Summary
Full Decision
Case No. 67/2013-T
Arbitral Decision
A - REPORT
A, taxpayer number …, and B, taxpayer number …, married to each other, residents in …, Belgium - "Claimants", filed a request for arbitral determination on 4 March 2013, pursuant to Articles 10 and following of Decree-Law no. 10/2011 of 20 January (Legal Regime for Tax Arbitration, hereinafter referred to as "LRTA"), against the Tax and Customs Authority (hereinafter referred to as "TCA").
The Claimants (Cls) chose not to appoint an arbitrator, whereupon the Ethics Board of CAAD proceeded to appoint Dr. Jorge Carita. The Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 6 June 2013 by order of the President of the Ethics Board.
The Cls seek the declaration of illegality and annulment of the Personal Income Tax (IRS) assessment for 2008 no. 2012 ... and the collection order no. 2012 ... in the amount of € 1,630.63, and the restitution of the same amount, already paid, plus compensatory interest accrued and accruing until full and effective payment. They further seek the condemnation of the respondent to pay costs, attorney's fees and other legal expenses.
The Cls base the alleged illegality of the assessment on the following grounds:
The Cls acquired a property (hereinafter referred to as "Property A"), intended for own and permanent residence - autonomous fraction designated by the letter "AM", of the urban property described in the … Registry of Real Property of Lisbon under number ..., of the parish …, and registered in the property tax roll of the same parish, under article ... -, on 24.08.2007.
The Cls sold another property (hereinafter referred to as "Property B"), which had been the own and permanent residence of the Cls - autonomous fraction designated by the letter "C", described in the … Registry of Real Property of Lisbon, under number 134, of the parish of …, and registered in the property tax roll of the same parish, under article … (acquired by the Cls in 2004) -, on 26.08.2008.
In their 2008 Personal Income Tax Return, the Cls declared the sum of € 16,035.64 as necessary expenses, within the meaning of Article 51, paragraph a), of the Personal Income Tax Code (CIRS).
The Cls further declared the amount of € 71,896.18, proceeds from the sale of Property B, as reinvestment in the acquisition of Property A.
The Tax Authority (TCA) requested from the Claimants, under Articles 128 and 134 of CIRS and Article 59, paragraph 3, paragraph d), and paragraph 4 of the General Tax Law (LGT), evidence of the expenses deducted in 2008, pursuant to Article 51, paragraph a) CIRS, in a letter dated 06.08.2012.
The Cls presented, via email, the requested evidence on 28.08.2012.
By an official document containing a proposal to amend the income declarations for 2008, dated 10.09.2012, the TCA informed the claimants of two irregularities regarding the 2008 Personal Income Tax Return:
(i) The expense of € 154.70, paid to Bank A for the valuation of Property B, in order to obtain the respective mortgage loan, did not constitute a "necessary expense" under Article 51, paragraph a) CIRS;
(ii) The reinvestment of € 71,896.18 carried out under Article 10, paragraph 5, paragraph b) CIRS, was invalid, because the acquisition of Property A had occurred outside the period of "twelve months preceding" the date of sale of Property B.
The TCA invoked at that moment that the period for acquiring Property A was situated between 26.08.2007 and 26.08.2008.
The Cls responded on 20.09.2012, alleging that:
(i) The expense of € 154.70 for valuation of Property B should be considered by the TCA as a necessary expense, just as real estate brokerage expenses and charges are.
The Cls argue that the concept of "necessary expense" in Article 51 of CIRS has been interpreted differently over the years by the Tax Administration, but that since 2008, real estate brokerage expenses are considered to fall within that concept.
The Cls thus draw a parallel with the situation of bank valuation of a property, an unavoidable requirement, indispensable for obtaining real estate credit and, therefore, consider it as a "necessary expense" for the acquisition of the property.
(ii) The calculation of the twelve-month period prior to the sale of Property B carried out by the TCA was incorrect, since 26.08.2007, considered by the TCA as the last day of the period for accepting the reinvestment of Property A, was a Sunday, and therefore, under the law (Article 279, paragraph e) of the Civil Code), should be transferred to the next working day, that is, the previous Friday, 24.08.2007, precisely the date of acquisition of Property A.
The Cls invoke Article 10, paragraph 5, paragraph b) of CIRS, as drafted in 2008, which provided that reinvestment could only take place for payment of the acquisition of another property intended for own and permanent residence, if the acquisition of that property took place in the twelve months preceding, such period to be calculated in accordance with Article 20, paragraph 1, CPPT, which refers to Article 279 of the CC. According to the Cls, the law is clear in stating that the acquisition must take place in the twelve months preceding the date of realization, this moment being that of the sale of the property, with the period being calculated "backwards".
The TCA notified the Cls of the final order, pursuant to Article 77 of the LGT, Article 36 of CPPT and Article 66 of CIRS, dated 31.10.2012, in which:
(i) It reiterated the refusal to consider the expense of € 154.70 for property valuation as a necessary expense within the meaning of Article 51, paragraph a) CIRS, citing the usual practice of the TCA;
(ii) It considered that the alienation of Property B had been made outside the deadline, because, under Article 10, paragraph 5, paragraph b) CIRS, "the date of acquisition of the property is the decisive moment to start calculating the period", and the reinvestment is valid provided that the alienation had been made between 24.08.2007 and 25.08.2008 (since 24.08.2008 is a Sunday); Property B was alienated on 26.08.2008, therefore, outside the deadline.
The Cls were notified of the 2008 Personal Income Tax assessment (no. 2012 ...), as well as of the collection of € 1,630.63.
The Cls proceeded to pay the tax due.
Regarding the obligation to pay compensatory interest, required by the TCA, in the amount of € 195.01, the Cls consider that the assessment of interest violates the duty to provide reasons (Article 35, paragraph 9, of the LGT), as the TCA makes no reference to the adequate causal nexus between the actions of the Claimants and the delay in the assessment, nor to the censurability of their conduct.
The Cls base their request for payment of indemnificatory interest accrued and accruing until full and effective payment on Article 43 of the LGT and Article 22 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (CRP), on the fact that there was an error by the services in the calculation of the tax. They further cite case law and doctrine to the effect that the error, attributable to the services that carried out the assessment, is demonstrated by the judicial annulment of that act.
The Respondent replied on 15.07.2013, refuting the arguments presented by the Cls as follows:
Regarding the charges for property valuation, the TCA considers that, in the absence of administrative guidelines regarding the admissibility of bank expenses relating to the contracting of a bank loan as "necessary expenses", as occurs with real estate brokerage expenses, and with neither the regime of analogy nor extensive interpretation being in effect, and these expenses not falling within the interpretation of the concept - as they are not expenses that cannot but be incurred for purposes of acquisition or alienation of the properties in question (necessary), nor being inseparable from the main transaction (inherent) - they cannot be accepted as "necessary expenses".
As to reinvestment, the TCA disagrees with the Cls' understanding, considering that, in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 5, paragraphs a) and b), the relevant fact for purposes of starting the calculation of the period is the acquisition (24.08.2007), being that the certain fact from which one departs to the uncertain fact which is the realization (alienation). In the TCA's view, only from the acquisition will the taxpayer know that they have only 12 months to carry out the alienation, being uncertain whether they will succeed or not - in the case, the alienation occurs on 26.08.2008. The TCA further criticizes the Cls' arguments as constituting a proposal for retroactive calculation of periods (from alienation, a subsequent and uncertain fact, to acquisition, prior and certain) without any legal, case law or doctrinal support, considering it even unconstitutional, for violation of the principles of legal certainty and security.
The TCA maintains, thus, the option rendered in the final order of 31.10.2012.
Finally, regarding compensatory interest, the TCA invokes the existence of notification which contains the reasoning for the assessment of such interest.
The meeting with the parties, referred to in Article 18 of the LRTA, took place on 20 September 2013.
B - SANITATION
The Arbitral Tribunal is regularly constituted and is materially competent, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 1, paragraph a) of the LRTA. The case is not subject to defects that would invalidate it and the Parties have legal personality and capacity, being legitimate (Article 10, paragraph 2, of the LRTA).
C - MATTERS OF FACT
I - Proven
The Cls acquired a property intended for own and permanent residence, autonomous fraction designated by the letter "AM", of the urban property described in the … Registry of Real Property of Lisbon under number ..., of the parish of …, and registered in the property tax roll of the same parish, under article ..., on 24.08.2007 – designated as Property A.
The Cls sold another property, which had been own and permanent residence of the Cls, autonomous fraction designated by the letter "C", described in the … Registry of Real Property of Lisbon, under no. …, of the parish of …, and registered in the property tax roll of the same parish, under article … (acquired by the Cls in 2004), on 26.08.2008 – designated as Property B.
In their 2008 Personal Income Tax Return, the Cls declared the sum of € 16,035.64 as necessary expenses, within the meaning of Article 51, paragraph a), of the Personal Income Tax Code (CIRS).
The Cls further declared the amount of € 71,896.18, proceeds from the sale of Property B, as reinvestment in the acquisition of Property A.
The TCA notified the Cls of the final order, pursuant to Article 77 of the LGT, Article 36 of CPPT and Article 66 of CIRS, dated 31.10.2012, in which:
(i) It refused to consider the expense of € 154.70 for property valuation as a necessary expense within the meaning of Article 51, paragraph a) of CIRS, citing the usual practice of the TCA;
(ii) It considered that the alienation of Property B had been made outside the deadline for reinvestment established in Article 10, paragraph 5, paragraph b) of CIRS;
The Cls were notified of the 2008 Personal Income Tax assessment and proceeded to pay the tax due.
The Cls received on 17.12.2012 notification regarding the assessment of compensatory interest and its demonstration: Notification RY...PT
II – Reasoning
The facts were given as proven based on documents attached to the case file.
III - Unproven
It is not proven that the expense for property valuation is necessary within the meaning of Article 51 of CIRS.
D - LAW
I - Reinvestment
The question of reinvestment as a condition for exclusion from the taxation of capital gains is absolutely central to the resolution of the dispute. At issue is the timeliness of the acquisition of Property A.
It falls to us, therefore, to determine, in the first place, what is the exact period of time during which the acquisition would be susceptible of constituting a reinvestment of the value of the realization of the alienation of Property B, which leads us to reflect on the very nature of this period.
The period corresponds to a predetermined period of time, after which, the legal situation becomes final. The period guarantees legal certainty and security in the Legal System and the protection of legal positions (Principle of Preclusion).
In Civil Law, two types of periods are distinguished: prescription (Articles 298/1 and 300 et seq. of the CC), and lapse (Articles 298/2 and 328 et seq. CC). Prescription is an institute of an imperative nature, with rigid periods, as Menezes Cordeiro teaches us, "when the rule fixes a period, the norm becomes self-sufficient: it is valid on its own, exhausts itself in the task of fixing a predetermined period" and that "it is not permissible for the interpreter-applicant to extend or restrict periods pre-fixed by law, under the guise of legal-scientific directives"[1]. Prescription has, as a rule, a long period, applies to obligations, and is satisfied with the general provision of Article 298/1 of the CC.
On the other hand, lapse applies, as a rule, to potestative rights (which the Legal System intends to be exercised with alacrity or to cease, given their destabilizing character), has a short period, and can be set aside by the autonomy of the parties. In a broad sense, "lapse corresponds to a general scheme of extinction of legal situations, by virtue of the supervention of a fact to which the law or other sources attribute that effect" - it occurs through "the extinction of a legal position by the verification of a fact strictly speaking endowed with extinctive efficacy". In a strict sense, it corresponds to a "form of repercussion over time on legal situations that, by law or contract, must be exercised within a certain time"[2] – once the period expires, without the right being exercised, this right becomes extinct.
Lapse in a strict sense may be of two types: simple, in which the law merely provides or mentions the cessation of the legal situation by the lapse of the period; or punitive, in which "the Law imposes the cessation of a legal position as a reaction to its non-exercise within the fixed period" – "institution of a burden on the sphere of the holder of the position subject to a term" [3].
Thus, the impeditive cause of lapse is the "effectuation of the act itself subject to lapse" [4].
The tax legislator also distinguishes between these two concepts – Articles 45 and 48 of the LGT. In Tax Law, lapse corresponds to the "period for exercising the right to assess the tax debt through the procedure for assessment of taxes", while prescription corresponds to the "period for demanding payment of tax debts already assessed" [5]. Citing Freitas da Rocha, "in legal terms, prescription and lapse have as their main consequence the termination of subjective legal claims already constituted as of the tax fact" [6]. The same author further tells us that, with the lapse of time, the obligation that was legal becomes a mere "moral obligation" or "obligation of conscience".
In fact, however, for Tax Law, the division between the two institutes is somewhat artificial, since "in practice, (…) the reality is the same: after the lapse of the period, the holder ceases to be able to exercise a certain legal claim, considering their action to be untimely". [7]
According to the same author, the period referred to in Article 10, paragraph 5, of CIRS (version in effect in 2008) is a prescriptive period. However, the reinvestment of capital gains raises some problems, in particular, determining what is the tax fact. In fact, the taxation of capital gains resulting from the alienation of a property is subject to a condition: the non-existence of reinvestment of the proceeds of alienation in a new acquisition, within a certain period of time (period).
This problem also relates to the broader question of determining the start of the period. Citing Menezes Cordeiro, the start of the period corresponds to the "structuring factor of the institute: on it depends, therefore, all subsequent development" [8].
It is thus verified that the situation provided for in Article 10, paragraph 5, of CIRS is an anomalous situation, different from what would be a "normal" period. As Freitas da Rocha teaches, "when the exigibility of the tax is dependent on the verification of a condition, the period of prescription only begins to run from the moment of verification of the condition", and thus, "while the condition is not verified, the tax is not exigible, and one cannot say that there is an obligation to pay" [9]. Thus, in the case of taxation of capital gains, this is only owed in the event of the non-existence of reinvestment within the established period.
This situation seems, therefore, to escape what is typical prescription in civil law. In fact, it resembles the logic of punitive lapse – applicable, normally, to procedure -, by placing on the taxpayer the condition that will exonerate them from the obligation (that is, in order not to be obliged to pay tax on the capital gain obtained, the taxpayer must have reinvested the value of the realization - proceeds of alienation, which generates the capital gain).
The situation is even more atypical considering that there is no right that arises with the alienation of the property, nor one that becomes extinct with the lapse of the period. What there is is an expectation of benefiting from an exclusion from taxation, verified a legal condition within the predetermined period.
Let us see the specific case.
At first glance, the TCA's argument is more convincing: it is more solid and more in accordance with the doctrines of civil law, with regard to periods.
However, let us look more closely.
The question raised in the proceedings, in simplistic terms, comes down to knowing whether a period can be calculated in a retroactive manner (that is, backwards). It appears that the Respondent has reason in calling this proposal unconstitutional, for violation of the constitutional principles of legal security and certainty.
It should be noted that the question raised is so preliminary that almost no doctrine or case law has addressed it. Nor does Article 279 of the CC assist us in this moment (it should further be noted that, contrary to what is invoked in the proceedings, Article 20 of CPPT has no role here, as we would be dealing with a substantive period, not a procedural one). Our automatic response to the problem is that it seems obvious, within the panorama of Portuguese Law, that the period is only calculated for the future, from a moment that is certain and fixed in time.
The parties debate in the proceedings on what is the decisive moment for the start of the calculation of the period: whether, as the TCA argues, the first chronologically determined moment – the acquisition, because that is the certain moment from which to count the 12-month period; or whether, as the Cls argue, the alienation. Although insipid, the Cls' argument raises the veil of the apparent simplicity of the question.
If, at first glance, the TCA is right, it is by looking at the constitutive moment that it proposes that some confusion arises. The tax law – Article 10 of CIRS – intends to tax Capital Gains, Capital Gains that are generated with the alienation of the property. Now, observing the chronological course of events, the acquisition (which occurs in 2007) is completely irrelevant to the tax legislator. Only when the alienation occurs (in 2008) does that first event appear as potentially relevant.
The constitutive moment of Capital Gain is that of the realization – it is the realization/alienation value that generates the Capital Gain confronted with the acquisition value of that same property. And the intention of the tax legislator is to tax the gain with the alienation. This is the constitutive tax fact: the one that generates the obligation to pay the tax.
However, by giving precedence to the relevant tax fact - alienation of Property B -, being this the moment from which the period is calculated, the normal order of events is altered – the chronological one -, departing from a recent event to an older one. On the other hand, it also suffers from incoherence to base a period on an event without any relevance, at the time of its occurrence, to the Tax Authority – that of the acquisition of Property A.
This situation becomes even more absurd considering what is at stake. Periods are intended to protect a right during a certain lapse of time, after which, the creditor will no longer be able to defend themselves (a "… loss of coercive means occurs, although the actual interest may still be said to subsist" [10]).
Now, no right is formed with the acquisition of the property. There is no right to the exclusion of taxation of Capital Gains, and even less a right supposedly formed a priori of the very alienation that generates the Capital Gain subject to taxation. To say this would mean that in 2007, a right should have arisen in the legal sphere of the Cls: the right to be excluded from taxation of the proceeds of an alienation that is subsequent and eventual, and even more so, that, by not alienating, this right would become prescribed.
On the other hand, neither is an obligation to pay formed. This also only arises with the alienation and the Capital Gain resulting from it.
The taxpayer only has the right to the tax benefit – exclusion from taxation - if they have alienated and, a fact logically subsequent, have acquired – reinvested.
The incoherence of applying the "normal" logic (more civilistic) to this anomalous situation in Tax Law leads us to a deeper question: is the "period" established in Article 10, paragraph 5, b) of CIRS (version in effect in 2008) really a period?
In fact, it seems to us that reinvestment, within the period of time determined by law, is a condition of verification or a factual presupposition for the exclusion of taxation – a question that only arises after the alienation. That is, what the law intends is to assist the taxpayer who is decapitalized by virtue of an acquisition in the 12 months preceding, for which the proceeds of alienation will compensate. The condition is that there has been an investment in an acquisition of a property for own and permanent residence, combined with an alienation of another property, also for own and permanent residence, whose proceeds are expected to be used in the payment of the first acquisition.
Thus, it seems to us that the period of time determined by law (in paragraph 5, b), of Article 10) of CIRS only formally comes down to a period. In reality, it does not protect any right from aggression, since there is no right, nor is the logic of calculation of the period applicable to it, as the constitutive tax fact occurs at a moment chronologically subsequent to the fact that can determine the exclusion from taxation.
Choosing not to consider the predetermined time period in Article 10, paragraph 5, b), of CIRS, as a period per se, there remains the question of how to proceed with the calculation of this time interval.
As mentioned above, the application of Article 20 of CPPT does not apply here, as it is not a procedural period. There being no provision to assist us in the CIRS, and this being a dispute based on the tax legal relationship between the subjects, it remains for us to resort to the LGT. Article 2 of the LGT refers us subsidiarily to the general rules of the Civil Code. We would then again be subject to the application of Article 279 of the CC, on a subsidiary basis. However, the application that the Cls make of paragraph e) of Article 279 of the CC does not appear to us as correct. In fact, not being a period and, mainly, a period whose calculation is determined in a retroactive manner, the idea lacks legal support (and doctrinal or case law) that the last day of the period, falling on a Sunday, could be transferred to the previous Friday. This option appears to us already as a complete distortion of the institutes.
The Cls do not therefore have reason. The reinvestment in question was not carried out in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by law.
We conclude, therefore, that the Capital Gain is not excluded from taxation, and the payment of the tax is due.
II - Necessary Expense
The Capital Gain not being excluded from taxation, it is necessary to verify whether the assessment was correctly carried out, taking into account Articles 43, 44, 49, 50, and 51, all of the CIRS. The determination of the amount due must necessarily take into account the charges and necessary expenses (Article 51 of CIRS).
According to the current guidance of the TCA, the expense of property valuation does not constitute a necessary expense within the meaning of Article 51 of CIRS. In fact, it should be added, it would only be admissible to consider this expense as necessary provided it resulted from legal obligation, for example, under the regime of Home Loan Credit (DL 348/98, of 11 December), Article 22, paragraph 2, in which it is a condition of a mandatory nature for obtaining a loan.
Thus, it is concluded that the assessment was correctly carried out.
III - Compensatory Interest
It has been demonstrated that the Cls received notification regarding the demonstration of the assessment of compensatory interest. It is the common practice of the Tax Administration to send the taxpayer three notifications: the collection notice, the demonstration of the assessment of the tax, and the demonstration of the assessment of interest. These documents are sent electronically and automatically, and it is not frequent that the taxpayer receives two of the notifications without receiving the other.
On the other hand, even if the lack of material reasoning were alleged, due to the difficult legibility of the document, the truth is that it contains the essential elements demonstrating the assessment of interest: the period of assessment of the tax, the period of calculation of interest (from the maturity of the obligation to pay the tax), the basis value for the calculation, the applicable rate, and the result, that is, the amount of interest to be paid.
For which reason there is nothing censurable in the assessment of compensatory interest carried out by the TCA, the Cls not having reason.
IV - Indemnificatory Interest
The assessment not being subject to defects leading to its annulment, the request for payment of indemnificatory interest falls away.
E - Value of the Case
The value of the case is fixed at € 1,630.63 pursuant to Article 97-A, paragraph 1, a), of CPPT, applicable by force of paragraphs a) and b) of paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the LRTA and paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings.
F - COSTS
Costs charged to the Claimants, with the amount thereof being fixed at € 306.00, in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 2 of the LRTA, Article 4 of RCPAT, and Table I attached thereto.
G - DECISION
On these grounds, judgment is rendered that the Claimants do not have reason, there being nothing of note to censure regarding the assessment of the tax and interest carried out by the TCA, which must therefore be maintained in the legal system.
Notify accordingly.
Lisbon, 29 October 2013
The Arbitrator
Jorge Carita
[1] MENEZES CORDEIRO, António – Treatise on Portuguese Civil Law, I. General Part, Volume IV, Almedina, 2005, p. 162
[2] Ibid., p. 207
[3] Ibid., p. 210
[4] Ibid., p. 224
[5] FREITAS DA ROCHA, Joaquim – Lessons in Tax Procedure and Process, Coimbra Publisher, 4th Edition, p. 429
[6] FREITAS DA ROCHA, op.cit., ibid
[7] FREITAS DA ROCHA, op.cit. - p. 431
[8] MENEZES CORDEIRO, op.cit. - p. 166
[9] FREITAS DA ROCHA, op.cit. - p. 435
[10] FREITAS DA ROCHA, op.cit.- p. 429
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