CAAD 580/2015-T: Stamp Tax on Construction Land Under Verba 28.1 TGIS – Constitutional Court Reform Decision

ARBITRAL DECISION

REOPENING OF PROCEEDINGS

By decision dated 13-03-2016, this Court granted the petition for annulment of the Stamp Duty assessments under item 28.1 of the General Table of Stamp Duty ("TGIS") for the year 2014, in the following terms:

"In accordance with the foregoing, this Arbitral Court decides to refuse the application of item 28.1 of the TGIS on the ground of material unconstitutionality by violation of the principle of equality (based on taxpaying capacity) provided for in Article 13 of the CRP. Consequently, the contested Stamp Duty assessments are declared illegal due to the absence of an enabling norm, in the amounts of € 16,789.95 (relating to the property registered under the article...) and € 41,403.51 (relating to the property registered under the article...), which shall be annulled, with consequent reimbursement to the Claimant of the amounts paid."

The Public Prosecutor's Office lodged the appropriate appeal of the decision to the Constitutional Court, in accordance with Article 280, paragraph 1, subparagraph a) of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic and Articles 70, paragraph 1, subparagraph a), 72, paragraph 1, subparagraph a) and paragraph 3 of Law No. 25/82, of 15 November, and Article 25, paragraph 1, of the RJAT, which was admitted by this court by order of 15-06-2016.

By summary decision No. 608/2018, of 18-09-2018, handed down by the Honorable Judge Counselor Rapporteur Maria de Fátima Mata-Mouros, in accordance with Article 78-A of Law No. 25/82, of 15 November, which became final on 04-10-2018, the following decision was handed down:

"III. Decision

On the basis of the foregoing, it is decided:

a) Not to declare unconstitutional the provision contained in Item 28.1 of the General Table of Stamp Duty, approved by Law No. 55-A/2012, of 29 October, and amended by Law No. 83-C/2013, of 31 December, to the extent that it imposes annual taxation on the ownership of construction land whose building, authorized or planned, is for residential purposes, with a tax assessed value equal to or exceeding € 1,000,000.00;

b) And, consequently, to declare the appeals lodged well-founded, determining the reform of the appealed decision in accordance with the present ruling of non-unconstitutionality."

Following this decision, the present arbitral proceedings are reopened in order that, in accordance with what has been determined by the Constitutional Court, a new decision be handed down on the dispute, maintaining, as unchanged, the points of the previous decision as regards the material facts, in particular the identification of the proved facts and their respective justification.

II. LEGAL MATTERS – NEW ASSESSMENT

Analyzing the initial petition, doubt may arise as to what is the actual object of the request for arbitral pronouncement: (i) whether the Stamp Duty assessments for the year 2014, effected in March 2015 or (ii) whether the collection notes for the second installment of the Stamp Duty for the year 2014, payable during July 2015. This doubt is justified by the reference made to the value of the contested acts – and consequent economic value of the claim – which corresponds to the total amount of the second installment of Stamp Duty. However, the petition filed by the Claimant is very clear: "It is therefore requested that the Claimant's petition be judged well-founded and the assessments of the tax mentioned above be annulled." It is evident from this petition that what the Claimant seeks is the annulment of the tax assessments effected in March 2015 and not the collection notes which, moreover, as has been recognized by the arbiters of this Arbitration Center, cannot even be the subject of any arbitral petition for annulment. Given the foregoing, this court considers the petition for arbitral pronouncement admissible, correcting the economic value of the claim to the total of the contested assessments, in the amount of € 58,193.46.

Proceeding to the analysis of the petition for arbitral pronouncement, it is concluded that the Claimant contests the legality of the challenged assessment acts on the basis of an interpretation and application of the original wording of item 28 of the TGIS, as introduced by Law No. 55-A/2012, of 29 October.

As the Respondent correctly notes, the assessment of the 2014 tax was effected on the basis of the wording of item 28 of the TGIS introduced by Law No. 83-C/2013, of 31 December, which became the following (our underlining):

"28. Ownership, usufruct or right of superficies of urban properties whose tax assessed value appearing in the tax roll, in accordance with the Code of Municipal Property Tax (CIMI), is equal to or exceeding (euros) 1,000,000 - on the tax assessed value used for purposes of IMI:

28.1 For residential property or for construction land whose building, authorized or planned, is for residential purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the IMI Code: 1%

28.2 For property, when the taxable persons who are not natural persons are resident in a country, territory or region subject to a clearly more favorable tax regime, listed in the list approved by ministerial order of the Minister of Finance: 7.5%"

To that extent, considering that the rule of taxable occurrence, in the wording in force at the date of the tax facts, expressly refers to construction land whose authorized or planned building is for residential purposes, there is no longer justification for theoretical discussion about what should be understood by "residential urban property." For this reason, the Claimant's allegations regarding the legality of assessing Stamp Duty on construction land with a tax assessed value greater than € 1,000,000 are unjustified in light of the wording of the rule of taxable occurrence on which the contested assessments were based.

Notwithstanding, and given the petition filed by the Claimant seeking a declaration of illegality of the contested assessments, it is necessary to analyze the validity thereof.

Thus, it is necessary to assess whether, in the case at hand, the prerequisites of objective taxable occurrence listed in item 28.1 of the TGIS are met, namely:

(i) that it is construction land;

(ii) with a tax assessed value equal to or exceeding € 1,000,000.00; and

(iii) whose building, planned or authorized, is for residential purposes.

Taking into account the list of proved facts, there is no doubt that points (i) and (ii) are met, given that both properties subject to taxation are construction land with tax assessed values exceeding the legal minimum mentioned.

As to point (iii), that is, as to the type of building, planned or authorized, for said construction land, the records show only what was deemed proved: the properties were assigned the location coefficient provided for residential use.

Now, as decided in arbitral case No. 150/2017-T, "It is not the mere registration in the property roll as 'construction land' that brings about the inevitable application of item 28.1 of the TGIS, since it does not, in itself, constitute conclusive proof that a particular property has a planned building for residential purposes. See in this regard JOSÉ MANUEL FERNANDES PIRES, (Lessons on Taxes on Property and Stamp Duty. Coimbra, Almedina, 3rd ed., 2015, pages 110 to 112): 'The right to build is not inherent in the right of ownership, but only arises anew in the patrimony of the owner when an administrative act of the competent public entity recognizes and authorizes the owner to build or to subdivide. [...] only when that right is constituted in the legal sphere of the owner does the IMI Code establish that we are dealing with construction land.'

Thus, it seems clear that for the verification of the normative provision, mere registration in the property roll of a property as construction land used for residential purposes is not sufficient, since the scope of the objective taxable occurrence now at issue does not dispense with the demonstration of an effective building potential, necessarily revealed by the existence of documentary support that authorizes it. That is to say, the incidence of the tax, for purposes of the provision in item 28.1 of the TGIS, is materialized only, and even then not in definitive or complete terms, with the verification of an "effective use," to use the felicitous expression of JOSÉ MANUEL FERNANDES PIRES (op. cit., p. 507). (…)

Now, without the demonstration of this effective building potential, item 28.1 of the TGIS does not appear to be applicable. However, for purposes of the application of item 28.1 of the TGIS, this effective building potential is not sufficient. It is necessary to prove that the building, authorized or planned, is for residential purposes. That is to say, it cannot be for a purpose other than residential purposes, since, as it appears to us, building for commercial or industrial purposes will not give rise to the application of the provision to which we have been referring."

It happens that, in the present case, neither did the Respondent manage to prove that the building, planned or authorized, for the construction land in question was intended for residential purposes (limiting itself merely to invoking the coefficients considered for purposes of determining their respective tax assessed values and contained in the roll), nor did the Claimant allege or prove the contrary.

From the records nothing more emerges than the information contained in the property rolls and which, as stated above, cannot be considered sufficient for purposes of verifying the prerequisites of objective taxable occurrence.

Thus, in the opinion of this court, the absence of concrete proof as to any possible use of the planned or authorized buildings for the construction land in question must operate to the disadvantage of the Respondent, in accordance with Article 74 of the LGT, which expressly provides that "The burden of proof of the facts constitutive of the rights of the tax administration or of the taxpayers falls on whoever invokes them."

As stated in the arbitral decision handed down in case No. 418/2016-T[1], which we endorse: "As already stated, whether in the administrative proceeding or in the case records, it is only alleged and only demonstrated to be the 'Location Coefficient: residential' and 'Use: residential,' which in accordance with what is stated above is insufficient to substantiate the intended assessment. This is because the proof of those enabling prerequisites of taxation fell to the Respondent. It happens that it does not demonstrate it by not evidencing authorization or planning of construction intended for residential purposes, thus not demonstrating that the tax incidence norm is met, which serves as the basis for the assessment. For it to have been authorized, designed or planned a building for residential purposes constitutes a fact whose proof falls to the Respondent, as it is an essential fact to the integration of the norm, as an element of real incidence of the tax and is therefore constitutive of the right to assess it."

In light of the foregoing, this court concludes that an essential prerequisite for purposes of objective taxable occurrence is not met – that it is construction land whose building, planned or authorized, is for residential purposes – and consequent taxation, and such prerequisite cannot be presumed solely from the content of the property roll registration.

The petition for arbitral pronouncement filed by the Claimant deserves, therefore, to be well-founded, this court concluding that the acts of assessment of Stamp Duty under item 28.1 of the TGIS, with reference to the year 2014, are illegal and must be annulled, with all other legal consequences.

III. DECISION

In accordance with the foregoing, this Arbitral Court declares illegal the contested Stamp Duty assessments, in the amount of € 16,789.95 (relating to the property registered under article...) and € 41,403.51 (relating to the property registered under article...), which shall be annulled, with consequent reimbursement to the Claimant of the amounts paid.

Case Value: In accordance with the provision of Article 306, paragraph 2, of the CPC and Article 97-A, paragraph 1, subparagraph a), of the CPPT and Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Regulation on Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the case value is set at € 58,193.46, corresponding to the total value of the impugned assessments.

Costs: In accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the RJAT, the amount of costs is set at € 2,142.00, in accordance with Table I attached to the Regulation on Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, to be borne by the Respondent.

This arbitral decision shall be registered and notified to the parties.

Lisbon, 14-01-2019

The Sole Arbitrator

(Maria Forte Vaz)

REPORT

A..., S.A., Tax ID No...., with its registered office at Rua..., ... (hereinafter referred to simply as Claimant), presented on 02-09-2015 a petition for constitution of a sole arbitral tribunal, in accordance with Articles 2 and 10 of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January (Legal Regime for Arbitration in Tax Matters, hereinafter referred to as RJAT), in conjunction with subparagraph a) of Article 99 of the CPPT, in which the Tax and Customs Authority is named as Respondent (hereinafter referred to simply as Respondent).

The Claimant seeks a declaration of illegality of the acts of assessment of Stamp Duty under item 28.1 of the General Table of Stamp Duty ("TGIS") for the year 2014, with reference to construction land registered in the urban property roll of the parish of..., municipality of Figueira da Foz, under articles... and....

The petition for constitution of the arbitral tribunal was accepted by the Honorable President of the CAAD on 03-09-2015 and notified to the Tax and Customs Authority on the same date.

In accordance with subparagraph a) of paragraph 2 of Article 6 and subparagraph b) of paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the RJAT, the Deontological Council appointed the undersigned as arbitrator of the sole arbitral tribunal, who communicated acceptance of the appointment within the applicable time period.

On 03-11-2015, the parties were duly notified of this appointment, and they did not express any intention to refuse the appointment of the arbitrators, in accordance with the combined provisions of Article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraphs a) and b) of the RJAT and Articles 6 and 7 of the Deontological Code.

In accordance with the provision of subparagraph c) of paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the RJAT, the sole arbitral tribunal was constituted on 17-11-2015.

Notified to make submissions, the Respondent presented a pleading in which it sustains the legality of the challenged assessment acts, thus arguing for the rejection of the petition filed by the Claimant.

By order of 24-01-2016, the meeting provided for in Article 18 of the RJAT was dispensed with, and the parties were granted a period to present successive written submissions.

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The Claimant seeks a declaration of illegality of the acts of assessment of Stamp Duty under item 28.1 of the General Table of Stamp Duty ("TGIS") for the year 2014, with reference to construction land registered in the urban property roll of the parish of..., municipality of Figueira da Foz, under articles... and....

The Claimant substantiates this petition by arguing that the rule of taxable occurrence refers to "urban properties with residential use" and therefore will not extend to properties classified as construction land since these are their own category within the concept of urban property. As the Claimant states, "Regarding the definition of the different types of urban properties, the aforementioned Code provides, in paragraph 1 of its Article 6, a clear distinction between residential properties and construction land. The former are classified based on the respective municipal permit, or, in the absence thereof, as a result of normal use. The latter are defined based on their legal potential" (cf. Article 24 of the initial petition). The Claimant further sustains that "(…) the fact that for a particular construction land, building of property intended for residential purposes is authorized, or for any other purpose, although it must be considered in its evaluation, does not determine any change in the classification of the land which, for tax purposes, continues to be considered as such" (cf. Article 37 of the initial petition). In this sense, the Claimant concludes that "In these terms, resulting from Article 6 of the CIMI a clear distinction between residential urban properties and construction land, these cannot be considered, for purposes of stamp duty incidence, as properties with residential use, reason for which the annulment of the assessments in question is necessary, which is requested" (cf. Article 38 of the initial petition).

In its answer, the Respondent contests the Claimant's allegations, noting that the wording of item 28 of the TGIS on the basis of which the contested assessments were effected was introduced by Law No. 83-C/2013, of 31-12-2013. Thus, following this amendment, item 28.1 came to expressly refer to construction land whose authorized or planned building is intended for residential purposes. Accordingly, the Claimant's allegations regarding the interpretation of the letter of the law are unjustified and have no relevance to the situation at hand. Notwithstanding, the Respondent further sustains that the previous wording of item 28 of the TGIS, by resorting to the expression "residential urban properties," intended to encompass other realities beyond urban properties with residential use. To that extent, already in light of the previous wording, construction land whose authorized building was intended for residential purposes was covered by said rule of taxable occurrence, so that if the tax assessed value exceeded € 1,000,000, the Tax Authority would be required to proceed with the appropriate tax assessment.

II. SANCTION DECISION

The Arbitral Court was regularly constituted and is competent.

The parties have judicial personality and capacity and are legitimate (Articles 4 and 10, paragraph 2, of the same legislation and Article 1 of Ordinance No. 112-A/2011, of 22 March).

The case does not suffer from defects and there is no obstacle to the examination of the merits of the case.

III. MATERIAL FACTS

A. Proved Facts

The following facts are deemed proved:

1. The Claimant is the owner of the urban property located at..., ..., parish of..., municipality of Figueira da Foz, registered in the urban property roll of said parish under article..., with a tax assessed value of € 1,678,995.42.

2. The Claimant is the owner of the urban property located at..., ..., parish of..., municipality of Figueira da Foz, registered in the urban property roll of said parish under article..., with a tax assessed value of € 4,140,351.18.

3. Each of the properties is described in the roll as "construction land."

4. The roll shows that the location coefficient provided for residential purposes was assigned to the properties.

5. On 20-03-2015, the Tax Authority assessed Stamp Duty under item 28.1 of the TGIS with reference to the properties mentioned, in the total amount of € 58,193.46.

6. For payment of the second installment of the aforementioned tax, collection notes with numbers 2015... and 2015... were issued, due in July 2015.

B. Unproved Facts

No other facts with relevance to the arbitral decision were proved.

C. Substantiation of Material Facts

The material facts deemed proved are based on documentary evidence presented and not disputed.

IV. LEGAL MATTERS

Analyzing the initial petition, doubt may arise as to what is the actual object of the request for arbitral pronouncement: (i) whether the Stamp Duty assessments for the year 2014, effected in March 2015 or (ii) whether the collection notes for the second installment of the Stamp Duty for the year 2014, payable during July 2015. This doubt is justified by the reference made to the value of the contested acts – and consequent economic value of the claim – which corresponds to the total amount of the second installment of Stamp Duty. However, the petition filed by the Claimant is very clear: "It is therefore requested that the Claimant's petition be judged well-founded and the assessments of the tax mentioned above be annulled." It is evident from this petition that what the Claimant seeks is the annulment of the tax assessments effected in March 2015 and not the collection notes which, moreover, as has been recognized by the arbiters of this Arbitration Center, cannot even be the subject of any arbitral petition for annulment. Given the foregoing, this court considers the petition for arbitral pronouncement admissible, correcting the economic value of the claim to the total of the contested assessments, in the amount of € 58,193.46.

Proceeding to the analysis of the petition for arbitral pronouncement, it is concluded that the Claimant contests the legality of the challenged assessment acts on the basis of an interpretation and application of the initial wording of item 28 of the TGIS, as introduced by Law No. 55-A/2012, of 29 October.

As the Respondent correctly notes, the assessment of the 2014 tax was effected on the basis of the wording of item 28 of the TGIS introduced by Law No. 83-C/2013, of 31 December, which became the following (our underlining):

"28. Ownership, usufruct or right of superficies of urban properties whose tax assessed value appearing in the tax roll, in accordance with the Code of Municipal Property Tax (CIMI), is equal to or exceeding (euros) 1,000,000 - on the tax assessed value used for purposes of IMI:

28.1 For residential property or for construction land whose building, authorized or planned, is for residential purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the IMI Code: 1%

28.2 For property, when the taxable persons who are not natural persons are resident in a country, territory or region subject to a clearly more favorable tax regime, listed in the list approved by ministerial order of the Minister of Finance: 7.5%"

To that extent, considering that the current rule of taxable occurrence expressly refers to construction land whose authorized or planned building is for residential purposes, there is no longer justification for theoretical discussion about what should be understood by "residential urban property." For this reason, the Claimant's allegations regarding the legality of assessing Stamp Duty on construction land with a tax assessed value greater than € 1,000,000 are unjustified in light of the current rule of taxable occurrence (on which the contested assessments were based).

Thus, considering that the properties owned by the Claimant are construction land whose authorized or planned building is intended for residential purposes (hence, in determining the tax assessed value, the location coefficient of properties intended for residential purposes was considered) and that they have a tax assessed value exceeding € 1,000,000, the contested assessments are legally admissible.

Nevertheless, this court considers that the contested assessments are invalid and therefore cannot be maintained in the legal order.

Indeed, although the question has not been raised by any of the parties, it is necessary to assess whether the rule in question, in its current wording and which was the origin of the contested assessments, can be applied or whether its application may be refused on the ground of unconstitutionality. It is now settled, both in doctrine and in case law, that unconstitutionality is a matter of official knowledge, imposing on the decision-maker the non-application of a rule which it deems unconstitutional, even if such has not been raised by any of the participants. In this sense, see the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court of 14-05-2014, case No. 0195/13, of 17-06-1998, case No. 22421, of 25-10-1995, case No. 15287, and of 03-02-1993, case No. 13621.

It is therefore necessary to assess the constitutional conformity of said item 28 of the TGIS.

In the opinion of this court, despite the justification presented by the legislator for the introduction of this tax and the economic rationale underlying it, the difference in treatment between properties used for residential purposes and other urban properties with different uses is not justified.

As José Casalta Nabais states[2], "(…) the principle of equality of taxation, based on the principle of taxpaying capacity, tells us that persons are taxed in accordance with their respective taxpaying capacity, which means, on one hand, that those persons who do not have this capacity will be excluded from the field of incidence of taxes and, on the other hand, that given those with taxpaying capacity, taxpayers with the same capacity will pay the same tax(es) (horizontal equality) and taxpayers with different capacities will pay different taxes, whether in qualitative or quantitative terms (vertical equality)."

It so happens that this court cannot grasp in what way the taxpaying capacity revealed by the owner of an urban property used for residential purposes of value exceeding € 1,000,000 is different – and justification for the requirement of an additional contribution for the consolidation of public accounts – from that of an owner who holds an urban property used for commerce or services of equal tax assessed value. In fact, the legislator has not demonstrated the justification for this difference in treatment.

If, as results from the public discussion of the legislation introducing such tax, the objective was to rebalance the distribution of the sacrifices of austerity, requiring an additional effort from taxpayers who revealed greater taxpaying capacity through the holding of real property of high value (exceeding € 1,000,000), the difference in taxpaying capacity is not explained between a taxpayer owner of property for residential purposes valued at € 1,000,000 and a taxpayer owner of property for commerce or service of equal value.

Against this understanding, it does not proceed to argue that it is the law itself – Article 6 of the CIMI – which distinguishes between urban properties used for residential, commercial, industrial or service purposes, construction land, etc., and therefore one cannot even admit that these situations must be subject to the same type of regulation; with substantive differences existing, it would be imperative to treat unequally what is not equal, giving full compliance with the constitutional provision of equality.

Although it is recognized that the material difference between a property used for residential purposes and a property used for commerce/services justifies differences in regulation (particularly in the matter of consideration of construction areas and applicable coefficients, for example), the truth is that this does not translate into a difference in taxation under IMI, more specifically regarding the tax rate. Indeed, regardless of the use or allocation of the property, the tax rate for urban properties, built or not, is exactly the same, so that a property used for residential purposes with a certain tax assessed value will, in principle, pay exactly the same tax as a property used for commerce with the same tax assessed value, located in the same municipality.

Note that under IMI, the difference in treatment occurs at the level of the determination of the values of fiscally relevant incidence, but not at the level of taxation proper, with the law not providing for differentiation of rates based on the type of use of urban properties.

And this is due, precisely, to the fact that it is considered that, in light of the adjustment of evaluation criteria based on the use of properties, the tax assessed values fixed by evaluation in accordance with the CIMI will actually correspond to the revelation of comparable taxpaying capacities. Hence the subjection to the same tax rate: the taxpaying capacity revealed is comparable, being by virtue of the assessment system provided for in Articles 37 and following of the CIMI ensured the differentiated treatment of what, fiscally, will have relevance to justify a differentiated treatment.

The substantive difference between a property used for residential purposes, a property used for commerce, and construction land was considered, in the tax sphere, in fixing the very evaluation criteria, which permits setting an equal IMI rate for urban properties, regardless of their respective use.

Accordingly, owners of urban properties with tax assessed values exceeding € 1,000,000 will reveal exactly the same taxpaying capacity, and for this purpose the use or allocation of said properties is completely irrelevant.

The measure of the taxpaying capacity of tax on property must always be the value of that property itself, with use not being an element sufficiently relevant to justify a differentiated treatment. An urban property valued at € 1,000,000 will be worth, fiscally, exactly that same value regardless of whether it is used for residential purposes, commerce, or services. Use for residential purposes is not, nor can it be, in our legal system a criterion justifying a tax that excludes from its scope properties used for commerce or services of equal or even higher value.

This difference in treatment has no, in the opinion of this court, rational basis to legitimize it and to permit sustaining a judgment of constitutional conformity of said rule.

As José Casalta Nabais states[3], "With respect to taxation of property, the Constitution requires only that it constitute an instrument of equality among citizens. The reduction of inequalities is thus the constitutional objective of taxation of property, an objective that opens the door to the legislator to proceed, in particular, in the discrimination of properties, taxing those of higher value and exempting those of lower value or adopting progressive rates." The constitutionally permitted discrimination is, therefore, between properties of higher value as against properties of lower value, and not between properties of equal value, with the use or utility derived from the property in question being irrelevant in this regard.

What is stated above regarding the difference in treatment between property used for residential purposes and property used for other purposes is fully applicable to the difference in treatment imposed by item 28.1 of the TGIS between construction land for buildings used for residential purposes and construction land for buildings used for other purposes. This differentiation of treatment under Stamp Duty between some and other construction land has no substantiation, nor legitimacy, constituting an actual violation of the constitutional principle of equality, based on taxpaying capacity.

Accordingly, item 28.1 of the TGIS cannot be applied in the case at hand, and as the contested assessment acts lack legal basis, they must be annulled as illegal.

V. DECISION

In accordance with the foregoing, this Arbitral Court refuses to apply item 28.1 of the TGIS on the ground of material unconstitutionality by violation of the principle of equality (based on taxpaying capacity) provided for in Article 13 of the CRP. Consequently, the contested Stamp Duty assessments are declared illegal due to the absence of an enabling norm, in the amounts of € 16,789.95 (relating to the property registered under article...) and € 41,403.51 (relating to the property registered under article...), which shall be annulled, with consequent reimbursement to the Claimant of the amounts paid.

Case Value: In accordance with the provision of Article 306, paragraph 2, of the CPC and Article 97-A, paragraph 1, subparagraph a), of the CPPT and Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Regulation on Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the case value is set at € 58,193.46, corresponding to the total value of the impugned assessments.

Costs: In accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the RJAT, the amount of costs is set at € 2,142.00, in accordance with Table I attached to the Regulation on Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, to be borne by the Respondent.

This arbitral decision shall be registered and notified to the parties.

Lisbon, 13-03-2016

The Sole Arbitrator

(Maria Forte Vaz)

[1] In this decision reference is made to several other arbitral decisions, in particular those handed down in cases No. 447/2016-T, No. 415/2016-T, No. 387/2016-T, No. 294/2016-T, No. 290/2016-T, and No. 467/2015-T.

[2] The Fundamental Duty to Pay Taxes, Almedina, 2004, page 443.

[3] Tax Law, Almedina, 3rd Edition, page 182.