Summary
Full Decision
ARBITRAL DECISION
I. REPORT
I.1
On 21 May 2018, the claimant A..., Lda., a legal entity no. ..., with registered office at Av. ..., ...-... Lisbon, requested, pursuant to articles 2 and 10 of Decree-Law no. 10/2011 of 20 January, the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal with the designation of a sole arbitrator by the Deontological Council of the Administrative Arbitration Centre, in accordance with article 6, no. 1 of the aforementioned legal instrument.
The request for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal was accepted by the President of CAAD and was notified to the Tax and Customs Authority (hereinafter referred to as AT or "Respondent") on 01 August 2018.
The Claimant did not proceed to designate an arbitrator, wherefore, under article 5, no. 2, subparagraph b) and article 6, no. 1 of the RJAT, the undersigned was designated by the President of the Deontological Council of CAAD to serve as the sole arbitrator in this Arbitral Tribunal, having accepted in accordance with legal requirements.
The AT submitted its reply on 01 October 2018.
The Claimant was notified by order dated 03.10.2018 to, if so wished, comment on the exceptions (material incompetence of the Arbitral Tribunal) raised by the Respondent.
The Claimant responded to the exception by submission on 11.10.2018.
By order of 17.10.2018, the meeting provided for in article 18 of the RJAT was dispensed with and it was decided that the proceedings would continue with written closing arguments.
Duly notified, the parties submitted their arguments (02.11.2018 by the Claimant and 20.11.2018 by the Respondent).
The Claimant seeks that the Arbitral Tribunal declare illegal the assessment of Corporate Income Tax (IRC) no. 2018... for the tax year 2013, and the assessment no. 2018... of compensatory interest with all legal consequences, in the total amount of €7,793.32.
I.2. The Claimant supports its request, in summary, as follows:
The Claimant contends that the AT no longer has the power to demand payment of the assessments in question, as this right is barred by the statute of limitations.
The inspection activity in question commenced on 26.10.2016, the date on which the Claimant's certified accountant signed the Order of Service that initiated the inspection.
The date of 03.07.2017 is nothing more than a date artificially cited by the AT in an attempt to extend the suspension period.
As a rule, a tax inspection procedure must be concluded within a period of six months from its commencement.
It should be noted, however, that such extension does not operate automatically, and the AT is subject to a strict duty of substantiation.
The AT did not exercise this power, which is why it should be concluded that the tax inspection procedure in question would have to be concluded within a maximum period of six months, in order to fully comply with the principle of proportionality, provided for in article 7 of the RCPITA.
Accordingly, since the tax inspection in question commenced on 22.10.2016 and the AT did not invoke any grounds conducive to extending the six-month period, it should have been concluded by 26.04.2017.
Therefore, and since this did not occur (reasoned request for extension), it is unequivocal that the norm contained in article 36, no. 2 of the RCPITA was violated.
We thus have that the statute of limitations for the assessments in question commenced, as prescribed in article 45, no. 4 of the LGT, on 01.01.2014.
The four-year period referred to in article 45, no. 1 of the same legal instrument ran continuously and without any suspension.
For this reason, the AT should have notified the Claimant to proceed with payment of the tax due by 01.01.2018.
Given that the assessments in question are dated 10.01.2018, they are unenforceable, on the basis of their being statute-barred.
Furthermore, the RIT is silent with respect to the assessment of compensatory interest, so that even if the theory of minimal substantiation is accepted, the fact remains that the AT never made reference in the substantiation report of the assessment act to the fact that compensatory interest would be assessed, even though these, by the nature of the tax in question, are included in the IRC assessment.
On the other hand, there is no culpable conduct on the part of the Claimant, which equally prevents the assessment of compensatory interest, since the requirement of compensatory interest presupposes the fault of the taxpayer, which is not proven in the record.
Given that fault is not proven, compensatory interest cannot be upheld.
It is also important to note that the Claimant considers that the same suffers from a breach of legal formality, due to lack of prior hearing, which is invoked in accordance with article 163, no. 1 of the CPA (subsidiarily applicable by virtue of subparagraph d) of article 29, no. 1 of the RJAT).
I.3 In its reply, the AT invoked the following:
The determination of taxable matter was ascertained by the tax inspection services through the use of indirect assessment methods.
This determines the material incompetence of the present Arbitral Tribunal to hear and determine the request in question.
Thus, it is held that there is material incompetence of the Tribunal for the examination of the part of the arbitral decision request above identified, which constitutes a dilatory exception that prevents the hearing of this request and leads to dismissal of the instance as to the claim in question, in accordance with article 576, no. 2 and article 577, no. 2, subparagraph a), both of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), applicable by virtue of article 29, no. 1, subparagraph e) of the RJAT.
Strictly speaking, the Claimant, notwithstanding being notified to do so, did not timely avail itself of the request for revision of taxable matter, which is legally provided for that purpose.
Constituting the procedure for revision of taxable matter under article 91 of the LGT a condition of judicial impugnability, grounded in error in the quantification or in the presuppositions of the application of indirect methods, its absence entails that both the verification of the presuppositions of the indirect assessment and the taxable matter consequently fixed become res judicata or decided matter.
Wherefore, the present arbitral tribunal should refrain from hearing the request and should dismiss the Respondent entity from the instance, in accordance with article 278, no. 1, subparagraph e) and article 576, nos. 1 and 2 of the CPC, applicable by virtue of article 29, no. 1, subparagraph e) of the RJAT.
The Respondent continues, arguing that the inspection procedure commenced with the signature of the certified accountant on 03/07/2017.
From this date onwards, the statute of limitations for the right to assess is suspended, in accordance with article 46, no. 1 of the LGT.
This suspension may last up to a maximum of six months following notification to the taxpayer of the commencement of external inspection action.
In this case, the commencement of the inspection procedure occurred with the signature of the certified accountant on 03/07/2017.
The final RIT was sent by letter no. ..., dated 28/11/2017, dispatched by registered mail with acknowledgment of receipt (CTT registration no. ... PT), acknowledgment signed on 29/11/2017.
Accordingly, in accordance with article 62, no. 2 of the RCPITA: "2 - The report referred to in the preceding number shall be notified to the taxpayer by registered mail within 10 days following the expiration of the period referred to in article 60, no. 4, with the procedure being deemed concluded on the date of notification."
Thus, it becomes inescapable that the inspection procedure ceased well before six months had elapsed, in compliance with articles 36, nos. 1 and 2 of the RCPITA.
Accordingly, it must be concluded that compensatory interest is owed by the Claimant, given that only by facts imputable to it was the assessment of the tax due delayed, pursuant to article 102 of the CIRC, as well as to article 35, no. 1 of the General Tax Law (LGT).
There being a need, on the part of the tax inspection services, to ascertain the taxable matter through the use of indirect assessment methods, this fact is due solely and exclusively to fault imputable to the Claimant.
I.4 The Claimant responded to the exceptions as follows:
The limitation imposed by subparagraph b) of article 2 of Ministerial Order no. 112-A/2011 of 22 March does not imply that the final assessment act resulting from the fixing of taxable matter by indirect methods is not arbitrable.
The AT is not correct, as the case in question concerns vices relating to the final assessment act, even if the taxable matter was determined by indirect methods.
The subject of the arbitral decision request corresponds to the vices of the final tax assessment act (even if the taxable matter was determined by indirect methods) with respect to IRC and compensatory interest, relating to the tax period of 2013, and not vices of the act of determination of taxable matter by indirect methods.
The statute of limitations for the right to assess and the illegality of the assessment of compensatory interest are vices that may be invoked and subject to direct challenge, as the request for revision of taxable matter constitutes a prerequisite or condition of impugnability of the assessment only in the case of error in the presuppositions of application of the indirect valuation of taxable matter.
II. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
A material incompetence exception of the Arbitral Tribunal is raised, which must be addressed preliminarily.
The Respondent alleges that the request formulated in the arbitral decision request is the annulment of an IRC assessment that was drawn up following an inspection procedure in which the taxable matter was ascertained through indirect assessment methods. The Respondent concludes that this dilatory exception should lead to dismissal of the instance.
What is the law?
The competence of arbitral tribunals functioning at CAAD is defined, in the first instance, by article 2, no. 1 of the RJAT, which establishes the following:
"1 - The competence of arbitral tribunals comprises the examination of the following claims:
a) The declaration of illegality of acts of assessment of taxes, self-assessment, withholding at source and payment on account;
b) The declaration of illegality of acts of determination of taxable matter when not giving rise to assessment of any tax, of acts of determination of taxable income and of acts of determination of patrimonial values;"
In the second instance, the competence of arbitral tribunals functioning at CAAD is limited by the commitment of the Tax and Customs Authority which, pursuant to article 4, no. 1 of the RJAT, has been defined by Ministerial Order no. 112-A/2011 of 12 March, which establishes in article 2 the following, insofar as relevant: "The services and bodies referred to in the preceding article commit themselves to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals functioning at CAAD that have as their object the examination of claims relating to taxes whose administration is entrusted to them referred to in no. 1 of article 2 of Decree-Law no. 10/2011 of 20 January, with the exception of the following:
a) (...);
b) Claims relating to acts of determination of taxable income and acts of determination of taxable matter, both by indirect methods, including the decision of the revision procedure;
(...)"
In the case at hand, the challenged act is an IRC assessment relating to the tax year 2013. It is manifest and accepted by all that the assessment was made following an inspection procedure in which the taxable matter was ascertained through indirect assessment methods.
In the arbitral decision request, the Claimant invokes only one ground for the annulment of the assessment: statute of limitations.
The subject of the arbitral decision request is the assessment act and not the prior indirect assessment act. The Claimant points to no vice relating to the indirect assessment.
What is truly at issue is the legality or otherwise of the assessment, namely whether or not the statute of limitations period has expired, without it being necessary to examine and pronounce ourselves on the quantification of the indirect assessment, nor on the presuppositions for determining the indirect assessment.
The present action does not have as its subject the decision on the assessment of taxable matter by indirect methods, but rather the act of assessment of IRC for which the Tribunal is competent, pursuant to article 2, no. 1, subparagraph a) of the RJAT and article 2 of Ministerial Order no. 112-A/2011 of 22 March.
Furthermore, under article 86, no. 5 of the LGT, the request for revision of taxable matter, provided for in article 91 of the LGT, prior to judicial remedies, is only necessary in the case of error in the quantification or error in the presuppositions of the indirect determination of taxable matter.
Having the Claimant invoked statute of limitations as a ground, pursuant to article 86, no. 5 of the LGT, the challenge of the assessment is not dependent on prior recourse to the request for revision of taxable matter.
Given the foregoing, since the challenged act is an assessment and no ground relating to the quantification of taxable matter, nor relating to the presuppositions of the indirect assessment has been invoked, it appears to us that this Tribunal is materially competent to examine the arbitral decision request.
Given the foregoing, the exception raised is unfounded, and the arbitral tribunal is deemed materially competent (article 2, no. 1, subparagraph a) of the RJAT).
The Tribunal is competent and is duly constituted, pursuant to articles 2, no. 1, subparagraph a), 5 and 6, all of the RJAT.
The parties have legal standing and capacity.
The parties are legitimate and are legally represented, pursuant to articles 4 and 10 of the RJAT and article 1 of Ministerial Order no. 112-A/2011 of 22 March.
The proceedings are properly constituted.
There are no other preliminary questions that need to be addressed nor vices that invalidate the proceedings.
It now becomes necessary to examine the merits of the request.
III. THEMA DECIDENDUM
The central question to be decided, as framed by the Claimant, is whether the right to assess the tax (IRC-2013) is barred by the statute of limitations.
IV. FACTUAL MATTER
IV.1. Proven Facts
Before addressing the issues, it is necessary to present the factual matter relevant to its understanding and decision, which, having examined the documentary evidence, the administrative tax proceedings file attached and having regard to the facts alleged, is established as follows:
Through service order no. OI2016..., the business activity of the Claimant was subject to an external inspection procedure, which covered the period of 2013.
The present Claimant was notified, in the person of its certified accountant, of the Order of Service, dated 26.10.2016.
On 03.07.2017, the Claimant's certified accountant wrote the said date on the service order.
Following the inspection that then took place, the Claimant was notified on 25.10.2017 of the draft tax inspection report in order to, within the period of 15 (fifteen) days, exercise the right of prior hearing.
The Claimant exercised its right of prior hearing on 10.11.2017.
The Claimant was notified of the final RIT on 29.11.2017.
The said RIT determined that "based on the evidence collected (...), in particular the failure to identify customers on invoices, the discrepancy in the description of products purchased and sold, the date of recording in the SAFT file, both of invoices and purchases, the discrepancy in the balances of accounts #2111 and #71113, as well as the recording of some internal movements without documentary support, there are facts that by themselves justify the application of indirect methods in accordance with article 87, no. 1, subparagraph b) of the LGT."
The RIT concluded that in the case at hand there is an impossibility of direct and exact proof and quantification of the elements necessary for the correct determination of the taxable matter of any tax.
Subsequently, the Claimant was notified on 11.01.2018 of the corresponding IRC assessment no. 2018... (dated 08.01.2018, with the voluntary payment deadline of 19/02/2018) and the assessment of compensatory interest no. 2018..., in the total amount of €7,793.32.
The assessment of compensatory interest no. 2018... indicates that the compensatory interest relates to the delay in the assessment of IRC, indicates the amount on which the interest is calculated (€6,841.84), the period of time considered for the calculation of interest (2014/06/01 to 2017/11/20), the applicable rate (4%) and the value of interest (€951.48).
IV.2. Unproven Facts
There are no essential facts that are unproven, as all facts relevant to the examination of the request have been considered proven.
IV.3. Substantiation of the Factual Matter
The proven facts form part of uncontested matter and are documentarily demonstrated in the proceedings.
The facts set out in items 1 to 10 are accepted on the basis of the analysis of the administrative proceedings, the documents submitted by the Claimant (docs. 1 to 5 of the request for constitution of the Tribunal) and the position taken by the parties.
V. THE LAW
Statute of Limitations
The Claimant alleges the statute of limitations bars the right to assess IRC for 2013.
The statute of limitations period is four years (article 45, no. 1 of the LGT). As IRC is a periodic tax, this period begins to run from the end of the year in which the taxable event occurred (article 45, no. 4 of the LGT).
In the case of IRC for the tax year 2013, the statute of limitations period commenced on 01.01.2014.
As stated in item 1 of the proven facts, the AT initiated an external tax inspection of the taxpayer. An inspection is external when inspection acts are performed wholly or partly on the premises of the taxpayer (article 13, subparagraph b) of the RCPITA).
The statute of limitations period is suspended upon the commencement of an external tax inspection (article 46, no. 1 of the LGT). As expressly stated in article 46, no. 1 of the LGT, suspension occurs upon notification to the taxpayer of the service order. The relevant moment for the commencement of suspension of the statute of limitations period is that of notification of the service order. In the case at hand, notification occurred on 03.07.2017, which the Claimant acknowledges in its article 11 of the arbitral decision request. The date of the service order (26.10.2016) is irrelevant for the purposes of suspension of the statute of limitations period.
Furthermore, pursuant to article 51, no. 2 of the RCPITA, the external inspection procedure is considered to have commenced upon notification to the taxpayer of the service order and not on the date of issuance of the service order.
Given the foregoing, from 03.07.2017, the statute of limitations period for IRC for 2013 was suspended.
The final report of the inspection procedure was notified to the taxpayer on 29.11.2017, at which date the suspensive effect ceased.
The challenged assessment was made on 08.01.2018 and notified to the taxpayer on 11.01.2018.
Having regard to the date the statute of limitations period commenced (01.01.2014) and its suspension (from 03.07.2017 to 29.11.2017), the four-year period had not yet elapsed when the taxpayer was notified of the IRC assessment.
Accordingly, the statute of limitations does not bar the tax act.
The Claimant invokes, in its arguments, the principle of official investigation (article 99, no. 1 of the LGT), requesting this Tribunal to conduct investigative measures to ascertain which Service Order had been signed by the taxpayer in October 2017. Now, as correctly noted in the judgment of the TCAS of 24.11.2016, proc. no. 06887/13:
"The principle of investigation reflects the power and duty that the Tribunal has to clarify and instruct autonomously, even beyond the contributions of the parties, the facts subject to judgment, thereby creating the basis for deciding, a principle that applies in tax judicial proceedings (cfr. article 99, no. 1 of the General Tax Law; article 13, no. 1 of the Tax Procedure Code).
However, the Tribunal's power and duty of investigation is limited to facts alleged by the parties or which the judge may officially know (cfr. article 99, no. 1 of the LGT). In other words, we cannot forget that the dispute and the object of the proceedings are individualized not only by the claim but also by the cause of action, since our procedural law has adopted the so-called substantiation theory, according to which it is not enough for the plaintiff to formulate a claim, but must equally delimit it by a concrete 'causa petendi' (cfr. article 581 of the Civil Code). In contentious tax proceedings too, the judge is limited to judging 'secundum allegata', and cannot by itself broaden the object of the proceedings, a premise that conditions the examined principle of investigation."
The principle of official investigation does not consist of substituting a party in its duty to allege facts that the Claimant itself does not allege in the arbitral decision request and has doubts about, reflected in articles 32 and 33 of its arguments, regarding their existence.
For this reason, this ground also fails and must be rejected.
Finally, it should be noted that since the tax inspection procedure was initiated on 03.07.2017 and concluded on 29.11.2017, the six-month period (article 36, no. 2 of the RCPITA) for its conclusion was met.
Compensatory Interest
The Claimant does not accept the assessments of compensatory interest, corresponding to the challenged assessment. The Claimant contends that the assessment of compensatory interest suffers from lack of substantiation and violation of the right of participation.
It is important to begin by noting that the autonomous challenge of compensatory interest can only be grounded on a vice proper to that assessment, namely the non-verification of the legal presuppositions on which it depends.
The right to substantiation, with respect to acts that affect rights or legally protected interests, has constitutional consecration of a nature analogous to rights, freedoms and guarantees - Title II, Part 1 of the CRP - article 268, no. 3 - the respective constitutional principle having been elaborated in article 77, nos. 1 and 2 of the LGT.
Substantiation has the function of informing the administered party of the reasons for the decision, allowing it to choose between accepting the act or challenging it. Substantiation must be contextual and integrated into the act itself (albeit possibly by reference), expressed and accessible (through a brief exposition of the factual and legal grounds for the decision), clear (so as to allow, through its terms, precise understanding of the facts and law on which the decision is based), sufficient (allowing the recipient of the act concrete knowledge of the motivation thereof) and congruent (the decision must be the logical and necessary conclusion of the reasons invoked as its justification).
The lack or insufficiency of substantiation of the act, a vice of a formal nature (and not substantive), occurs, therefore, when the respective act does not externalize in a clear, sufficient and congruent manner the reasons why it has a particular substantive content: the act is only substantiated if a normally diligent or reasonable recipient - an ordinary person - placed in the concrete situation expressed by the substantiating declaration and faced with the concrete administrative act (which will require, depending on its diverse nature or type, greater or lesser density of substantiation elements) is in a position to know the functional (not psychological) cognitive and evaluative course of the author of the act.
The decision in tax procedure matters also requires a brief exposition of the factual and legal reasons that motivated it, such substantiation being able to consist of mere declaration of agreement with the grounds of earlier opinions, information or proposals, including those forming part of the tax inspection report, and must always contain the applicable legal provisions, the qualification and quantification of the taxable facts and the operations for ascertaining the taxable matter and the tax (cfr. article 77 of the LGT), with substantiation being constitutionally adequate that respects the aforementioned principles of sufficiency, clarity and congruence and is, on the other hand, contextual or contemporaneous with the act, with substantiation provided afterwards being irrelevant.
With respect to the act of assessment of interest, the case law of the STA has established understanding to the effect that the minimal substantiation required for such acts of assessment (interest) must indicate the reason for the assessment, the amount on which the same is calculated, the period of time considered for the calculation of interest, the applicable rate and the value of the interest, with mention of these elements in the assessment act itself or by reference to an attached document.
Therefore, turning to the concrete case, it is understood that the requisites required for the validity of the aforementioned act of assessment (of interest) are satisfied, for that, as is evident, in particular, from item 10 of the proven facts, in the assessment the aforementioned elements are explicitly stated [the reason for the assessment (there having been delay in the assessment of part or the whole of the tax, by a fact imputable to the taxpayer - articles 102 of the CIRC and 35 of the LGT); indication of the missing tax on which the interest is calculated (€6,841.84); the period to which the rate of interest applies - from 2014/06/01 to 2017/11/20; the applicable interest rate for the period (4%); and the value of the interest (€951.48)], necessary to fulfill the function of the legal duty of substantiation. Accordingly, it does not appear to us that the act suffers from lack of substantiation.
The Claimant also alleges the absence of fault, which should prevent the requirement of compensatory interest.
Pursuant to article 35 of the LGT, the presuppositions for the assessment of compensatory interest to taxpayers are: (a) the existence of an unlawful act (consisting of the delay in the assessment or payment of tax due or in the receipt of a refund exceeding the amount due); (b) fault; (c) damage; and (d) nexus of causality between the act and the damage.
It follows from the wording of the legal norm cited that compensatory interest is only due when there is fault of the taxpayer, that is, when the delay in the assessment or payment of tax is attributable, by way of intent or negligence, to the taxpayer.
In order for the Tax Administration to be able to assess compensatory interest to the Claimant, it must be possible to discern in the latter's conduct the existence of fault, whether in the form of intent or in the more attenuated form of negligence.
It should be recalled, in this regard, that, as article 35 of the LGT, relating to compensatory interest, is based on the presuppositions of civil liability contained in article 483 of the Civil Code, fault - in the forms of intent or negligence - must be assessed in accordance with the "diligence of a good father of a family, in light of the circumstances of each case" (cfr. article 487 of the Civil Code).
Now, in the case of compensatory interest, the factuality on which the judgment of fault must be grounded can be none other than that which underlies the ascertainment of tax found to be due, to the extent that they are integrated therein, pursuant to article 35, no. 8 of the LGT. In the present proceedings, the factuality that led to the indirect assessment is not at issue, precisely because it would be outside the material competence of this Tribunal.
Since the factual situation that led to the indirect assessment is legally consolidated, including because the Claimant did not use the necessary means of defense had it wished to challenge that prior act. Accordingly, the judgment of fault that permits the requirement of payment derives from the fact that the AT detected serious deficiencies and irregularities in the Claimant's accounting, imputable to and the responsibility of the latter, which prevented direct proof of the taxable matter (article 87, no. 1, subparagraph b) and article 88, subparagraph a) of the LGT).
In this case, there was a culpable and reprehensible conduct on the part of the Claimant that delayed the assessment of the tax and permits the requirement of compensatory interest (article 35, no. 1 of the LGT).
As for the violation of the right of participation, under article 60, no. 3 of the LGT, having the AT heard the taxpayer with respect to the tax from which the assessment of compensatory interest derives, it is no longer legally required that it conduct a new hearing in an autonomous and distinct manner.
Accordingly, the ground of violation of the Claimant's right of participation also fails.
VI. DECISION
Given all the foregoing, it is decided:
a) To judge the request for declaration of illegality of the IRC assessment no. 2018... for the tax year 2013, and the assessment no. 2018... of compensatory interest to be entirely without merit;
b) To uphold entirely the tax acts that are the subject of this proceeding;
c) To condemn the Claimant to pay the costs of the proceedings, in accordance with the below.
The value of the proceeding is fixed at €7,793.32 in accordance with article 97-A, no. 1, subparagraph a) of the CPPT, applicable by virtue of subparagraph a) of article 29, no. 1 of the RJAT and no. 2 of article 3 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings.
The value of the arbitration fee is fixed at €612.00 in accordance with Table I of the Regulation of Costs of Tax Arbitration Proceedings, to be paid in full by the Claimant, as the request was entirely without merit, pursuant to articles 12, no. 2 and 22, no. 4, both of the RJAT, and article 4, no. 4 of the cited Regulation.
Notify accordingly.
Lisbon, 08 January 2019
The Arbitrator
(André Festas da Silva)
[1] In this sense cfr. decision of CAAD, 15/04/2015, proc. no. 694/2014T and Legal Regime of Tax Arbitration, Carla Castelo Trindade, Almedina, 2016, p. 109
[2] In this sense cfr. judgment of STA of 01/6/2016, proc. no. 499/16, Annotated LGT, Diogo Leite Campos and others, Encontro da Escrita, 4th ed., 2012, p. 746 and Lessons of Tax Procedure and Process, Joaquim Freitas Rocha, 2009, Coimbra Editora, p. 190
[3] The Duty of Express Substantiation of Administrative Acts, Vieira de Andrade, Almedina, 1990, pp. 53 et seq.
[4] Cfr. judgments of STA, of 26/3/2014, proc. no. 01674/13 and of 23/4/2014, proc. no. 01690/13.
[5] Cfr. the judgments of STA, of 21/4/2010, proc. no. 743/09; of 16/10/2010, proc. no. 830/10; of 30/11/2011, proc. no. 619/11; of 29/2/2012, proc. no. 928/11; of 14/2/2013, proc. no. 645/12 and of 09/03/2016, proc. no. 0850/15
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