IUC Vehicle Tax Assessment Challenged in CAAD Arbitration: Decision 289/2015-T

ARBITRAL DECISION

I. - STATEMENT

A - PARTIES

A..., LDA, legal entity no...., with registered office at Building..., Avenue..., Lot..., ...floor - Lisbon, hereinafter referred to as the "Claimant," filed an application for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal, pursuant to Article 10(2) of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January (Legal Framework for Arbitration in Tax Matters, hereinafter referred to as "RJAT"), with a view to examining the following dispute against the Tax and Customs Authority (which succeeded, among others, the General Directorate of Taxes), hereinafter referred to as "Respondent" or "AT".

B - CLAIM

1 - The application for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal was accepted by His Excellency the President of CAAD on 07 May 2015 and, on the same date, notified to the AT.

2 - The Claimant did not proceed to appoint an arbitrator, wherefore, pursuant to Article 6(1) of the RJAT, the undersigned, on 02-07-2015, was designated by the Ethics Council of the Administrative Arbitration Centre as arbitrator of a Single Arbitral Tribunal, having accepted in the terms legally provided.

3 - The Parties were, on 02-07-2015, duly notified of such designation, and did not manifest the will to refuse it, pursuant to the combined provisions of Article 11(1)(a) and (b) and Articles 6 and 7 of the Code of Ethics.

4 - Under these circumstances, in accordance with Article 11(1)(c) of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January, as amended by Article 228 of Law No. 66-B/2012, of 31 December, the arbitral tribunal was duly constituted on 21-07-2015.

5 - Following the order issued by the arbitral tribunal on 27-11-2015, concerning whether the Claimant intended to waive the holding of the meeting provided for in Article 18 of the RJAT (Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January), and whether it waived the submission of pleadings, equally provided for in the said legal provision, the Claimant stated that, although waiving the holding of the said meeting, it did not waive the submission of written pleadings.

6 - By order issued by the arbitral tribunal on 11-12-2015, a successive period of 5 days was granted for the Claimant, within 5 days, to submit written pleadings, and for the Respondent, if it wished, in the same period and successively, counted from notification of the Claimant's pleadings, to file its counter-pleadings to the proceedings.

7 - On 06 December 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal considered the holding of the meeting provided for in Article 18 of the RJAT to be waived, having regard to both the orders issued to this effect in the electronic case management system, and the fact that the dispute related fundamentally to matters of law, and the will of the parties to waive the said meeting.

8 - The Claimant hereby requests that this Arbitral Tribunal:

a) - Declare the illegality and consequent annulment of both the assessment acts relating to the Vehicle Circulation Tax (hereinafter referred to as IUC), and the assessment acts of compensatory interest (JC) associated therewith, contained in the assessments of which it was notified, which are referenced in the proceedings, relating to the years 2013 and 2014.

b) - Condemn the Tax and Customs Authority to reimburse the amount of € 553.65, which it indicates as the value of the claim.

c) - Condemn the Tax and Customs Authority to payment of indemnificatory interest, relating to the payment of the amount improperly assessed and paid.

C - CAUSE OF ACTION

9 - The Claimant, in support of its application for arbitral pronouncement, support which, in essence, it reiterates in the written pleadings duly filed, states, in summary, the following:

10 - That it carries on the activity of rental of motor vehicles and provision of services associated with fleet management.

11 - That it was recipient of various IUC assessment notices (in the number of sixteen), relating to the years 2013 and 2014, concerning nine vehicles, as identified in the Table Annexed to the claim.

12 - That it proceeded to payment of the amounts relating to the assessments of IUC and JC, identified in the proceedings.

13 - That it is not the taxpayer of IUC in relation to the vehicles in question, given that they had already been sold at the date of the tax liability.

14 - That even if the vehicles were not registered in the name of the buyers, this does not prevent the IUC from applying to the actual owners of the vehicles, once the respective transfer is demonstrated.

15 - That IUC complies with the equivalence principle, seeking to burden taxpayers in proportion to the environmental and road costs they cause, and therefore the interpretation of the expression "shall be considered," referred to in Article 3(1) of the Vehicle Circulation Tax Code (CIUC), which understands the same to constitute an irrebuttable presumption of ownership based on registration, would directly clash with the said principle.

16 - That in light of Article 3(1) of the CIUC, having the vehicles in question been sold on dates prior to the dates of tax liability, the taxpayers should be the new owners of those same vehicles.

17 - That the documents, attached to the proceedings, relating to accounting extracts, (jointly with the invoices attached to the proceedings), prove the sale of the motor vehicles identified in the Table Annexed to the application for constitution of the arbitral tribunal.

D - RESPONDENT'S ANSWER

18 - The Respondent, Tax and Customs Authority, (hereinafter referred to as AT), filed on 28-09-2015 its Answer, having, on the other hand, waived the submission of written pleadings, insofar as it considers that the written pleadings submitted by the Claimant were not submitted within the established time period.

19 - In the said Answer, the AT considers, first and foremost, as preliminary issues, the lack of proof of the timeliness of the application for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, in relation to the disputed assessments, with the exception of the assessment relating to the vehicle with licence plate ...-...-...

20 - It also emphasises the lack of attachment of certain documents to the application for arbitral pronouncement, namely those relating to both the payment of IUC and the payment of JC, as well as the receipt of the sale price of the vehicle.

21 - With respect to the mentioned documents, the AT also considers that, in light of Article 423 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which determines time limits for the attachment of said documents, as they were not presented with the pleadings in which the corresponding facts are alleged, their subsequent presentation is precluded.

22 - On the other hand, in its Answer, the AT believes that the Claimant's arguments cannot possibly be correct, inasmuch as they make an interpretation and application of the legal rules applicable to the case that is notoriously wrong, insofar as,

23 - They reveal an understanding that incurs not only in a biased reading of the letter of the law, but also in an interpretation that does not heed the systematic element, violating the unity of the regime enshrined in the entire CIUC and, more broadly, in the entire legal-fiscal system, further deriving from an interpretation that ignores the rationale of the regime enshrined in the CIUC. (Cf. Article 17 of the Answer)

24 - It states that the tax legislator in establishing in Article 3(1) of the CIUC who are the taxpayers of IUC established, expressly and intentionally, that these are the owners (or in the situations provided for in Article 3(2) the persons mentioned therein), being considered as such the persons in whose name they are registered. (Cf. Article 28 of the Answer)

25 - It emphasizes that the legislator did not use the expression "it is presumed" as it could have done, for example, in the following terms: "the taxpayers of the tax are the owners of the vehicles, being presumed as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose name they are registered." (Cf. Article 29 of the Answer)

26 - It considers that the drafting of Article 3 of the CIUC corresponds to a clear choice of legislative policy adopted by the legislator, whose intention, within its freedom of legislative arrangement, was that, for purposes of IUC, those considered owners are those who appear as such in the register. (Cf. Article 40 of the Answer)

27 - It states that the mentioned understanding has already been adopted by the jurisprudence of our courts, transcribing, for that purpose, part of the sentence of the Administrative and Tax Court of Penafiel, issued in Case No. 210/13.OBEPNF. (Cf. Articles 41 and 42 of the Answer)

28 - On the systematic element of interpretation, it considers that the solution advocated is intolerable, finding the understanding championed by the Claimant no legal support. (Cf. Article 45 of the Answer)

29 - On the "rationale" of the regime, the AT considers that, in light of a teleological interpretation of the regime enshrined throughout the Vehicle Circulation Tax Code, the interpretation advocated by the Claimant, in the sense that the taxpayer of IUC is the actual owner regardless of not appearing in the motor vehicle register, is manifestly wrong, insofar as it is the very rationale of the regime enshrined in the CIUC that constitutes clear proof that what the tax legislator intended was to create a tax based on the taxation of the owner of the vehicle, as it appears in the motor vehicle register. (Cf. Articles 68 and 69 of the Answer)

30 - It adds that the CIUC carried out a reform of the regime of taxation of vehicles in Portugal, substantially altering the regime of motor vehicle taxation, with the taxpayers of the tax becoming the owners appearing in the property register, regardless of the circulation of the vehicles on the public highway. (Cf. Article 71 of the Answer)

31 - In this sense, it states that this is the understanding registered, in particular, in recommendation No. 6-B/2012 of 22-06-2012, from the Ombudsman addressed to the Secretary of State for Public Works, Transport and Communications.

32 - It also considers that the interpretation conveyed by the Claimant is, beyond what has already been stated, unconformable with the Constitution, insofar as such interpretation results in the violation of the principle of trust, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of efficiency of the tax system and the principle of proportionality. (Cf. Articles 123 and 124 of the Answer)

33 - It adds that the invoices attached to the proceedings do not constitute sufficient proof to "undermine the (supposed) legal presumption established in Article 3 of the CIUC," insofar as they lack a synallagmatic character, which absence "[…] could be remedied by proof of receipt of the price […]" contained therein, by the Claimant. (Cf. Articles 85 and 87 of the Answer)

34 - It further states that the Respondent was not the one who gave rise to the filing of the application for arbitral pronouncement, but rather the Claimant, and consequently the Claimant should be condemned in the arbitral costs "pursuant to Article 527(1) of the New Code of Civil Procedure by virtue of Article 29(1-e) of the RJAT," also referring that the legal requirements conferring the right to indemnificatory interest are not met, emphasizing that the Claimant has not presented proof of payment, either of IUC or of JC, in respect of 15 of the 16 assessments contested by it. (Cf. Articles 144 to 147 and 153 of the Answer)

35 - It considers, in conclusion, that, in light of all the arguments presented, the tax acts in question are valid and legal, and the application for arbitral pronouncement should be judged unmeritorious, with the tax assessment acts impugned remaining in the legal order, and the Respondent should accordingly be absolved from the claim.

E - ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

36 - It is therefore incumbent to examine and decide.

37 - In light of the foregoing, in relation to the positions of the Parties and the arguments presented, the issues to be decided are, in particular, those of knowing:

a) Whether the rule of subjective scope of application contained in Article 3(1) of the CIUC establishes or does not establish a presumption.

b) What is the legal value of motor vehicle registration in the framework of the CIUC, particularly for the purposes of the subjective scope of application of this tax.

c) If, at the date of occurrence of the tax event, the vehicle had already been previously transferred, although the right of ownership thereof remains registered in the name of its previous owner, for the purposes of Article 3(1) of the CIUC, the taxpayer of IUC is the previous owner or the new owner.

F - PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

38 - The Arbitral Tribunal is duly constituted and is materially competent, pursuant to Article 2(1)(a) of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January.

39 - The Parties have legal personality and capacity, are legitimate and are legally represented (cf. Article 4 and Article 10(2) of Decree-Law No. 10/2011 and Article 1 of Ordinance No. 112/2011, of 22 March).

40 - The proceedings do not suffer from defects that would invalidate them.

41 - Having in view the tax administrative proceedings, a copy of which was attached to the proceedings by the AT, and the documentary evidence forming part of the proceedings, it is now incumbent to present the factual matter relevant to the understanding of the decision, as is fixed in the terms mentioned below.

II - REASONING

G - FACTUAL BASIS

42 - With respect to material facts relevant, this tribunal considers the following facts to be established:

43 - The Claimant carries on the activity of rental of motor vehicles and provision of services associated with fleet management.

44 - The Claimant was recipient of various IUC assessment notices (in the number of sixteen), relating to the years 2013 and 2014, concerning nine vehicles, as identified in the Table Annexed to the claim.

45 - The Claimant proceeded to payment of the amounts relating to the assessments of IUC and JC, identified in the proceedings.

46 - The Claimant attached to the proceedings both the invoices for the sale of the nine vehicles and the documents relating to accounting extracts, which (jointly with the said invoices), prove the sale of the motor vehicles identified in the Table Annexed to the application for constitution of the arbitral tribunal.

47 - The Claimant submitted written pleadings, in which, in essence, it reiterates the grounds contained in its application for arbitral pronouncement.

48 - The Respondent waived the submission of written pleadings, as it understood that the written pleadings submitted by the Claimant were not submitted within the established time period. It must be noted in this regard that this is without reason, given that the Claimant's pleadings were submitted on 21-12-2015, the last day of the time limit for such submission, inasmuch as the Claimant, as appears from the proceedings, was notified on 14-12-2015 and the time limit established for such submission was 5 days.

REASONING ON ESTABLISHED FACTS

49 - The established facts are based on the documents mentioned, with respect to each of them, insofar as their adherence to reality was not questioned.

UNPROVED FACTS

50 - There are no facts established as unproved, given that all facts deemed relevant to the examination of the claim were proved.

H - LEGAL BASIS

51 - The factual matter is established, and it is now important to proceed with its legal subsumption and determine the law applicable to the underlying facts, in accordance with the issues to be decided enunciated in Article 37.

52 - The essential and decisive issue in the present proceedings, with respect to which there are absolutely opposed understandings between the Claimant and the AT, is reduced to knowing whether the rule of subjective scope of application contained in Article 3(1) of the CIUC establishes or does not establish a rebuttable presumption.

53 - The positions of the parties are known. Indeed, for the Claimant, the expression "shall be considered," inscribed in Article 3(1) of the CIUC, should be understood as a rebuttable legal presumption.

54 - The Respondent, for its part, considers that the drafting of Article 3 of the CIUC corresponds to a clear choice of legislative policy adopted by the legislator, whose intention, within its freedom of legislative arrangement, was that, for purposes of IUC, those considered owners are those who appear as such in the register.

I - INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE OF SUBJECTIVE SCOPE OF APPLICATION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 3(1) OF THE CIUC

55 - On this issue, that is, whether the rule of subjective scope of application contained in Article 3(1) of the CIUC establishes a presumption, it should be noted that the settled jurisprudence in CAAD points in the direction that the said rule establishes a legal presumption. Indeed, from the first Decisions, issued on this matter, in the year 2013, among which may in particular be cited those issued in the framework of Cases No. 14/2013-T, 26/2013-T and 27/2013-T, to the most recent of which may be indicated the Decision issued in the context of Case No. 69/2015-T, passing through numerous Decisions issued in the year 2014, of which are mentioned, by way of mere example, the Decisions issued in Cases No. 34/2014-T, 120/2014-T and 456/2014-T, all point to the understanding that Article 3(1) of the CIUC establishes a rebuttable legal presumption.

In this regard, consideration should also be given to the understanding inscribed in the Decision of the Central Administrative Court of the South, issued on 19-03-2015, Case 08300/14, available at: www.dgsi.pt, when it expressly states that Article 3(1) of the CIUC "[…] establishes a legal presumption that the holder of the motor vehicle register is its owner, and such presumption is rebuttable by virtue of Article 73 of the General Tax Law (LGT)".

This is an understanding that is entirely endorsed by this tribunal and is accepted as valid and applicable in the present case without further ado, as there is no need for other developments, given the abundant grounds set out in the mentioned Decisions and in the said Decision.

56 - Being this the understanding that, with respect to Article 3(1) of the CIUC, is entirely upheld by this tribunal, it is important, however, to note the lack of merit in the Respondent's position, when, in Articles 123 and 124 of its answer, it alleges that the interpretation that goes in the direction of understanding that a rebuttable legal presumption is established in Article 3(1) of the CIUC violates the constitutional principles of trust and legal certainty, of the efficiency of the tax system and of proportionality.

Let us examine that issue, then.

Let us see,

• With respect to the principle of proportionality, it is first and foremost important to emphasize that the same, insofar as it is materially inherent to the regime of rights, freedoms and guarantees, inscribed in their defence, aims, in essence, to discipline the action of the Public Administration in order that its activity in its relationship with individuals is guided by the choice of measures most appropriately balanced to the pursuit of the public interest.

As Professor Freitas do Amaral teaches, in Curso de Direito Administrativo (Course in Administrative Law), Vol II, Almedina, 2002, pp. 127/128 et seq., the "principle of proportionality constitutes a constitutive manifestation of the principle of the Rule of Law," and "[…] the idea is firmly anchored that, in a democratic Rule of Law state, the measures of public powers should not exceed what is strictly necessary for the realization of the public interest."

The principle of proportionality, adds the said Professor, ibid., p.129, means that "[…] the limitation of private goods or interests by acts of public powers must be adequate and necessary for the concrete purposes pursued by such acts, as well as tolerable when confronted with those purposes."

With respect to the principle of proportionality, it should also be noted, as J. J. Gomes Canotilho and Vital Moreira tell us, in CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA, ANOTADA (ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC), VOLUME I, 4th Edition, 2007, Coimbra Editora, pp. 392/393, when they consider that the said principle is divisible into three sub-principles, namely: "[…] a) principle of suitability (also designated as the principle of adequacy); b) principle of exigibility (also called the principle of necessity or indispensability); c) principle of proportionality in the strict sense, which means that the restrictive legal means and the ends obtained should be in a "just measure," preventing the adoption of unduly restrictive, excessive legal measures, in relation to the ends obtained […]".

The said sub-principles all have a common denominator, namely that of just balance and permanent coherence between the purposes of the law and the means adopted to achieve such purposes, which, in the circumstances and attempting the transposition of the said principle to the case at hand, will imply responding to the question of what is the appropriate interpretation of Article 3(1), with a view to the pursuit of the legal purposes envisioned in Article 1 of the CIUC, which translate to the tax burden on actual owners of motor vehicles (and not necessarily those registered) in proportion to the environmental and road costs they cause.

As Professor J. J. Gomes Canotilho states in Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição (Constitutional Law and Theory of the Constitution), Almedina - Coimbra, 1998, pp. 264 et seq., the most important field of application of the principle of proportionality or of the prohibition of excess, which has constitutional basis in Articles 18(2) and 266(2) of the Portuguese Constitution (CRP), "[…] is that of the restriction of rights, freedoms and guarantees by acts of public powers. However, the logical domain of application of the principle of proportionality extends to conflicts of legal goods of any kind." The administration, adds the said author, ibid., "[…] must always observe, in each concrete case, the requirements of the prohibition of excess […]".

In this same direction points the jurisprudence, in particular the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 01-07-1997, Case No. 041177, available at: www.dgsi.pt, when it considers that the principle of proportionality in the broad sense comprises the congruence, the suitability or the adequacy of the means or measure to achieve the legally proposed purpose and, in the strict sense, encompasses the prohibition of excess.

The principle of proportionality is a corollary of the principle of justice, which means and implies that in its action the Public Administration should harmonize the specific public interest it is called upon to pursue with the rights and legitimate interests of individuals possibly affected by its acts, interests and rights which, in the case at hand, are reduced to the non-taxation in IUC of persons who are no longer owners of the vehicles and who, consequently, in no way contribute to the realization of any road and environmental cost.

What matters is to balance the legal purposes and the means to pursue them, and, in the framework of an assessment, to identify the most appropriate means for that effect, which, in the case, translate to the interpretation adopted by the arbitral tribunal.

It will be said, moreover, that the understanding that the said Article 3(1) of the CIUC establishes a rebuttable legal presumption corresponds to the only interpretation that coherently comports with the said principle of equivalence, and that is in line with the principles of justice and proportionality.

The interpretation that understands that a rebuttable legal presumption is established in Article 3(1) of the CIUC is, therefore, the only one that permits ensuring the pursuit of the purposes aimed at by the law - to burden the owners of motor vehicles in proportion to the environmental and road costs they cause, - as stated in Article 1 of the CIUC, which means that the taxpayers of IUC are, presumptively, the persons in whose name the vehicles are registered, that is, the said taxpayers are, in principle, and only in principle, the persons in whose name such vehicles are registered, there being, therefore, no other interpretation capable of achieving the said legal purposes, only thus, it is reaffirmed, are the said principles of proportionality and justice shown to be complied with.

The contrary understanding, that is, that considered by the AT, which interprets Article 3(1) of the CIUC as not establishing a rebuttable legal presumption, understanding that the taxpayers of IUC are, definitively, the persons in whose name the vehicles are registered, in the just measure in which it leads to the imposition of a tax burden on whom may already not be the owner of the vehicle in question and who, in this way, does not pollute, removing from tax liability whom, in reality, is the actual cause of environmental and road damage, resulting from the use of vehicles of which they are the real owners, it is evident that the legally prescribed purposes would not, in any way, be achieved, not respecting, thus, the principle of equivalence which, within the framework of the CIUC, has an absolutely structuring function. Such understanding, that yes, does not show itself, under these circumstances, in harmony with the principle of proportionality.

The interpretation made by the tribunal, in the decision which is now reformed, had precisely into account the principle of proportionality when, against what the Respondent intended, it has, in due account, that the definitive registration does not have constitutive effect in that it is intended to give publicity to the registered act, functioning only as a mere rebuttable presumption of the existence of the right and when, in homage to that principle, it has regard to the principle of equivalence, as a fundamental element of the CIUC.

• As for the efficiency of the tax system, it will be said that the efficiency of the Administration in general, or of the AT in particular, in the ordinary sense, corresponds to the capacity/methodology of work oriented towards the optimization of work performed or services provided, which means producing the maximum, in quantity and quality, with the minimum of costs and resources, having nothing to do with the observance of legally established principles and with respect for the rights of citizens, whether in the capacity of taxpayers or otherwise.

In the technical sense, it will be said that the principle of efficiency of the tax system is, commonly held, in the domain of tax procedure, as a corollary of the principle of proportionality, which as is known, imposes an adequate proportion between legal purposes and the means chosen to achieve those purposes, or, as Diogo Leite Campos, Benjamim Silva Rodrigues and Jorge Lopes de Sousa state, in Lei Geral Tributária, Anotada e Comentada (General Tax Law, Annotated and Commented), 4th Edition 2012, Encontro de Escrita, Lda, Lisbon, p. 488, in the notes to Article 55 of the General Tax Law, it concerns a principle that obliges "[…] the tax administration to refrain from imposing on taxpayers obligations that are unnecessary to the satisfaction of the purposes it seeks to pursue."

In this framework, the said principle of efficiency of the tax system will mean the capacity to achieve legally fixed objectives with the minimum of resources, which will also have nothing to do with respect for the rights of citizens, nor with the need for observance of other principles to which the tax administration must subject its activity, in particular that of inquisitorial procedure and the discovery of material truth, and obviously, the application of the mentioned principle of efficiency cannot be made, either with prejudice to the rights of citizens, or by the absence of observance of legal purposes. [1]

• As for the principle of legal certainty and trust, it should be noted, first and foremost, that the latter principle, that of trust, is a concretization of the principle of good faith, which, having consecration in our legal system since 1996, came to have express constitutional inscription, as is stated in Article 266(2) of the Portuguese Constitution (CRP), where it is established that "Administrative bodies and agents are subordinate to the Constitution and the law and must act, in the exercise of their functions, with respect for the principles of equality, proportionality, justice, impartiality and good faith." (emphasis added)

With respect to good faith, it is worth noting what Professor Freitas do Amaral states when, in Curso de Direito Administrativo (Course in Administrative Law), Vol. II, Almedina, 2002, pp. 135/136, citing Professor V. Fausto de Quadros, he tells us that "[…] the Public Administration is obliged to obey good faith in its relations with individuals. More: it should even give, also there, the example to individuals of the observance of good faith, in all its manifestations, as the essential nucleus of its ethical behavior. Without this, we can never affirm that the State (and with it other public entities) is a person of integrity."

On the other hand, the principle of trust is also regarded as a consequence of the principle of legal certainty, inseparable from the Rule of Law, which having to guarantee a minimum of certainty in the rights of persons and in the legal expectations created for them, is generative of trust of citizens in the legal protection of the Public Administration.

Regarding the principles of legal certainty and protection of trust, Professor J. J. Gomes Canotilho tells us in Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição (Constitutional Law and Theory of the Constitution), Almedina - Coimbra, 1998, p. 250 et seq., that the said principles are closely associated, being considered that "[…] legal certainty is connected with objective elements of the legal order - guarantee of legal stability, security of orientation and realization of law - while protection of trust is more connected with the subjective components of security, namely the calculability and foreseeability of individuals in relation to the legal effects of acts of public powers." In any case, adds the said Professor, ibid., that the "[…] general principle of legal certainty in the broad sense (thus encompassing the idea of protection of trust) can be formulated as follows: the individual has the right to be able to trust that his acts or public decisions affecting his rights, positions or legal relations grounded in valid and effective legal norms are linked to the legal effects foreseen and prescribed by those same norms."

It follows from this doctrine that persons in alienating their vehicles should be assured that, should they proceed to the sale of vehicles of which they are owners, and these not being registered in the name of the buyers, the legal effects resulting therefrom will be those foreseen and arising from the legal norms in force and their adequate interpretation, in light of the legal purposes of those same norms, which, in the present case, led the arbitral tribunal to consider registration as a rebuttable presumption of the existence of the right and that only those persons who cause road and environmental costs should be taxed.

The best way to, in the case at hand, ensure legal certainty, in the broad sense, is, thus, that concretized by way of the interpretation made by the arbitral tribunal, when it considers that there is established in Article 3(1) of the CIUC a rebuttable legal presumption, allowing any citizen who proceeds to the sale, to a third party, of a motor vehicle, the possibility of demonstrating that, at the time of the IUC liability, they were no longer its owner nor responsible for the payment of that tax.

• Beyond what is stated above, it is also important to ascertain whether the interpretation adopted by the arbitral tribunal, beyond not conflicting with any of the referenced principles, is inscribed directly and substantively in the context of the constitutional order.

With respect to the interpretation of law in light of the Constitution, or of interpretation in conformity with the Constitution, Professor Jorge Miranda tells us, in Manual de Direito Constitucional (Manual of Constitutional Law), TOME II, Introduction to the Theory of the Constitution, 2nd edition, Coimbra Editora, 1987, p. 232 et seq., that what is at issue, first and foremost, is "[…] taking into account, within the systematic element of interpretation, that which pertains to the Constitution. Indeed, each legal provision must not only be understood in the set of provisions of the same law and each law in the set of the legislative order; it must also be considered in the context of the constitutional order [..]". (emphasis added)

The understanding that considers that a rebuttable legal presumption is established in Article 3(1) of the CIUC is supported by various elements of interpretation, among which may be cited the systematic element, insofar as interpretation in conformity with the Constitution implies that within the systematic element of interpretation, account is taken of that which pertains to the Constitution.

On the mentioned systematic element, the following should be stated:

a) In the understanding of BAPTISTA MACHADO, in Introdução ao Direito e ao Discurso Legitimador (Introduction to Law and to Legitimizing Discourse), p. 183, the systematic element "[…] comprises the consideration of the other provisions that form the normative complex of the institute in which the rule to be interpreted is integrated, that is, which regulate the same matter (context of the law), as well as the consideration of legal provisions that regulate parallel normative problems or related institutes (parallel places). It also comprises the systematic place that belongs to the rule to be interpreted in the overall order, as well as its consonance with the spirit or intrinsic unity of the entire legal order."

b) It is known that a legal principle, in the case the principle of equivalence, does not exist in isolation, but rather is linked by an intimate nexus with other principles that integrate, at the more global level, the respective legal order, in the case, with the other principles embodied in the system inscribed in the CIUC, and with other principles constitutionally enshrined. In that sense, each article of a given legal instrument, in the case the CIUC, will only be comprehensible if we situate it both before the other articles that follow or precede it and before the constitutional order.

c) With respect to the systematization of the CIUC, concerns of an environmental order were determinative in that the mentioned principle of equivalence was, from the outset, inscribed in the first article of the said Code, which necessarily leads to subsequent articles, insofar as they are grounded in such a principle, being influenced by it. This occurred, in particular, with the tax base, which came to be constituted by various elements, particularly those relating to pollution levels, and with the tax rates, established in Articles 9 to 15, which were influenced by the environmental component, and, naturally, also with the subjective scope of application itself, provided for in Article 3 of the CIUC, which cannot avoid the influence referred to.

d) The said principle of equivalence, as noted by Sérgio Vasques, in Os Impostos Especiais de Consumo (Excise Duties), Almedina, 2001, p. 122 et seq., implies that "[…] the tax should correspond to the benefit that the taxpayer derives from public activity; or to the cost that the taxpayer imputes to the community by its own activity." The said author adds, ibid., that "Thus, a tax on automobiles based on a rule of equivalence will be equal only if those who cause the same road wear and the same environmental cost pay the same tax; and those who cause different wear and environmental cost, pay different tax as well." For this reason, as also the cited author states, ibid., the realization of the principle of equivalence dictates special requirements "[…] with respect to the subjective scope of application of the tax [..]."

The mentioned principle that informs the current Vehicle Circulation Tax, is inscribed in the environmental concerns stated in Article 66(2)(a) of the Portuguese Constitution (CRP) and in the necessity of - with a view to ensuring the right to the environment, in the framework of sustainable development - to "Prevent and control pollution and its effects and harmful forms of erosion," concerns which are, manifestly, considered in the interpretation defended by the arbitral tribunal.

On the other hand, the provision in Article 66(2)(h) of the Constitution, when it states that, in the framework of sustainable development, it is incumbent on the State to "ensure that fiscal policy reconciles development with the protection of the environment and quality of life," entails as a corollary the polluter-pays principle, which concretizes the idea, inscribed therein, that who pollutes should, for that reason, pay, being thus, the interpretation defended by the arbitral tribunal, in perfect concordance with the constitutional order.

e) It is also appropriate to leave a brief note, merely to raise the question of why the rules contained in Article 9 of the Civil Code oblige the interpreter of ordinary legislation, given that the said Code does not occupy any prominent place in the legal system.

To this question, Professor Jorge Miranda responds, ibid., p. 230, when he considers that the "[…] conclusion toward which one is inclined is that rules such as these are valid and effective, not because they are contained in the Civil Code - for it does not occupy any prominent place in the legal system - but, directly, as such, because they translate a legislative will, not contradicted by any other provisions, with respect to the problem of interpretation (which are not merely technical-legal) of which they take care."

The said author adds, ibid., that "rules on these matters can be considered substantially constitutional and it would not even be repugnant to see them elevated to the Constitution in its formal sense."

With respect to the problematic of interpretation and its rules, as is drawn from Professor José de Oliveira Ascensão, in O Direito, Introdução e Teoria Geral (Law, Introduction and General Theory), 2nd edition, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1980, pp. 352/353, it should be stressed the imperative character of these rules, and their binding nature for the interpreter.

The interpretation that the arbitral tribunal makes of Article 3(1) of the CIUC and the criteria that, for that purpose, it considered, as expressly mentioned in the Decision issued in the framework of Case No. 196/2014-T, from the literal element, to the systematic element, passing through the historical and rational (or teleological) elements, do not thus collide with any constitutional principles.

Article 9(1) of the Civil Code provides that the search for legislative thought should "[…] particularly take into account […] the unity of the legal system, the circumstances in which the law was elaborated and the specific conditions of the time in which it is applied," circumstances and conditions which, today more than ever, are of sensitivity to the environment and respect for issues related thereto, and which are inscribed in the constitutional order.

Thus, in light of what has been stated, it does not seem, with due deference, that the AT has grounds, insofar as the interpretation considered by the arbitral tribunal, as being the only one capable of respecting the legal purposes, does not violate any of the principles in question, that is, the principles of trust and legal certainty, of the efficiency of the tax system and of proportionality, and, on the other hand, such interpretation is expressly and substantively in conformity with the principles inscribed in the Constitution.

Thus, it is not apparent that the interpretation made by the tribunal, with respect to Article 3(1) of the CIUC, contends with any constitutional norms or principles in force.

J - ON THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY OF THE VEHICLE AND THE VALUE OF REGISTRATION

57 - First and foremost, it should be added, in light of what shall hereinafter be expressly stated with respect to the value of registration, that the buyers of the vehicles become owners of those same vehicles by way of the conclusion of the corresponding purchase and sale contracts, with or without registration.

58 - There are three articles of the Civil Code that are important to take into account, with respect to the acquisition of ownership of a motor vehicle. They are, first of all, Article 874, which establishes the notion of a purchase and sale contract, as "[…] the contract by which ownership of a thing, or another right, is transmitted, in exchange for a price"; Article 879, in whose paragraph (a) it is established, as essential effects of the purchase and sale contract, "the transmission of ownership of the thing or the titularity of the right" and Article 408, which has as its heading contracts with real effect, and establishes in its paragraph 1, that "the constitution or transfer of real rights over a determined thing takes place by mere effect of the contract, except for the exceptions provided by law." (emphasis added)

We are, in effect, in the domain of contracts with real effect, which means that their conclusion brings about the transmission of real rights, in the case, motor vehicles, determined by mere effect of the contract, as expressly follows from the norm previously mentioned.

59 - With respect to the said contracts with real effect, it is worth noting the teachings of Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, when, in notes to Article 408 of the Civil Code, they tell us that "These contracts called real (quoad effectum), because they have as their immediate effect the constitution, modification or extinction of a real right (and not merely obligations tending to that result) are distinguished from the so-called real contracts (quoad constitutionem), which require the delivery of the thing as an element of their formation (cf. Articles 1129, 1142 and 1185)".

We are, thus, facing contracts in which the ownership of the thing sold is transferred, without more, from the seller to the buyer, having, as its cause, the contract itself.

60 - Also from the jurisprudence, in particular from the Decision of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 03B4369 of 19/02/2004, available at: www.dgsi.pt, it is drawn that, in light of Article 408(1) of the Civil Code, "the constitution or transfer of real rights over a determined thing takes place by mere effect of the contract, except for the exceptions provided by law." This is the case of the purchase and sale contract of a motor vehicle (Articles 874 and 879(a) of the Civil Code), which does not depend on any special formality, being valid even when concluded in verbal form - in accordance with Decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 3-3-98, in CJSTJ, 1998, year VI, Volume I, page 117". (emphasis added)

61 - Having the purchase and sale contract, in light of what has been stated, real effect with the mentioned consequences, one must also consider the legal value of motor vehicle registration subject to that contract, insofar as the transaction of the said property is subject to public registration.

62 - It indeed establishes, in Article 1(1) of Decree-Law No. 54/75, of 12 February, relating to the registration of motor vehicles, that "The registration of vehicles has essentially as its purpose to give publicity to the legal situation of motor vehicles and their trailers, with a view to the security of legal transactions." (emphasis added)

63 - Being clear, from the said norm, what is the purpose of registration, there is, however, no clarity, within the scope of the said Decree-law, about the legal value of that registration, and it is important to consider Article 29 of the mentioned legal instrument, relating to the registration of motor vehicle property, when it provides that "The provisions relating to property registration are applicable, with the necessary adaptations, to the registration of motor vehicles, […]." (emphasis added)

64 - In this framework, so that we may reach the sought knowledge about the legal value of motor vehicle property registration, it is important to take into account what is established in the Real Property Registration Code, approved by Decree-Law No. 224/84, of 06 July, when it provides in its Article 7 that "the definitive registration constitutes a presumption that the right exists and belongs to the registered holder in the precise terms in which the registration defines it." (emphasis added)

65 - The combination of the provisions mentioned above, particularly that established in Article 1(1) of Decree-Law No. 54/75, of 12 February and in Article 7 of the Real Property Registration Code, permits considering, on the one hand, that the fundamental function of registration is to give publicity to the legal situation of vehicles, allowing, on the other hand, to presume that the right exists and that such right belongs to the holder in whose name it is registered, in the precise terms in which it is defined in the registration.

66 - Thus, the definitive registration constitutes nothing more than the presumption that the right exists and belongs to the registered holder, in the exact terms of the registration, but a rebuttable presumption, admitting, therefore, contrary proof, as follows from law and jurisprudence has been pointing out, and to this regard, among others, the Decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice Nos. 03B4369 and 07B4528, respectively, of 19/02/2004 and 29/01/2008, available at: www.dgsi.pt.

67 - The function legally reserved for registration is, thus, on the one hand, to publicize the legal situation of the goods, in the case, of vehicles and, on the other, to permit us to presume that there exists a right over those vehicles and that the same belongs to the holder, as such inscribed in the registration, which means that registration does not have a constitutive nature of the right of ownership, but only a declarative one, hence registration does not constitute a condition of validity of the transfer of the vehicle from the seller to the buyer.

68 - Thus, if the buyers of the vehicles, as "new" owners thereof, do not promptly promote the adequate registration of their right, it is presumed, for the purposes of Article 7 of the Real Property Registration Code and Article 3(1) of the CIUC, that the vehicles continue to be the property of the person who sold them and who remains their owner in the registration, being that person the taxpayer of the tax, in the assurance, however, that such presumptions are rebuttable, either by force of Article 350(2) of the Civil Code, or in light of Article 73 of the General Tax Law (LGT). Hence, from the moment in which the presumptions in question are set aside, by means of proof of the said sales, the AT cannot persist in considering the seller of the vehicle, who, in the registration, continues to appear as its owner, as the taxpayer of IUC.

L - ON THE MEANS OF PROOF PRESENTED

69 - Always keeping in mind the verbal nature which purchase and sale contracts of motor vehicles may take, the proof of the sale of such property may be made by any means, in particular by means of invoices - receipts, relating to the sales of the vehicles.

70 - In this regard, that is, on the proof of the sale of motor vehicles supported on invoices - receipts, it is worth noting the understanding inscribed in the Decision of the Central Administrative Court of the South, issued on 19-03-2015, Case 08300/14, available at: www.dgsi.pt, when it states that "[…] The invoice should be viewed as the accounting document through which the seller sends to the buyer the general conditions of the transaction carried out (appearing) in the phase of liquidation of the amount to be paid by the buyer, [ ] not constituting proof of payment of the price by the same buyer and, consequently, proof that the purchase and sale was concluded (only the issuance of invoice/receipt or receipt constitutes proof of payment and discharge) [ ]".

71 - The Claimant, as a means of proof that it proceeded to the sale of the vehicles, identified in the present proceedings, on a date prior to the date of tax liability, attached, as documents annexed to the application for arbitral pronouncement, copies of the invoices relating to those alleged sales, which occurred between 23-11-1992 and 23-11-2008.

72 - It should, moreover, be emphasized that nothing permits considering that the invoices presented, all of them processed by a Certified Program, identified by No. 580/AT, as supporting the sale of the nine vehicles in question in the proceedings, do not reflect and correspond to the sales which, allegedly, were carried out.

73 - The invoices attached to the proceedings, as proof of the alienation of the vehicles, taking into account the business purpose of the Claimant and its business activity, translated in particular into the rental of motor vehicles, with the possibility of subsequent sale, show themselves to be totally adjusted to the mentioned business reality, being absolutely plausible the sale of the vehicles which the invoices presented aim to prove, with no elements being identified that embody any sham contracts, rather permitting the conclusion that we are facing invoices that reproduce the real and true sale of the vehicles to the persons indicated therein.

74 - Having, however, in view what is referred in the previous Article 71, and the need to proceed to the investigation of material truth with respect to the facts, the arbitral tribunal, considering in particular the provision in Article 13 of the Tax Procedure Code (CPPT) and Article 99 of the General Tax Law (LGT), promoted measures in order that the invoices, presented as proof of the sales in question, be complemented with other information, aimed in particular at the verification of the actual receipt of the values relating to the sales of the vehicles in question.

75 - With respect to the provision in the last of the mentioned articles, that is, Article 99 of the General Tax Law, it is worth noting what, in notes to this article, is indicated by Diogo Leite Campos, Benjamim Silva Rodrigues and Jorge Lopes de Sousa, in Lei Geral Tributária, Anotada e Comentada (General Tax Law, Annotated and Commented), 4th Edition 2012, Encontro de Escrita, Lda, Lisbon, p. 859, when, with respect to the inquisitorial principle, they state that "It is affirmed, without margin for doubt, the principle of full inquisitorial power of the tax tribunal in the domain of tax procedure […]. The inquisitorial principle applies to all tax tribunals that know of matters of fact, justifying the rejection of application of those norms of civil procedure that establish certain moments for the presentation of documents (cf. Articles 523, 524 and 706 of the CPC) […]", articles which correspond, respectively, to the current Articles 423 and 425 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with Article 706 being revoked.

76 - In this framework, it is also important to recall the teachings of Jorge Lopes de Sousa, in Código de Procedimento e de Processo Tributário, Anotado e Comentado (Tax Procedure and Process Code, Annotated and Commented), Volume I, 6th Edition, Áreas Editora, SA, Lisbon, 2011, p. 174, when, in notes to Article 13 of the mentioned Code, he states that "The limitation of powers of cognition to alleged facts, besides those of official knowledge, has no clear justification in tax procedure nor can it be understood in absolute terms. Indeed, although it is undeniable that there are some similarities between civil declaratory proceedings and impugnation proceedings […] it is also clear that there are substantial differences […]", which "reveals that we are not facing a process in which the dispositional principle fully prevails."

77 - The Claimant, within the time period granted for that purpose, came to add, to the said invoices, other elements complementary to them, in particular the corresponding accounting extracts, capable of proving that the values relating to the sales of the said vehicles were, by it, actually, received, which confirms the transfer of the ownership of those goods, on dates prior to the dates of the IUC liability.

78 - The said documents, as indeed the invoices which they complement, relating to the sale of the nine vehicles, insofar as they enjoy the presumption of veracity which Article 75(1) of the General Tax Law (LGT) confers upon them, it falling to the AT, in view of Article 75(2) of the General Tax Law, on the basis of well-founded and objective reasons which it might have, to demonstrate that the information inscribed therein does not correspond to reality, permit considering that such documentation constitutes sufficient means of proof to rebut the presumptions in question in the proceedings, that is, the presumption established in Article 7 of the Real Property Registration Code and that enshrined in Article 3(1) of the CIUC, which means that, at the time when the tax was due, the Claimant was not the owner of the vehicles in question.

79 - The Respondent when it considers that there is no legal basis for the said documents to have been requested, as appears from the outset in the Preliminary Issues to its Answer, and later in the Application, presented by it on 16/11/2015, in particular by violation of what is determined in Article 423 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that the presentation of documents should occur with the respective pleading, does not, at all, take into account what is referred in the previous Article 76, that is, that the inquisitorial principle applies to all tax tribunals that know of matters of fact, justifying the rejection of application of those norms of civil procedure that establish

80 - The AT, when it understands that the Claimant does not prove what it alleges, in particular because it does not make proof of payment, either of IUC or of JC, is not taking into account the documents, attached to the proceedings, relating to assessments relating to the nine vehicles identified in the proceedings, where there is reference to the corresponding payment. On the other hand, it did not, equally, take into account the information contained in the Tax Administrative Proceedings/Tax Service - Lisbon …, relevant to the present proceedings, when it states therein that "all official assessments issued were paid by the taxpayer A..."

81 - With respect to the said assessments, the Respondent states, in its Preliminary Issue (1), that with the exception of the IUC assessment of 2013, relating to the vehicle ...-...-..., for which the respective notification with the indication of the payment deadline (13-03-2015) was attached, the Claimant "does not make any proof of the timeliness of the application for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal in relation to all other disputed assessments." However, the other assessments, as appears from the proceedings, have the same payment deadline, that is, the date which is mentioned above, and therefore, having the application for constitution of the arbitral tribunal been filed on 05-05-2015 and accepted on 07-05-2015, its timeliness is assured.

82 - The amount resulting from the sixteen assessments, associated with the nine vehicles in question, amounts to a total of € 571.52, of which € 553.65 corresponds to IUC and € 17.87 to compensatory interest. In this respect, it should be noted the manifest error found in the addition of the items that make up the value of the proceedings, given that to the amount paid as IUC should be added the amount paid as JC, in order to obtain the total that was paid, and not the contrary, as is indicated in the application for arbitral pronouncement, insofar as the sum of € 553.65, which was paid in IUC, cannot correspond to the total paid of € 571.52, increased by the other item relating to the € 17.87, paid as compensatory interest.

83 - Under these circumstances, and in summary, having in view that the presumption enshrined in Article 3(1) of the CIUC was rebutted, with respect to the vehicles identified in the proceedings, whose first sale, with respect to the vehicle with licence plate ...-...-..., occurred on 23-11-1992 and the last of the sales, relating to the vehicle with licence plate ...-...-..., was completed on 23-11-2008, that is, on dates prior to the dates of the IUC liability, which pertains to the years 2013 and 2014, it should be considered that the Claimant, with respect to the mentioned vehicles, was not, at the date to which the assessments in question pertain, the taxpayer of the tax in question.

84 - The AT, when it understands that the taxpayers of IUC are, definitively, the persons in whose name the motor vehicles are registered, without considering that Article 3(1) of the CIUC embodies a presumption, is proceeding with the illegal assessment of IUC, with respect to the vehicles identified in the proceedings, based on the erroneous interpretation and application of the rules of subjective scope of application of the Vehicle Circulation Tax, contained in the said Article 3 of the CIUC, which constitutes the commission of tax acts lacking in legality due to error as to the factual and legal assumptions, determining the annulment of the corresponding tax acts, by violation of law.

M - ON REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT PAID AND INDEMNIFICATORY INTEREST

85 - With respect to the reimbursement requested, it should, first and foremost, be noted the lack of merit in the Respondent's position, when it questions the right that, with respect to the said reimbursement, the Claimant has, insofar as no proof was made of payment, neither of the tax nor of compensatory interest, relating to the sixteen assessments in question in the proceedings. Indeed, as is stated above, in particular in Articles 81 and 83, the amount of € 571.52 relating to all assessments of IUC and JC was paid by the Claimant, which occurred on 27-02-2015.

86 - Pursuant to Article 24(1)(b) of the RJAT, and in conformity with what is established therein, the arbitral decision on the merits of the claim, from which no recourse or challenge may be taken, binds the tax administration from the end of the period provided for recourse or challenge, and the latter - in the exact terms of the granting of the arbitral decision in favor of the taxpayer and until the end of the period provided for the spontaneous execution of the sentences of judicial tax tribunals - must "Restore the situation that would exist if the tax act subject of the arbitral decision had not been carried out, adopting the acts and operations necessary for that purpose." (emphasis added)

87 - These are legal commands that are in total harmony with Article 100 of the General Tax Law, applicable to the case by force of Article 29(1)(a) of the RJAT, in which it is established that "The tax administration is obliged, in case of total or partial allowance of complaints or administrative appeals, or of judicial proceedings in favor of the taxpayer, to the immediate and full restoration of the situation that would exist if the illegality had not been committed, including the payment of indemnificatory interest, in the terms and conditions provided by law." (emphasis added)

88 - The case in the present proceedings raises the manifest application of the mentioned norms, inasmuch as following the illegality of the assessment acts, referenced in this proceedings, and the payment of the sum of € 571.52, as is stated above, there must, by force of those norms, be reimbursement of the amount paid, both as to the tax and to compensatory interest, as a way of achieving the restoration of the situation that would exist if the illegality had not been committed, which amount, in the case at hand, is reduced to the total of € 571.52.

89 - As for indemnificatory interest, it appears manifest that, in light of what is established in Article 61 of the Tax Procedure Code (CPPT) and the requirements for the right to indemnificatory interest being met, that is, the existence of error imputable to the services from which results payment of the tax debt in an amount greater than that legally due, as provided for in Article 43(1) of the General Tax Law, the Claimant has the right to indemnificatory interest at the legal rate, calculated on the amount of € 571.52.

CONCLUSION

90 - In the factual framework that has been referred to, the AT, in carrying out the assessment acts in question in the present proceedings, founded on the idea that Article 3(1) of the CIUC does not establish a rebuttable presumption, makes an erroneous interpretation and application of this rule, committing an error as to the legal assumptions, which constitutes violation of law.

91 - On the other hand, because the AT, at the time of the occurrence of the tax events, considered the Claimant to be the owner of the vehicles referenced in the present proceedings, considering it, as such, a taxpayer of the tax, when such ownership, with respect to the nine vehicles in question, was no longer inscribed in its legal sphere, basing itself, thus, on factual matter divergent from actual reality, commits an error as to the factual assumptions, and therefore a violation of law.

III - DECISION

92 - Wherefore, having regard to all the foregoing, this Arbitral Tribunal decides:

• To judge the application for arbitral pronouncement to be meritorious, as proved, on the ground of violation of law, insofar as it concerns the annulment of the assessment acts of IUC and JC, relating to the vehicles referenced, relating to the years 2013 and 2014;

• To annul, consequently, the assessment acts of IUC and JC, relating to the years 2013 and 2014, relating to the vehicles, as is stated above;

• To condemn the AT to payment of indemnificatory interest at the legal rate, counted from the date of payment of the sum of € 571.52, relating to the assessments associated with the nine vehicles identified in the proceedings, until its full reimbursement.

• To condemn the AT to pay the costs of the present proceedings.

VALUE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

In conformity with Articles 306(1) and (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 97-A(1) of the Tax Procedure Code and Article 3(2) of the Costs Regulation in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, and having in view the error found in the addition of the items that make up the value of the proceedings, the value is fixed at € 571.52.

COSTS

In accordance with Article 12(2), at the end thereof, and Article 22(4), both of the RJAT, and Article 4 of the Costs Regulation in Tax Arbitration Proceedings and Table I, which is annexed thereto, the amount of total costs is fixed at € 306.00.

Let notification be made.

Lisbon, 07 January 2016

The Arbitrator

António Correia Valent

(The text of the present decision was prepared by computer, pursuant to Article 131(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (former 138(5)), applicable by reference to Article 29(1)(e) of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January (RJAT), governed in its drafting by the orthography prior to the Orthographic Agreement of 1990.

[1] See the study on the matter, prepared by Professor Carlos Pestana Barros, in Ciência e Técnica Fiscal (Science and Fiscal Technique), 2005, No. 416, pp. 105-126