Summary
Full Decision
ARBITRAL DECISION
I – REPORT
1.1. A... (hereinafter referred to as "claimant"), taxpayer with NIF (Tax Identification Number)..., domiciled at Rua ..., ..., having been notified of the decision dismissing the administrative claim number ... and the consequent Municipal Property Tax assessment act (number ..., dated 11/7/2013), filed, on 17/1/2014, a request for constitution of an arbitral tribunal and arbitral pronouncement, pursuant to the provisions of article 99 of the CPPT (Code of Tax Procedure and Process) and article 2, section 1, subsection a), and article 10, section 2, subsection c), of Decree-Law number 10/2011, of 20/1 (Legal Regime of Arbitration in Tax Matters, hereinafter referred to simply as "LRAT"), in which the Tax and Customs Authority (AT) is requested, with a view to "annulment of the decision dismissing the Administrative Claim number ... and consequent declaration of illegality of the Municipal Property Tax assessment act (IMI) underlying it (IMI Assessment number ..., of 11/7/2013)".
1.2. On 21/3/2014, the present Singular Arbitral Tribunal was constituted.
1.3. Pursuant to article 17, section 1, of the LRAT, the AT was cited, as the defendant party, to submit its response, in accordance with and for the purposes of the aforementioned article. The AT submitted its response on 2/5/2014, arguing for the complete dismissal of the claimant's request.
1.4. By order of 7/7/2014, the Tribunal found, pursuant to article 16, subsection c), of the LRAT, that the meeting provided for in article 18 of the LRAT was dispensable and that the case was ready for decision. The parties were notified of this intention, in order to pronounce themselves within the established deadline, if they so wished. Both parties agreed to dispense with the said meeting.
1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of articles 16, subsections c) and e), and 19 of the LRAT, the Tribunal found, by order of 18/7/2014, dispensable the production of submissions (written or oral), as it considered that these could prove redundant and, furthermore, because there existed in the case file sufficient elements, both factual and legal, to render the decision. The parties were notified of this order to pronounce themselves within the established deadline. The present claimant communicated its acceptance of the dispensation of the said submissions.
1.6. The Arbitral Tribunal was regularly constituted, is materially competent, the case does not suffer from defects that would invalidate it, and the Parties have legal personality and capacity, being duly legitimized.
II – GROUNDS: MATTERS OF FACT
2.1. The present claimant argues, in its initial petition: a) "that the additional IMI assessment is illegal due to lack of substantiation"; b) "that the additional IMI assessment is illegal due to absence of an enabling norm"; c) "that the additional assessment is illegal for being based on a VPT (Patrimonial Taxable Value) determined after verification of the taxable fact"; and d) "that the additional IMI assessment is retroactive in nature, and as such is unconstitutional".
2.2. The present claimant concludes with "allowance [of] the present request [...], declaring the illegality of the additional IMI assessment sub judice." Finally, it requests compensation "for the expenses incurred with the provision of an undue guarantee".
2.3. For its part, the AT argues, in its defense, that the claimant has no grounds in the alleged defects. It concludes, for this reason, that "the present action should be judged without merit, on the grounds that the claim is not substantiated, and the Defendant is absolved of the claimant's request".
2.4. The following facts are deemed proven:
i) The present claimant is the owner of the urban property, constituted in full ownership, located at Rua ..., registered in the urban real estate registry under article ..., of the parish of ..., municipality and district of ..., as appears from the Urban Property Schedule (document number 1 of the PA attached to the case file).
ii) The urban property in question is comprised of 3 stories or divisions capable of independent use, respectively identified in the Urban Property Schedule as "CVRC", "1st" and "AGFT", which are assigned to "residential" use (document number 1 of the PA).
iii) By collection document number 2012 ..., of 7/3/2013, the present claimant was notified of the IMI assessment levied on the urban property described above, relating to the year 2012, in the global amount of €507.29. The collection document concerned the first installment of IMI, fixed in the amount of €169.10 (document number 2 of the PA).
iv) By collection document number 2012 ..., also of 7/3/2013, the present claimant was notified of the amount corresponding to the second installment of IMI on the same urban property described above, in the equal amount of €169.10 (document number 3 of the PA).
v) Finally, by collection document number 2012 ..., of 11/7/2013, the present claimant was notified of the third installment of IMI for the year 2012 of the property in question, in the amount of €1,277.20 (document number 4 of the PA).
vi) Not accepting the terms of the assessment underlying collection document number 2012 ..., the present claimant filed, on 28/11/2013, an administrative claim of the said assessment (see pages 3 et seq. of the PA).
vii) On 28/11/2013, the claimant provided a bank guarantee of €1,596.50 (page 42 of the PA), which was strengthened by a deposit guarantee of €115.00 on 18/12/2013 (document 10 attached to the petition).
viii) By Office number ..., of 30/12/2013, the present claimant was notified of the decision dismissing the said administrative claim (page 60 of the PA).
2.5. There are no unproven facts relevant to the decision of the case.
III – GROUNDS: MATTERS OF LAW
In the present case, there are four disputed legal questions: a) whether "the additional IMI assessment is illegal due to lack of substantiation"; b) whether "the additional IMI assessment is illegal due to absence of an enabling norm"; c) whether "the additional assessment is illegal for being based on a VPT determined after verification of the taxable fact"; and whether d) "the additional IMI assessment is retroactive in nature". A final note is warranted regarding the request for compensation for alleged undue provision of guarantee [e)].
Let us examine them, then.
a) The present claimant alleges that "the additional IMI assessment is illegal due to lack of substantiation", since, in its view, "the collection document for the alleged 'third installment' of IMI contains no mention whatsoever of the fact that an additional IMI assessment was being made, nor the underlying factual reasons or even the legal provisions applied. [...] And it should not be pretended that the reference contained in the collection document transcribed below corresponds to the legal justification of the assessment, since the same neither permits, nor reconstructs the evaluative judgment pursued by the AT services and which will have determined the performance of the act sub judice, nor identifies the enabling norm upon which that act is based."
In its response, the AT concluded, in this regard, that "the Claimant is not justified in this matter [...] given that] substantiation is a relative concept, which varies according to the specific legal type of administrative act, and the legal requirement must be understood in suitable terms, given the functionality of the institute and the essential objectives to be pursued. [...]. [Despite the] establishment of standardized and computerized substantiation, [the same] has not failed to observe the provisions of article 77 of the General Tax Law nor does it call into question the guarantor purposes of the right to substantiation. Secondly, should a situation of lack or insufficiency of substantiation be verified [...], it was incumbent upon the Claimant to request the issuance of the certificate provided for in article 37 of the CPPT. [...]. Now, having the Claimant not used the facility conferred by law, it is necessary to conclude that the act sub judice contained, and contains, all the elements necessary for its full understanding and that the proclaimed vice which it suffered was healed. [...]. Even if the act sub judice suffered from deficiencies at the level of the substantiation discourse - which is admitted only by mere academic hypothesis - such deficiencies would degrade into mere non-essential irregularities. Since, nevertheless, such deficiencies permit the full clarification of its recipient, enabling it to lodge a protest against them, as, indeed, the Claimant did through the present request for arbitral pronouncement."
Also in the draft decision that served as the basis for the decision dismissing the administrative claim presented by the claimant here, it was justified that, "consulting the assessments notified to the claimant and attached at pages 30 to 34, it is concluded that this concerns the Municipal Property Tax, with the tax identification of the taxpayer, the tax year to which it refers - 2012 - and the identification of the document and its respective assessment date - 11-07-2013. There is also the identification of the property - with its respective municipality/parish/cadastral article - ... (extinct) - Urban ... - AGFT, CVRC and 1st floor, the patrimonial taxable value, the exempt value - 0 -, the rate applied - 0.30% - and the tax due. The amount to be paid relating to the installment in question is also identified and the payment deadline for the same - November/2013. Additionally, the information that the application of the safeguard clause provided for in the law was observed is included. It identifies IMI as a Tax whose revenue is municipal, with the rates applied being fixed by deliberation of the Municipal Assembly - article 112 of the IMI Code and further that one may lodge a claim or challenge within the terms and deadlines established in articles 76 and 102 of the CPPT."
In fact, observing the collection document appearing in document number 3 of the PA attached, it is verified that the elements indicated above are present. However, the question that arises is as follows: are such elements sufficient to affirm that the duties of substantiation of the act are duly fulfilled?
Generically, and as noted in the following judgment, "if the formal substantiation does not clearly explain the motivation of the act, through obscurity, contradiction or insufficiency, the act is deemed not substantiated [...]. There is obscurity when the assertions made by the author of the decision do not make clear the reasons why the decision was made as it was. In other words, the grounds of the act must be clear, so that one may perfectly grasp the meaning of the reasons that determined the performance of the act; thus, the use of ambiguous, vague and generic expressions is not permitted. [...]. Finally, substantiation is insufficient if its content is not sufficient to explain the reasons why the decision was taken. In other words, the substantiation must be sufficient, in the sense that no reasons are left unsaid that would conveniently explain the final decision." (Judgment of the TCAS [Superior Tax Court] of 4/12/2012, case 6134/12).
Now, in this light, it is found that, although the elements itemized in the draft decision appear in the collection document in question, there is also evident obscurity and insufficiency of substantiation, both resulting in the conclusion that the said act should be deemed not substantiated.
In fact, it is verified that: 1) the indication that IMI "is municipal revenue", or that "rates are fixed by deliberation of the Municipal Assembly", says or clarifies nothing about the motivation of the act (the same can be said regarding the indication that the claimant "may lodge a claim or challenge the assessment"); 2) it is informed that "in the assessment of IMI, the safeguard clauses provided for in the law [...] or article 138 of the IMI Code" (italics ours) were applied, which reveals, in a clear manner, the use of an ambiguous formulation that does not permit determining - to use the words of the Judgment of the TCAS mentioned above -, with the necessary "perfection, the meaning of the reasons that determined the performance of the act".
It is worth noting that this type of question, relating to the substantiation of IMI collection documents, has already been the subject of analysis in various judgments.
Thus, for example, see the following judgments: "Tax acts are subject to substantiation (article 268, section 3, article 77 of the GTL [General Tax Law] and article 125 of the CPA [Code of Administrative Procedure]). The substantiation of the act of fixing the VPT, whether resulting from assessment or from updating, must be communicated to the taxpayer liable for IMI to be assessed based on that taxable matter. If it was not, and also the IMI assessment does not make known the manner in which the VPT was determined, that assessment cannot be deemed sufficiently substantiated, especially since section 2 of article 77 of the GTL imposes that the substantiation of tax acts be integrated, among other things, by the operations of determination of the taxable matter." (Judgment of the STA [Supreme Court of Administrative Law] of 19/9/2012, case 659/12); "It is [...] unequivocal [...] that the collection document sent to the Taxpayer [...] refers to the location of the property, the cadastral article, the patrimonial taxable value, the assessment date, the tax year to which it relates, the rate applied and the tax due. The issue raised in the case file is reduced to knowing whether the elements contained in that note are or are not sufficient to meet the legal requirements of substantiation regarding the determination of the patrimonial taxable value. [...] as to the reference made in the said collection note [...], to which the Appellant insists on granting relevance at the level of the substantiation of the patrimonial taxable value [...] the sentence had already stated [and the STA agrees] that the same elucidates nothing «regarding the matter of property valuation under the cadastral article, since this norm only provides for a safeguard regime, establishing limits on the increase of IMI». In conclusion, we find it certain that the AT did not make known what led it to ascertain the patrimonial value [in question] and not some other value" (Judgment of the STA of 19/4/2012, case 36/12); "It is incumbent upon the AT, as formal substantiation of the assessment act, to invoke the satisfaction of the specific legal prerequisites upon which its right to assessment depends, with clear, sufficient and congruent elements, in order to permit the administered party to judge the correctness/legality thereof and thus conform to it or impugn it, graciously or judicially, if it considers it tainted by some defect that affects its legality. Even the so-called acts performed in mass are subject to a minimum of substantiation in order to achieve that purpose, which constitutes a guarantee of the administered party, even of constitutional order" (Judgment of the TCAS of 28/2/2012, case 4893/11).
By the foregoing, it is concluded that there exists obscurity in the justification present in the collection document under analysis, and insufficiency of elements that permit understanding how the VPT presented was determined, whereby the assessment in question is illegal due to lack of substantiation.
The AT further alleges that "it was incumbent upon the Claimant to request the issuance of the certificate provided for in article 37 of the CPPT. [...]. Now, having the Claimant not used the facility conferred by law, it is necessary to conclude that the act sub judice contained, and contains, all the elements necessary for its full understanding and that the proclaimed vice which it suffered was healed."
However, the failure to request the said certificate does not prevent the invocation of the defect of lack of substantiation. As is well noted in the Judgment of the TCAS of 12/11/2002 (case 7002/02), "the possibility granted by article 22 of the CPT [former Tax Procedure Code] aims exclusively to obtain the healing of the deficiency of notification, with deferment of the commencement of the deadline for use of the gracious or contentious means of challenge, not constituting a condition for access to such means. Thus, the failure to use that facility shall never have as a consequence the impossibility of invoking the defect of form through lack of substantiation as the grounds for the judicial challenge filed against the act whose substantiation has not been communicated to the taxpayer. [...]. In truth, in the CPT in force at the time, as currently in the Code of Tax Procedure and Process, we know of no legal provision that imposes any condition for the administrative claim or for the judicial challenge filed on the grounds of a defect of form due to lack of substantiation. Thus, the fact that the Appellant did not use the facility provided for in article 22 of the CPT, contrary to what the Appellant maintains, does not prevent it from challenging the tax assessment in question on the grounds of lack of substantiation. The Appellant runs, however, the risk that substantiation exists, notwithstanding that it has not been communicated to it, and, consequently, of seeing the challenge filed on that ground fail, a risk it would not run had it previously ascertained, through the said facility, the existence of substantiation of the challenged act."
The argument regarding the alleged "automatic" healing of the defect invoked by the claimant is therefore without merit. The same is true of the following argument, equally invoked by the defendant: "the substantiation is sufficiently clear and unequivocal, especially since the Claimant, both through the Administrative Claim filed by it at an earlier time, and through the present request for arbitral pronouncement, demonstrates, in light of the arguments set forth in its filings, to have fully understood the factual and legal framework upon which the Defendant's decision was based [...]. [...] deficiencies [«at the level of substantiation discourse», nevertheless] permit the full clarification of its recipient, enabling it to lodge a protest against them, as, indeed, the Claimant did through the present request for arbitral pronouncement."
This argument, as presented, is without merit and could even conduct, in theory, to the inadmissibility of the invocation (or irrelevance of the consideration) of the defect of lack of substantiation of acts should the taxpayer resort to the Courts (whether arbitral or judicial). The fact that a request for pronouncement is filed does not permit demonstrating, per se, that the act was duly substantiated.
In fact, as is emphasized, in this regard, in the following judgment: "[The] obligation [of substantiation of acts] does not have as its sole objective the «protection by this means of the rights and interests of the administered parties but includes, in the first place, the guarantee of a correct decision-making procedure» - José Carlos Vieira de Andrade, The Duty of Express Substantiation of Administrative Acts, p. 43. What is not sought, then, and merely, is that the individual be apprised of the reasons why the Administration decided one way and not another; what is also sought is to impose upon the Administration, by this means, a necessary explicit reflection and weighing of the reasons and arguments at stake, which the substantiation of the act must reveal, thus making administrative activity transparent. Hence, it is not sufficient to say, in demonstration of compliance with the duty to substantiate, that the administered party reacted against the administrative act, revealing, with that reaction, to have grasped the scope and reasons of the act. On the one hand, it is not certain that the administered party has not merely "guessed" the hidden grounds of the administrative act, which must appear from the act itself. On the other hand, the legislator wished the administration not to decide rashly, obliging it to embody in the substantiation the reasons for its choice, such that the administration itself perceives, in substantiating, whether or not its choice is well-founded, in time to correct course if that be the case, and that the act presents itself transparently. This is to conclude that it is not decisive the argument, moreover, frequent, according to which merely the fact that the act was contentiously appealed, with the resulting imputation of defects, already demonstrates that it was duly substantiated." (Judgment of the TCAS of 28/2/2012, case 4893/11). (Italics ours).
b) to d) Given that the understanding of the present claimant regarding the preceding question [a)] is substantiated, it becomes unnecessary to verify the substantiation of other defects imputed to the act now being challenged.
In this respect, see, for example, the following precedents: "There is an omission of decision when the court fails to assess and decide a question it has been called upon to resolve, unless its examination has been prejudiced by the solution given to the dispute. By virtue of the provision in section 2 of article 124 of the CPPT, one must first address defects involving violation of law stricto sensu (except in cases where the content of the act cannot be apprehended, namely in the case of lack of substantiation), thus ensuring more effective protection of the taxpayer's rights." (Judgment of the STA of 7/9/2011, case 23/11); "the judge [...] [has] the duty imposed on him – cf. article 660, section 2 of that first statute [CPC] – to resolve all questions submitted for his consideration, excepted only those whose decision is prejudiced by the solution given to others" (Judgment of the STA of 22/3/2006, case 916/04).
e) The Defendant further formulates a request for compensation for undue guarantee.
In its response, the AT alleged that, "the amounts of costs in which the Claimant incurred with said provision of guarantee being unknown, the prerequisites on which the recognition of the requested compensation is based are not substantiated. [And,] In any case, the request should not be formulated in this venue, but rather in the venue of Execution of Judgment, should the Claimant's claim prevail in the case and the Defendant fail to comply with the judgment within the respective legal deadline."
In this regard, agreement is reached with the sense and justification given in a very similar case, which was decided in DA [Arbitral Decision] number 36/2013, of 9/10/2013, and whose text is reproduced in the parts most relevant here: "Regarding the request for conviction in the payment of compensation for undue provision of guarantee, article 171 of the CPPT establishes that «compensation in the case of a bank guarantee or equivalent unduly provided shall be requested in the proceeding in which the legality of the enforceable debt is contested» and that «compensation must be requested in the administrative claim, challenge or appeal or, if its grounds are supervenient, within 30 days after its occurrence». [...]. The request for constitution of the arbitral tribunal has as a corollary the arbitral proceeding becoming the venue in which the «legality of the enforceable debt» will be discussed, whereby, as results from the express wording of that section 1 of the said article 171 of the CPPT, it is also the arbitral proceeding that is appropriate for examining the request for compensation for undue guarantee. [...]. The regime of the right to compensation for undue guarantee is contained in article 53 of the GTL [...]. In the case at hand, [...] the error in the correction made had repercussions on the assessments [...], whereby the Appellant is entitled to be compensated for the damages arising from the guarantees provided [...]. With no elements permitting the determination of the amount of compensation, the conviction must be effected with reference to what shall be liquidated in execution of the present judgment (article 661 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1961, which corresponds to article 609 in the Code of Civil Procedure of 2013, and article 565 of the Civil Code)."
Thus, it is concluded, with the same grounds and in the same terms as the above-cited decision, for the substantiation of the request for compensation of the present claimant for the expenses incurred with the provision of an undue guarantee.
IV – DECISION
In light of the foregoing, it is decided:
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To adjudge the request for arbitral pronouncement well-founded, with the consequent annulment, with all legal effects, of the challenged assessment act;
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To adjudge the request for conviction of the AT in the payment to the claimant of the compensation to be liquidated in execution of the present decision, relating to the expenses of the guarantee provided, well-founded.
The value of the case is fixed at €1,277.20 (one thousand two hundred seventy-seven euros and twenty cents), pursuant to article 32 of the CPTA [Code of Tax Procedure] and article 97-A of the CPPT, applicable by force of the provision in article 29, section 1, subsections a) and b), of the LRAT, and article 3, section 2, of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings (RCPAT).
Costs are borne by the defendant, in the amount of €306.00 (three hundred and six euros), pursuant to Table I of the RCPAT, given that the present request was adjudged well-founded, and in compliance with the provisions of articles 12, section 2, and 22, section 4, both of the LRAT, and the provision in article 4, section 4, of the cited Regulation.
Notify.
Lisbon, 30 July 2014.
The Arbitrator
(Miguel Patrício)
Text prepared by computer, pursuant to the provision in article 138, section 5, of the CPC [Code of Civil Procedure], made applicable by reference in article 29, section 1, subsection e), of the LRAT.
The drafting of the present decision is governed by the spelling prior to the 1990 Orthographic Agreement.
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