AIMI on Building Land Declared Unconstitutional: Equality and Ability-to-Pay Principles (CAAD 700/2018-T)

ARBITRATION DECISION

I - REPORT

1. A..., S.A., legal entity no. ..., with registered office at Rua ..., no. ..., parish of ..., municipality of ..., (hereinafter referred to as Claimant or Taxpayer), submitted on 2018-12-28 a petition for constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal, pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph a) of no. 1 of articles 2, 5 no. 1 subparagraph a), 6, no. 1 and 10, nos. 1 and 2, all of Decree Law no. 10/2011 of 20 January (hereinafter referred to as RJAT), seeking to have the Tax and Customs Authority (hereinafter referred to as Respondent or TA) declared illegal and the consequent annulment of the assessment of the AIMI no. 2018..., relating to the year 2018, in the total amount of €1,415.50.

2. The petition for constitution of the singular arbitral tribunal was accepted by the Honourable President of CAAD, and served on the Respondent on 2018-12-28.

3. Pursuant to and for the purposes of subparagraph a) of no. 2 of article 6 of the RJAT, by decision of the Honourable President of the Deontological Council of CAAD, duly served on the parties within the prescribed periods, the undersigned was appointed as arbitrator and communicated to that Council his acceptance of the assignment within the period prescribed in article 4 of the Code of Ethics of the Centre of Administrative Arbitration.

4. On 2019-02-15 the parties were notified of this appointment, having manifested no intention to refuse the appointment of the arbitrator, in accordance with the combined terms of article 11, no. 1, subparagraphs a) and b) in the wording as amended by Law no. 66-B/2012 of 31 December.

5. The singular arbitral tribunal was constituted on 2019-03-07 in accordance with the requirement of subparagraph c) of article 11 of the RJAT, in the wording as amended by article 228 of Law no. 66-B/2012 of 30 December.

6. Duly notified to that effect by means of a ruling issued on 2019-03-07, the Respondent submitted on 2019-04-08 its response, and on that same date proceeded to attach the administrative file (PA).

7. By means of a ruling issued on the last of the aforesaid dates, duly served on the parties, which set out, among other things, the dispensation of the hearing referred to in article 18 of the RJAT and the submission of closing arguments, the date of 7 July 2019 was indicated as the foreseeable deadline for the issuance of the final decision and its notification to the parties.

8. To substantiate its petition, the Claimant invokes, in summary and to the extent relevant here, the following (which is mentioned mainly by way of transcription):

8.1. "The Claimant is a joint-stock company whose object is the exercise of civil construction activity, purchase and sale of real property and leasing of real property" (see article 1 of the petition for arbitration and document no. 1 attached thereto);

8.2. "(...) is the owner of the following urban properties located on Rua ..., of the parish of ..., ..., registered in the respective property registry under articles ..., ... and ..." (see article 2 of the petition for arbitration and documents nos. 2, 3 and 4 attached thereto);

8.3. "(...) the "inventories" of the Claimant consist of "land for construction", for which it is taxed under Corporate Income Tax since the date of its incorporation" (see article 4 of the petition for arbitration);

8.4. "(...) the Head of the Finance Service of ... sent to the Claimant the identification list of properties subject to AIMI in the year 2018 and the assessment in the amount of €1,415.50" (see articles 5 and 6 of the petition for arbitration and documents nos. 5 and 6 attached thereto);

8.5. "On 23 October 2018, the Claimant filed an administrative appeal at the Finance Service of ..., which was rejected (...)" (see article 7 of the petition for arbitration and document no. 7 attached thereto);

8.6. The Claimant further asserts that "(...) there are in AIMI different rates and rules for individual taxpayers and companies (...) and that "such taxation directly violates constitutional norms and principles" (see articles 13 and 14 of the petition for arbitration);

8.7. The Claimant further makes various considerations throughout its submissions regarding AIMI, concluding, among other things, that the same is offensive to the constitutional principles of contributive capacity, equality and autonomy of local government.

8.8. The Claimant concludes its petition for arbitration by requesting that "the contested AIMI assessments relating to the Claimant's properties identified be annulled" and "consequently the Tax Authority be condemned: to refund to the Claimant the sum of €1,415.50, plus indemnatory interest from payment until full restitution and costs".

1. As mentioned, on 2019-04-08 the Tax and Customs Authority proceeded to attach the PA and submitted its response where, fundamentally in brief summary, and to the extent relevant here, it defends the following (which is likewise mentioned mainly by way of transcription):

9.1. "(...) the AIMI is assessed on properties classified as residential and as land for construction - regardless of their potential use (given the fact that the law refers, without more, to article 6 of the IMI Code) - insofar as they are not expressly listed in the rule delimiting the negative scope of taxation" (see article 9 of the response);

9.2. "(...) as regards AIMI assessed on urban properties of which are owners, usufructuaries or superficiaries legal entities and equivalent structures (article 135-A/2 of the IMI Code), the tax assumes the nature of a real tax insofar as the determination of the amount payable abstracts from the economic dimension of the entities, namely their qualification as small, medium or large enterprises, nor does it affect the total net assets of the entities" (see article 13 of the response);

9.3. "(...) the legislator excluded from the scope of taxation urban properties classified as "commercial, industrial or service and "other" but expressly chose to maintain other properties which also form part of the assets of enterprises, such as those classified as residential or land for construction, by not including them in the negative delimitation provided for" (see article 24 of the response);

9.4. "(...) as the interpretation of the Claimant is clearly abrogating of the law, cloaked in legislative impulse, if accepted, it violates the constitutional principle of separation and interdependence of powers, enshrined in articles 2 and 111 of the Constitution, constituting itself as a reference and limit to the courts' powers of cognition" (see article 27 of the response):

9.5. "(...) the contrary understanding, namely that in the exclusion of taxation provided in article 135-B), no. 2 of the IMI Code are properties classified as land for construction whose potential purpose is not residential, is clearly abrogating of the law, cloaked in legislative impulse, as well as unconstitutional (...)" (see article 35 of the response);

9.6. "(...) the theology of the tax is interpreted as aiming, in a first instance, to reach a portion of the assets of the tax subjects, falling on immovable property constituting a portion of assets, recognizable in law as capital of a given entity (individual or collective), regardless of whether it is devoted to any productive process or income-generating activity (...)" (see article 96 of the response);

9.7. "(...) it is unequivocal that one is faced with a rule of objective scope of general and abstract character, applicable indiscriminately to all cases in which the respective factual and legal presuppositions are met" (see article 103 of the response);

9.8. The Respondent further devotes substantial portion of its submissions to rebut the position defended by the Claimant regarding the alleged violation of the constitutional principles of equality and contributive capacity, concluding that no such violation exists, as well as of the principle of local autonomy, which is likewise invoked by the Claimant.

9.9. To this end and with particular emphasis on the constitutional principles of equality and contributive capacity, it invokes and enumerates several arbitral decisions in a sense similar to that which it defends in the context of the interpretation it gives to no. 2 of article 135-B of the IMI Code.

9.10. The TA concludes its response submission in the sense of the inadmissibility of this petition for arbitration.

1. The Singular Arbitral Tribunal is materially competent and is duly and properly constituted pursuant to articles 2, no. 1, subparagraph a), 5 and 6 of the RJAT.

2. The parties have legal personality and legal capacity, and are duly and legally represented (article 3, 6 and 15 of the Code of Procedure and Tax Procedure, ex vi article 29, no. 1, subparagraph a)).

3. No exceptions have been raised to be addressed.

II - GROUNDS

A - MATTERS OF FACT

A.1 - Facts Established as Proven

With relevance to the appreciation and decision on the issue raised, the following facts are established and taken as proven:

1. On 31 December 2017 the Claimant was the owner of the following land for construction:

(i) - urban registry ..., parish of ..., municipality of ...-VPT-€59,820.00,

(ii) - urban registry ..., parish of ..., municipality of ...-VPT-€117,594.63,

(iii) - urban registry ..., parish of ..., municipality of ...-VPT-€176,460.75, the first of which being "property intended for housing" and those identified under registries ... and ..."land for construction".

1. On the said immovable properties, the AIMI assessment no. 2018... was made pursuant to the provisions of article 135-F, no. 1 of the IMI Code, in the amount of €1,415.50, corresponding to the rate of 0.4% on the respective VPT(s) of €353,875.28.

2. From the said assessment, the Claimant submitted on 2018/10/23 to the Finance Service of ..., an administrative appeal, which was assigned number ...2018...

3. Such appeal was rejected by means of a ruling issued on 2019-01-22 and notified to the Claimant.

4. The decision rejecting the administrative appeal refers to the grounds of the draft decision, which mentions, among other things, the following:

"1) The properties on which the AIMI in question was assessed are land for urban construction, thus classified pursuant to subparagraph b) of no. 1 of article 6 of the IMI Code and as such registered in the property registry, whose designation is "Warehouses and industrial activity";

1. Article 135-B of the IMI Code provides that "Excluded from the additional municipal property tax are urban properties classified as "commercial, industrial or service and "other" pursuant to subparagraphs b) and d) of no. 1 of article 6 of this Code";

2. Now the said article 6 of the IMI Code, with the heading "Species of urban properties" defines in its no. 2 that "...commercial, industrial or service are the buildings or constructions...";

3. As land for construction are not buildings, they cannot be classified as the species of commercial, industrial or service properties, as defined in subparagraph b) of no. 1 of article 6 of the IMI Code, definition to which the aforesaid article 135-B of the same statute refers, and are therefore subject to taxation;

4. There is no indication whatsoever of any intention on the part of the legislator to extend to urban construction land any exclusion, given its reference to the definition of the species of commercial, industrial or service urban properties and others, set out in subparagraphs b) and d) of no. 1 of article 6 of the IMI Code".

1. The Claimant on 2018-09-28 proceeded to pay the tax assessed against it.

2. On 2018-12-28, the Claimant submitted to CAAD a petition for arbitration which gave rise to the present case (see the CAAD case management information system).

A.2 - Facts Established as Not Proven

With relevance to the decision, there are no facts that should be considered as not proven.

A.3 - Grounds for the Matters of Fact Established as Proven and Not Proven

With respect to the matters of fact, the tribunal does not have to pronounce on everything that was alleged by the parties; rather, it has the duty to select the facts that matter for the decision and to distinguish the proven from the not proven matters (see article 123, no. 2 of the CPPT and articles 607, no. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable ex vi article 29, no. a) and e) of the RJAT).

In this way, the facts relevant to the judgment of the case are chosen in function of their legal relevance, which is established in consideration of the various plausible solutions of the legal question(s). (see article 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable ex vi article 29, no. 1, subparagraph e) of the RJAT).

Accordingly, having regard to the positions assumed by the parties in the light of article 110, no. 7 of the CPPT, the documentary evidence and the attached PA, the facts listed above are considered proven with relevance to the decision.

B - ON THE LAW

• Object and Delimitation

The AIMI assessed by the TA and at issue in the present case relates to the following properties:

(i) - urban registry ..., parish of ..., municipality of ...-VPT-€59,820.00,

(ii) - urban registry ..., parish of ..., municipality of ...-VPT-€117,594.63,

(iii) - urban registry ..., parish of ..., municipality of ...-VPT-€176,460.75, the first of which being "property intended for housing" and those identified under registries ... and ..."land for construction".

• Regulatory Framework

The AIMI was created by article 219 of Law no. 42/2015 of 28 December, which approved the State Budget for 2017, by adding articles 135-A to 135-K to the IMI Code, which now constitute chapter XV of that code.

Constituting revenue of the Financial Stability Fund of Social Security, in accordance with the provisions of no. 2 of article 1 of the IMI Code (as amended by article 257 of Law no. 114/2017 of 29 December (State Budget Law 2018), with entry into force on 2018-01-01.

The objective or real scope of the additional municipal property tax falls, in accordance with the provisions of no. 1 of article 135-B "on the sum of the patrimonial property values of the urban properties located in Portuguese territory of which the taxpayer is the owner".

Providing in no. 2 of the same provision an exclusion from the scope of taxation on urban properties classified as "commercial, industrial or service and other", pursuant to subparagraphs b) and d) of no. 1 of article 6 of this Code.

In this way, urban properties devoted to "housing" and "land for construction" are subject to the AIMI, as defined in the said article 6 of the IMI Code.

Like the IMI regime, the taxpayers of the tax in question are the owners, usufructuaries or superficiaries of the respective properties - article 135-A, no. 1, regardless of whether they are individuals or legal entities, being equated to these "any collective structures or centres of interest without legal personality that appear in the property registries as taxpayers of property tax, as well as undivided succession represented by the head of family", according to the requirement of no. 2 of article 135-A.

On the other hand, article 6 of the IMI Code classifies, under its no. 1, the species of urban properties as follows:

Article 6

Species of Urban Properties

1. Urban properties are divided into:

a) Residential;

b) Commercial, industrial or service;

c) Land for construction;

d) Other

The remaining numbers of the rule densify the requirements/conditions relating to the different species of properties in question.

Given the regulatory framework mentioned, and without prejudice to what will be said below, it can be advanced, as a partial and provisional conclusion, that it is the understanding of this tribunal that the literal meaning of the AIMI rules leads to the assessment of the tax, and to the extent relevant here, on "land for construction" and "residential" properties regardless of the use to which they are put, since they are not listed in the negative delimitation of the scope of taxation.

The understanding noted does not constitute an isolated or unprecedented position within the CAAD framework and has been followed by numerous arbitral decisions, of which the following stand out: 654/2017-T of 2018-09-03, 664/2017-T of 2018-06-26, 667/2017-T of 2018-09-05, 685/2017-T of 2018-09-06, 690/2017-T of 2018-09-06, 692/2017-T of 2018-05-11, 696/2017-T of 2018-07-23, 6/2018-T of 2018-07-26, 306/2018-T of 2018-28, 401/2018-T of, 420/2018-T of 2019-01-15, 456/2018-T of 2019-02-28 and 574/2018-T of 2019-04-19.

The Claimant frames its petition for arbitration fundamentally invoking that the taxation of the AIMI in question violates the principles of contributive capacity and equality and that there is no "just allocation of the tax burden between legal entities, that is, between those engaged in real property activity, transforming rural land into urban land and the remaining enterprises", asserting the existence of double taxation by virtue of the fact that the Claimant's assets have already been taxed under IMI.

As was anticipated, not subscribing to this interpretation, this tribunal subscribes to the position set out in case no. 6/2018-T of 2018-07-26, issued within CAAD, which we accept without any reservation: "the literal meaning of articles 135-A and 135-B, nos. 1 and 2, is clear and does not lend itself to any doubts of interpretation. Since the letter of the law or grammatical element is the first element to be invoked in legal hermeneutics and it is to be presumed that the legislator knew how to express his thought in adequate terms (no. 3 of article 9 of the Civil Code), it will not be necessary to invoke other elements from among those available in the hermeneutical arsenal."

Following likewise and in similar sense what is stated regarding this segment in the decisions issued within the scope of cases nos. 664/2017-T and 676/2017-T, which the aforesaid decision invokes: "The exclusion of the tax accordingly covers properties classified as commercial, industrial or service, understood as such the buildings or constructions licensed for such purposes or which have as their normal destination each of these purposes. It encompasses, furthermore, the residual species referred to in subparagraph d) of no. 1 of that article 6, thereby including land situated within or outside of an urban cluster that are not land for construction nor rural properties, and also the buildings and constructions that do not fall into any of the previous classifications.

The scope of the objective scope, by effect of the reference to that article 6, was thus defined not only by reference to a species of urban property, but also by reference to the administrative procedure through which the classification was made or, failing a license, to the rule, purpose of such properties for commercial, industrial and service purposes or others".

It cannot fail to diverge from the position sustained by the Claimant regarding the interpretation it makes of article 135-B) of the IMI Code, in the sense that the legislator intended to exclude from the scope of the AIMI properties that prove essential for the Claimant to obtain income in the pursuit of its economic activity.

Returning to the cited arbitral decision from case no. 6/2018-T, the interpretation that the Claimant sustains "(...) has no support in the letter of the law nor does it follow from rational and systematic elements. It is clear from the reading and interpretation of the rules in question that the legislator's option was not in the sense advocated by the Claimant. Such an option would presuppose that the legislator, rather than having delimited the scope of taxation through characterized types, had opted for a case-by-case evaluation depending on the use of the property, in practical terms, in an economic activity of a legal entity. What is demonstrated not to have happened."

"(...) it was not on the basis of the activity to which the properties are devoted that the exclusion of the scope was defined, for in the version that was approved, the non-scope was defined only on the basis of the types of properties indicated in article 6 of the IMI Code, without any allusion to the use of the operation of the legal entities.

These are distinct concepts: the use of a property, which presupposes a utilization and the purpose for which it is intended, the "normal purpose" underlying the classifications of the properties, to which no. 2 of article 6 of the IMI Code refers.

If there had been maintained, in the final version of the Budget, the legislative intention to remove the scope from properties directly devoted to the operation of the legal entities, it would certainly have been maintained the reference to this use that was in the proposal and that expressed this legislative option.

Thus, having been removed this allusion to the use of the properties, there is no support to conclude that residential properties and land for construction devoted to the activity of the legal entities do not fall within the scope of the AIMI".

"In the absence of other elements that lead to a less immediate interpretation of the text, the interpreter should opt in principle for the one that better and more immediately corresponds to the natural meaning of the verbal expressions used, and in particular to the natural meaning of the verbal expressions used, and in particular to their technical-legal meaning, in the assumption (not always exact) that the legislator knew how to express his thought correctly".

Also regarding the constitutional questions raised by the Claimant, it contends that the taxation in question constitutes a violation of the principles of fiscal equality and contributive capacity.

The understanding that this tribunal subscribes regarding constitutional questions does not diverge from the negative judgment that has been issued on the same, among others, and even if by way of example, the arbitral decisions issued within CAAD in cases nos. 664/2017-T, 676/2017-T, 678/2017-T, 6/2018-T and 306/2018-T, with no reasons being seen to diverge therefrom, and which boil down in particular to what is stated within case no. 664/2017-T (taken up in case no. 676/2017-T:

"(...) the Constitutional Court has emphasized that one of the essential objectives constitutionally defined in the tax system, alongside the satisfaction of the financial needs of the State and other public entities, is that of just allocation of income and wealth, as is apparent from article 103, no. 1 of the Constitution.

It is this binding of the tax system to the idea of social justice and the reduction of social inequality of income and wealth that requires that it be progressive. This requirement is expressly enshrined within personal income taxation in accordance with no. 1 of article 104, the personal income tax aims at "the reduction of inequalities and shall be unique and progressive having regard to the needs and income of the family unit".

Fiscal progressivity requires that the relationship between the tax paid and the level of income be more proportional, which can only be achieved by applying a higher tax rate to taxpayers with higher incomes. In other words, there is progressivity when the value of the tax increases in proportion greater than the increase in the taxable base.

Consequently, the Constitution requires an intrinsic progressivity of contributing to a reduction in income inequality (on all these aspects, see the Constitutional Court judgment no. 187/2013, nos. 97, 98 and 99).

Fiscal progressivity is also a requirement of the principle of material equality.

As Casalta Nabais notes, the principle of fiscal equality has implicit mainly "the idea of generality or universality, pursuant to which all citizens are bound by the duty to pay taxes, and of uniformity, requiring that such duty be assessed by a single criterion - the criterion of contributive capacity. This implies equal tax for those with equal contributive capacity (horizontal equality) and different tax (in qualitative terms) for those with different contributive capacity in proportion to this difference (vertical equality)". (Direito Fiscal, 5th edition, Coimbra Editora, 2009, p. 151-152).

"Configuring the general principle of equality as a material equality, the principle of contributive capacity - according to the same author - as the tertium comparationis of equality in the field of taxes, does not require a specific and direct constitutional provision. Its constitutional foundation is the principle of equality articulated with the other principles and provisions of the respective "fiscal constitution" and in particular those that already flow from the structuring principles of the tax system contained in articles 103 and 104 of the Constitution (op.cit., p.152).

As a presupposition and criterion of taxation, the principle of contributive capacity - within the same line of understanding - "removes the tax legislator from arbitrariness, obliging him that in the selection and articulation of the taxable facts, he adhere to manifestations of contributive capacity, that is, erect into the object of the taxable material of each tax a certain economic presupposition that is a manifestation of this capacity and is present in the various legal hypotheses within the respective tax" (op. cit., p.154).

Also the Constitutional Court, more recently, has analyzed the principle of fiscal equality under the lens of contributive capacity, as can be seen in particular in judgment no. 142/2004 where it is stated that "[t]he principle of contributive capacity expresses and concretizes the principle of fiscal or tax equality in its aspect of uniformity - the duty of all to pay taxes according to the same criterion - with contributive capacity filling the single criterion of taxation".

The recognition of the principle of contributive capacity as a criterion designed to assess the constitutional inadmissibility of certain or various solutions adopted by the tax legislator has also led to the idea, expressed for example in Constitutional Court judgment no. 348/97, that taxation in accordance with the principle of contributive capacity will imply "the existence and maintenance of an effective connection between the tax payment and the economic presupposition selected for the object of the tax, requiring, therefore, a minimum of logical coherence of the various concrete hypotheses of tax provided for in the law with the corresponding object thereof."

In sum, the principle of tax equality can be implemented through different aspects: a first aspect lies in the generality of the tax law, in its application to all without exception; a second aspect lies in the uniformity of the tax law, in treating equally those taxpayers who are in equal situations and differently those who are in different situations, in the measure of the difference, to be assessed by contributive capacity; finally, there is the prohibition of arbitrariness, in precluding the introduction of discriminations among taxpayers that are devoid of rational foundation (see Constitutional Court judgments no. 306/2010 and 695/2014)".

According to Sérgio Vazques "Alongside the taxation of income, the taxation of assets is presented as that which best lends itself to personalization and to the redistribution of wealth, thereby requiring a broad consensus as to its legitimacy and convenience".

Continuing the same author:

"(...) The taxation of assets is thus justified as the continuation of the personal tax on income and as the reinforcement of the qualitative discrimination that it carries out."

Returning to the situation of the present case, it is not apparent that the taxation of land for construction or for residential purposes as part of the Claimant's assets, as provided in articles 135-A and 135-B of the IMI Code, collides with the principle of fiscal equality and contributive capacity.

Finally, the Claimant further asserts that "taxation in AIMI of companies engaged in real property activity results in a loss of revenue from IMI (as a municipal tax), since it may render their economic-financial balance unviable, leading to the abandonment of such activity" (...) "with no consideration having been given to the autonomy of local government (article 6 of the Constitution)".

Article 6 of the Constitution provides as follows:

Article 6

(Unitary State)

1. The State is unitary and respects in its organization and functioning the system of insular autonomy and the principles of subsidiarity, autonomy of local authorities and democratic decentralization and public administration.

2. The archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira constitute autonomous regions endowed with political-administrative statutes and their own government bodies.

With respect to this argumentative segment brought before this tribunal by the Claimant, it cannot fail to subscribe to what is stated by the Tax and Customs Authority, leaving only note, without need to adduce any other considerations, that, in fact, the Claimant does not substantiate the assertions it makes in this regard.

III - INDEMNATORY INTEREST

The Claimant formulates a request for reimbursement of the amount paid from the contested assessment and indemnatory interest.

As the petition for arbitration is not to be judged admissible, it cannot be concluded that there are undue payments, and consequently, annulment of the assessments is not justified, nor is restitution of the amount paid, nor payment of indemnatory interest, pursuant to the provisions of article 43, no. 1 of the General Tax Law.

IV. DECISION

In view of what has been set out above, this Singular Arbitral Tribunal decides as follows:

a. The arbitration petition filed by the Claimant is judged inadmissible, and the Respondent is absolved therefrom;

b. The tax acts that are the subject of this proceeding are maintained in the legal order;

c. The Claimant is condemned to pay the procedural costs.

In the same sense, in addition to the arbitral decisions cited above, others have been issued in the following cases operating under the auspices of CAAD, which are attached in full: 654/2017 of 03-09-2018; 667/2017 of 05-09-2018; 678/2017 of 06-06-2018; 682/2017 of 20-07-2018; 683/2017 of 12-07-2018; 684/2017 of 06-09-2018; 685/2017 of 06-09-2018; 690/2017 of 06-09-2018; 692/2017 of 11-05-2018; 693/2917 of 03-09-2018; 696/2017 of 23-07-2018; 6/2018 of 26-07-2018; 291/2018 of 28-02-2019; 306/2018 of 28-12-2018; 310/2018 of 10-12-2018; 324/2018 of 22-01-2019; 356/2018 of 11-01-2019; 401/2018 of 22-01-2019; 420/2018 of 15-01-2019; 456/2018 of 28-02-2019; 574/2018 of 17-04-19.

V - VALUE OF THE CASE

In accordance with the provisions of articles 296, nos. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved by Law no. 47/2013 of 26 June, 97-A, no. 1, subparagraph a) of the Code of Procedure and Tax Procedure, and article 3, no. 2 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the value of the case is fixed at €1,415.50 (one thousand four hundred fifteen euros and fifty cents).

VI - COSTS

Pursuant to the provisions of articles 12, no. 2, 22, no. 4 of the RJAT and articles 2 and 4 of the Regulation of Costs in Arbitration Proceedings and Table I attached thereto, the amount of costs is fixed at €306.00 (three hundred six euros).

NOTIFY

Document prepared by computer, pursuant to the provisions of article 131 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable by referral of article 29, no. 1, subparagraph e) of the Regime of Tax Arbitration, with blank lines, and reviewed by the arbitrator.

NOTIFICATION TO THE PUBLIC MINISTRY

The Respondent requested, with appeal to the provisions of article 280, no. 3 of the Constitution and article 72, no. 3 of the Law of the Constitutional Court, notification of this decision to the Public Ministry.

Since the Public Ministry has no representation before the arbitral tribunals functioning under CAAD (article 4 of the Statute of the Public Ministry), this decision shall be communicated to the Attorney General's Office for the appropriate action.

[The drafting of this decision is governed by the spelling prior to the Orthographic Agreement of 1990, except with regard to transcriptions made]

Twenty-first of May in the year two thousand and nineteen

The Arbitrator

(José Coutinho Pires)