and sale contract of the vehicles.
119 - Thus, if the buyers of the vehicles, as their "new" owners, do not promptly promote the appropriate registration of their right, it is presumed, for purposes of No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC and in accordance with the provision in Article 7 of the Property Registration Code, that the vehicle continues to be the property of the person who sold it and who remains its owner in the registration, being certain, however, that such presumption is rebuttable, whether by force of the provision in No. 2 of Article 350 of the CC, or in light of the provision in Article 73 of the LGT. Hence, once the said presumption is displaced, through proof of the respective sale, the TA cannot persist in considering as taxpayer of the IUC the seller of the vehicle, who, in the registration, continues to appear as its owner.
L - ON THE MEANS OF PROOF PRESENTED
120 - Since written form is not legally required for the purchase and sale contract of motor vehicles, proof of the corresponding sale may be made by any means, in particular through testimonial or documentary evidence, the latter including, in particular, invoices relating to the sales of the vehicles.
121 - As a means of proof that it proceeded to sell the vehicles identified in the present proceedings, at a date prior to the date of exigibility of the tax, the Claimant attached copies of the sales invoices of the said vehicles, in which the amount of VAT assessed is set out.
122 - With regard to the invoices presented by the Claimant, as proof of the sale of the vehicles in question, it is important to note that the TA, in addition to having requested the attachment to the proceedings of 2 Arbitral Decisions rendered in Proceedings No. 150/2014-T and Proceedings No. 220/2014-T, where such matter is touched upon, considers that the said invoices, in that they are unilaterally issued by the Claimant, do not constitute suitable documents to prove the sale of the vehicles in question, but, with due respect, it is not correct.
Let us see,
123 - It is apparent from the Legal Dictionary of Ana Prata, Almedina - Coimbra, 1990, 3rd Edition, that an invoice is the "written document in which the things sold and delivered are discriminated, their quality, quantity and price, and whose delivery the seller cannot refuse to the buyer, if the purchase and sale is commercial".
124 - In annotations to Article 476 of the Commercial Code, Abílio Neto, Ediforum - Lisbon, 1991, 10th Edition, refers that an invoice is the "document in which the seller makes the complete discrimination of the goods sold to the buyer and in which he indicates the expenses he incurred, as well as the advantages he grants in prices and the conditions of delivery and payment".
125 - Before the amendments introduced to the VAT Code by Decree-Law No. 197/2012, of 24 August, invoices or equivalent documents could, within the scope of transfers of goods or the provision of services, be issued, provided that these observed the requirements legally required for invoices.
126 - From the provision in paragraph b) of No. 1 of Article 29, in No. 5 of Article 36 and in Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 40, all of the CIVA, in the wording introduced by Decree-Law No. 197/2012, of 24 August, it is apparent that only the invoice, the invoice-receipt and the simplified invoice embody recognized documents for purposes of the transfer of goods or the provision of services.
127 - It can thus be said, in view of the doctrine and what is legally established, that an invoice is the document in which, in addition to the mention of the names of the suppliers and acquirers of things or services subject of a given legal transaction, should, in particular, discriminate such things or services, their quality and quantity, as well as the respective price and other elements included in the taxable value, as well as the applicable VAT rates and the amount of tax due, elements which, it should be noted, are observed by the invoices presented by the Claimant.
128 - The invoices attached to the proceedings, as proof of the sale of the vehicles, having in account the business purpose of the Claimant and its business activity, translated in the conclusion of long-term rental contracts and financial lease contracts of motor vehicles with its customers, ended, or during which the ownership of the said vehicles is transmitted to the respective lessees, prove themselves entirely suited to the mentioned business reality, and the sale of the vehicles that the invoices presented aim to prove is absolutely plausible, no elements being identified that would allow the conclusion that the invoices in question do not document real transactions.
129 - It could even be said that, in the case at hand, it would be strange if it were otherwise, that is, that one who, like the Claimant, has an economic activity embodied and centered on the conclusion of financial lease contracts of motor vehicles, would not, as a rule, ultimately transfer the ownership of the vehicles to the corresponding lessees.
130 - Thus, nothing permits consideration that the elements inscribed in the said invoices are non-conforming with the reality that contractually occurred, which means that the invoices in question do not appear as embodying any simulated contract, quite the opposite, everything indicates that they reflect and prove the facts mentioned in them, that is, the effective sale of the vehicles to the persons indicated therein as being their acquirers. In addition,
131 - Invoices, being an indispensable commercial document are equally an essential accounting document, with relevant implications in the tax field, and it should be noted that, in the case at hand, the Claimant having, as it has, an activity of an entrepreneurial nature, the said invoices are subject to stringent legal rules, whether of a commercial order, or of an accounting and tax order.
132 - The invoices in question in the proceedings, naturally inscribed in the framework of commercial relations between two entities, in this case between the Claimant and the former lessees-acquirers of the vehicles, aim, on the other hand, and in the case, to demonstrate the existence of the transaction in question to the Tax Administration, which gives them a dimension and quality value different from what is reserved for them in the strict commercial field, given that, certain conditions being met, the tax legislation deemed it appropriate to consider them as true.
133 - As has been underlined, tax legislation, in particular that mentioned above, recognizes invoices with probative credibility, and it should be emphasized, because it is not a matter of minor importance, quite the opposite, it is a fundamental matter, that, given that such invoices have been issued in accordance with commercial and tax legislation, which is not questioned by the Respondent, the law, in this case, No. 1 of Article 75 of the LGT, attributes to it a presumption of veracity.
134 - Thus, in view of the presumption of veracity conferred, in the field of legal tax relationships, on the facts inscribed in invoices and the transmission of the vehicles to their acquirers being held as true, it would fall to the TA, in view of the provision in Article 75, No. 2 of the LGT, within the scope of the well-founded and objective reasons it had, to demonstrate that such sales did not, in reality, occur, it not being sufficient to assert, as it does, that the invoices attached to the proceedings do not constitute suitable documents to prove the sale of the vehicles in question and to prove the transmission of their ownership.
135 - The presumption established in the above-mentioned Article 75, No. 1 of the LGT, when it establishes that the said documents enjoy the presumption of veracity, implies, in fact, that if it is not demonstrated by the TA, as it was not, the absence of correspondence between the content of such invoices and reality, its content should be considered true.
136 - The documents presented by the Claimant, as means intended to prove the transactions of the vehicles in question, enjoying thus the said presumption of veracity, appear with sufficient suitability, in order to demonstrate the said transactions, constituting, in our view, an appropriate and adequate means of proof to rebut the presumption established in No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC.
137 - In view of what has been stated above, and having in account both the presumption established in No. 1 of Article 3 of the CIUC, and the transfer of ownership of the vehicles in question, by mere effect of the contract, prior to the date of exigibility of the tax, and the legal value of vehicle registration in the economy of the CIUC, the tax assessment acts in question cannot merit our approval, whether because an appropriate interpretation and application of the legal norms of subjective incidence was not taken into account, which embodies an error as to the legal grounds, or because the said acts were based on a matter of fact clearly divergent from the effective reality, which embodies an error as to the factual grounds.
138 - In such circumstances, having in account, on the one hand, that the presumption established in Article 3, No. 1 of the CIUC has been rebutted and that, on the other hand, the vehicles in question in the present proceedings were sold on a date prior to the date of exigibility of the tax, that is, to the moment when the Administration can require the tax payment, it cannot fail to be considered that, when the tax became exigible, in view of the provision in No. 3 of Article 6, combined with No. 2 of Article 4, both of the CIUC, the Claimant was not the taxpayer of the tax in question.
139 - The TA, when it understands that the taxpayers of the IUC are, definitively, the persons in whose name the motor vehicles are registered, without considering that Article 3 of the CIUC embodies a presumption, nor having in account the probative elements that were presented to it, is proceeding to the illegal assessment of the IUC, based on the erroneous interpretation and application of the norms of subjective incidence of the Unique Circulation Tax, contained in the said Article 3 of the CIUC, whether at the level of the provision, or of the stipulation, which configures the practice of a tax act lacking in lawfulness due to error as to the factual and legal grounds, which determines the annulment of the corresponding tax acts, due to violation of law.
M - ARBITRAL COSTS
140 - In this regard, more specifically on the responsibility for payment of arbitral costs, which the TA, in that it did not give rise to the request for arbitral decision, considers to be due by the Claimant, "in accordance with Article 527/1 of the New Code of Civil Procedure ex vi Article 29/1-e) of the RJAT", it is important only to note that, in view of what is established in No. 2 of the said Article 527 of the CPC, the "loser" party "[...] causes the costs of the proceedings, in the proportion in which it loses", being, that is exactly what will apply in the case at hand.
CONCLUSION
141 - In the circumstantial framework that has been referenced, the TA, in practicing the assessment acts in question in the present proceedings, founded on the idea that Article 3, No. 1 of the CIUC does not establish a rebuttable presumption, makes an erroneous interpretation and application of this norm, committing an error as to the legal grounds, which constitutes a violation of law.
142 - On the other hand, because the TA, at the date of occurrence of the tax facts, considered the Claimant to be the owner of the vehicles referenced in the present proceedings, considering it as such a taxpayer of the tax, when such ownership, with respect to the vehicles in question, was no longer inscribed in its legal sphere, based thus on a matter of fact divergent from the effective reality, commits an error as to the factual grounds, and therefore of violation of law.
III - DECISION
143 - Accordingly, having regard to all that has been stated, this Arbitral Tribunal decides:
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To declare well-founded, as proven, on grounds of violation of law, the request for arbitral decision with respect to the annulment of the IUC assessment acts, for the years 2009 to 2012, as identified in the proceedings, relating to the vehicles identified in the proceedings;
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To annul, consequently, the IUC assessment acts, for the years 2009 to 2012, relating to the vehicles, as are mentioned above;
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To condemn the TA to pay the costs of the present proceedings.
VALUE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In accordance with the provisions of Articles 306, No. 2 of the CPC (former 315, No. 2) and 97-A, No. 1 of the CPPT and Article 3, No. 2 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the value of the proceedings is set at €40,082.15.
COSTS
In accordance with the provisions of Article 12, No. 2, in fine, and Article 22, No. 4, both of the RJAT, and Article 4 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings and Table I, which is attached thereto, the total amount of costs is set at €2,142.00.
Let it be notified.
Lisbon, 05 November 2014
The Arbitrator
António Correia Valente
(The text of the present decision was drawn up by computer, in accordance with Article 131, No. 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (former 138, No. 5), applicable by reference of Article 29, No. 1, paragraph e) of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January (RJAT), its drafting being governed by the spelling prior to the Orthographic Agreement of 1990.)
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