Process: 497/2017-T

Date: June 14, 2018

Tax Type: Outros

Source: Original CAAD Decision

Summary

This CAAD arbitral decision (Process 497/2017-T) addresses whether administrative fees (emolumentos) charged by tax authorities for providing information constitute arbitrable tax matters under Portuguese law. An enforcement agent requested information about an estate's heirs and assets under article 749 of the Civil Procedure Code, supported by judicial authorization for lifting tax secrecy. The Finance Service demanded payment of €15.36 for issuing a certificate, despite the agent arguing that direct information provision (not certification) was legally required without charge under CPC article 749(5) and Ordinance 202/2011. After the hierarchical appeal against this fee was dismissed, the enforcement agent sought arbitration at CAAD. The core legal issue concerned whether CAAD has jurisdiction over disputes regarding administrative fees for information services, or whether such fees fall outside the scope of tax arbitration defined in RJAT (Legal Regime for Tax Arbitration). The case required analyzing the legal distinction between taxes (impostos), fees (taxas), and administrative charges (emolumentos) in Portuguese law, and determining which disputes qualify for tax arbitration. The tribunal had to examine whether fees charged under the Regulation of Costs of Tax Proceedings constitute arbitrable tax matters, or whether they are merely administrative charges excluded from CAAD's competence. This decision has significant implications for enforcement agents, legal practitioners, and tax authorities regarding the proper channels for challenging information service fees and understanding the boundaries of tax arbitration jurisdiction in Portugal.

Full Decision

ARBITRAL DECISION

1. Report

On 04-09-2017, A…, taxpayer no.…, with tax address at Rua …, no.…, …, …-… Póvoa de Varzim, hereinafter referred to as the Claimant, submitted to the Administrative Arbitration Centre (CAAD) a request for constitution of an arbitral tribunal with a view to declaring the illegality of the act of dismissal of hierarchical appeal no. …2017….

The request for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal was accepted by the Hon. President of CAAD on 04-09-2017 and notified to the Respondent on the same date.

The Claimant did not proceed to appoint an arbitrator, therefore, pursuant to article 6, no. 2, paragraph a) of the RJAT, Dr. Suzana Fernandes da Costa was designated as arbitrator by the President of the Deontological Council of CAAD on 08-11-2017, the appointment having been accepted within the legal time limit and terms.

On the same date, the parties were duly notified of this appointment, and they did not manifest any intention to refuse the appointment of the arbitrator, in accordance with article 11, no. 1, paragraphs a) and b) of the RJAT, in conjunction with articles 6 and 7 of the Deontological Code.

Thus, in accordance with the provision of paragraph c) of no. 1 of article 11 of the RJAT, the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 28-11-2017.

On 29-11-2017, an order was issued ordering notification of the Respondent to, within 30 days, present a response and, if it so wished, request the production of additional evidence and remit to the arbitral tribunal a copy of the administrative file within the time limit for presenting the response.

On 04-12-2017, the Respondent presented its response and attached a petition informing that it did not object to the dispensation with the holding of the meeting provided for in article 18 of the RJAT, nor to the dispensation with oral arguments.

On 22-12-2017, an order was issued to notify the Claimant to, within 10 days, pronounce itself on the dispensation with the meeting provided for in article 18 of the RJAT and on the dispensation with oral arguments. Since the Claimant did not pronounce itself within the established time limit, a new order was issued on 25-01-2018, ordering its notification to pronounce itself on the dispensation with the meeting and oral arguments, within 10 days.

On 13-03-2018, an order was issued deciding to dispense with the meeting provided for in article 18 of the RJAT and to dispense with oral arguments. The date of 11-05-2018 was then set for the pronouncement of the arbitral decision, and the Claimant was warned that, until that date, it must attach to the proceedings proof of payment of the subsequent arbitration fee. On the same date, the Claimant attached to the proceedings proof of payment of the subsequent arbitration fee.

On 09-05-2018, a new order was issued rendering without effect the order of 13-03-2018 to the extent that it dispensed with oral arguments, taking into account that the response of AT contained matter of exception and the Claimant had not pronounced itself on the order of 25-01-2018. In this order, the notification of the Claimant was ordered to respond to the exception within a time limit of 15 days and to present, if it so wished, its written arguments, and AT could present its arguments within the same time limit, calculated successively. In the same order, the time limit for the decision was extended to 14-06-2018, in view of the complexity of the matter and in order to permit compliance with the principle of contradiction.

On 10-05-2018, the Claimant came to pronounce itself on the matter of exception and present its arguments. AT presented arguments on 23-05-2018.

The parties possess legal personality and capacity and are legally entitled (articles 4 and 10, nos. 1 and 2 of the RJAT and article 1 of Ordinance no. 112-A/2011 of 22 March).

The arbitral request is timely, in accordance with article 10, no. 1, paragraph a) of Decree-Law no. 10/2011 of 20 January and article 102, no. 1, paragraph a) of the Code of Tax Procedure and Process.

The proceedings do not suffer from nullities and no preliminary questions were raised, with the exception of the incompetence of the Arbitral Tribunal to hear the Claimant's request, which shall be decided below.

2. Cause of Action

The Claimant begins by stating that it is an enforcement agent designated in common enforcement proceedings no. …/12…TBGMTR, which are pending before the Judicial Court of the District of Braga – Guimarães – Central Instance –… Enforcement Section – J1. And within the scope of the aforementioned proceedings, the Claimant requested judicial authorization, pursuant to article 749 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), for the lifting of tax secrecy, in order for AT to provide the following information: identification of heirs (name, taxpayer number and address) associated with the tax identification number of a certain undivided estate, and identification of assets that were identified in the list of assets for purposes of Stamp Tax or Inheritance and Gift Tax. On the aforementioned request, a judicial order was issued granting the requested authorization.

The Claimant further states that it sent, on 30-01-2016, to the Finance Service of …, an email message with a PDF file attached, requesting information relating to the estate with the NIF…, which includes the defendant in the aforementioned judicial proceedings as heir, information that would be the identification of heirs and household head and the list of assets comprising the estate.

The Claimant alleges that it received an email message on 31-01-2017 from the Finance Service of …, requesting the sending, within 15 days, of a cheque endorsed to IGCP, E.P.E., in the amount of 15.36 €, for payment of a certificate. The same message also informed that the certificate could be collected at the counter of the Finance Service or a sealed envelope could be sent for its return.

The Claimant further refers that it sent, in response to the previous message, an email message alleging that the issuance of a certificate was not requested, but only the provision of information under article 749 of the CPC, since the data in question are available through direct electronic consultation. In the same message, the Claimant referred to article 749, no. 5 of the CPC, which states that "when electronic access is not possible for the enforcement agent to obtain information on the identification and location of assets of the defendant, the services referred to in no. 1 must provide them by the fastest means and within 10 days." The Claimant also transcribed article 3 of Ordinance no. 202/2011 of 20-05, which states that "the remuneration due for the services provided in the identification of the defendant and in the identification and location of its assets to public and private institutions that provide assistance to enforcement in accordance with article 749 of the Civil Procedure Code, corresponds to half of 1 unit of procedural account (UC) for the set of searches carried out." The Claimant ended the request asking that the requested information be made available to it in accordance with the terms and conditions provided in no. 5 of article 749 of the CPC, and that, if the purpose of requiring payment for the information provided were to be maintained, a reasoned decision would be issued with express reference to the enabling normative provision.

The Claimant states that, in response to this email message, it received a new message from the Finance Service informing it that the provision of the information in question, when requested without invoking the unavailability of the system/electronic access, or those provided for in no. 7 of article 749 of the CPC, are subject to taxation, in accordance with the Regulation of Costs of Tax Proceedings and the Table of Fees, approved by Decree-Law no. 29/98 of 11-02.

On 08-02-2017, the Claimant presented a hierarchical appeal against that order, which was expressly dismissed on 28-08-2017, following which the Claimant filed the present arbitral proceedings.

To substantiate its arbitral request, the Claimant transcribes the provision of article 749 of the CPC, and states that it results from the conjunction of its various numbers that the enforcement agent accesses two types of data:

a) Those of direct and electronic access, not subject to prior judicial authorization;

b) Other data that "the enforcement agent considers useful for the identification or location of attachable assets," but whose "consultation … is subject to judicial order of authorization."

For the Claimant, the condition provided for in no. 5 (when electronic access is not possible) is not limited to the data provided for in no. 3 (those of direct access), but to all and any information that the enforcement agent deems necessary to identify the assets of the defendant, and it is the responsibility of the service holding the data to make them available "by the fastest means and within 10 days."

In the Claimant's understanding, regarding the remuneration of entities that provide information to the enforcement agent, it is clear that no. 8 of article 749 of the CPC establishes the remuneration regime for all those who "provide assistance to enforcement in accordance with this article," whether through direct electronic consultation or by any other means.

Thus, for the Claimant, payment of a fee cannot be required for the issuance of a certificate by invoking the "Regulation of Costs of Tax and Customs Proceedings and the Table of Fees of the Services of the General Tax Authority (DGCI)," as this would not be applicable to consultations carried out by an enforcement agent in the context of civil enforcement proceedings.

The Claimant concludes by stating that the provision of information in civil enforcement proceedings, in accordance with article 749 of the CPC, which are not available through direct and electronic access, whether or not subject to prior judicial authorization, are not taxed in accordance with the Regulation of Costs of Tax and Customs Proceedings and the Table of Fees of the Services of the General Tax Authority, but rather in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code.

3. Response of the Respondent

The Tax and Customs Authority presented a response, beginning by raising the exception of incompetence ratione materiae of the arbitral tribunal to hear the act of assessment of fees, and that the dilatory exception provided for in no. 1 and no. 4, paragraph a) of article 89 of the CPTA thus occurs, applicable by virtue of article 29, no. 1, paragraph c) of the RJAT, which prevents the tribunal from hearing the request and leads to the dismissal of AT from the instance, by virtue of no. 2 of the aforementioned article 89 of the CPTA.

Next, it presents AT's defence by way of impeachment, defending the unfoundedness of the request.

AT begins by stating that, in accordance with no. 3 of article 9 of Law no. 32/2014 of 30-05, which approved the pre-enforcement extrajudicial procedure, the consultations carried out by the enforcement agent are carried out through SISAAE (information system supporting the activity of enforcement agents), it not being necessary for the information to be provided by the finance services.

AT states that the Claimant's request concerns data protected by the duty of tax secrecy and that they are further protected by Law no. 67/98 of 26-10 (Personal Data Protection Law), and that in order for them to be made available, a judicial order of authorization is necessary, in accordance with no. 7 of article 749 of the CPC. An order that was obtained by the Claimant.

AT alleges that, in accordance with article 749, no. 8 of the CPC, remuneration is due for the services provided by AT in the identification of the defendant and in the identification and location of assets, remuneration defined in article 21 of Law no. 32/2014 of 30-05, with the professional representative public association of enforcement agents centralizing the collection and distribution of all amounts due in accordance with the procedure provided for in the law.

AT lists the data provided by the platform and described in no. 3 of article 2 of Ordinance no. 331-A/2009 of 30-03, and states that such data, which are of direct access by enforcement agents, are free for the aforementioned agents, since, in accordance with article 20 of Law no. 32/2014 of 30-05, they are paid by the Claimant holding the enforceable title.

As for data protected by the duty of secrecy, AT alleges that they are not free because they are not included in the list of no. 3 of article 2 of Ordinance no. 331-A/2009 of 30-03.

AT further states that article 2 of the law defining the pre-enforcement extrajudicial procedure establishes that this procedure applies to enforcement proceedings whose provision or consultation of information from databases does not depend on prior judicial order.

AT concludes by stating that the dilatory exception of incompetence ratione materiae of the Arbitral Tribunal to hear the act of assessment of fees should be considered well-founded. And if this is not the case, it asks for the unfoundedness of the request and the dismissal of AT from the instance.

4. Factual Matters

4.1. Proven Facts:

Based on the documentary evidence produced and the position of the parties set out in the procedural documents, the following facts are considered proven and relevant to the decision of the case:

  1. The Claimant sent, in its capacity as enforcement agent designated in common enforcement proceedings no. …/12…TBGMR, which were pending before the judicial court of the district of Braga – Guimarães, to the hon. judge of the proceedings, a request in which it asked, under no. 7 of article 749 of the CPC, authorization for the lifting of tax secrecy in order for AT to provide the following information: identification of heirs (name, address and taxpayer number) associated with the tax identification number…, of undivided estate, and identification of assets that were indicated in the list of assets submitted for purposes of Stamp Tax or Inheritance and Gift Tax relating to the same NIF.

  2. The judge of the proceedings identified above granted judicial authorization for lifting of tax secrecy, as requested by the enforcement agent.

  3. The Claimant requested from the Finance Service of … on 30-01-2016 the provision of the following information, following the judicial authorization: identification of heirs and household head of the estate with the NIF… (taxpayer number and addresses), an estate in which B…, NIF…, appears as heir, as well as the list of assets comprising the estate.

  4. On 31-01-2017, the Finance Service of … sent to the Claimant an email message, in which it states that "in compliance with that requested through the request for certificate for proceedings no. …/12..TBGMR, (…) relating to the Defendant B…, I hereby request Your Excellency to send a cheque endorsed to IGCP, E.P.P., Public Credit and Treasury Management Institute, public business entity, in the amount of 15.36 €, within the time limit of 15 days, after which the request for certificate shall be archived."

  5. On 02-02-2017, the Claimant sent an email message to the Finance Service of …, declaring that it did not request issuance of a certificate but rather provision of information under article 749 of the CPC, and in which it requested the provision of the information previously requested in accordance with art. 749, no. 5 of the CPC, with express reference to the enabling normative provision.

  6. On 06-02-2017, the Finance Service of … notified the Claimant by email of an order from the head of the Finance Service, Mr. C…, which stated that the provision of the information requested without invoking the unavailability of the system/electronic access or those provided for in no. 7 of article 749 of the CPC, would be subject to taxation in accordance with the Regulation of Costs of Tax Proceedings and the Table of Fees.

  7. On 08-02-2017, the Claimant presented a hierarchical appeal against the decision issued by the head of the Finance Service of … in the aforementioned order, in which it requested the revocation of the decision and, in its place, requested that it be ordered to make available the requested data without payment of the requested fees.

  8. On 28-08-2017, the Claimant was notified of the decision dismissing the hierarchical appeal presented, signed by the Sub-General Director of the Tax Justice Services Department, D….

No other facts with relevance to the decision of the case were proven.

4.2. Unproven Facts

There are no other facts relevant to the assessment of the merits of the case that have not been proven.

4.3. Substantiation of Proven Factual Matters:

The conviction of the sole arbitrator was based on the position assumed by the parties and on the documents attached to the proceedings by the Claimant.

5. On the Exception of Incompetence Ratione Materiae of the Arbitral Tribunal

It is first necessary to determine the question of the competence of the arbitral tribunal, since the violation of rules of competence ratione materiae results in the absolute incompetence of the tribunal, which is of public policy and its determination must precede that of any other matter, in accordance with the arbitral decisions in proceedings no. 17/2012-T and no. 736/2014-T.

According to Mário Aroso de Almeida and Carlos Alberto Fernandes Cadilha, in Commentary to the Code of Procedure in Administrative Courts, 2nd revised edition, 2007, Almedina, page 117, "(…) the only question before an incompetent tribunal that it is competent to hear is to determine its incompetence. Once that incompetence is verified, it becomes naturally prevented from entering into the assessment either of the remaining procedural requirements, or, obviously, of the merits of the case."

AT alleges, in its response, the occurrence of the exception of incompetence ratione materiae of the arbitral tribunal to hear the act of assessment of fees. For AT, it results from the provision of article 2 of the RJAT that, given the arbitral request and the cause of action, the incompetence ratione materiae of the Arbitral Tribunal to hear the Claimant's claim is manifest.

The Claimant, notified to pronounce itself on the matter of exception, came to state that article 2 of the RJAT provides that the competence of arbitral tribunals comprises the assessment of the legality of acts of assessment of taxes. The Claimant refers to the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 18-02-2009 in proceedings no. 0947/08, and transcribes the following part of that decision: "the constitutional and legal distinction between the concepts of tax and fee is based on the unilateral or bilateral and syallagmatic nature of levies, with those having the first characteristic being qualified as taxes and those having the latter characteristics being qualified as fees." For the Claimant, a fee is a tax, and the conditions are met for the Arbitral Tribunal to hear the request, and the exception of incompetence of the Tribunal lacks foundation.

Let us examine this:

Article 2, no. 1 of the RJAT provides that the competence of arbitral tribunals comprises the assessment of the following claims:

  • the declaration of illegality of acts of assessment of taxes, self-assessment, withholding at source and payment on account;

  • the declaration of illegality of acts of determination of taxable matter when it does not give rise to the assessment of any tax, of acts of determination of taxable aggregate and of acts of fixing patrimonial values."

In turn, article 4, no. 1 of the RJAT, determines that "the binding of the tax authority to the jurisdiction of the tribunals constituted in accordance with the present law depends on an ordinance of the members of the Government responsible for the areas of finance and justice, which establishes, in particular, the type and maximum value of the disputes covered."

The ordinance in question is Ordinance no. 112-A/2011 of 22-03, which provides in its article 2 that "the services and bodies referred to in the preceding article bind themselves to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals operating in CAAD which have as their object the assessment of claims relating to taxes[1] whose administration is entrusted to them referred to in no. 1 of article 2 of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January."

A tax, according to Casalta Nabais, in an objective sense, is a "pecuniary, unilateral, definitive, coercive obligation without syallagmatic character" (Tax Law, Almedina, 6th edition, 2010, p. 11).

According to Alberto Xavier, in Manual of Tax Law, I, 1981, page 42, fees have "syallagmatic, non-unilateral character. Which in turn derives functionally from the nature of the constitutive fact of the obligations in which they are translated and which consists either in the provision of a public activity or in the use of assets of the public domain or in the removal of a legal limitation to the activity of individuals."

The obligation required of the Claimant – a fee for the provision of written information or for the issuance of a certificate – even if misinterpreted by the Finance Service of … and even injurious to the rights attributed by law to enforcement agents, does not have the nature of a tax. This is because it has a counterpart, and cannot be understood as a unilateral obligation.

For its part, as Sérgio Vasques and Carla Castelo Trindade state in the article "The material scope of tax arbitration," Notebooks on Tax Justice April/June 2013, page 24, one of the consequences to be attributed to the wording of the RJAT and the binding ordinance is that "the material scope of arbitration is limited to the analysis of issues relating to taxes, and therefore are not susceptible to recourse to arbitration, inasmuch as they fall outside the terms of binding of the tax authority, issues relating to fees and special contributions."

Also Conceição Gamito and Teresa Teixeira Mota, in the journal Tax Arbitration no. 2, in the article "arbitrability of fees," p. 21, state that "notwithstanding the broad designation of tax arbitration and the constant reference to levies with regard to arbitrable acts, fees and contributions will, prima facie, be excluded from the material scope of competence of arbitral tribunals."

Also Serena Cabrita Neto and Carla Castelo Trindade, in Tax Litigation, volume II, 2017, p. 154, write that "within the scope of tax arbitration (…) the material competence of the arbitral tribunal will depend on the act being challenged." And they continue by saying that "arbitral tribunals will no longer be materially competent to hear the legality of acts of assessment, self-assessment, withholding at source or payment on account of fees and contributions."

The question that must be assessed here is whether the act of assessment of fees by the Finance Service of … for the issuance of a certificate and/or for the provision of written information can or cannot be the subject of arbitral pronouncement.

From what has been stated above, there is no doubt that we are dealing with a fee for the provision of a service, whether it be the provision of written information or the issuance of a certificate by the Finance Service.

We thus understand that the respondent is not bound by the jurisdiction of CAAD with respect to this matter and that the exception of incompetence ratione materiae is verified.

Even if it were understood that we are not dealing with incompetence ratione materiae but rather with an unnamed dilatory exception (as occurs in proceedings 324/2016-T), the consequence would be the same: the dismissal of the instance.

6. On the Subject Matter of the Hierarchical Appeal Decision

The arbitral request concerns, directly, the decision that terminated a hierarchical appeal and, indirectly, an order of the finance service of … that does not contain the assessment of a tax.

The decision that terminated the hierarchical appeal does not assess the legality of the assessment of a tax.

Therefore, for this reason as well, CAAD does not have competence to hear the arbitral request filed by the Claimant.

7. Decision

In view of the above, it is determined:

  • To judge well-founded the dilatory exception of incompetence of CAAD ratione materiae.

  • To dismiss the Respondent from the instance (articles 96 and 278 of the Civil Procedure Code, ex vi article 29, no. 1, paragraphs a) and e), of the RJAT).

8. Value of the Proceedings:

In accordance with the provision of article 306, no. 2 of the CPC and 97-A, no. 1, paragraph a) of the CPPT and 3, no. 2 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the value of the action is fixed at 15.36 €.

9. Costs:

In accordance with article 22, no. 4 of the RJAT, and Table I attached to the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the amount of costs is fixed at 306.00 €, to be borne by the Claimant.

Let notice be given.

Lisbon, 14 June 2018.

Document prepared by computer, in accordance with article 138, no. 5 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), applicable by reference under article 29, no. 1, paragraph e) of the Tax Arbitration Regime, reviewed by me.

The Sole Arbitrator

Suzana Fernandes da Costa

[1] Our emphasis

Frequently Asked Questions

Automatically Created

Are fees (emolumentos) for providing information subject to tax arbitration under Portuguese RJAT?
Under Portuguese RJAT, administrative fees (emolumentos) for providing information services by tax authorities present jurisdictional challenges for CAAD arbitration. The key issue is whether such fees constitute 'taxes' (tributos) within RJAT's scope. According to RJAT article 2, tax arbitration covers disputes about the legality of tax acts. Administrative fees for services like certificate issuance or information provision may be classified as remuneration for specific services rather than taxes proper. The distinction depends on whether the charge has a unilateral, coercive nature typical of taxation or represents payment for a divisible public service. Fees charged under the Regulation of Costs of Tax Proceedings and Table of Fees (Decree-Law 29/98) may fall outside CAAD's jurisdiction if deemed administrative charges rather than taxes, potentially requiring challenge through administrative courts instead of tax arbitration.
What is the legal distinction between taxes and fees (taxas) in Portuguese tax arbitration proceedings?
Portuguese law distinguishes between taxes (impostos), fees (taxas), and administrative charges (emolumentos) based on their legal nature and purpose. Taxes are unilateral, coercive levies imposed by law without direct correlation to specific services rendered to the taxpayer. Fees (taxas) are charges for specific public services, benefits, or removal of legal obstacles, with some correlation between payment and service received. Administrative fees (emolumentos) typically remunerate specific administrative acts like certifications or document issuances. For tax arbitration purposes under RJAT, only disputes involving 'taxes' broadly defined fall within CAAD jurisdiction. The qualification determines the proper forum: tax arbitration for tax matters, or administrative courts for purely administrative charges. The classification depends on examining the legal basis, purpose, and characteristics of each charge under Portuguese Constitutional and tax law principles.
Can the CAAD arbitral tribunal rule on disputes involving administrative fees charged for information services?
CAAD arbitral tribunal jurisdiction over administrative fees for information services depends on whether such fees qualify as 'taxes' under RJAT article 2. The tribunal must examine if fees charged under Decree-Law 29/98 (Regulation of Costs of Tax Proceedings) constitute tax matters or merely administrative charges for services. If fees are deemed remuneration for specific administrative acts (like certificate issuance) rather than tax obligations, CAAD may lack competence, requiring dismissal for incompetence. The respondent tax authority typically raises this as an exception in its response. The tribunal must analyze whether the charge has fiscal nature and coercive character typical of taxes, or represents payment for divisible services. When information provision is legally mandated without charge under specific procedural rules (like CPC article 749(5)), the legitimacy of imposing fees becomes questionable. However, jurisdictional competence is distinct from substantive legality—CAAD must first establish it has authority to adjudicate before examining the fee's legality.
What happens when a hierarchical appeal (recurso hierárquico) is denied regarding information service fees in Portugal?
When a hierarchical appeal (recurso hierárquico) is denied regarding information service fees in Portugal, the appellant may seek judicial review or arbitration depending on the fee's legal classification. If the fee constitutes a tax matter, RJAT article 10 allows challenging the dismissal decision through CAAD arbitration within 90 days, provided statutory requirements are met including payment of arbitration fees. The arbitration request must identify the contested administrative act, legal grounds, and requested relief. However, if CAAD determines the fee is an administrative charge outside tax arbitration scope, it will dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, directing the claimant to administrative courts. Before proceeding substantively, CAAD examines preliminary questions including its own competence. The respondent tax authority often raises jurisdictional exceptions arguing fees for information services are non-arbitrable administrative charges. The tribunal's jurisdictional ruling is critical as it determines whether the dispute proceeds in arbitration or must be redirected to ordinary administrative litigation under the Administrative Procedure Code.
What are the procedural requirements for challenging fee assessments through tax arbitration at CAAD?
Challenging fee assessments through CAAD tax arbitration requires meeting specific procedural requirements under RJAT. First, the claimant must exhaust administrative remedies by filing a hierarchical appeal or waiting for the statutory response period to expire. The arbitration request must be submitted within 90 days of notification of the hierarchical appeal decision (or deemed rejection). The request must include: identification of parties, contested administrative act, legal and factual grounds, evidence offered, and requested relief (RJAT article 10). The claimant must pay the initial arbitration fee upon filing. The request is examined for formal compliance by the CAAD President. If accepted, parties may appoint arbitrators or the President designates them. The respondent tax authority submits a response within 30 days, often raising preliminary exceptions including jurisdictional incompetence if fees are deemed non-arbitrable. The tribunal must first resolve competence questions before addressing merits. If jurisdiction exists, proceedings continue with evidence, arguments, and decision. The claimant must pay the subsequent arbitration fee before decision issuance. Failure to meet procedural requirements or pay fees may result in dismissal.