Summary
Full Decision
ARBITRAL DECISION
I. Report
1. A..., Ltd., legal entity no. ..., with registered office at ..., no. ..., ...-... ..., Soure, requested the constitution of an arbitral tribunal in tax matters, raising a request for arbitral pronouncement against the acts of assessment of the Single Vehicle Circulation Tax (SVCT), plus compensatory interest, relating to the tax periods of 2013 and 2014 and the motor vehicle with registration number ...-...-..., in the total amount of € 1,247.48.
2. As grounds for the request, submitted on 14 July 2015, the Applicant alleges, in summary, that the vehicle in question was no longer in its possession during the periods to which the disputed assessments relate, given that it had been transferred to a third party by means of a purchase and sale contract executed on 30 September 2004.
3. In response to what was requested, the Tax and Customs Authority (AT) pronounced itself in the sense of the inadmissibility of the present request for arbitral pronouncement, maintaining in the legal order the impugned tax acts and, accordingly, for the absolution of the defendant entity, invoking, however, its timeliness as a dilatory exception, preventing consideration of the merits of the request.
4. The request for constitution of the arbitral tribunal was accepted by the President of CAAD and automatically notified to the Tax and Customs Authority on 15 July 2015.
5. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (a) of section 2 of article 6 and paragraph (b) of section 1 of article 11 of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January, as amended by article 228 of Law no. 66-B/2012, of 31 December, the Ethics Council designated the undersigned as arbitrator of the singular arbitral tribunal, who communicated acceptance of the charge within the applicable period, and notified the parties of such designation on 31 August 2015.
6. Duly notified of such designation, the parties manifested no will to refuse the designation of the arbitrator, pursuant to the combined provisions of article 11, section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the RJAT and articles 6 and 7 of the Ethics Code.
7. Thus, in accordance with what is prescribed in paragraph (c) of section 1 of article 11 of the RJAT, as amended by article 228 of Law no. 66-B/2012, of 31 December, the singular arbitral tribunal was constituted on 15 September 2015.
8. With the arbitral tribunal duly constituted, it is materially competent, in light of what is prescribed in article 2, section 1, paragraph (a) of the RJAT.
9. The parties have legal personality and capacity and have standing (articles 4 and 10, section 2 of the RJAT, and article 1 of Order no. 112-A/2011, of 22/03).
10. Given the knowledge that derives from the procedural documents—in particular from the administrative proceeding, exemplarily instructed—which is deemed sufficient, the Tribunal decided to dispense with the meeting referred to in article 18 of the RJAT.
II. Factual Matters
11. With relevance to the assessment of the questions raised, the following factual elements stand out, which, based on the documentary evidence joined to the file, are considered proved:
11.1. On 24 September 2014, due to untimely payment of the SVCT relating to the tax periods of 2013 and 2014 and motor vehicle with registration number ...-...-..., official assessments no. ... and ..., to which correspond the payment documents no. 2013... and 2014..., respectively, were issued by the competent services of the Tax and Customs Authority.
11.2. Duly notified to the Applicant, the aforesaid assessments, whose total amount is € 1,247.48, had as deadline for their voluntary payment, 31 October 2014.
11.3. Disagreeing with the assessments notified to it, the Applicant, on 31 October 2014, lodged administrative complaints thereto, under article 68 of the Code of Tax Procedure and Process.
11.4. As grounds for the complaints presented, the Applicant alleges, in essence, that at the date of exigibility of the tax assessed, the vehicle to which it relates was no longer its property, since it had been transferred by means of a purchase and sale contract executed on 30 September 2004, a fact which it proves by presenting a copy of the respective invoice.
11.5. By orders of 10 November 2014, from the head of the competent Finance Service, the complaints were dismissed in their entirety, on the ground that, according to information held in the Motor Vehicle Registration Offices, the vehicle in question, registered on 25 June 1990, had been registered in the name of the complainant since 30 July 2004, this situation remaining until 16 October 2014, the date on which the registration thereof was cancelled. Accordingly, it was the complainant who was the passive subject of the tax obligation at the date of exigibility of the tax with reference to the periods of 2013 and 2014.
11.6. From the decisions rejecting the administrative complaints, the now Applicant lodged hierarchical appeals which, by orders of 31 March 2015, were also subject to rejection, with the decisions notified to the Applicant's representative on 15 April 2015, through office no. ... of the Finance Directorate of....
11.7. The rejection of the aforementioned hierarchical appeals is grounded, as are the appealed decisions, in the circumstance that the Applicant appears in the Motor Vehicle Register as owner of the vehicle in question at the moment of exigibility of the tax, admitting, however, that the presumption derived from the registration would be rebuttable, in the following terms: "The registration does not cease to constitute a presumption that the registered right exists and belongs to the registered holder (...), that presumption being rebuttable by proof to the contrary. However, the rebuttal of such presumption must be carried out in the proper venue. That is to say, in the concrete case, that the presumption can be rebutted within the registration sphere, with the consequent downstream effects, in particular in the tax domain."
Not having been rebutted the presumption, in the aforementioned terms, the decisions rejecting the appeals confirm the assessed liabilities considering "that all the elements on which the assessment depends are met (...), the assessment not being affected by any incorrectness (...)".
12. There are no facts relevant to the decision on the merits that have not been proved.
III. Cumulation of Requests
13. The present request for arbitral pronouncement concerns various SVCT assessments. However, given the identity of the tax facts, the tribunal competent to decide, and the grounds of fact and law invoked, the tribunal considers that nothing prevents, in light of the provisions of articles 3 of the RJAT and 104 of the CPPT, the cumulation of requests.
IV. Legal Matters
14. In the request for arbitral pronouncement, the Applicant submits to the assessment of this tribunal the legality of the acts of SVCT assessment, relating to the tax periods of 2013 and 2014 and the vehicle with registration number ...-...-..., invoking the circumstance that, at the date to which the tax facts that originated them relate, the vehicle to which they concern had already been transferred to a third party, and that, consequently, it does not assume the capacity of passive subject of the tax assessed against it.
15. It is, therefore, a question of determining whether the Applicant should or should not be considered a passive subject of SVCT with respect to the vehicle and periods to which the tax relates, considering that it, although then still registered in its name, had already been transferred by means of a purchase and sale contract.
16. With respect to this matter, article 3 of the SVCT Code provides, in its sections 1 and 2, that: "1 - Passive subjects of the tax are the owners of vehicles, being understood as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose names they are registered."
17. According to the understanding of the Respondent, the aforementioned rule does not entail any legal presumption, considering that "the legislator expressly and intentionally established that those (as owners or in the situations provided for in section 2, the persons therein mentioned) be considered as the persons in whose names those (the vehicles) are registered..."
18. For its part, the Applicant maintains that such a rule establishes a legal presumption, rebuttable according to general terms and, in particular, by virtue of what is provided in article 73 of the General Tax Law, according to which presumptions of tax incidence always admit proof to the contrary.
19. This matter has been the subject of numerous decisions within the arbitral tribunals operating at CAAD, generally in the sense of the admissibility of the respective requests, on the ground that the rule in question contains a legal presumption that admits proof to the contrary [i].
20. Adhering without reservation to the position referred to above, dispensing, as unnecessary and tedious, with the reproduction of the respective reasoning, since in the present proceeding nothing new is put forward on that matter.
On the Dilatory Exception
21. With the relevant factual elements summarized as well as the positions which, on the matter of interpretation of the applicable law, are sustained by the Parties, it is important, before anything else, to analyze and decide on the exception invoked by the Respondent.
22. According to what the Respondent alleges, the object of the request is the SVCT assessments relating to the tax periods of 2013 and 2014 and the vehicle with registration number ...-...-..., that is, the Applicant "petitions that the Tribunal deign to assess the legality of the acts of SVCT assessment identified in the proceeding."
23. However, continues the Respondent, "pursuant to the request for Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal under analysis, the immediate object of the proceeding should be the dismissal of hierarchical appeals...
Nevertheless, from the tenor of the request formulated, it is verified that the tax acts assessed and which are in fact the object of the request for arbitral pronouncement are not the dismissal of hierarchical appeals (...) but rather, as the Applicant refers, the acts of SVCT assessment relating to the years 2013 and 2014, concerning the vehicle ...-...-...".
24. Thus, "pursuant to the provisions of article 10, section 1, paragraph (a) of the RJAT, intending the Applicant to react against the acts of official assessment, the request for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal should have been presented within 90 days counting from the end of the period for voluntary payment..."
25. In these terms, since the assessment notes show as the deadline for payment the day of 31 October 2014, and the Applicant presented the request for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal on 14 July 2015, the period legally defined for impugning the assessment acts in question in arbitration had already been exceeded. Accordingly, "not having been requested the assessment of the legality of the second-degree act, there exists no support that could defend the timeliness of the request and consequently the possibility of the Tribunal arbitral assessing the same with respect to the acts of assessment that the Applicant intends to impugn."
26. With the grounds that are summarized above, the Respondent concludes that "resulting clear and unequivocally from the request for arbitral pronouncement, the direct impugning of the tax acts referred to above, the request formulated (leading to the annulment of the assessment acts) should be declared inadmissible, as untimely, since the expiration of the right of action constitutes a dilatory exception preventing consideration of the merits of the case, pursuant to the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article 576 of the CPC (ex vi paragraph (e) of article 2 of the CPPT and paragraphs (a) and (e) of section 1 of article 29 of the RJAT, which is hereby requested."
27. The Tax and Customs Authority considers, therefore, that the Applicant defines as the object of the request for arbitral pronouncement the acts of SVCT assessment and compensatory interest whose period for voluntary payment ended on 31 October 2014, the request having been presented on 14 July 2015. Submitted already after the expiration of the period provided for in section 1 of article 10 of the RJAT, it would be clearly untimely.
28. This understanding is not followed. Indeed, it results clearly from the cited rule that, in situations, such as that which is evident in the present proceeding, where there has been administrative complaint and or hierarchical appeal, the period for presenting the request for arbitral pronouncement is counted from the notification of the decision made therein.
29. It is emphasized that this matter has been the subject of various arbitral decisions, and it is recalled in this regard the Arbitral Decision issued in Case 419/2014-T, from which the following is transcribed:
"As follows from the competence attributed to the arbitral tribunals operating at CAAD to assess the legality of assessment acts, and not of decisions dismissing hierarchical appeals or administrative complaints, when there is impugning of assessment acts administratively, these assessment acts are always impugnable within a period counting from the notification of the dismissal decision, since article 10, section 1, indicates them as initial terms. For this reason, the arbitration requester need not impugn the second or third degree acts and, even when he does impugn them, it is considered that the object of the arbitration proceeding is always the mediate object constituted by the assessment acts maintained by second or third degree acts whenever the Requester does not attribute to these acts defects of their own. But, obviously, if the arbitration requester merely intends to see declared the illegality of assessment acts, which are those that, being susceptible to coercive execution, affect his legal sphere, he need not impugn the second or third degree acts, which lack autonomous harmfulness.
Moreover, a hypothetical deficiency in the formulation of the request would not have absolution of the instance as a corollary, merely giving rise, if necessary, but always when necessary, to a correction, as required by paragraph (c) of section 1 of article 18 of the RJAT, in accordance with the constitutional right to contentious impugning of all acts of the Administration that harm the rights of taxpayers (articles 20, section 1, and 268, section 4, of the CRP)."
30. In the same sense, the following can be read in an Arbitral Decision of 27 October 2015, in Case 124/2015-T:
"We are once again in that case where there appears to be confusion between the material scope of arbitration (article 2 of the RJAT) and the date from which the request for arbitral pronouncement may be filed (article 10 of the RJAT) and also, once again, it is a matter here of the approach to the question of recourse, through arbitration, of second or third degree acts. The problematic of second and third degree acts in tax arbitration concerns, as it is understood, at least two distinct questions: a first one, to know whether, having had recourse to an administrative gracious remedy, the object of the arbitration proceeding will be the decision that comes to be made by the Tax Administration – in the context of administrative complaint, hierarchical appeal or official revision request – or, on the contrary, the assessment act, self-assessment, withholding at source, or payment on account; a second, which interlinks questions of competence and questions of period, and which is to know whether the tribunal will have competence – and, if so, to what extent – to assess a first-degree act when the request is presented in the context of a tacit dismissal of administrative complaint, hierarchical appeal or official revision request previously presented.
With respect to the first question, already in the context of judicial impugning, it was questionable whether, before an express decision of administrative complaint, hierarchical appeal or official revision request, the taxpayer was impugning the assessment act directly previously complained about, appealed or revised (the first-degree act) or the decision itself (of dismissal) of complaint, appeal or official revision request which, in turn, assessed the (il)legality of the impugned act - the second degree act. The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) came to pronounce itself on the question, in an order dated 18 May 2011, handed down in the context of Case no. 0156/11[1], admitting that "(…) the real object of the impugning is the assessment act and not the act that decided the complaint, so that the defects of that and not of this order are truly in question(…)."
"(…) the impugning is not, therefore, limited by the grounds invoked in the administrative complaint, being able to have as ground any illegality of the tax act.(…)"
This is the first question that must be made clear: the object of the arbitration proceeding is the assessment act of [income tax].
A different question from this is to know whether the request for arbitral pronouncement was presented within the period. Here the Tribunal understands that the arbitration legislator was clear in compartmentalizing questions of competence and questions of periods.
Thus it is that as to competence or material scope in which the object of arbitration is, as was concluded, the assessment of the illegality of assessment acts [of income tax].
As to the period, the taxpayer may resort to arbitration immediately upon notification of the assessment acts of taxes, self-assessment, withholding at source and payment on account, or, having resorted to the administrative avenue, after notification of the dismissal decision or the formation of tacit dismissal. This answer is found, in turn, in article 10. From this rule should not, however, be withdrawn the competence for direct assessment of second degree acts. This is a rule that concerns solely and exclusively the dies a quo of the period for presentation of the request for arbitral pronouncement. It is a rule that therefore concerns the moment from which the counting of the period for requesting the constitution of the arbitral tribunal begins.
Indeed, article 2, section 1, paragraph (a), determines that arbitral tribunals have competence to assess "the declaration of illegality of assessment acts of taxes, self-assessment, withholding at source and payment on account". There is, therefore, no reference to acts of dismissal of administrative complaint, hierarchical appeal or official revision request, i.e., there is no mention of the arbitrability of decisions dismissing, express or tacit, the prior administrative avenues used. There is not, nor should there be.
It is understood in this regard that second or third degree acts may always be arbitrable, to the extent that they contain, and only to that extent, themselves, the (il)legality of the assessment acts in question. At the basis of this understanding will be, for part of the Doctrine, a teleological interpretation, in particular because paragraph (a) of section 1 of article 10 expressly refers to the "decision of hierarchical appeal" and is also, as it is understood, the fact that the second or third degree act is assessing the assessment act, self-assessment, withholding at source or payment on account object of the arbitration.
It is hereby maintained, therefore, an interpretation according to which are not arbitrable the defects proper to the acts dismissing administrative complaints, hierarchical appeals or revision requests of the tax act because they escape the material scope of tax arbitration. In other words, those dismissal acts may only be "brought" to arbitral jurisdiction, in the strict condition of having themselves assessed the (il)legality of the tax act that the passive subject, truly and effectively, intends to impugn through the arbitral avenue.
In this sense, see the arbitral decision handed down in the context of Case no. 272/2014-T]:
"65 - The dismissal of an administrative complaint embodies, in the framework of judicial impugning, the case provided for in section 2 of article 102 of the CPPT, raising the question of whether, given the competences legally attributed to arbitral tribunals, these will be competent to, in any circumstance, assess the acts dismissing administrative complaints.
66 - Being the competence of the arbitral tribunals operating at CAAD circumscribed and limited, as was already mentioned above, to the declaration of illegality of assessment acts of taxes, self-assessment, withholding at source and payment on account, the assessment of the acts dismissing administrative complaints, by the aforementioned tribunals, must be conditioned on the effective knowledge that such acts had of the legality of the assessment acts with which they are related.
67 - The decision dismissing the administrative complaint, handed down in the aforementioned circumstances, reaffirms the legality of the assessment act in question and reconfirms it, just as it had been initially configured.
68 - The dismissal of the administrative complaint, is a harmful act susceptible to impugning by the interested party, which, to the extent that it proceeds to the reaffirmation of the primary assessment act underlying and of which it is inseparable, cannot but have its assessment committed to arbitral tribunals, which, as already mentioned, have their competences fundamentally centered on the declaration of illegality of assessment acts of taxes.""
31. Following the position expressed in the arbitral decisions in the segments transcribed above, which is adhered to without reservation, it is verified, in the present case, that the notifications of the decisions dismissing the hierarchical appeals occurred on 16 and 20 April 2015, and the request for arbitral pronouncement was presented on 14 July following, therefore within the period provided for in article 10, section 1 of the RJAT.
32. In these terms, the exception invoked by the Tax and Customs Authority is considered inadmissible.
On the Merits of the Request
33. Concluding, in the wake of the guidance that has invariably been followed by arbitral jurisprudence, that the rule of subjective tax incidence of SVCT establishes a rebuttable presumption, it is important to analyze the documentation offered by the Applicant in order to know whether or not it constitutes sufficient proof for its rebuttal.
34. As referred to above, in the matter of facts, in the situation to which the present request concerns, the taxation of a motor vehicle is in question, which, at the date of exigibility of the tax, would already be the property of a third party, transferred by means of a purchase and sale contract executed with the Applicant.
35. With respect to the situation referred to, a copy of the invoice that evidenced the transaction is presented, as an element of proof: identified with no. ... and issued on 30 September 2004, from it appears to concern the "sale of a vehicle with registration number ...-...-... damaged for scrap".
On the Rebuttal of the Presumption
36. Presumptions of tax incidence can be rebutted through the special contradictory procedure provided for in article 64 of the CPPT or, alternatively, through the avenue of administrative complaint or judicial impugning of the tax acts on which they are based.
37. In the present case, the Applicant did not use that specific procedure, so the present request for arbitral decision is the proper means to rebut the presumption of subjective tax incidence of SVCT that supports the tax assessments whose annulment is the object of the request, since this is a matter that falls within the material competence of this arbitral tribunal (articles 2 and 4 of the RJAT).
38. With the Applicant appearing in the Motor Vehicle Register as owner of the vehicle identified in the request in the tax periods to which the disputed assessments concern, and having the vehicle in question, at the date of exigibility of the tax, already passed to the ownership of a third party by means of a purchase and sale contract, it remains to evaluate the proof presented, in order to determine whether it is sufficient to rebut the presumption established in section 1 of article 3 of the same Code.
39. To rebut the aforementioned presumption, derived from the entry in the motor vehicle register, the applicant offers a copy of the sales invoice issued on a date prior to the date of exigibility of the tax relating to the tax periods to which the assessments concern.
On Rebuttal of the Presumption Based on Commercial Invoices
40. Pronouncing itself on the documentary evidence presented, the Respondent alleges that the invoices joined to the file do not constitute suitable documents to effect the proof sought in the sense that the Applicant is not the owner of the vehicles in the tax periods to which the assessments in question relate.
42. In that sense, the Respondent maintains that "Invoices are not suitable to prove the conclusion of a synallagmatic contract such as purchase and sale, since such documents do not reveal by themselves an indispensable and unequivocal declaration of intent (i.e., acceptance) on the part of the purported acquirers."
43. Furthermore, according to the Respondent, the Applicant "did not join documentary proof of receipt of the price when it could and should have done so", concluding that "it must be concluded that such documents can never benefit from the presumption of truthfulness referred to in article 75 of the LGT."
44. It is, therefore, a question of knowing whether invoices that evidence commercial transactions constitute evidence for rebuttal of the presumption contained in article 3 of the SVCT Code and, if so admitted, whether the copy of the invoice presented by the Applicant constitutes sufficient proof for that purpose.
45. To do so, it is important to bear in mind that, in the situation under analysis, there is a purchase and sale contract which, concerning movable property and not being subject to any special formalism (Civil Code, article 219), operates the corresponding transfer of real property rights (Civil Code, article 408, section 1).
46. In the case of contracts involving the transfer of ownership of movable property, through the payment of a price, these have, as essential effects, among others, the delivery of the thing (Civil Code, articles 874 and 879).
47. However, since it is a purchase and sale contract having as object a motor vehicle, in which registration is mandatory, its proper performance presupposes the issuance of the sales declaration necessary for entry in the register of the corresponding acquisition in favor of the buyer, as has been understood by the jurisprudence of the superior courts.[ii] Such declaration, relevant for registration purposes, may constitute proof of the transaction, but does not constitute the only or exclusive means of proof of the transaction.
48. For registration purposes, no special formalism is required either, it being sufficient to present to the competent entity a request subscribed by the buyer and confirmed by the seller, which, through a sales declaration, confirms that the ownership of the vehicle was acquired by the latter by means of a verbal purchase and sale contract (see Motor Vehicle Registration Regulation, article 25, section 1, paragraph (a).[iii]
49. Although these are the rules resulting from the provisions of civil law relating to the informality of transfer of movable property and, as the case may be, its registration, it cannot but be noted that, in the situation under analysis, we are dealing with a commercial transaction, carried out between businesses.
50. In that context, the selling company is bound to comply with specific accounting and tax rules, in which invoicing assumes special relevance.
51. In the first place, by virtue of tax rules, the entity transferring the goods is obliged to issue an invoice for each transfer of goods, whatever the capacity of the respective acquirer (VAT Code, article 29, section 1, paragraph (b).
52. Also in accordance with the provisions of tax rules, the invoice must comply with a certain form, detailed regulated in articles 36 of the VAT Code and 5 of Decree-Law no. 198/90, of 19 June.
53. It is on the basis of this document issued by the supplier of goods that the acquirer, when it is an economic operator, will deduct the VAT to which it is entitled (VAT Code, article 19, section 2)—unless the tax borne in the acquisition of the vehicle, due to its characteristics, is not deductible—and account for the cost of the operation (Corporate Income Tax Code, articles 23, section 6 and 123, section 2).
54. For its part, it is also on the basis of the invoicing issued that the supplier of goods should account for the respective income, as follows from the provisions of paragraph (b) of section 2 of article 123 of the Corporate Income Tax Code.
55. Since they are issued in the legally prescribed form and constitute supporting elements of the entries in accounting organized in accordance with commercial and tax legislation, the data contained therein are covered by the presumption of truthfulness referred to in article 75, section 1 of the LGT.
56. Considering, therefore, the relevance attributed by tax legislation to invoices issued in accordance with legal requirements by commercial companies in the context of their business activity, and the presumption of truthfulness of the operations evidenced thereby, it cannot but be considered that these can constitute, by themselves alone, sufficient proof of the transfers invoked by the Applicant.
57. In the present case, it is verified that the invoice that evidences the transaction in question is issued in the legally prescribed form, containing therein, in particular, the usual denomination of the goods transferred, the sale price, the applicable VAT rate as well as the corresponding amount of tax, as results from tax law (see VAT Code, article 36, section 5).
58. In these terms, it is considered that the invoice presented by the Applicant constitutes sufficient proof of the alleged fact for purposes of rebuttal of the presumption in question.
59. Thus, considering rebutted the presumption of ownership derived from the motor vehicle register contained in section 1 of article 3 of the SVCT Code, the assessments object of the present request should be annulled, on the ground of illegality and error in the assumptions on which they are based.
V. Decision
In these terms, and with the grounds set forth, the Arbitral Tribunal decides:
a) To judge inadmissible the dilatory exception invoked by the Tax and Customs Authority (AT);
b) To judge admissible the request for arbitral pronouncement, with respect to the illegality of the SVCT assessments and compensatory interest, relating to the vehicle with registration number ...-...-... and the tax periods of 2013 and 2014, to which the payment documents 2013... and 2014... relate, determining, in consequence, their annulment.
Value of case: € 1,247.48
Costs: Under article 22, section 4 of the RJAT, and in accordance with Table I attached to the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, I fix the amount of costs at € 306.00, to be borne by the Respondent (AT).
Lisbon, 9 February 2016,
The Arbitrator, Álvaro Caneira.
[i] By way of merely exemplary illustration, see Cases 14/2013-T, 26/2013-T, 27/2013-T, 73/2013-T, 170/2013-T, 217/2013-T, 256/2013-T, 289/2013-T, 294/2013-T, 21/2014-T, 42/2014-T, 43/2014-T, 50/2014-T, 52/2014-T, 67/2014-T, 68/2014-T, 77/2014-T, 108/2014-T, 115/2014-T, 117/2014-T, 118/2014-T, 120/2014-T, 121/2014-T, 128/2014-T, 140/2014-T, 141/2014-T, 152/2014-T, 154/2014-T, 173/2014-T, 174/2014-T, 175/2014-T, 182/2014-T, 191/2014-T, 214/2014-T, 219/2014-T, 221/2014-T, 222/2014-T, 227/2014-T, 228/2014-T, 229/2014-T, 230/2014-T, 233/2014-T, 246/2014-T, 247/2014-T, 250/2014-T, 262/2014-T, 302/2014-T, 333/2014-T, 414/2014-T, 646/2014-T, all available at www.caad.org.pt.
[ii] See STJ, Orders of 23.3.2006 and 12.10.2006, Cases 06B722 and 06B2620.
[iii] It is noted that, in the context of the special procedure for registration of property of vehicles acquired by verbal purchase and sale contract, approved by Decree-Law no. 177/2014, of 15 December, the invoice constitutes, among others, a document that evidences the actual purchase and sale of the vehicle, provided that it contains the registration number of the vehicle as well as the name of the seller and the buyer.
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