Summary
Full Decision
ARBITRAL DECISION (consult full version in PDF)
The Arbitrators José Pedro Carvalho (Arbitrator President), Marisa Isabel Almeida Araújo and Cristina Coisinha, appointed by the Ethics Council of the Administrative Arbitration Centre to form an Arbitral Court, hereby decide as follows:
I – REPORT
-
On 27 December 2018, A..., taxpayer no. ..., resident at ..., no. ..., ..., ...-... Lisbon, filed a petition for constitution of an arbitral tribunal, under the combined provisions of articles 2nd and 10th of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January, which approved the Legal Framework for Arbitration in Tax Matters, as amended by article 228 of Law no. 66-B/2012, of 31 December (hereinafter, abbreviated as RJAT), seeking the declaration of illegality of the act of assessment of Personal Income Tax (IRS) no. 2017..., relating to the year 2016, and the respective assessment of compensatory interest no. 2017..., in the total amount of €75,284.92, as well as the decision rejecting in part the gracious appeal which had said assessment act as its subject.
-
In order to substantiate her petition, the Petitioner alleges, in summary, the following:
i. the act of additional IRS assessment and compensatory interest suffers from a defect of form due to lack of substantiation;
ii. omission of an essential formality by failing to give the Petitioner the opportunity to participate in a prior hearing in the final decision of the assessment procedure;
iii. defect of violation of law, by violation of the provisions of no. 5 of article 10 of the IRS Code.
-
On 28-12-2018, the petition for constitution of the arbitral tribunal was accepted and automatically notified to the Tax Authority (AT).
-
The Petitioner did not proceed with the appointment of an arbitrator, therefore, under the provisions of paragraph a) of no. 2 of article 6 and paragraph a) of no. 1 of article 11 of the RJAT, the President of the Ethics Council of the CAAD appointed the signatories as arbitrators of the collective arbitral court, who communicated acceptance of the appointment within the applicable time limit.
-
On 15-02-2019, the parties were notified of these appointments, having manifested no intention to challenge any of them.
-
In accordance with the provisions of paragraph c) of no. 1 of article 11 of the RJAT, the collective Arbitral Court was constituted on 07-03-2019.
-
On 03-04-2019, the Respondent, duly notified for this purpose, submitted its response defending itself by way of objection.
-
On 09-07-2019, the meeting referred to in article 18 of the RJAT was held, where witnesses presented by the Petitioner were examined, and the time limit referred to in art. 21/1 of the RJAT was extended, in accordance with no. 2 of the same article.
-
A time limit having been granted for the submission of written submissions, these were submitted by the parties, pronouncing themselves on the evidence produced and reiterating and developing their respective legal positions.
-
It was indicated that the final decision would be notified by the end of the time limit provided in art. 21/1 of the RJAT, extended in accordance with legal provisions.
-
The Arbitral Court is materially competent and is regularly constituted, in accordance with articles 2, no. 1, paragraph a), 5 and 6, no. 2, paragraph a), of the RJAT.
The parties have legal personality and capacity, are legitimate and are legally represented, in accordance with articles 4 and 10 of the RJAT and article 1 of Order no. 112-A/2011, of 22 March.
The proceedings do not suffer from any nullities.
Thus, there is no obstacle to the consideration of the case.
Having examined everything, it is necessary to pronounce
II. DECISION
A. FACTUAL MATTER
A.1. Facts Established as Proved
-
On 15-01-1997, the Petitioner acquired, for the price of forty million escudos, the urban property located at Rua ..., nos. ..., ... and ... and Rua de ... no. ..., parish ..., municipality of Sintra.
-
Said property constituted the family home of the Petitioner and her family unit for the period between January 1997 and its delivery to the purchaser, following the disposal that occurred on 17-10-2016.
-
In said property, the Petitioner slept, kept her personal belongings, took her meals, received friends and family members and slept with her daughter.
-
The invoices addressed to the Petitioner by electricity and water service providers contained the address Rua ..., nos. ..., ... and ... and Rua ... no. ..., parish of ..., municipality of Sintra.
-
Correspondence addressed to the Petitioner and her daughter by various entities contained the address Rua ..., nos. ..., ... and ... and Rua ... no. ..., parish of ..., municipality of Sintra.
-
On 07-10-2015, the Petitioner executed a promise-to-purchase contract for the urban property located at Rua ..., nos. ..., ... and ... and Rua ... no. ..., parish ..., municipality of Sintra, in terms of which it was agreed that the purchase and sale deed would be executed by 30-04-2016.
-
Due to financial difficulties inherent to the promisee purchaser, an addendum to the promise contract was executed, amending the third clause so that the definitive transaction could be completed on any business day, until 30 May 2016.
-
As the financial difficulties of the promisee purchaser persisted, a second addendum to the promise contract was executed, again amending the third clause, so that the definitive transaction could be completed by 30 September 2016.
-
The validity of the Petitioner's and her daughter's Citizen Card expired on 30-03-2016.
-
The Petitioner proceeded with the renewal of said Citizen Cards.
-
Since the Petitioner had the expectation of disposing of her family home located at Rua ..., nos. ..., ... and ... and Rua ... no. ..., parish of ..., municipality of Sintra, by 30-04-2016, at the time of renewal of the Citizen Cards, the Petitioner indicated as her residence address ..., no. ..., ..., ...-... Lisbon.
-
The property located at Rua ..., nos. ..., ... and ... and Rua ... no. ..., parish of ..., municipality of Sintra, was disposed of on 17-10-2016.
-
The Petitioner completed IRS Form 3 for the year 2016, having declared in Annex G the disposal of two properties (article ... and ...), on 17-10-2016, for the amount of €600,000.00, with the total acquisition value of €199,519.16 and the value of expenses and charges relating to the property with article ... of €19,777.92.
-
The Petitioner also declared the intention to reinvest, with the amount outstanding on the loan at the time of disposal of the real property under article ... being €74,796.63 and declared the amount of €450,000.00, as the amount she intended to reinvest without recourse to credit.
-
As of 28-03-2016, according to the AT cadastre, the Petitioner's domicile was at ..., ..., ..., in Lisbon, as this had been changed on 11-02-2014.
-
On 13-09-2017, the Petitioner was notified of the existence of discrepancies in the values entered in annex G of IRS Form 3, relating to the year 2016 and to exercise the right to hearing, if she so wished.
-
From said notification, the following appeared:
[Content of notification omitted]
-
On 22-09-2017, the Petitioner requested the issuance of a certificate containing the necessary substantiation, considering that the information provided by the AT was insufficient to determine the motivation underlying the projected corrections.
-
On 17-10-2017, the certificate had still not been issued, so the Petitioner reiterated the petition filed.
-
On 18-10-2017, the Petitioner was notified, by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt, of the Order of the Head of the Lisbon Finance Service ..., dated 13-10-2017, which contained the following:
[Content of order omitted]
-
In October 2017, the Petitioner was notified of the IRS assessment act no. 2017..., relating to the year 2016.
-
The AT disregarded the values entered by the Petitioner in the "Intention to Reinvest" field, considering that the exclusion of taxation of the partial capital gain could not occur in accordance with nos. 5 and 7 of article 10 of the IRS Code.
-
On 19-03-2018, the Petitioner submitted a gracious appeal no. ...2018... having as its subject said assessment act.
-
The Petitioner was notified of the draft decision on the gracious appeal, having exercised the respective right to hearing.
-
Through Office no. ... of 28-09-2018, the Petitioner was notified of the Order of the Chief of the Administrative Justice Division of the Lisbon Finance Directorate, which partially rejected the gracious appeal submitted.
-
The decision partially rejecting the gracious appeal contained the following:
[Content of rejection omitted]
-
The Petitioner did not proceed with payment of said IRS assessment, therefore a tax enforcement process no. ...2017... was instituted against her for coercive collection of the tax.
-
In order to obtain suspension of the tax enforcement process, the Petitioner provided security – voluntary mortgage – having incurred costs of €1,000.97.
A.2. Facts Established as Not Proved
With relevance to the decision, there are no facts that should be considered as not proved.
A.3. Substantiation of Proved and Not Proved Factual Matter
With regard to factual matter, the Court does not need to pronounce on everything alleged by the parties; rather, it is incumbent upon it to select the facts that matter for the decision and distinguish proved from unproved matter (cf. art. 123, no. 2, of the CPPT and article 607, no. 3 of the CPC, applicable under article 29, no. 1, paragraphs a) and e), of the RJAT).
Thus, the facts relevant to the judgment of the case are selected and defined according to their legal relevance, which is established in light of the various plausible solutions to the legal question(s) (cf. former article 511, no. 1, of the CPC, corresponding to current article 596, applicable under article 29, no. 1, paragraph e), of the RJAT).
Thus, taking into account the positions adopted by the parties, in light of article 110/7 of the CPPT, the documentary evidence and the administrative proceedings joined to the file, and the witness evidence produced, the facts listed above were established as proved, with relevance to the decision.
In particular, the facts established as proved in points 2, 3, 7, 8, and 11 took into account the witness evidence produced, which revealed direct knowledge of the same, relating with coherence and detail that the Petitioner habitually lived in the urban property located at Rua ..., nos. ..., ... and ... and Rua ... no. ..., parish of ..., municipality of Sintra, there conducting her personal and family life, a situation that continued until its disposal, which, given that it was made to a citizen of a foreign country, suffered from certain complications and delays that delayed the process.
Allegations made by the parties and presented as facts, consisting of strictly conclusive statements, not susceptible to proof and whose truthfulness is to be assessed in relation to the concrete factual matter above consolidated, were not established as proved or not proved.
B. THE LAW
Having reached this point, it is necessary, by reference to the contents of the Arbitral Petition, to identify the issues to be decided, that is, the defects imputed to the IRS assessment identified above.
In the Arbitral Petition, the Petitioner invokes the defect of lack of substantiation and the defect of violation of law, by violation of the provisions of no. 5 of article 10 of the IRS Code, which necessitates the annulment of the assessment.
It is therefore necessary to determine the order of examination of the defects pointed out in the tax act.
Article 124 of the CPPT provides that:
"1 - In the judgment, the court shall appraise as a priority the defects that lead to the declaration of non-existence or nullity of the contested act and, subsequently, the defects raised that lead to its annulment.
2 - In the said groups, the appraisal of the defects is done in the following order:
a) In the first group, those defects whose procedence determines, in the prudent judgment of the judge, more stable or effective protection of the offended interests;
b) In the second group, that indicated by the appellant, provided that he establishes between them a relationship of subsidiarity and no other defects are raised by the Public Prosecutor or, in other cases, that established in the previous paragraph."
Thus, and as the Petitioner has not expressly established any relationship of subsidiarity between the defects raised, the examination shall proceed to the appraisal of the defect of violation of law, as this is the one whose procedence determines the most stable and effective protection of the offended interests.
Thus, the question to be decided concerns the verification of the requirements of the regime for exclusion of taxation as real estate capital gains from gains arising from the onerous transfer of property, governed by nos. 5 and 6 of article 10 of the CIRS, allocated to permanent personal residence and whose gain was reinvested in property equally intended for permanent personal residence of the taxpayer and his family unit, in a situation in which the tax domicile did not coincide with the permanent personal residence.
In the case in question, it was necessary to ascertain whether the disposed property, at the date of its disposal, constituted the family home of the Petitioner and her family unit, given that: (i) the Petitioner did not have her tax domicile there; (ii) the Petitioner changed her address approximately six months before the disposal of her residence, anticipating the acquisition of the property object of the reinvestment and taking advantage of the fact that she was obliged to renew her citizen card.
Thus, as the AT equates the concepts of tax domicile and habitual residence with "permanent personal residence," it consequently taxed the gains obtained because the disposed property was not the Petitioner's tax domicile at the time of its sale.
Now, article 10 of the IRS Code (CIRS), in the part that concerns us, provides as follows:
"(…)
5 - Excluded from taxation are gains arising from the onerous transfer of properties intended for permanent personal residence of the taxpayer or his family unit, provided that the following conditions are cumulatively verified:
a) The realization value, less the amortization of any loan contracted for the acquisition of the property, is reinvested in the acquisition of ownership of another property, land for construction of property and/or respective construction, or in the expansion or improvement of another property exclusively with the same purpose situated in Portuguese territory or in the territory of another State member of the European Union or the European Economic Area, provided that, in the latter case, there exists an exchange of information in tax matters;
b) The reinvestment provided for in the previous paragraph is effected between 24 months before and 36 months after the date of realization;
c) The taxpayer manifests the intention to proceed with reinvestment, even if partial, mentioning the respective amount in the income statement for the year of the disposal;
d) (Repealed.)
That is, provided that the cumulative legal conditions provided for in no. 5 of article 10 of the CIRS are verified, the real estate capital gains are excluded from taxation for IRS purposes.
Under no. 4 of article 13 of the CIRS, the family unit is constituted by:
a) Spouses not judicially separated as to persons and property, or those in a de facto union, and their dependents;
(…)
The concept of tax domicile is defined in paragraph a), of no. 1 of article 19 of the LGT which, at the date of the facts, provided as follows:
1 - The tax domicile of the taxpayer is, unless otherwise provided:
a) For natural persons, the place of habitual residence;
(…)
It so happens that residence and tax domicile are not univocal concepts. Indeed, residence expresses a reality of social life – the place where a determined person has his or her life organized and which, as such, serves as his or her basis of life – and tax domicile is a special domicile, by which the exercise of rights and the fulfillment of duties provided for in tax norms is exposed to a determined place.
Still on the conceptual level, we can verify the divergence between habitual residence and permanent personal residence, just as tax domicile does not always coincide with residence in the sense of the place where a person has his or her home, and this conclusion can even be inferred from the wording of article 82 of the Civil Code, which admits the possibility of residence or domicile in different places.
However, at the conceptual level, neither does habitual residence identify with permanent residence, nor does domicile coincide with address, that is, the place where a person has his or her home, as can be inferred from the two numbers of article 82 of the Civil Code.
Being habitual residence the place where a person normally lives and has the center of his or her life, there are no great differences between "tax domicile" and "permanent residence": there is between the two figures an intimate relationship, which translates into both presupposing a place with which a certain person is in connection, the place where he or she has his or her organized existence and which, as such, serves him or her as a basis of life.
However, doctrine and jurisprudence hold the understanding that there is no identity between "tax domicile" and "permanent residence," admitting that the taxpayer may prove his permanent residence by presenting "justifying facts" that he has fixed therein in a habitual and permanent manner the center of his personal life.
An understanding that finds support in the letter of no. 11 of article 4 of the CIRS: "the tax domicile presumption establishes the permanent personal residence of the taxpayer who may, at any time, present proof to the contrary" (emphasis added).
That is, the aforementioned normative provision establishes a presumption, rebuttable at all times by the taxpayer, through contrary proof.
Proof that the Petitioner managed to make in the present proceedings, both documentarily and testimonially, as results from the facts established as proved, in particular from what is contained in number 3.
Also going in this direction is the jurisprudence of our superior courts, notably of the Supreme Administrative Court, as per the judgment of 23/11/2011, handed down in the context of process no. 0590/11, in whose summary one can read: (…) II - The fact that taxpayers have not notified the change of domicile to the property in relation to which they requested IMI exemption, by itself, does not indicate that they do not have permanent personal residence in that property.
III - Residence in a certain place, the habitatio, can be demonstrated through "justifying facts" that the beneficiary fixed in the property the center of his personal life".
More recently, the Supreme Court of Justice, in the context of process no. 01077/11.9 BESNT, decided unequivocally as follows: I - In order for the tax exclusion provided for in no. 5 of art. 10 of the CIRS to operate (exclusion from taxation of the gain obtained through the onerous disposal of properties intended for permanent personal residence of the taxpayer), the law requires that the respective gain be reinvested, within 24 months, in the acquisition of a different property and that this also be intended for residence of the taxpayer or his family unit.
II - For the purposes of this provision, the concept of permanent personal residence does not equate to the concept of tax domicile.
In sum, the reference to "permanent personal residence" does not require its identity with tax domicile.
Tax domicile is the domicile registered with the tax authorities for tax and notification purposes. Tax domicile, which may be different from civil domicile, is the place of location of the taxpayer in relation to the public administration in tax matters; it is the domicile registered for tax and notification purposes.
Regardless of any breach by the taxpayer of some ancillary obligation, what matters is the proof that the disposed property and the acquired property had that special allocation.
With the disposed property being allocated to the permanent personal residence of the taxpayer and his family unit, and the acquired property having equally been allocated to his permanent residence, this legal requirement is fulfilled for the gains arising from the respective disposal to be susceptible to exclusion from taxation for IRS purposes, under no. 5 of article 10 of the CIRS.
Given the foregoing, the tax act object of the present arbitral action suffers from error in the factual assumptions, and consequent error in law, and should be annulled and thus the arbitral petition succeeds and the examination of the remaining defects imputed to it by the Petitioner is prejudiced.
INDEMNIFICATION FOR SECURITY IMPROPERLY PROVIDED
The Petitioner formulated, accessorily, a petition for indemnification for improper security.
The arbitral decision on the merits of the claim of which no appeal or challenge may be brought binds the Tax Authority from the end of the time limit provided for appeal or challenge, and this must, in the exact terms of the procedence of the arbitral decision in favor of the taxpayer and until the end of the time limit provided for spontaneous execution of the judgments of tax courts, restore the situation that would exist if the tax act that is the object of the arbitral decision had not been performed, adopting the acts and operations necessary for this purpose, as expressly results from paragraph b) of art. 24 of the RJAT.
In the same provision, "the legislator made clear that the effects provided therein are 'without prejudice to the other effects provided for in the Code of Tax Procedure and Process.' It is considered in this regard that the legislator is here referring to all effects arising from the CPPT, for the taxpayer, and that are applicable after the consolidation in the legal order of a certain tax-legal situation, arising from a final decision whether gracious or judicial."
Notwithstanding the fact that the judicial challenge process is essentially a process of mere annulment, condemnation of the Tax Authority to pay indemnification for improperly provided security may be pronounced therein, as results from art. 171 of the CPPT.
As mentioned in the decision handed down in Process no. 28/2013-T, "it is unequivocal that the judicial challenge process encompasses the possibility of condemnation to pay improperly provided security and is, in principle, the appropriate procedural means to formulate such petition, which is justified by obvious reasons of procedural economy, since the right to indemnification for improperly provided security depends on what is decided regarding the legality or illegality of the assessment act. The petition for constitution of the arbitral tribunal has as a corollary that the 'legality of the debt being executed' will be discussed in the arbitral process, therefore, as results from the express content of that no. 1 of the cited art. 171 of the CPPT, it is also the arbitral process that is appropriate for examining the petition for indemnification for improperly provided security."
It is concluded, thus, that this court is competent to examine the petition for indemnification for improperly provided security.
The legal regime for the right to indemnification for improperly provided security is found in article 53 of the LGT, which establishes the following:
"1. The debtor who, to suspend enforcement, offers bank or equivalent security shall be indemnified fully or partially for the losses resulting from its provision, should he have maintained it for a period exceeding three years in proportion to the success in administrative appeal, judicial challenge or opposition to enforcement that have as their object the secured debt.
-
The time limit referred to in the previous number does not apply when it is verified, in gracious appeal or judicial challenge, that there was an error attributable to the services in the assessment of the tax.
-
The indemnification referred to in number 1 has as its maximum limit the amount resulting from the application to the secured value of the rate of indemnificatory interest provided for in this law and may be requested in the very process of gracious appeal or judicial challenge, or autonomously.
-
Indemnification for provision of improperly provided security shall be paid by deduction from the revenue of the tax of the year in which payment was effected."
In the case in question, it is verified that the error from which the acts of partial annulment assessment suffer is attributable to the Respondent Entity, as the assessments were of its own initiative and the Petitioner contributed in no way to the commission of this error.
Thus, the Petitioner has the right to indemnification for the security provided.
In this case, it is verified that the Petitioner provided security – voluntary mortgage – having incurred costs of €1,000.97, the amount of which she is entitled to be reimbursed.
C. DECISION
For these reasons, this Arbitral Court judges the arbitral petition filed to be entirely well-founded and, consequently:
a) Annuls the IRS assessment no. 2017..., for defect of violation of law;
b) Condemns the Respondent to pay indemnification for improperly provided security in the amount of €1,000.97;
c) Condemns the Respondent in the costs of the proceedings, in the amount fixed below.
D. Value of the Proceedings
The value of the proceedings is fixed at €75,284.92, in accordance with article 97-A, no. 1, a), of the Code of Tax Procedure and Process, applicable by force of paragraphs a) and b) of no. 1 of article 29 of the RJAT and of no. 3 of article 3 of the Regulations of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings.
E. Costs
The value of the arbitration fee is fixed at €2,448.00, in accordance with Table I of the Regulations of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, to be paid by the AT, once the petition was entirely well-founded, in accordance with articles 12, no. 2, and 22, no. 4, both of the RJAT, and article 4, no. 5, of the cited Regulations.
Notify.
Lisbon, 31 October 2019
The Arbitrator President
(José Pedro Carvalho)
The Arbitrator Member
(Marisa Isabel Almeida Araújo)
The Arbitrator Member
(Cristina Coisinha)
Frequently Asked Questions
Automatically Created