IUC Tax Subjective Incidence and Legal Presumptions - CAAD Arbitration 583/2015-T

Arbitral Decision[1]

The Arbitrator Dr. Sílvia Oliveira, designated by the Ethics Council of the Administrative Arbitration Centre (CAAD) to constitute the Arbitral Tribunal, constituted on 20 November 2015, with respect to the above-identified case, decided as follows:

1. REPORT

1.1. A…– Credit Financial Institution, S.A., (hereinafter referred to as the "Claimant"), legal entity no…, with registered office at the Place of…, Sintra, filed a request for arbitral pronouncement and for the constitution of a singular Arbitral Tribunal, on 7 September 2015, pursuant to the provisions of article 4 and paragraph 2 of article 10 of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January [Legal Regime of Arbitration in Tax Matters (RJAT)], in which the Tax and Customs Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "Respondent") is the Respondent.

1.2. The Claimant intends, in the aforementioned request for arbitral pronouncement, that the Arbitral Tribunal declare "(…) the (…) request (…) well-founded determining, in consequence (…) the annulment of the act of total rejection of the Gracious Complaint filed; the annulment of the assessment acts presented by the Claimant; the Refund to the Claimant of the amount (…) relating to the tax unduly paid and (…) the payment to the Claimant of indemnitory interest for the deprivation of the aforementioned amount (…)".

1.3. The request for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal was accepted by His Excellency the President of CAAD on 9 September 2015 and notified, on the same date, to the Respondent.

1.4. Given that the Claimant did not proceed with the appointment of an arbitrator, pursuant to the provisions of article 6, paragraph 2, letter a) of RJAT, the undersigned was designated as arbitrator, on 5 November 2015, by the President of the Ethics Council of CAAD, the appointment having been accepted within the legally prescribed timeframe and terms.

1.5. On the same date, the Parties were duly notified of this designation, and did not express any will to refuse the appointment of the arbitrator, in accordance with the combined terms of article 11, paragraph 1, letters a) and b) of RJAT and articles 6 and 7 of the Ethics Code.

1.6. Thus, in compliance with the provision in letter c), of paragraph 1, of article 11 of RJAT, the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 20 November 2015, and an arbitral order was issued on the same date, to the effect of notifying the Respondent to, in accordance with the provisions of article 17, paragraph 1 of RJAT, submit a response within a maximum period of 30 days and, if it wished, request the production of additional evidence.

1.7. On 10 December, the Respondent filed a request to alter the designation of legal experts initially presented on 5 October 2015.

1.8. On the same date, an arbitral order was issued to the effect of accepting the new designation of legal experts carried out by the Respondent.

1.9. On 16 December, the Respondent attached to the file the respective administrative case file.

1.10. On 17 December 2015, the Respondent submitted its Response, having defended itself by way of objection to the effect that "(…) the present request for arbitral pronouncement should be judged unfounded, maintaining in the legal order the contested tax assessment acts and absolving (…) the respondent entity from the request".

1.11. On 17 December 2015, an arbitral order was issued to the effect that the Parties submit, within a period of five days, on the possibility:

1.11.1. Of waiving the holding of the meeting referred to in article 18 of RJAT, and,

1.11.2. Of waiving the submission of arguments.

1.12. On 23 December 2015, the Claimant filed a request to waive the meeting provided for in article 18 of RJAT, but deeming "the submission of written final arguments pertinent".

1.13. The Respondent did not submit, within the timeframe granted for this purpose, its position on the content of the arbitral order referred to in point 1.11 above.

1.14. In these terms, it was decided by the Arbitral Tribunal, in an order dated 29 December 2015, in accordance with the procedural principles laid down in article 16 of RJAT, of the autonomy of the arbitral tribunal in the conduct of the case and in the determination of the rules to be observed [letter c)], of cooperation and procedural good faith [letter f)] and of the free conduct of the case laid down in articles 19 and 29, paragraph 2 of RJAT, also taking into account the principle of the limitation of useless acts provided for in article 130 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) [applicable by virtue of the provision of article 29, paragraph 1, letter e) of RJAT]:

1.14.1. To waive the holding of the meeting referred to in article 18 of RJAT;

1.14.2. Not to waive the submission of arguments, and, in consequence, "to notify the Claimant and the Respondent to, in this order and in successive manner, submit written arguments within a period of 15 days, with the period for the Respondent beginning to run from the date of notification of the joining of the Claimant's arguments or from the end of the period granted for this purpose (in case the Claimant does not submit arguments)".

1.14.3. To designate 15 February 2016 for purposes of rendering the arbitral decision.

1.15. In the same order, the Claimant was further warned that "until the date of rendering the arbitral decision, it should proceed with the payment of the subsequent arbitral fee, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 4 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings and communicate this payment to CAAD".

1.16. The Claimant submitted arguments on 13 January 2016, to the effect that "the AT bases the illegality of the tax assessment acts on the fact that the Claimant (…) did not prove compliance with the declarative obligation provided for in article 19 of CIUC", an argumentation that "(…) cannot prevail as it constitutes an illegal a posteriori argumentation (…)" taking into account that "(…) in the present case the disputed IUC assessments relate to years in which the vehicles were already alienated, with no obligation whatsoever to communicate (…) that alienation", whereby "(…) the well-foundedness of the present request should be determined and (…) the Claimant should be refunded the unduly paid tax and, moreover, the payment of indemnitory interest (…) should be determined".

1.17. The Respondent submitted arguments on 12 February 2016 to the effect that "the Claimant, in its arguments, adds nothing of substance in relation to what was already contained in its request for constitution and pronouncement of the Arbitral Tribunal", whereby it understands that "(…) the arguments of the Claimant cannot, in any way, proceed, as they make an interpretation and application of the legal norms applicable to the present case that is notoriously erroneous" reiterating further that "(…) it maintains, entirely (…) the tenor of its Response duly submitted".[2]

1. CAUSE OF ACTION

2.1. The Claimant "is a company (…) whose principal activity consists, among others, in offering its customers various automobile financing solutions, such as financial leasing (…) or Long-Term Rental (…)".

2.2. The Claimant "through the Finance Portal, verified that there were pending payment various tax assessment acts for IUC relating to the years 2013 and 2014 (…)".

2.3. Notwithstanding having verified "(…) that such assessments related to vehicles that had already been alienated", and "despite being dissatisfied with such tax acts, the Claimant made payment of the same".

2.4. "Despite having made payment of the tax acts in question (…) the Claimant filed (three) Gracious Complaints because, in essence, the vehicles on which IUC was assessed were not, at the date of the tax event, its property (…)".

2.5. However, "according to the understanding advocated by the AT, the liable party of the IUC in question would be the (…) Claimant, because this appeared as owner with the Motor Vehicle Registry Office".

2.6. And because "(…) the understanding of the AT is, clearly, contrary to what has been stated by the Arbitral Tribunal (…)", "the Claimant cannot agree with such decision, nor with the arguments underlying it".[3]

2.7. On the other hand, the Claimant also states that "(…) it cannot accept the decision rejecting the Gracious Complaints filed against the aforementioned (…) tax assessment acts of IUC, nor the arguments underlying them, insofar as (…) they suffer, the same, from various defects (…)".

On the Claimant's Legitimacy

2.8. In this matter, the Claimant clarifies that "within the scope of the group to which it belongs, it underwent throughout the years several restructurings and changes of designation" and the Claimant seeks to demonstrate that it has legitimacy with respect to "(…) the tax assessment acts of IUC in the case at issue (…)".

On the Cumulation of Claims

2.9. In this connection, the Claimant understands that the request for constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal "(…) with a view to jointly assessing the (i)legality of the decisions rejecting the (three) gracious complaints filed against the IUC assessments relating to the years 2013 and 2014", "although constituting (tax) autonomous acts, the (i)legality of the same can be assessed jointly", because "there is identity of the factual and legal grounds".

On the Law – On the liable party in the context of IUC

2.10. The Claimant understands that, in this matter, "in light of the content of (…) article 3 of CIUC (…) the Claimant does not qualify as a liable party before the letter and spirit of the law (…)".

On the letter of the law: the presumption of article 3, paragraph 1 of CIUC and the "non-ownership" of the vehicles at issue

2.11. Here, for the Claimant, "(…) it is important to interpret the meaning of article 3, paragraph 1 of CIUC (…)" because "(…) this norm, contrary to what occurred in the previous automobile taxation regime (…), does not use the expression presumed to be, but rather the expression to be considered", concluding "that such expressions are equivalent" and that "regardless of the expression used (…) we continue to be dealing with a presumption".[4] [5]

2.12. Thus, the Claimant understands that "there can be no doubt as to the characterization of article 3, paragraph 1 of CIUC as a rebuttable presumption" that "(…) under pain of interpretation contrary to the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, admits contrary proof".[6]

2.13. And given that the Claimant carried out "(…) in the context of a Gracious Complaint (…) the destruction of such presumption", because "the vehicles on which the IUC's at issue now were charged, were, in their great majority, subject to financial leasing (…)", it understands that "under the terms of article 3 of CIUC, it cannot be considered a liable party of the tax".

On the Effects of Registration

2.14. The Claimant continues by stating that "(…) without prejudice to article 3 of CIUC being considered a mere presumption, one cannot invoke any constitutive effect of motor vehicle registration", that is, "the registration of acquisition with the competent Motor Vehicle Registry Office is not a condition for the transmission of ownership, nor does it affect its validity"

2.15. In fact, the Claimant understands that "(…) motor vehicle registration is a mere presumption of motor vehicle ownership – which (…) was destroyed by the Claimant – there being (…) no constitutive effect of Registration".[7]

On the spirit of the law: the principle of equivalence

2.16. The Claimant reiterates that "(…) it was not, at the date of the tax events, the owner of the vehicles in question" whereby it understands that "(…) before the letter of the law, it cannot, with respect to the vehicles at issue, be the liable party of the IUC".

2.17. Now, in this context, "(…) it is important to bear in mind (…) the spirit of the law" because "(…) the rules provided for in article 3 of CIUC (…)" must "(…) be interpreted taking into consideration the rationale of the Single Circulation Tax" whereby, for the Claimant, "the final part of paragraph 1 of article 3 of CIUC (…) cannot (…) be interpreted to the effect of intending to tax only those who appear in the motor vehicle register as owner and not the effective owner".

2.18. Indeed, the Claimant states that "the reform of automobile taxation was, in essence, motivated by environmental concern", a reason that was evident "(…) in the inclusion of carbon dioxide emissions in the taxable base of IUC".[8]

2.19. Thus, the Respondent concludes that "the rationale of CIUC is not (…) to tax those who appear in the respective register as owner (…)" "but rather, to tax the users (…) of the vehicles who, by virtue of their respective use, cause an environmental cost" whereby "(…) nor by virtue of the spirit of article 3 of CIUC, can the (…) the Claimant be considered a liable party of the tax".[9]

On the interpretation and uniform application of the law

2.20. In this matter, the Claimant states that "given that we are dealing with the same factual and legal identity (…), those decisions should be followed".[10] [11]

On the right to indemnitory interest

2.21. Finally, "(…) the (…) Claimant understands that it is owed (…) indemnitory interest" because "as sufficiently demonstrated (…) such assessments suffer from illegality", "and it is certain (…) that the Tax Authority had at its disposal all the elements and/or mechanisms that would enable it to make a good decision in the case".

On the Claim

2.22. In these terms, the Claimant concludes that "(…) the present request should be declared entirely well-founded determining, in consequence":

2.22.1. "The annulment of the act rejecting the Gracious Complaint filed";[12]

2.22.2. "The annulment of the assessment acts presented by the Claimant";

2.22.3. "Refund to the Claimant of the amount (…) relating to the unduly paid tax and, as well";

2.22.4. "The payment to the Claimant of indemnitory interest for the deprivation of the aforementioned amount (…)".

1. RESPONSE OF THE RESPONDENT

3.1. The Respondent in the response filed defended itself by way of objection having, in summary, presented the following arguments:

On the alleged illegitimacy of the Claimant as a liable party of the IUC

3.2. In this connection, the Respondent argues that the allegations of the Claimant "(…) cannot in any way proceed, as they make an interpretation and application of the legal norms applicable to the present case that is notoriously erroneous" because "the error in which the Claimant incurs, results (…) not only from a biased reading of the letter of the law, (…) as from the adoption of an interpretation that does not attend to the systematic element, violating the unity of the regime enshrined in the entire CIUC and, more broadly, in the entire tax legal system and (…) further stems from an interpretation that ignores the rationale of the regime enshrined in the article in question, and likewise, in the entire CIUC".

Biased reading of the letter of the law

3.3. In this connection, the Respondent argues that "the tax legislator in establishing in article 3, paragraph 1 who are the liable parties of the IUC established expressly and intentionally that these are the owners (…), being considered as such the persons in whose name the same are registered".

3.4. In these terms, and citing various examples, the Respondent continues arguing that "it is imperative to conclude that (…) the legislator established expressly and intentionally that are considered as (…) owners (…), the persons in whose name the (…) the vehicles are registered, because it is this interpretation that preserves the unity of the tax legal system", thus defending the departure from the establishment of a presumption by the legislator, which, according to it, would imply "unequivocally conducting an interpretation against the law".

3.5. Thus, the Respondent argues that "in light of this wording it is manifestly not possible to invoke that it is a presumption, as the Claimant argues (…) it being (…) a clear option of legislative policy adopted by the legislator, whose intention (…) was that, for purposes of IUC, those be considered owners, those who as such appear in the motor vehicle register", "(…) understanding already adopted by the jurisprudence of our courts".[13]

Interpretation that does not attend to the systematic element, violating the unity of the regime

3.6. The Respondent understands that "from the articulation between the scope of the subjective incidence of IUC and the constitutive fact of the corresponding tax obligation there flows unequivocally that only the legal situations subject to registration (…) generate the birth of the tax obligation (…)" being this "(…) considered due on the first day of the taxation period (…)".

3.7. That is, "the moment from which the tax obligation is constituted presents a direct relationship with the issuance of the registration certificate, in which must appear the facts subject to registration".

3.8. Thus, "in the absence of such registration (…) the owner shall be notified to comply with the corresponding tax obligation, as the Respondent (…) will not have to proceed with the assessment of the tax based on elements that do not appear in registers and public documents and, as such, authentic (…) whereby the non-updating of the registration shall be imputable within the legal sphere of the liable party of IUC and not in that of the Portuguese State (…)".

3.9. The Respondent continues arguing that, "should one accept the position defended by the Claimant (…) the Respondent would have to proceed with the assessment of IUC with respect to that other person identified by the person appearing in the motor vehicle register to whom it had first assessed the IUC (…)".

3.10. "In turn, after assessing the IUC with respect to that other person, this one could also allege and prove that meanwhile it has already entered (…) financial leasing (…) with another third party, but that this one also has not registered (…)", "(…) and so successively (…)", "putting (…) in question the expiry period of the tax" and, therefore, in the understanding of the Respondent, "one cannot in any way follow such reading".

3.11. In these terms, on this point, the Respondent concludes that "(…) the tax legislator intended intentionally and expressly, that were considered as owners, lessees, purchasers with reservation of ownership or holders of the right to purchase in long-term rental, the persons in whose name [the vehicles] are registered".

Interpretation that ignores the teleological element of interpretation of the law: the rationale of the regime enshrined in the article in question, and likewise, in the entire CIUC

3.12. In this sense, the Respondent argues that, taking into consideration the tenor of parliamentary debates surrounding the approval of Decree-Law no. 20/2008, of 31 January, "it flows unequivocally that IUC is owed by the persons who appear in the register as owners of the vehicles", so as to "avoid the problems (…) related to the fact that there are many vehicles not registered in the name of the real owner".[14][15]

3.13. In fact, according to the position defended by the Respondent, "the new regime of taxation of IUC came to substantially alter the automobile taxation regime, becoming liable parties of the tax the owners appearing in the register of ownership (…)".

3.14. Thus, according to the Respondent, "it flows clearly that the tax acts at issue do not suffer from any defect of violation of law", insofar as in light of the provisions of the applicable legislation, "it was the Claimant, in the capacity of owner appearing in the Motor Vehicle Registry Office, the liable party of the IUC".

On interpretation contrary to the Constitution

3.15. On the other hand, the Respondent further understands that "(…) the interpretation conveyed by the Claimant shows itself contrary to the Constitution" because "(…) in the interpretative task (…) the principle of contributory capacity (…)" imposes itself that "be articulated with (…)" "the principle of confidence and legal certainty, the principle of efficiency of the tax system and the principle of proportionality".

3.16. Now, for the Respondent, "the interpretation proposed by the Claimant (…) is offensive of the foundational principle of confidence and legal certainty that should inform any legal relationship (…)" being that "in parallel, the interpretation given by the Claimant is offensive of the principle of efficiency of the tax system, insofar as it results in a hindrance (…) of the competencies attributed to the Respondent, with obvious prejudice to the interests of the State (…)".[16] [17]

On the lack of proof of the transmission of ownership of the vehicle

3.17. In this connection, the Respondent states that "(…) accepting that it be admissible to destroy the presumption in light of the jurisprudence (…) established in this arbitration centre (…)", it understands that "(…) copies of second printings of sales invoices of the vehicles" are not "(…) sufficient proof to undermine the (supposed) legal presumption (…)", because "an invoice is not apt to prove the celebration of a synallagmatic contract such as buying and selling (…)".

3.18. On the other hand, the Respondent further argues that "after the submission of the request for arbitral pronouncement it became barred, on the part of the Claimant, the subsequent presentation of documentary evidence".[18] [19]

On the consequences of non-compliance with article 19 of CIUC

3.19. In this regard, the Respondent states that "the Claimant made no proof as to the compliance with this obligation, as moreover it was its responsibility, whereby necessarily the intended destruction of article 3 at issue must fail".

3.20. "Thus, the Claimant having not complied with the burden of proof imposed on it and verifying now the non-compliance with the declarative obligation required by article 19 of CIUC, (…) consequences (…) necessarily shall be drawn from its omissive conduct", "namely, its responsibility for the arbitral costs (…)".

On indemnitory interest

3.21. In this matter, the Respondent understands that "the legal prerequisites conferring the right to the requested indemnitory interest are not met".[20]

On responsibility for payment of arbitral costs

3.22. In this regard, the Respondent argues that "the registration of ownership constitutes an essential element in the information system between the Respondent and other public entities (…) and with the forces of authority (…) with a view to the exchange of information necessary for the assessment and supervision of (…) IUC".

3.23. Thus, "the transmission of ownership of motor vehicles is not susceptible to being controlled by the Respondent, as there is no accessory declarative obligation regarding this matter (…) meaning that IUC is assessed in accordance with registral information (…) transmitted by the Institute of Registries and Notaries".

3.24. In summary, the Respondent argues that "IUC is not assessed in accordance with information generated by the Respondent itself (…)" whereby "the Claimant having not taken care of the updating of the motor vehicle register (…) it is necessary to conclude that the Claimant did not proceed with the diligence required of it", leading "(…) the Respondent to limit itself to complying with the legal obligations to which it is bound (…)".[21]

3.25. "Therefore, it was not the Respondent who gave cause to the submission of the request for arbitral pronouncement, but rather the Claimant itself" whereby, "consequently, the Claimant should be condemned to the payment of the arbitral costs arising from the present request for arbitral pronouncement (…)".[22]

3.26. In these terms, the Respondent concludes the response filed to the effect that "the present request for arbitral pronouncement should be judged unfounded, maintaining in the legal order the tax assessment acts under challenge and absolving (…) the respondent entity from the request".

1. PRELIMINARY RULING

4.1. The request for arbitral pronouncement is timely, because submitted within the period provided for in letter a), of paragraph 1, of article 10 of RJAT.[23]

4.2. The parties enjoy legal standing and legal capacity, are legitimate regarding the request for arbitral pronouncement and are duly represented, in accordance with the provisions of articles 4 and 10 of RJAT and article 1 of Ordinance no. 112-A/2011, of 22 March.

4.3. The Tribunal is regularly constituted, in accordance with article 2, paragraph 1, letter a), articles 5 and 6, all of RJAT and is competent as to the assessment of the request for arbitral pronouncement formulated by the Claimant.

4.4. The cumulation of claims is legal, as the prerequisites required in article 3, paragraph 1 of RJAT are met, that is, the well-foundedness of the claims depends, essentially, on the assessment of the same factual circumstances and the interpretation and application of the same principles or rules of law.

4.5. With regard to the value of the request for arbitral pronouncement, taking into account the provisions of article 306 and article 297, both of CPC, of which "where several claims are joined in the same action, the value is the sum corresponding to the sum of the values of all of them", whereby being claimed, in the case under analysis, the annulment of the IUC assessments (tax and interest), of the years 2013 and 2014, of the vehicles identified in the case, the value of the claim should correspond to the total of such assessments, that is, EUR 8,302.13 (and not EUR 8,339.18, as indicated by the Claimant), without such alteration having implications for the amount of final costs of the case.[24]

4.6. No nullities were identified in the case.

4.7. There are no exceptions or preliminary questions that must be addressed, whereby nothing stands in the way of addressing the merits of the case.

1. FACTUAL MATTERS

On the proven facts

5.1. The Claimant is a company whose principal activity consists in offering its customers various solutions for automobile financing, such as Financial Leasing or Long-Term Rental (LTR).

5.2. The Claimant was notified of the assessments of Single Circulation Tax (IUC) relating to motor vehicles of category A, B and C, relating to the years 2013 and 2014, which are identified below, as per copies attached to the case:

[TABLES WITH VEHICLE ASSESSMENTS - GROUP I, II, AND III - containing dates, registration numbers, years, and amounts in EUR]

5.3. The Claimant made payment of the IUC assessments identified above, on the dates indicated in the footnotes to the above tables.

5.4. The Claimant, not agreeing with the aforementioned IUC assessments, relating to the years 2013 and 2014, filed the following gracious complaints (as per documents 2 and 3 attached with the request):

• No. …2015… relating to the IUC assessments identified in the table "Group I", above, filed on 17 March 2015;

• No. …2015… relating to the IUC assessments identified in the table "Group II", above, filed on 17 March 2015;

• No. …2015… relating to the IUC assessments identified in the table "Group III", above, filed on 08 April 2015;

alleging in all that "(…) at the date of the tax event the vehicles in question were not property of the claimant" because "the vehicles in question were subject to financial leasing, having been acquired by the lessees after the end of the leasing or still during the leasing" (as per documents 2 and 3 attached with the request).

5.5. The Claimant was notified, through the official letters identified below, of each of the draft decisions and their respective grounds, relating to the gracious complaints identified above [to the effect that "(…) on the anniversary date of the registrations of the vehicles whose single circulation tax is subject of objection in the present case, the same were registered (…) in the name of the claimant (…)"], as well as to exercise, if it wished, the right to prior hearing, within a period of 15 days from the date of notification (as per document 3 attached with the request):

• Official Letter no…, of 14 May 2015, relating to gracious complaint no. …2015… (relating to the IUC assessments identified in the table "Group I", above);

• Official Letter no…, of 14 May 2015, relating to gracious complaint no. …2015… (relating to the IUC assessments identified in the table "Group II", above);

• Official Letter no…, of 14 May 2015, relating to gracious complaint no. …2015… (relating to the IUC assessments identified in the table "Group III", above).

5.6. The Claimant exercised, on 25 May 2015, the right to prior hearing, in writing, with respect to each of the gracious complaints identified above, reiterating the argumentation already presented (as per document 1 attached with the request).

5.7. The Claimant was notified, on 8 June 2015, through the official letters identified below, of the decision rejecting each of the gracious complaints filed [to the effect of proposing "that the draft decision rejecting (…) be converted into final"], as per document 1 attached with the request:

• Official Letter no…, of 04 June 2015, relating to the order of 28 May 2015, relating to gracious complaint no. …2015… (IUC assessments identified in the table "Group I", above);

• Official Letter no…, relating to the order of 28 May 2015, relating to gracious complaint no. …2015… (IUC assessments identified in the table "Group II", above);

• Official Letter no…, of 04 June 2015, relating to the order of 28 May 2015, relating to gracious complaint no. …2015… (IUC assessments identified in the table "Group III", above).

5.8. It is considered proven the existence of the following LTR contracts, entered into between the Claimant (lessor) and the respective lessees (as per copies attached with the Request) and signed by both parties, for the vehicles which follow, and from whose copies can be extracted, summarily, the following information:

[TABLE WITH ALD CONTRACTS - containing contract numbers, registration numbers, contract dates, terms, and lessees]

5.9. No other facts capable of affecting the decision on the merits of the claim were proven.

On the unproven facts

5.10. Sufficient documentary evidence was not attached to the case to support the existence, at a moment prior to the issuance of each of the following identified documents, of the Leasing (LEA) or Long-Term Rental (ALD) contracts referenced therein:

[TABLE WITH UNPROVEN DOCUMENTS - containing document numbers, dates, values in EUR, vehicles, contracts, and document references]

5.11. Sufficient documentary evidence was not attached to the case to support the effective transmission of ownership of the vehicles underlying the IUC assessments subject to the request for arbitral pronouncement, as no document was attached that proved the payment of the values contained in the documents identified in the previous point.

5.12. No documentary evidence was attached relating to the amount of EUR 37.05 that would have been assessed as IUC relating to the year 2014, relating to the vehicle registration …-…-…, whereby that amount was disregarded from this request for arbitral pronouncement (see point 4.5., above).[100]

5.13. No facts were verified as unproven with relevance to the arbitral decision.

1. GROUNDS OF LAW

6.1. In the context of the arbitral case under analysis, the following will be the issues to be decided:

6.1.1. Does article 3 of the IUC Code establish or not a rebuttable presumption regarding the owners of motor vehicles, as liable parties of the tax, so as to rule out the presumption that those whose names the vehicles are registered in are considered as such?

6.1.2. Did the Claimant succeed in demonstrating, as a matter of arbitral procedure, that it was not, at the date of the IUC assessments subject to this case, the liable party of the tax, succeeding in destroying the presumption referred to in the previous point?

6.1.3. Do the IUC assessments made by the Respondent suffer, in consequence, from illegality, in light of the applicable legislation?

On the subjective incidence of IUC

6.2. In this matter, it will be important first to ascertain the legality of the acts of total rejection of the three gracious complaints filed, as well as the legality of the forty-two IUC assessments notified to the Claimant, relating to the years 2013 and 2014, subject to the present Request for Arbitral Pronouncement.[101]

6.3. Indeed, in the request for arbitral pronouncement the Claimant invokes the circumstance that "in light of the content of (…) article 3 of CIUC (…) it does not qualify as a liable party before the letter and spirit of the law (…)", because "the vehicles on which the IUC's (…) at issue were charged, were, in their great majority, subject to financial leasing (…)" and "(…) at the date of the tax events, the same (a) had been acquired by the lessees after the end of the respective leasing; or (b) had been acquired by the lessees still during the leasing; or (c) had been acquired by third parties" (underlining ours).

6.4. In this connection, the Claimant considers itself not to be the liable party of the tax which was assessed to it, because according to the provisions of article 3, paragraph 1 of the IUC Code, a rebuttable presumption is established therein, that is, one that admits contrary proof, namely, by demonstrating that the motor vehicles underlying the IUC assessments were not its property on the date of the occurrence of the tax event (in the years 2013 and 2014).

6.5. In the opposite sense, the Respondent considered that the provision of article 3, paragraph 1 of the IUC Code, does not contain any legal presumption as "to understand that the legislator enshrined (…) a legal presumption, would unequivocally constitute an interpretation against the law" (underlining ours).

6.6. Thus, according to the Respondent, the legislator established in an express and intentional manner that those whose names the vehicles are registered in are considered as owners.

6.7. In these terms, it will be necessary to answer the questions of whether, on the date of the occurrence of the tax event (for each of the vehicles identified in point 5.2., above):

6.7.1. The vehicles underlying the IUC assessments at issue were or were not the property of the Claimant?

6.7.2. And in consequence, determine whether, for purposes of the provisions of article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the IUC Code, the Claimant could or could not be considered as a liable party of IUC relating to the vehicles in question?

6.8. Now, these being the main issues to be decided in the present case, it will be necessary to determine the subjective incidence of IUC, in accordance with the provisions of the respective Code and to take a position on the said norm of subjective incidence so as to ascertain whether it establishes or not a rebuttable legal presumption.

6.9. However, and before proceeding to interpret the provisions of article 3, paragraph 1 of the IUC Code, it will be relevant to bear in mind the provisions of article 11 of the General Tax Law (LGT), insofar as tax norms must be interpreted in accordance with the general principles of interpretation and, likewise, the provisions of article 9 of the Civil Code which establishes the rules and elements for the interpretation of norms.

6.10. In fact, the interpretative activity is, as Francesco Ferrara states, "the most difficult and delicate operation to which a jurist can dedicate himself (…)" as "(…) the interpreter must seek not what the legislator wanted, but what in the law seems objectively intended (…)" (underlining ours).[102]

6.11. Thus, for the same author, understanding the law "is not only to grasp mechanically the apparent and immediate meaning that results from the verbal connection; it is to inquire deeply into the legislative thought, to descend from the verbal surface to the intimate concept that the text contains and to develop it in all its possible directions" (underlining ours).[103]

6.12. As Baptista Machado states[104] "the legal provision presents itself to the jurist as a linguistic statement, as a set of words that constitute a text. Interpreting consists evidently in drawing from that text a certain meaning or content of thought. The text contains multiple meanings (polysemy of the text) and frequently contains ambiguous or obscure expressions (…)" whereby "(…) although apparently clear in its verbal expression and carrying only one meaning, there is still a need to account for the possibility that the verbal expression has betrayed the legislative thought – a phenomenon more frequent than might appear at first sight" (underlining ours).

6.13. Thus, so that we can conclude whether article 3, paragraph 1, of the IUC Code establishes (i) a rebuttable presumption as to who should be considered a liable party of the tax based on Motor Vehicle Registration or whether (ii) the Legislator intended expressly and intentionally to determine, based on Motor Vehicle Registration, who should be considered the liable party of IUC, it is fundamental in the first place to pay attention to the letter of the Law.

6.14. In these terms, in accordance with the provision of article 3, paragraph 1 of the IUC Code, "the liable parties of the tax are the owners of vehicles, being considered as such the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose name the same are registered" (underlining ours).

Literal Element

6.15. In accordance with the literal element of the norm referred to, the problem centers on the expression "being considered as such" used by the Legislator, because the letter of the Law does not refer to the expression "presumed to be" (as appeared in the diplomas preceding the present Code), thus making it questionable whether the nature of presumption continues or ceases to be present in the norm under analysis.

6.16. In this sense, by way of example, it appears that in article 243, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code and in articles 45, paragraph 6 and 89-A, paragraph 4 of the LGT, the expression "is considered" is also used and, in these cases, we are dealing with legal presumptions so that, in accordance with the general norms of interpretation, it is considered that the minimum correspondence in language is assured, for purposes of determining the legislative thought that is objectified in the norm at issue.[105]

6.17. And, as Karl Larenz states[106], if "the literal meaning in most cases is not sufficient as an interpretative criterion, precisely because it still allows various interpretations", it is also true that, if accompanied by other elements, it is quite relevant and indicative of the true meaning of the norm under analysis, pointing to the effect that the expression "being considered as such" is equivalent to the expression previously used of "being presumed to be as such" (underlining ours).

Historical Element

6.18. Notwithstanding, and also within the scope of the elements of interpretation in accordance with article 9 of the Civil Code, it is important also to pay attention to the historical element.

6.19. In the understanding of Baptista Machado[107], this element "comprises all materials related to the history of the provision, namely: the evolutionary history of the institute, figure or legal regime in question (…); the so-called sources of law, that is the legal or doctrinal texts that inspired the legislator in the elaboration of the law (…); the preparatory works" (underlining ours).

6.20. In this connection, the legislator, in the definition of the subjective incidence of the Municipal Tax on Vehicles (IMV), the Tax on Circulation (ICI) and the Tax on Road Transport (ICA), taxes abolished by IUC, established that "the tax is owed by the owners of vehicles, being presumed to be as such, unless contrary proof, the persons in whose name the same are registered or matriculated" (underlining ours).

6.21. In these terms, as to this element of interpretation it is demonstrated that the antecedents of the IUC Code established a presumption that the liable parties of IUC are the owners registered with the Motor Vehicle Registry Office.

6.22. With respect to IUC, notwithstanding continuing to assign to the owners of vehicles the quality of liable parties, the legislator chose to use a different formulation of the incidence norm, abandoning the expression
"(…) being presumed to be as such, (…)" in favor of the expression "(…) being considered as such (…)".

6.23. In consequence, it is clear that the understanding underlying the provision of that article of the IUC Code provides for a rebuttable presumption, with respect to which the semantic question in no way alters the interpretative meaning of the norm.[108] [109]

6.24. Thus, and similarly to the understanding followed in earlier arbitral decisions on the same matter, we understand that it should be concluded that article 3, paragraph 1, of the IUC Code establishes a presumption, as it is not the substitution of the expression "being presumed to be" by the expression "being considered as such" that causes this norm to cease to establish a presumption (underlining ours).[110]

6.25. In fact, we understand that we are dealing with a mere semantic question, which does not in the slightest alter the content of the norm in question, because:

6.25.1. For there to be a legal presumption, it is necessary that the norm establishing it adapts to its respective legal concept (set forth in article 349 of the Civil Code), being irrelevant for this whether it is explicit (revealed by the use of the expression "presumed to be") or merely implicit.[111] [112]

6.25.2. On the other hand, the freedom of configuration of the legislator is limited by fundamental principles enshrined in the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (CRP), namely, the principle of equality, whose relevance is pertinent in the case under analysis.[113]

6.26. In this connection, "taxation in accordance with the principle of contributory capacity will imply the existence and maintenance of an effective connection between the tax payment and the economic circumstance selected to be the object of the tax, requiring, for this, a minimum of logical coherence of the various hypotheses (…) provided for in the law with the corresponding object of the same" (underlining ours).[114]

6.27. It is in the sense of the legal concept of presumption and in respect of the constitutional principles of equality and contributory capacity that the legislator assigns full effectiveness to the presumption derived from Motor Vehicle Registration by adopting it, as such, in the definition of the subjective incidence of this tax, established in paragraph 1, of article 3 of the IUC Code.

6.28. Indeed, with respect to the importance of Motor Vehicle Registration, it is important to state that registration allows for the publicity of the legal situation of goods and, likewise, to presume that the right exists over these goods and that the same belongs to the holder, as it appears in the register.

Rational and Teleological Element

6.29. It will now be the turn to be used the rational or teleological element which has the greatest importance in determining the meaning of the norm under analysis, because, according to the author Menezes Cordeiro[115], "interpretation is today dominated by the teleological factor".

6.30. Thus, with respect to the rational and teleological element, it is important to note that IUC has underlying the principle of equivalence (enshrined in article 1 of the Code of that tax), and which came to embody environmental concerns in establishing that the tax should burden taxpayers for the environmental and road costs caused by automobile circulation, that is, whoever pollutes has to pay (principle which also underlies article 66, paragraph 2, letter h), of CRP and Community Law).[116]

6.31. As Sérgio Vasques writes[117], "in obedience to the principle of equivalence, the tax must be shaped in attention to the benefit that the taxpayer derives from public activity, or in attention to the cost that it imputes to the community by its own activity" whereby "a tax on automobiles based on a rule of equivalence will be equal only if those that cause the same road wear and the same environmental cost pay the same tax; and those that cause wear and environmental cost different, pay different tax as well" (underlining ours).

6.32. Indeed, what is intended to be achieved through the establishment of said principle of equivalence is to cause the prejudices that accrue to the community, resulting from the use of motor vehicles, to be assumed by their owner-users, as costs that only they should bear.

6.33. Being known the dimension of the environmental damages caused by motor vehicles, the logic and coherence of the system of automobile taxation, in general, and of the regime inscribed in the IUC Code, in particular, point to the effect that whoever pollutes must pay, thus associating the tax to the environmentally caused damages.

6.34. These are, therefore, concerns of remarkable importance, in the economy of IUC, and which cannot be left out of account, coherently, in the interpretation of article 3, relating to the subjective incidence of that tax.

6.35. In these terms, corresponding the taxation (in the context of IUC) of the real polluters to an important purpose sought by the law, in light of the rational and teleological character elements of interpretation, it is necessary to conclude that paragraph 1 of article 3 of the IUC Code establishes a rebuttable presumption.[118]

6.36. In summary, it is important to stress that the aforementioned elements of interpretation, whether those related to literal interpretation, whether those regarding the logical elements of interpretation, of a historical nature or of a rational order all point in the direction that the expression "being considered as such" has a meaning equivalent to the expression "being presumed to be as such", and should thus be understood that, it is reiterated, the provision of paragraph 1 of article 3 of the IUC Code establishes a legal presumption.

6.37. Now, in accordance with the provisions of article 349 of the Civil Code, presumptions are the inferences that the law (or the judge), draws from a known fact to establish an unknown fact.

6.38. In this way, presumptions constitute means of proof, having this for function the demonstration of the reality of facts (article 341 of the Civil Code), whereby those in whose favor the legal presumption operates are relieved of proving the fact to which it leads (article 350, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code).

6.39. However, presumptions, except in cases where the law prohibits it, can be destroyed, by means of contrary proof (article 350, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code) and, when dealing with presumptions of tax incidence, these are always rebuttable, as expressly provided in article 73 of the LGT.

6.40. In fact, these presumptions of tax incidence can be destroyed through the proper adversarial procedure, provided for in article 64 of the Code of Tax Procedure and Process (CPPT) or, alternatively, by way of gracious complaint or judicial challenge of the tax acts based thereon.[119]

6.41. In these terms, the answer that should be given to the question formulated in point 6.1.1., above will be that article 3 of the IUC Code does, in fact, establish a rebuttable presumption as to the owners of motor vehicles, in a way as to be able to rule out the presumption that those whose names the vehicles are registered in are considered as such.[120]

On the destruction of the presumption

6.42. In light of the above, having concluded that article 3 of the IUC Code establishes a rebuttable presumption as to the owners of motor vehicles, it is now necessary to analyze whether this presumption was effectively destroyed by the Claimant, as results from the provisions of article 73 of the LGT.

6.43. Thus, in general, the person (in this case a legal entity) who is inscribed in the register as owner of the vehicle (and who, in that sense, is considered by the Tax Authority as being the liable party of IUC) must demonstrate, by means of available evidence, that it is not the real owner of the vehicle and, likewise, that ownership was transferred to another.

6.44. In concrete terms, what the Claimant proposes to prove, as results from the case, is therefore the "non-ownership" of the motor vehicles (which gave rise to the assessment acts subject to the request for arbitral pronouncement) on the date of the tax event of IUC (in 2013 and 2014), because, as stated above in point 6.2., "(…) at the date of the tax events, the same (a) had been acquired by the lessees after the end of the respective leasing; or (b) had been acquired by the lessees still during the leasing; or (c) had been acquired by third parties".

6.45. For purposes of proof that the transmission of ownership of the said vehicles occurred, the Claimant attached to the request the following documentation:[121]

6.45.1. Copies of invoices (or equivalent documents), relating to each of the vehicles underlying the IUC assessments subject to the request (and identified above in point 5.2.), with the identification of the Entity to whom it was issued, Address and Tax No.);

6.45.2. Copies of the "Entity Extract" of each of the entities that the Claimant alleges to have acquired each of the vehicles underlying the IUC assessments subject to the request (containing information relating to the identification of the Entity, Address, Bank and IBAN, and containing still a sort of "current account", contractually existing, between the Claimant and each of the entities);

6.45.3. Copy of two LTR contracts relating to two vehicles underlying the IUC assessments subject to the request (and identified above in point 5.8.).

6.46. In these terms, for purposes of proof that the transmission of ownership of the motor vehicles underlying the IUC assessments occurred, at a moment prior to the tax event (in 2013 and 2014), it will be necessary to ascertain what value should be recognized to the elements made available, by the Claimant, to prove that transmission.

6.47. In general terms, whenever a buying and selling of a vehicle occurs, a bilateral document intended for motor vehicle registration (whose completion does not constitute an essential formality of the transaction) must be filled out and which contains a declaration signed by both parties regarding the celebration of the contract.

6.48. And precisely because the buying and selling of movable property is a non-formal transaction, the Motor Vehicle Registration services merely require this private instrument as proof in order to proceed with the alteration of the register (which can be promoted by the seller, on behalf of the purchaser, armed with a simple copy of that declaration).

6.49. In the case under analysis, what the Claimant intends in the case is not merely to destroy a tax presumption but rather to destroy the presumption of veracity of the facts that are registered publicly (and for purposes of public interest).[122]

6.50. Now, the basis for the taxation carried out by the Respondent was, according to what appears in the Motor Vehicle Registry, that the Claimant was, for purposes of the provisions of article 3, paragraph 1 of the IUC Code, the legitimate owner of the vehicles in relation to which the tax was assessed, relating to the years 2013 and 2014, whose legality verification is the object of the present request for arbitral pronouncement.

6.51. As we saw above (see conclusion of point 6.41.), article 3, paragraph 1 of the IUC Code establishes a rebuttable presumption by the liable party, by virtue of the provisions of article 73 of the LGT whereby, in light of the verification of such basis for the assessment, legitimizing the action of the Respondent, it is incumbent upon the Claimant to present sufficient proof of the illegitimacy of the tax acts, in which case the assessments of the tax could not be maintained in the legal order.

6.52. In this matter, and proceeding to analyze in more detail the documents presented by the Claimant, for purposes of destroying the legal presumption referred to above, we must state the following:

6.52.1. With respect to the copies of invoices and equivalent documents, given that these are private documents, unilaterally issued by the Claimant (although with a commercial character), without any intervention by the purchaser, can by this be objected to as to the desired contractual effects of any transaction (namely, that this was, in fact, celebrated, thus invalidating any probative value of the same.[123] [124]

6.52.2. With respect to the copies of "Entity Extract", attached for each of the entities that the Claimant alleges to have acquired each of the vehicles underlying the IUC assessments subject to the request, given that they also contain information, unilaterally prepared by the Claimant, relating to the identification of each of the Entities, the probative value for the intended purpose will also be reduced.

6.52.3. Lastly, and with respect to the copies of the two LTR contracts attached, these do not prove by themselves (and even if together with the invoices contained in documents no. 28 and 31 attached by the Claimant) that the two vehicles subject to the said contracts were alienated at a moment prior to the date of the tax event of IUC of the years 2013 and 2014.

6.53. In consequence, to the documents identified in points 6.52.1. and 6.52.2., above, given that they have the nature of private documents and are unilateral, only very limited probative value can be recognized.[125]

6.54. In fact, in the case under analysis, as a mechanism to destroy the presumption, the Claimant only attached, as already stated, as proof that it was no longer the legitimate owner of the vehicles identified in point 5.2., above, the copies of the documents identified in point 6.52., above, to prove the alleged transfer of ownership of the same.

6.55. Now, from the analysis conducted on the copies of invoices (and other equivalent documents), as well as of the "entity extracts" attached by the Claimant to the case, as stated above (see points 6.52. and 6.53.) limited value should be recognized to the same to prove the existence of a synallagmatic contract, as is the case with buying and selling, because any of those accounting documents does not prove even the payment of the price by the purchaser.[126]

6.56. Indeed, in general terms, both invoices (such as, for example, debit notes), constitute accounting documents prepared by companies, and should:

6.56.1. The former be framed as accounting documents through which the seller sends to the purchaser the general conditions of the transaction conducted and;

6.56.2. The latter be framed as accounting documents in which the issuer communicates to the recipient that this one owes it a certain monetary amount.

6.57. Although both documents referred to in the preceding point appear in the phase of settling the amount to be paid by the purchaser, but making no proof of the payment of the price by the same, in consequence, also cannot prove that the buying and selling contract was concluded.[127]

6.58. Indeed, in each of the documents attached by the Claimant (doc. 5 to 31) there is a mention of "Valid as receipt after good collection", but as to this "good collection" no proof was made by the Claimant, whereby one can question whether the value in question in each of those documents (invoices or equivalent documents) was or was not paid by the invoiced entity.[128]

6.59. In fact, not having been attached to the case, in particular, copies of documents proving payment of the price (check or proof of transfer of the amount relating to the alienation of each of the vehicles), the effective transmission of ownership of the said vehicles could not be proven.

6.60. Indeed, only with the presentation of such documents (with presumption of veracity and authenticity), would there have been sufficient force to destroy, in accordance with the provisions of article 73 of the LGT, the presumption contained in article 3, paragraph 1 of the IUC Code (and as a consequence of which resulted the tax assessments).

6.61. In these terms, it will be necessary to conclude that the Claimant failed to prove the transmission of ownership of the vehicles that constitute the object of the IUC assessments that are part of the Arbitral Request and, in consequence, failed to destroy the presumption derived from the inscription in the Motor Vehicle Registry.

6.62. Consequently, the Claimant failed to demonstrate that, on the date of the IUC assessments, it was not the owner of the vehicles subject to those assessments (and identified in point 5.2., above), the answer to the question formulated in point 6.1.2. being negative, that is, the Claimant did not succeed in destroying the presumption of article 3 of the IUC Code.

6.63. In this way, in accordance with the provisions of article 16 of the IUC Code, the Respondent was competent to assess the tax to the Claimant, as the person in whose name the vehicles subject to the assessments are registered (in accordance with the provisions of article 3 of the IUC Code).

6.64. Thus, the answer to the question above formulated in point 6.1.3. will also be negative, that is, the IUC assessments made by the Respondent do not suffer, as a consequence of the above, from illegality, and should not, for this reason, be annulled.

On the payment of indemnitory interest

6.65. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 24 of RJAT "the payment of interest is due, regardless of its nature, in the terms provided in the general tax law and in the Code of Tax Procedure and Process", from which it results that an arbitral decision is not limited to assessing the legality of the tax act.

6.66. As Jorge Lopes de Sousa states "it falls within the competencies of the arbitral tribunals operating at CAAD the fixing of the effects of the arbitral decision which can be defined in a process of judicial challenge, namely, the annulment of the acts whose declaration of illegality is requested, the condemnation of the Tax and Customs Authority to the payment of indemnitory interest (…)" (underlining ours).[129] [130]

6.67. Thus, in tax arbitral cases there will be place to the payment of indemnitory interest, in the terms of the provisions of articles 43, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 100 of the LGT, when it is determined that there was an error imputable to the services from which results payment of the tax debt in an amount greater than legally due (underlining ours), it being unnecessary that the same be requested in the petition. [131] [132]

6.68. In these terms, the right to indemnitory interest will depend on the verification of an error (of fact or of law) imputable to the services of the Respondent, from which resulted a payment of the tax debt in an amount greater than legally due.

6.69. In the case under analysis, in promoting the IUC assessments relating to the years 2013 and 2014, considering the Claimant as a liable party of this tax, the Respondent limited itself to complying with the provisions of paragraph 1, of article 3, of the IUC Code, which, as analyzed above, assigns such quality to persons in whose name the vehicles are registered.

6.70. Now, as concluded above, the said norm has the nature of a legal presumption, whereby it follows for the Respondent the right to assess the tax and demand it from persons in whose name the vehicles are registered, thus no error being perceived that would be imputable to it.

On responsibility for payment of arbitral costs

6.71. In consonance with the preceding point, and in accordance with the provisions of article 527, paragraph 1 of CPC (ex vi 29, paragraph 1, letter e) of RJAT), it must be established that the Party that gave cause to them shall be condemned in costs or, if there is no judgment on the action, whoever drew benefit from the case.

6.72. In this connection, paragraph 2 of the said article specifies the expression "gave cause to them", according to the principle of non-success, understanding that the losing party, in the proportion in which it loses, gives cause to the costs of the case.[133]

6.73. In these terms, taking into account what was analyzed above, the responsibility regarding arbitral costs should be entirely imputed to the Claimant.

1. DECISION

7.1. In accordance with the provisions of article 22, paragraph 4, of RJAT, "in the arbitral decision rendered by the arbitral tribunal appears the fixing of the amount and the distribution among the parties of the costs directly resulting from the arbitral case".

7.2. In this connection, the basic rule regarding responsibility for case expenses is that the Party that gave cause to them should be condemned, understanding that the losing party, in the proportion in which it loses, gives cause to the costs of the case (article 527, paragraphs 1 and 2 of CPC in force).

7.3. In the case under analysis, taking into account what was stated above, the principle of proportionality imposes that the totality of responsibility for costs be attributed to the Claimant, in accordance with the provisions of article 12, paragraph 2 of RJAT and article 4, paragraph 4 of the Regulation of Costs in Arbitration Proceedings.

7.4. In these terms, taking into account the conclusions set forth in the preceding Chapter, this Arbitral Tribunal decided:

7.4.1. To judge unfounded the request for arbitral pronouncement presented by the Claimant, maintaining in the legal order both the IUC assessments subject to the request and the acts of rejection of the gracious complaints filed regarding those IUC assessments, of the years 2013 and 2014, with the consequences flowing therefrom;

7.4.2. To judge unfounded the request for payment of indemnitory interest formulated by the Claimant;

7.4.3. To condemn the Claimant to the payment of the costs of the present case.

Value of the case: In accordance with the provisions of articles 306, paragraph 2 of CPC, article 97-A, paragraph 1 of CPPT and article 3, paragraph 2 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the value of the case is fixed at EUR 8,302.13.[134]

In accordance with the provisions in Table I of the Regulation of Costs of Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the value of the costs of the Arbitral Case is fixed at EUR 918.00, to be paid by the Claimant, in accordance with article 22, paragraph 4 of RJAT.

Notice is hereby given.

Lisbon, 15 February 2016

The Arbitrator

Sílvia Oliveira