Process: 383/2018-T

Date: January 22, 2019

Tax Type: IUC

Source: Original CAAD Decision

Summary

This CAAD arbitration case (Process 383/2018-T) addresses the subjective incidence of IUC (Imposto Único de Circulação - Single Circulation Tax) on vehicles subject to financial leasing (LSG) and long-term rental (ALD) contracts. The financial institution A... S.A. challenged IUC assessments totaling €11,209.94 for vehicles that had been transferred to lessees or third parties before the tax due date. The core legal issue concerned whether the leasing company remained the IUC taxpayer after vehicle transmission, despite vehicles remaining registered in its name. The Applicant argued that ownership had transferred through LSG/ALD contract terminations, supported by invoices documenting sales at residual values. They contended that vehicle registration does not determine tax liability and that invoices constitute sufficient proof of transmission under Article 29 of the VAT Code. The Tax Authority countered that Article 3 and Article 6 of the IUC Code establish taxpayer status based on registered ownership, creating a legal presumption that can only be rebutted through proper vehicle registration updates. The AT maintained that without official registration changes, the leasing company remains liable regardless of contractual arrangements. The tribunal had to determine whether invoices and contractual documentation sufficiently prove ownership transfer to rebut the registration-based presumption, and whether failure to update vehicle registration should impose IUC liability on the former registered owner. This case exemplifies recurring disputes in Portuguese tax law regarding the intersection of civil ownership transfer and tax liability determination based on public registry presumptions.

Full Decision

ARBITRAL DECISION

REPORT

A..., S.A., (hereinafter the Applicant) a legal entity no. ..., with registered office at Rua..., no. ..., ...-..., in Lisbon, pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 2, of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January (Legal Regime for Arbitration in Tax Matters, hereinafter referred to only as LRATM), requested the constitution of a single Arbitral Tribunal, in which the Tax and Customs Authority is named as respondent, hereinafter AT or Respondent, with a view to the declaration of illegality and consequent annulment of the tax acts for the assessment of Unique Vehicle Tax identified in the case file and the acts dismissing the administrative complaints, in the amount of €11,209.94.

Pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 1, of the LRATM, as amended by Article 228 of Law no. 66-B/2012, of 31 December, the single Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 22 October 2018.

The AT responded, arguing that the petition should be dismissed as unfounded.

In view of the subject matter contained in the case file, the meeting referred to in Article 18 of the LRATM and the holding of final submissions were dispensed with.

The Arbitral Tribunal is regularly constituted and is materially competent, pursuant to paragraph (a) of paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the LRATM.

The parties have legal personality and capacity, are parties with standing, and are represented (Article 4 and paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the LRATM and Article 1 of Ordinance no. 112/2011, of 22 March).

There are no nullities, exceptions, or preliminary issues that would prevent the immediate hearing of the merits of the case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Based on the elements contained in the case file and the administrative procedure attached to the case file, the following facts are considered proven:

  • The Applicant is a financial institution with a strong presence in the national market, specialized in the automobile sector, executing – among others – financial leasing or long-term rental contracts ("LSG" and "ALD", respectively), intended for the acquisition, by companies and individuals, of motor vehicles.

  • The motor vehicles identified in Annex A were given in LSG and ALD by the Applicant to the customers also identified therein - (documents nos. 1 to 96);

  • In accordance with the aforementioned documents, "Upon termination of the contract, the lessee must immediately return the asset to the lessor, with all documents necessary for its sale in the place indicated by the latter, and in good working order and condition, unless the lessee intends a) to acquire the asset at the residual value fixed in the particular clauses, plus any charges and taxes due; b) To renew the contract term under conditions to be negotiated beforehand...";

  • The Applicant issued invoices on the value of the sale, in some cases, and on the residual value, in other cases, with respect to motor vehicles, which are the subject of the disputed Unique Vehicle Tax assessment acts;

  • The Applicant filed two administrative complaints against the aforementioned Unique Vehicle Tax assessments which were partially granted;

  • The Applicant paid the Unique Vehicle Tax assessment notices identified in the case file;

The Tribunal did not find proven the following fact:

The motor vehicles, which are the subject of the disputed Unique Vehicle Tax assessment acts, were sold by the Applicant to the lessees or purchasers identified in the invoices issued.

This tribunal formed its conviction based on the consideration of the documents attached to the case file.

STATEMENT OF LAW

The main issue raised in this case concerns whether the Applicant should be qualified as a taxpayer for Unique Vehicle Tax purposes, with respect to the Unique Vehicle Tax assessment acts identified in the case file concerning vehicles transmitted before the due date of the Unique Vehicle Tax.

On this subject, the Applicant argues, in summary, as follows:

  • The ownership of each of the motor vehicles listed in ANNEX A had already been transferred to its former lessees or, in specific situations, to third parties, either by express indication of the lessees or by virtue of assignment of the financial lessee's contractual position;

  • As the majority arbitral jurisprudence has emphasized, even during the term of a LSG or ALD, the lessor entity should not be considered a taxpayer for Unique Vehicle Tax purposes;

  • Registration of the acquisition of motor vehicles with the CRA (Central Registry Authority) is not a condition for the transmission of ownership, nor does it affect its validity, whereby the tax acts now challenged should be considered unequivocally illegal;

  • As to the evidentiary value of documents proving the transmissions and which, consequently, rebut the presumption of vehicle registration with the CRA, the fact is that Article 29 of the VAT Code has always recognized the invoice as a document to which legal relevance is attributed to document and prove transactions;

  • These documents which the Applicant has already submitted are more than sufficient to prove the transmissions of the motor vehicles in question, and they enjoy, as they necessarily must, the presumption of veracity discussed above.

  • Given the foregoing, and weighing all factors, it is clearly evident that the Applicant is not a taxpayer for the Unique Vehicle Tax contested – indirectly – in this Petition for Arbitral Decision, and since the subjective requirements of the tax incidence are not verified, those tax acts to which it was subject are, therefore, unequivocally and absolutely illegal, and, consequently and inevitably, the acts dismissing the administrative complaints contained in ANNEXES B and C, already attached.

In turn, the AT alleges, in summary, as follows:

  • The Applicant is wrong when it alleges the illegality of the Unique Vehicle Tax assessments (by violation of Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code) concerning vehicles that are the subject of financial leasing contracts executed;

  • In fact, the tax legislator, when establishing in Article 3, paragraph 1, who are the taxpayers for Unique Vehicle Tax purposes, expressly and intentionally established that these are the owners (or in the situations provided for in paragraph 2, the persons mentioned therein), being considered as such the persons in whose name the same are registered;

  • Article 6 of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code, under the heading "Taxable Event and Due Date", in its paragraph 1, establishes that: "The taxable event of the tax is constituted by the ownership of the vehicle, as attested by the registration or license plate in national territory." persons in whose name the same are registered.

  • In the absence of such registration, naturally, the owner will be notified to fulfill the corresponding tax obligation, as the Respondent, taking into account the current configuration of the legal system, will not have to assess the tax based on elements that do not appear in public records and documents and, as such, are authentic;

  • In these terms, the failure to update the registration, as provided for in Article 42 of the Automobile Registry Regulations, will be attributable to the legal sphere of the Unique Vehicle Tax taxpayer and not to that of the Portuguese State, as the subject of this Tax;

  • From all that has been set forth above, it is clear that the tax acts in question do not suffer from any defect of violation of law, to the extent that in light of what is provided for in Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Article 6 of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code, it was the Applicant, in its capacity as owner, the taxpayer for Unique Vehicle Tax purposes;

  • However, even if this were not the case – which is only admitted by mere academic hypothesis – and accepting that it is admissible to rebut the presumption in light of the jurisprudence already established in this arbitration center, it would still be necessary to assess the documents submitted by the Applicant and their evidentiary value with a view to such rebuttal;

  • Now, the contracts submitted by the Applicant are not sufficient proof that there was a transfer of ownership of a vehicle from the Applicant to a third party on a specific date, since it does not submit a copy of a check or a bank statement showing the receipt of a specific amount relating to the sale of a vehicle;

  • The Applicant further submits a collection of invoices/receipts as documents 97-150, and from these documents appear the date of issue and the date of maturity, which do not coincide, in addition to stating at the lower right side "Valid as receipt after good collection".

  • In fact, the Applicant does not submit a single bank statement or check proving that the invoices were paid or whether the contracts were performed, or whether, on the contrary, they are in dispute;

  • It must further be said that with respect to the invoices, they are not capable of proving the conclusion of a synallagmatic contract, as they do not reveal by themselves an essential and unequivocal declaration of will (i.e., acceptance) on the part of the purported purchasers;

  • In these terms, this petition for arbitral decision should be dismissed as unfounded, maintaining the tax assessment acts impugned in the legal order and absolving, accordingly, the Respondent of the petition.

Let us see what should be understood.

  • On the Interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code

Article 3 of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code establishes the following:

"1 - Taxpayers for this tax are the owners of vehicles, being considered as such natural or legal persons of public or private law, in whose name the same are registered.

2 – Financially leased vehicles, vehicles sold with retention of title, as well as other holders of purchase option rights arising from a leasing contract, are treated as equivalent to owners."

It follows from Article 11 of the General Tax Law (LGT) that the interpretation of tax law must be carried out in accordance with the general principles of interpretation.

The general principles of interpretation are established in Article 9 of the Civil Code (CC), as follows:

"1. Interpretation shall not be limited to the letter of the law, but shall reconstruct from the texts the legislative intention, taking especially into account the unity of the legal system, the circumstances in which the law was elaborated, and the specific conditions of the time in which it is applied.

  1. The interpreter cannot, however, consider legislative intention that does not have in the letter of the law a minimum of verbal correspondence, even if imperfectly expressed.

  2. In establishing the meaning and scope of the law, the interpreter shall presume that the legislator established the most correct solutions and knew how to express its intention in appropriate terms."

It is thus established that there are three elements of interpretation of the Law, namely: the literal element, the historical and rational element, and the systematic element.

Having regard to the literal element of the rule under discussion, it will be important, first of all, to reconstruct the legislative intention through the words of the law. It is stated in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code that "taxpayers for this tax are the owners of vehicles, being considered as such natural or legal persons of public or private law, in whose name the same are registered."

According to the AT, the expression "considered" does not constitute a legal presumption, and it is the legislator's intention to expressly and intentionally establish that those are considered as such (as owners) the persons in whose name the same (vehicles) are registered, as this is the interpretation that preserves the unity of the tax legal system.

However, from a literal point of view, it is noted that the expression "considered" or "considers" is often used with a meaning equivalent to the expression "presumed" or "presumes".

Thus, by way of example, see Article 191, paragraph 6, of the Code of Tax Procedure, among other articles highlighted in the arbitral decisions delivered in cases nos. 14/2013-T, 27/2013-T, 73/2013-T, or 170/2013-T.

In this manner, it can be said that the expression "considered" has "a minimum of verbal correspondence, even if imperfectly expressed", and such term should be recognized as having a current and normal correspondence to that presumptive meaning (See the arbitral decision rendered in case no. 286/2013-T).

Nevertheless, and as pointed out by the AT, the word "considered" is also used outside of presumptive contexts – See Article 18 of its response.

Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the control of the other elements of interpretation of a logical nature, Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code.

Thus, having regard to the historical element of interpretation, it is important to consider that the bill no. 118/X, of 7.03.2007, underlying Law no. 22-A/2007, of 29.06, establishes "as a structural and unifying element (…) the principle of equivalence, thus making it clear that the tax, as a whole, is subordinated to the idea that the Applicants should be burdened in proportion to the cost that they cause to the environment and to the road network, this being the reason for the existence of this tax figure."

In this context, it seems clear to us that the legislator intended to tax the actual and effective taxpayer causing road and environmental damage and not any holder of vehicle registration.

As has been emphasized on various occasions in various arbitral decisions, the principle of equivalence aims to internalize the negative environmental externalities resulting from the use of motor vehicles, and was established as a fundamental principle of the taxation of vehicles in circulation.

As argued by Sérgio Vasques, in Special Consumption Taxes, Almedina, Coimbra, 2001, p. 122, "Thus, a tax on automobiles based on a rule of equivalence will be fair only if those who cause the same road wear and the same environmental cost pay the same tax; and those who cause different wear and environmental cost, pay different tax as well", adding that the implementation of such principle "(…) dictates further requirements also with respect to the subjective incidence of the tax (…)".

Taking into account the grounds underlying the creation of the current Unique Vehicle Tax Code, in particular, the eruption of the principle of equivalence as a structural and unifying principle of the taxation of vehicles in circulation, it seems to us that paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code cannot be interpreted as a closed command, but rather as a rebuttable presumption, which is based on the assumption that in reality the agent responsible for environmental damage is, as a rule, the registered owner of the automobile. An assumption that cannot but be disregarded, should it be another agent in reality who is responsible, that is, the Unique Vehicle Tax taxpayer.

From a systematic point of view, it is important to emphasize again that already in Article 1 of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code it is established that "The Unique Vehicle Tax complies with the principle of equivalence, seeking to burden the Applicants in proportion to the environmental and road cost that they cause, in fulfillment of a general rule of tax equality."

As argued by A. Brigas Afonso and Manuel T. Fernandes, in Tax on Vehicles and Unique Vehicle Tax, Annotated Codes, pp. 183, "the legislator seeks to legitimize the taxation of motor vehicles based on the negative externalities caused by them (in public health, the environment, road safety, congestion of communication routes, and the urban landscape) demystifying the idea that motor vehicle taxation is very high in Portugal."

According to Batista Machado, in Introduction to Law and Legitimizing Discourse, p. 183, the systematic element "comprises the consideration of other provisions that form the complex normative framework of the institute into which the rule being interpreted is integrated, that is, which regulate the same subject matter (context of the law), as well as the consideration of legal provisions that regulate parallel normative problems or related institutes (parallel locations). It also comprises the systematic location that belongs to the rule being interpreted in the overall legal system, as well as its consonance with the spirit or intrinsic unity of the entire legal system."

This is, moreover, the most just solution if we consider that the unity of the tax system cannot but be found in the principle of material truth and in the principle of proportionality (See Saldanha Sanches, in Principles of Tax Litigation, pp. 21, and Alberto Xavier, in Concept and Nature of the Tax Act, pp. 147 et seq.).

In fact, the interpretation here defended is not only that which best comports with the principle of material truth, but also the only one that serves the purposes of tax justice.

Considering that tax law exists to regulate conflicts of interest between the state's pretensions to pursue the public interest of obtaining revenues and the pretensions of taxpayers to maintain the integrity of their assets, it should not, as a rule, serve as a criterion for interpreting the tax rule, the safeguarding of the state's patrimonial or financial interest.

In summary: based on Article 9 of the Civil Code, it is considered that all elements of interpretation (literal, historical, and systematic) point to the effect that Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code, in the wording applicable at the date of the tax facts, establishes a rebuttable presumption. This means that the taxpayers for Unique Vehicle Tax purposes, being, in principle, the owners of the vehicles, being considered as such the persons in whose name they are registered, may, in fact, be others, if they are effectively those causing environmental damage, as users of vehicles in circulation.

Given the foregoing, it is understood that the provision under analysis establishes a presumption of ownership in favor of the persons in whose name the vehicles are registered.

Pursuant to Article 73 of the General Tax Law, "Presumptions established in tax incidence rules always admit proof to the contrary."

As argued by Diogo Leite Campos, Benjamim Silva Rodrigues, and Jorge Lopes de Sousa, in General Tax Law, Annotated and Commented, pp. 652, 4th Edition, "what is intended 'always' is to tax actual income and not nonexistent income and it is for this reason, of wanting always to tax actual values, that Article 73 of the General Tax Law allows 'always' to rebut presumptions."

This is the interpretation that is in harmony, on the one hand, with the principle set forth in Article 11, paragraph 3, of the General Tax Law, which provides that in cases of doubt about the interpretation of tax rules "the economic substance of the tax facts" should be taken into account, and on the other hand, with the principle of equality in the distribution of public burdens, which requires that the taxation of the generality of taxpayers, whenever possible, be based on the economic reality underlying the tax facts and is not compatible with the existence of special cases of taxation based on fictional values in situations where the actual value of the tax facts is known or can be determined.

  • On the Specific Case

Given the foregoing, let us see who is the taxpayer for Unique Vehicle Tax purposes, with respect to vehicles covered by financial leasing contracts or ALD contracts with promise to sell, allegedly sold by the Applicant.

The Applicant submitted to the case file the financial leasing contracts or ALD contracts with promise to sell concerning the vehicles that are the subject of the Unique Vehicle Tax assessment acts identified in the case file and the corresponding sales invoices.

The Applicant also submitted to the case file the invoices allegedly relating to the sale of motor vehicles, which are the subject of the disputed Unique Vehicle Tax assessment acts, to prove the transfer of the right of ownership from the Applicant.

However, the Respondent disputed not only the contracts but also the invoices submitted by the Applicant, raising questions that these documents do not clarify, such as "were the contracts performed" and "was the price paid?".

Upon analysis of the documents, it is found that the contracts are, in general, very old, as is most of the invoices, and the description of the invoices refers either to the price of the asset, the residual value, or the sale of the asset. It is also found from the analysis of the documents that it is not possible to extract from them that there was payment of the price, since the invoices state "Valid after good collection", nothing being known about such good collection.

Thus, although the Applicant argues that at the moment of the occurrence of the tax fact relevant for the purposes of the due date of the respective Unique Vehicle Tax, the conditions for the subjective incidence of the tax fact verify themselves only in the sphere of the purchasers (former lessees, promissory purchasers, or third parties to whom the contractual position was assigned), when such transmission is questioned by the AT, it would have to be proven that the vehicles were transmitted, not only through the leasing and ALD contracts concluded, but also through contracts assigning the contractual position, statements of sale, and evidence of payment of the price due for the transmission.

In fact, although the invoices issued by the Applicant make presumptively indicate a prior transmission of the vehicles by the Applicant, no proof whatsoever was made of the transfer of ownership of the vehicles, since no evidence of payment, statements of sale, or other documents demonstrating the transmission of ownership of the vehicles were submitted.

Considering that the burden of proof is on the Applicant, and since it is not clear the manner of transmission of the vehicles, which is intended to be demonstrated, by force of Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code, the responsibility for payment of the Unique Vehicle Tax is attributable to the Applicant (in the same sense, see the Decision of CAAD no. 226/2017, of 26.09.2017, no. 430/2017, of 24.11.2017, no. 715/2015, of 29.03.2016).

As a consequence, based on the documents submitted, the Tribunal does not consider the presumption of ownership established in Article 3 of the Unique Vehicle Tax Code to be rebutted, whereby the Unique Vehicle Tax assessment acts identified in the case file should be maintained, and the responsibility for their payment is attributable to the Applicant.

DECISION

Thus, the Tribunal decides to render the arbitral petition partially upheld in the following terms:

  • To dismiss as unfounded, for not being proven, the petition with respect to the Unique Vehicle Tax assessment acts identified in the case file;

  • To dismiss as unfounded the petition for payment of compensatory interest.

VALUE OF THE CASE

In accordance with the provisions of Article 306, paragraph 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 97-A of the Code of Tax Procedure, and Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the value of the petition is fixed at €11,461.90.

COSTS

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 12, paragraph 2 of the LRATM, and Article 4, paragraph 4 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the value of the arbitration fee is fixed at €918, in accordance with Table I of the aforementioned Regulation, to be borne by the Applicant.

Let notice be served.

Lisbon, 22 January 2019

The Arbiter,

Magda Feliciano

(The text of this decision was prepared by computer, pursuant to Article 131, paragraph 5, of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable by reference to Article 29, paragraph 1, paragraph (e) of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January (LRATM), its drafting being governed by the spelling prior to the Orthographic Agreement of 1990.)

Frequently Asked Questions

Automatically Created

Who is liable for IUC (Imposto Único de Circulação) on vehicles under financial leasing or long-term rental contracts in Portugal?
Under Article 3(1) of the IUC Code, the taxpayer liable for IUC is the vehicle owner, defined as the person in whose name the vehicle is registered. For financial leasing (LSG) and long-term rental (ALD) contracts, the leasing company typically remains the registered owner during the contract term and is therefore the IUC taxpayer. However, arbitral jurisprudence has established that once ownership is effectively transferred—such as upon contract termination when the lessee exercises the purchase option—the leasing company should no longer be considered the IUC taxpayer, even if registration has not been updated. The key determinant is actual ownership transfer, not merely registration status, though registration creates a strong legal presumption.
Can the tax authority charge IUC to the leasing company after the vehicle has been transferred or returned by the lessee?
The Tax Authority can assess IUC to a leasing company after vehicle transfer if the vehicle remains registered in the company's name, as registration creates a legal presumption of ownership under Article 3(1) of the IUC Code. However, this presumption can be rebutted with sufficient documentary evidence proving ownership transfer occurred before the IUC due date. The leasing company must demonstrate actual transmission through contracts, invoices showing sale at residual value, and proof of delivery to the new owner. The failure to update vehicle registration with the Central Registry Authority (CRA) does not automatically make the former owner liable if effective ownership transfer is proven. Courts and arbitral tribunals have increasingly accepted that civil ownership transfer determines tax liability, not merely registration formalities.
What is the subjective incidence rule for IUC regarding vehicles registered in the name of financial institutions?
The subjective incidence rule for IUC on vehicles registered to financial institutions is governed by Article 3 of the IUC Code, which designates registered owners as taxpayers. Article 6 establishes that the taxable event is vehicle ownership as evidenced by registration. For leasing companies, this creates a rebuttable presumption: they are prima facie taxpayers for vehicles in their registry. However, when financial leasing contracts terminate through lessee purchase (at residual value under Article 13 of Decree-Law 149/95), ownership transfers even without immediate registration update. To escape IUC liability, financial institutions must prove: (1) contract termination occurred before the tax due date; (2) effective ownership transfer through sale/delivery documentation; (3) consideration was paid (residual value); and (4) VAT invoices were issued documenting the transaction. Registration delay attributable to administrative processing should not impose continued tax liability on the former owner.
How can a financial leasing company challenge unlawful IUC tax assessments through arbitration at CAAD?
A financial leasing company can challenge unlawful IUC assessments through CAAD (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa) under Article 2(1)(a) of the RJAT (Legal Regime for Tax Arbitration), which grants jurisdiction over disputes concerning tax legality. The company must file an arbitration request within 90 days of the final administrative decision (typically rejection of an administrative complaint under Article 70 of the LGT). The petition must specify: (1) the challenged tax assessments and their illegality grounds; (2) proof of prior administrative complaint filing; (3) evidence demonstrating the company is not the proper IUC taxpayer due to ownership transfer; and (4) supporting documentation including leasing contracts, termination agreements, sale invoices, and proof of vehicle delivery. The arbitration targets both the original tax assessments and the decisions dismissing administrative complaints. Companies must pay a court fee and the assessed tax amount (or provide guarantee) before proceedings commence, with refund available if successful.
What evidence is required to prove that a leasing company is no longer the taxable person for IUC purposes after contract termination?
To prove a leasing company is no longer the IUC taxpayer after contract termination, robust documentary evidence is required to rebut the registration-based ownership presumption. Essential evidence includes: (1) Financial leasing contracts showing termination provisions and lessee purchase options at residual value; (2) VAT invoices issued under Article 29 of the VAT Code documenting vehicle sale at residual or market value, which carry legal presumption of veracity; (3) Proof of payment/consideration received from the purchaser; (4) Vehicle delivery documentation showing transfer of possession; (5) Contract termination notices or agreements signed before the IUC due date; (6) In cases of third-party sales, assignment agreements transferring lessee contractual position; and (7) Any correspondence with tax authorities regarding registration updates. While vehicle registration transfer to the Central Registry Authority is not legally required for valid ownership transfer under civil law, its absence necessitates stronger alternative documentation. Arbitral tribunals have accepted invoice evidence as sufficient when combined with contractual proof of transmission occurring before the tax assessment reference date.