IUC Tax on Leased Vehicles: Who Pays – Owner or Lessee? CAAD Ruling 373/2015-T

ARBITRAL DECISION

I. REPORT

A…, S.A., legal entity no. …, with address at Rua …, no. …, … – … Lisbon (hereinafter Claimant), came, pursuant to Article 10, no. 2, of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January (Legal Framework for Tax Arbitration, hereinafter referred to only as LFTA), to request the constitution of a single Arbitral Tribunal, in which the Tax and Customs Authority is requested, hereinafter TA or Respondent, with a view to the declaration of illegality and consequent annulment of the tax assessment acts for Single Motor Vehicle Tax identified in the arbitral petition.

The request for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal was accepted by His Excellency the President of CAAD and automatically notified to the TA on 25 June 2015.

Pursuant to no. 1 of Article 11 of the LFTA, in the wording introduced by Article 228 of Law no. 66-B/2012, of 31 December, the single Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 26 August 2015.

The TA responded, arguing that the claim should be judged unfounded.

In view of the content of the matter contained in the case file, the meeting referred to in Article 18 of the LFTA was waived and the holding of final submissions was dispensed with.

The Arbitral Tribunal is duly constituted and has material jurisdiction, pursuant to paragraph a) of no. 1 of Article 2 of the LFTA.

The parties have legal personality and capacity, are legitimate and are represented (Article 4, and no. 2 of Article 10 of the LFTA and Article 1 of Portaria no. 112/2011, of 22 March).

Pursuant to Article 3 of the LFTA, having regard to the principle of simplification and procedural economy, the cumulation of claims is admissible, considering that the merits of the claims depend on the assessment of the same circumstances of fact and the interpretation and application of the same legal principles and rules.

No nullities, exceptions, or preliminary issues exist that prevent immediate consideration of the merits of the case.

II. FACTS

Based on the elements contained in the case file and in the administrative proceeding attached to the case file, the following facts are considered proven:

A. The Claimant is a credit institution with strong presence in the national market;

B. Among its areas of activity, automotive sector financing assumes special relevance; A substantial part of its activity consists of the conclusion – among others – of financial leasing contracts intended for the acquisition, by companies and individuals, of motor vehicles;

C. The motor vehicles identified in the list attached as ANNEX A (whose registration is contained in column D) were given in financial lease by the Claimant to the customers also identified there (in column M) – see the respective contracts, attached as documents no. 27 to 52;

D. During the term of these Contracts, the use of the respective motor vehicles was exclusively the responsibility of the lessees;

E. On the date of termination of these Contracts, the lessees of the said motor vehicles decided to exercise their option to purchase, which is legally and contractually guaranteed to them;

F. Having thus become owners of the mentioned vehicles (as evidenced by the sales invoices attached as documents no. 53 to 78, identified in column T of the table that constitutes ANNEX A, by reference to the registration and having paid the respective residual value;

G. It being certain that, in a limited number of cases (specifically, nos. 7, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 31 of ANNEX A), the subjects who became owners of the vehicles do not coincide with those who originally concluded the financial leasing contract;

H. The Claimant proceeded to pay the Single Motor Vehicle Tax, to which the additional assessment acts identified in the table attached as ANNEX A relate.

There are no facts with relevance to the decision of the case that should be considered unproven.

This Tribunal has formed its conviction based on the documents attached to the case file by the Parties.

III. LEGAL ISSUES

The main question that arises in the present case concerns whether the Claimant should be qualified as a taxpayer of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax, when on the date to which the Single Motor Vehicle Tax assessment acts under analysis refer, the Claimant was no longer the owner of those vehicles, although the transfer of the vehicles was not duly registered with the Motor Vehicle Registration Office.

Alternatively, the question of whether the Claimant should be qualified as a taxpayer of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax with respect to vehicles that are the subject of financial leasing contracts will be analyzed.

To this end, the Claimant argues, synthetically, the following:

1. In the years (and, a fortiori, in the months of those years) to which the Single Motor Vehicle Tax assessment acts Sub Judice refer, the vehicles to which the same correspond had already left the legal sphere of the Claimant, with ownership belonging to others;

2. So that, on the dates to which the tax facts that gave rise to the Single Motor Vehicle Tax assessments here at issue refer, the Claimant was no longer the owner of the vehicles to which the same refer;

3. Consequently, the Claimant cannot assume the status of taxpayer of the tax that was assessed to it.

4. Furthermore, even if this were not the case, which is not conceded except in the interest of argument, the truth is that, in all cases identified in the table attached as ANNEX A, the Claimant – even before disposing of the respective motor vehicles – could not be considered a taxpayer of the corresponding Single Motor Vehicle Tax, because such vehicles were subject to financial leasing contracts, which determines that it is the lessee, and not the lessor, who is responsible for the payment of the said tax;

5. The TA cannot avail itself of the argument of lack of registration of transfer to require the unpaid tax from the Claimant here, not only because, if the transfer were not valid, the latter would remain a "mere" lessor entity of the vehicle in question – which, as is already settled among us and will be developed below, determines its lack of standing to assume the burden of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax – but especially because the lack of registration does not affect the validity of the purchase and sale contract but only its effectiveness, and, even this, only as against third parties in good faith for purposes of registration; a qualification that the TA undoubtedly does not assume in the case at hand;

6. In sum, the invoices attached by the Claimant appear to be fully sufficient to prove the transfer of the motor vehicles underlying the present request for arbitral determination, enjoying moreover the presumption of truthfulness.

7. And there is also no doubt that the transfer of ownership, in the cases here at issue, occurred before the Single Motor Vehicle Tax became due whose assessment is contested: either in years prior to the year itself for which the Single Motor Vehicle Tax is being required; or in months prior to the one in which the Single Motor Vehicle Tax became due;

8. Even if there were doubts, concerning some of the motor vehicles, the circumstance that the same vehicles are subject to a financial leasing contract – which ended precisely with their transfer – would have required that such a conclusion be reached;

9. Indeed, if it were understood that, regarding some of these vehicles, there was no transfer of ownership – which is not conceded, it is repeated, and is considered merely in the interest of argument – such would determine that the respective financial leasing contracts would still be in effect;

10. Thus, the Claimant would be placed, regarding those same vehicles, in the capacity of lessor entity, and therefore would not be a taxpayer of the corresponding Single Motor Vehicle Tax, whose responsibility for payment falls on the lessee;

11. In accordance with no. 2 of Article 3 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code, the rule is very simple: as it falls to the lessees to have exclusive use of the motor vehicle subject to the contract, so it also falls to them the obligation to pay the tax;

12. With respect to financial leasing, it is then evident: recognizing it the legislator itself as "user of the leased vehicle" (Article 19), there is no doubt that the lessee should bear the responsibility for compensating the costs (environmental and road) associated with the potential use of the respective vehicle;

13. And this rule is, in my view, the one that appears most consistent, precisely from the point of view of the ratio of the law, referred to above: knowing in advance that the Single Motor Vehicle Tax aims to impose on taxpayers the responsibility that is assigned to them by the potential use of motor vehicles – with respect to the environmental and road costs that such use entails – the same cannot fail to constitute the burden of whoever actually causes such costs, which cannot fail to be the person to whom belongs the right to use the vehicle in question;

14. In the words of Diogo Leite de Campos: "The Single Motor Vehicle Tax is an environmental tax that takes into account the use of the asset that is presumed. The owner is a taxpayer because it is to be presumed that the owner uses the asset. But, by proof to the contrary, in the sense that the owner does not use the asset, there being another with title to that use, the taxpayer becomes this one, and only this one" (in Opinion attached as ANNEX C);

15. Continuing: "once it is proven that there is a 'non-owner' with a legitimate and exclusive title to the use of the vehicle, then the 'ratio legis' leads to the taxpayer being this one and only this one. It is this one who is effectively responsible for the damages caused to the environment and to the roads" (our emphasis);

16. In the cases here at issue – and if it were to be considered, for any reason that the Claimant cannot discern, that the transfers of ownership of these vehicles had not occurred – by being then subject to financial leasing contracts, the motor vehicles whose Single Motor Vehicle Tax assessments are contested were not, at any moment, used by the Claimant, but rather by the respective lessees;

For its part, the TA alleges, in summary, the following:

1. The tax legislator, in establishing in Article 3, no. 1, who are the taxpayers of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax, expressly and intentionally established that these are the owners (or in the situations provided for in no. 2, the persons enumerated there), considering as such the persons in whose name the same are registered;

2. Note that the legislator did not use the expression "are presumed", as it could have done, for example, in the following terms: the taxpayers of the tax are the owners of the vehicles, being presumed as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose name the same are registered;

3. On the other hand, the tax standard is full of provisions analogous to that enshrined in the final part of no. 1 of Article 3, in which the tax legislator, within its freedom of legislative configuration, expressly and intentionally, enshrines what should be considered legally, for purposes of incidence, of income, of exemption, of determination and of periodization of taxable profit, for purposes of residence, of location, among many others;

4. By way of merely exemplificative, see Articles 2 of the Code of Municipal Tax on Onerous Transfers of Immovable Property (IMT Code), 2, 3 and 4 of the Code of Income Tax of Natural Persons (IRS Code) and 4, 17, 18 and 20 of the Code of Income Tax of Legal Persons (IRC Code).

5. In the case of Article 2, no. 3, a) of the CIMT, for example, the tax legislator does not presume that there is onerous transmission in the perfection of the contract-promise of acquisition and disposal of immovable property in which it is provided in the contract or subsequently that the promissory purchaser may cede its contractual position to a third party; the tax legislator expressly and intentionally assimilates this contract to an onerous transmission of property for purposes of IMT.

6. Similarly, in the case of Article 17, no. 2 of the CIRC, the legislator also does not establish that the net surpluses of cooperatives are presumed to be the net result of the period, but rather that these are considered as such.

7. In fact, most of the provisions on incidence under IRC have as their underlying ratio the determination of what should be considered as income for purposes of this tax, as opposed to what, in accordance with accounting rules, is income for the period.

8. Therefore, if it were understood that by using the expression "is considered" the tax legislator would have established a presumption, practically all the provisions on incidence under IRC would be set aside precisely because accounting prescribes solutions different from those of the CIRC, being exactly the purpose of the legislator to set apart such accounting rules.

9. If this were the case, all the useful effect of the said rules would be frustrated.

10. In these terms, it is imperative to conclude that, in the case of the present arbitral determination proceedings, the legislator expressly and intentionally established that are considered as such [as owners or in the situations provided for in no. 2, the persons enumerated there] the persons in whose name the same [the vehicles] are registered, because it is this interpretation that preserves the unity of the legal-fiscal system.

11. To understand that the legislator established here a presumption would unequivocally be to effect an interpretation against the law.

12. In view of this wording, it is manifestly not possible to argue that this is a presumption, as the Claimant contends.

13. It is, rather, a clear option of legislative policy adopted by the legislator, whose intention, within its freedom of legislative configuration, was that, for purposes of Single Motor Vehicle Tax, be considered owners those who appear as such in the motor vehicle register.

14. In sum, Article 3 of the CIUC contains no legal presumption.

15. To be concrete: the Claimant argues, supported by the doctrine embodied in the opinion corporified in Annex C attached to p.i., that Decree-Law 54/75 says nothing about the legal value of motor vehicle ownership registration, so that in light of what is provided in Article 7 of the Land Registration Code (legal diploma subsidiarily applicable to the former) it is necessarily to be concluded that registration constitutes a mere presumption.

16. From the articulation between the scope of the subjective incidence of Single Motor Vehicle Tax and the constitutive fact of the corresponding tax obligation it unequivocally follows that only the legal situations that are the object of registration (without prejudice to the permanence of a vehicle in national territory for a period exceeding 183 days, provided for in no. 2 of Article 6) generate the birth of the tax obligation.

17. For its part, no. 3 of the same article provides that "the tax is deemed due on the first day of the tax period referred to in no. 2 of Article 4".

18. That is, the moment from which the tax obligation is constituted has a direct relationship with the issuance of the certificate of registration, in which the facts subject to registration must be contained (See Articles 4, no. 2 and 6, no. 3 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code, Article 10, no. 1 of Decree-Law 54/75, of 12 February, and Article 42 of the Motor Vehicle Registration Regulation).

19. The same legislative solution adopted by the tax legislator in Article 3, no. 2 of the CIUC works in the same sense, by making coincide the equivalences established there with the situations in which motor vehicle registration requires the respective registration.

20. Even admitting that, from the point of view of the rules of civil law and land registration, the absence of registration does not affect the acquisition of the quality of owner and that registration is not a condition of validity of contracts with real effect, in accordance with what is established in the CIUC (which in the case at hand constitutes special law, which, in accordance with general principles of law, derogates from the general rule), the tax legislator wanted intentional and expressly that be considered as owners, lessees, purchasers with retention of ownership or holders of the right of purchase option in long-term leasing, the persons in whose name the vehicles are registered;

21. The invoices are not apt to prove the conclusion of a synallagmatic contract as is the purchase and sale, because such documents do not themselves reveal an indispensable and unequivocal declaration of will (i.e., acceptance) on the part of the purported purchasers;

22. The invoices attached by the Claimant present in its description different mentions; Thus, while in the invoices attached in the form of pages 8, 10, 20, 23, 24, 25 and 26 of PDF Documents nos. 53 to 78 attached to p.i. one can read in the description field the mention "sale of the asset", in the invoices attached in the form of pages 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of PDF Documents nos. 53 to 78 attached to p.i. there appears in the description the mention "residual value".

In view of the above, regarding the position of the Parties and the arguments presented, in order to determine whether the Claimant should be qualified as a taxpayer of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax, in relation to the vehicles already identified, it will be necessary to verify:

a) Whether or not the rule of subjective incidence contained in Article 3, no. 1 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code establishes a presumption;

b) Who is the taxpayer of Single Motor Vehicle Tax, for purposes of what is provided in Article 3, no. 1 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code:

i. With respect to vehicles already disposed of on the date of the occurrence of the respective tax fact; and, alternatively,

ii. As regards vehicles that are the subject of financial leasing contracts concluded by the Claimant;

Let us see what should be understood.

a) Interpretation of no. 1 of Article 3 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code

Article 3 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code establishes the following:

"1 – The taxpayers of the tax are the owners of the vehicles, considering as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose name the same are registered.

2 – Financial lessees, purchasers with retention of ownership, as well as other holders of purchase option rights by force of leasing contracts are equated to owners."

It follows from Article 11 of the General Tax Law (GTL) that the interpretation of tax law must be made in accordance with the general principles of interpretation.

The general principles of interpretation are established in Article 9 of the Civil Code (CC), in the following terms:

"1. Interpretation must not be confined to the letter of the law, but must reconstruct from the texts the legislative thought, having especially in account the unity of the legal system, the circumstances in which the law was made, and the specific conditions of the time in which it is applied.

1. However, the interpreter cannot consider legislative thought that does not have in the letter of the law a minimum of verbal correspondence, even if imperfectly expressed.

2. In fixing the meaning and scope of the law, the interpreter shall presume that the legislator enshrined the most correct solutions and knew how to express its thought in adequate terms."

It is thus established that there are three elements of interpretation of Law, namely: the literal element, the historical and rational element, and the systematic element.

Taking into account the literal element of the rule here in discussion, it will be important, first of all, to reconstruct the legislative thought through the words of the law. It is stated in no. 1 of Article 3 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code that "the taxpayers of the tax are the owners of the vehicles, considering as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose name the same are registered."

According to the TA, the expression "considering" does not constitute a legal presumption, the legislator's intention being expressly and intentionally to establish that are considered as such (as owners) the persons in whose name the same (vehicles) are registered, because it is this interpretation that preserves the unity of the legal-fiscal system.

However, from a literal point of view, it is found that the expression "considering" or "is considered" is often used with a meaning equivalent to the expression "presuming" or "is presumed".

Thus, by way of example, see Article 191, no. 6 of the CPPT, among other articles noted in the arbitral decisions handed down in cases nos. 14/2013-T, 27/2013-T, 73/2013-T or 170/2013-T.

In this way, one can say that the expression "considering" has "a minimum of verbal correspondence, even if imperfectly expressed", and one should recognize to such word a current and normal correspondence to that presumptive meaning (See arbitral decision handed down, within the scope of case no. 286/2013-T).

However, and as is pointed out by the TA, the word "considering" is also used outside presumptive contexts – See Article 18 of its response.

Therefore, it is important to submit the control of the other elements of interpretation of a logical nature to no. 1 of Article 3 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code.

Thus, taking into account the historical element of interpretation, it is important to consider that the bill no. 118/X, of 7.03.2007, underlying Law no. 22-A/2007, of 29.06 establishes "as a structuring and unifying element (…) the principle of equivalence, thus making clear that the tax, as a whole, is subordinated to the idea that the Claimants should be burdened in the measure of the cost they cause to the environment and to the road network, being this the reason for existence of this tax figure."

In this context, it appears clear to us that the legislator intended to tax the real and effective taxpayer who causes road and environmental damage and not some holder of motor vehicle registration.

As has been highlighted in various arbitral decisions on several occasions, the principle of equivalence aims to internalize the negative environmental externalities resulting from the use of motor vehicles, and was elevated to a fundamental principle of taxation of motor vehicles in circulation.

As Sérgio Vasques argues, in Special Consumption Taxes, Almedina, Coimbra, 2001, p. 122, "Thus, a tax on automobiles based on a rule of equivalence will be just only if those who cause the same road wear and the same environmental cost pay the same tax; and those who cause different wear and environmental cost, pay different tax also", adding that the realization of the said principle "(…) requires other requirements still with regard to the subjective incidence of the tax (…)".

Taking into account the foundations underlying the creation of the current Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code, in particular, the emergence of the principle of equivalence as a structuring and unifying principle of the taxation of vehicles in circulation, it appears to us that no. 1 of Article 3 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code cannot be interpreted as a closed command, but rather as a rebuttable presumption, which is based on the assumption that in reality the agent responsible for environmental damage is, as a rule, the registered owner of the automobile. An assumption that cannot fail to be disregarded if in reality it is another agent responsible, that is, the taxpayer of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax.

From a systematic point of view, it will be important to reinforce once again that right from Article 1 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code it is established that "The single motor vehicle tax obeys the principle of equivalence, seeking to burden the Claimants in the measure of the environmental and road cost that these cause, in concretization of a general rule of tax equality."

As A. Brigas Afonso and Manuel T. Fernandes argue, in Tax on Vehicles and Single Motor Vehicle Tax, Annotated Codes, pp. p. 183, "the legislator seeks to legitimize the taxation of motor vehicles based on the negative externalities caused by them (on public health, the environment, road safety, the congestion of communication routes and the urban landscape) demystifying the idea that auto taxation is very high in Portugal."

According to Batista Machado, in Introduction to Law and to Legitimizing Discourse, p. 183, the systematic element "comprises the consideration of the other provisions that form the normative complex of the institute in which the rule under interpretation is integrated, that is, that regulate the same matter (context of the law), as well as the consideration of legal provisions that regulate parallel normative problems or related institutes (parallel places). It also comprises the place that is systematically owed to the rule under interpretation in the global legal system, as well as its consonance with the spirit or intrinsic unity of the entire legal system."

This is, moreover, the most just solution if we consider that the unity of the fiscal system cannot fail to be found in the principle of material truth and in the principle of proportionality (See Saldanha Sanches, in Principles of Tax Litigation, pp. p. 21, and Alberto Xavier, in Concept and Nature of the Tax Act, pp. 147 et seq.).

For the above reasons, the arguments of the TA do not stand, in the sense that "the presumption of motor vehicle ownership derives solely, directly and exclusively from the motor vehicle registration regime itself, and not from the fiscal legislation on motor vehicles that constitutes a collateral aspect of that regime."

In truth, the interpretation here defended is not only the one that best accords with the principle of material truth, but also the only one that serves the purposes of fiscal justice.

Similarly, contrary to what is argued by the TA, it does not appear defensible to us, in light of the current constitutional principles, the predominance of the principle of efficiency of the tax system over the principle of material justice. Although one cannot fail to understand the practical difficulties that the cancellation of the presumption established in Article 3, no. 1 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code may cause in terms of immediate revenue collection by the TA, the interpretation of the Law cannot be adjusted to these needs, but rather the procedures associated with the collection of this tax should be changed efficiently and in accordance with the Law, not forgetting the legal possibility of suspension of the statute of limitations for taxes.

Considering that tax law exists to regulate the conflicts of interests between the claims of the State to pursue the public interest of obtaining revenue and the claims of taxpayers to maintain the integrity of their assets, should not, as a rule, serve as a criterion for the interpretation of the tax rule, the safeguarding of the patrimonial or financial interest of the State.

In summary: based on Article 9 of the CC, it is considered that all elements of interpretation (literal, historical and systematic) point in the direction that Article 3, no. 1 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code establishes a rebuttable presumption. This means that the taxpayers of Single Motor Vehicle Tax being, in principle, the owners of the vehicles, considering as such the persons in whose name the same are registered, could, in fact, be others, if it were effectively others who cause the environmental damage, as users of the vehicles in circulation.

b) Taxpayer of Single Motor Vehicle Tax, for purposes of what is provided in Article 3, no. 1 and 2 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code with respect to:

· vehicles already disposed of on the date of the occurrence of the respective tax fact;

· vehicles that are the subject of financial leasing contracts concluded by the Claimant;

Taking into account what is set forth in a) above, it is understood that the provision under analysis establishes a presumption of ownership in favor of the persons in whose name the vehicles are registered.

Pursuant to Article 73 of the GTL, "The presumptions established in the rules on tax incidence always admit proof to the contrary."

As Diogo Leite de Campos, Benjamim Silva Rodrigues and Jorge Lopes de Sousa argue, in General Tax Law, Annotated and Commented, pp. p. 652, 4th Edition, "what is intended 'always' is to tax real income and not non-existent income and it is for this reason, of wanting always to tax real values, that Article 73 of the GTL allows 'always' to rebut presumptions.

This is the interpretation that is in harmony, on the one hand, with the principle stated in Article 11, no. 3 of the GTL that, in cases of doubt as to the interpretation of tax rules, "the economic substance of the tax facts should be taken into account" and, on the other hand, with the principle of equality in the distribution of public burdens, which requires that the taxation of the generality of taxpayers, whenever possible, be based on the economic reality underlying the tax facts and is not compatible with the existence of special cases of taxation based on fictitious values in situations in which the actual value of the tax facts is known or can be ascertained.

Thus let us see:

· vehicles already disposed of on the date of the occurrence of the respective tax fact;

The Claimant remained on the register as owner of the vehicles identified in Annex A, attached to the arbitral petition and documents no. 1 to 26, the TA therefore intending to impose on it the responsibility for the payment of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax for the year 2013 and 2014, in accordance with Article 3, no. 1 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code.

However, the Claimant alleges that, in fact, the vehicles in question had already been disposed of on the date of the anniversary of their respective registrations.

The Respondent argues, in turn, that the invoices attached by the Claimant are not sufficient to upset the (alleged) legal presumption established in Article 3 of the CIUC.

The Tribunal understands, however, that the documents attached by the Claimant in their entirety, which constitute the financial leasing contracts and the invoices/receipts of the sales effected following the end of the said contracts, whether through payment of the residual value of the asset or through payment of the value of the asset, do in fact presuppose the transfer of ownership and use of the vehicles in question to the duly identified purchasers.

In fact, from the analysis of the said documents, it is possible to conclude that the vehicles in question were the subject of a financial leasing contract, having been sold before or at the end of the said financial leasing contracts, resulting from the sales invoices/receipts the clear identification of the vehicles sold, of the respective financial leasing contracts and of the new owners.

Therefore, based on the documents attached, it is considered that the Single Motor Vehicle Tax assessment acts identified in documents no. 1 to 26 concern motor vehicles that had already been transferred on the date of the tax fact generating the Single Motor Vehicle Tax, and therefore the responsibility for its payment is imputable to the owners of those vehicles and not to the Claimant.

This Tribunal is thus convinced, by the evidence produced by the Claimant, that the Single Motor Vehicle Tax assessment acts sub judice are illegal, since the responsibility for their payment is not imputable to the Claimant, in view of the documents attached.

Taking into account what is set forth above, the analysis of the subsidiary question formulated by the Claimant as to who is responsible for the payment of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax in the case that financial leasing contracts had been concluded is therefore precluded.

IV. DECISION

Thus, the Tribunal decides as follows:

A) To judge the claim founded, as proven, for the arbitral determination and, in consequence, to declare illegal and annul all the assessment acts for the Single Motor Vehicle Tax and compensatory interest, which are the object of the claim;

B) To judge the claim for payment of indemnifying interest unfounded, although, regarding the illegal assessment acts, nothing was ascertained either as to the registration of the financial leasing contracts or as to the compliance by the Claimant of the obligation that was owed to it, by force of Article 19 of the Single Motor Vehicle Tax Code;

C) To condemn the Respondent in the costs of the present case, as the unsuccessful party.

V. VALUE OF THE CASE

In accordance with the provision of Article 306, no. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 97-A of the CPPT, Article 13 of the LFTA and Article 3, no. 2 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the value of the claim is fixed at €1,744.42.

VI. COSTS

Pursuant to the provision of Articles 12, no. 2 of the LFTA, and Article 4, no. 4 of the Regulation of Costs of Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the value of the arbitration fee is fixed at €306, in accordance with Table I of the said Regulation, at the charge of the Respondent, in accordance with Article 22, no. 4 of the LFTA.

Let notification be made.

Lisbon, 20 October 2015

The Arbitrator

Magda Feliciano

(The text of this decision was prepared by computer, in accordance with Article 131, no. 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable by referral of Article 29, no. 1, paragraph e) of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January (LFTA), with its writing governed by the orthography prior to the Orthographic Agreement of 1990).