IUC Tax on Leased Vehicles: Subjective Incidence in Financial Leasing – CAAD 775/2014-T

ARBITRAL DECISION

The arbitrator Guilherme W. d'Oliveira Martins, appointed by the Deontological Council of the Administrative Arbitration Centre (CAAD) to form the present Arbitral Tribunal, constituted on 30-01-2015, decides as follows:

I. REPORT

1. The company A… Portugal, S.A., NIPC …, submitted a request for constitution of a singular arbitral tribunal, in accordance with the combined provisions of articles 2 and 10 of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January (Legal Regime of Arbitration in Tax Matters, hereinafter referred to as RJAT), in which the Tax and Customs Authority (AT) is the respondent, with a view to the annulment of assessment acts of the single vehicle circulation tax, in the total amount of € 3,315.12.

2. The request for constitution of the arbitral tribunal was accepted by His Excellency the President of CAAD on 20-11-2014 and automatically notified to the Tax and Customs Authority.

3. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph a) of no. 2 of article 6 and paragraph b) of no. 1 of article 11 of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January, in the wording introduced by article 228 of Law No. 66-B/2012, of 31 December, the Deontological Council appointed as arbitrator of the singular arbitral tribunal the undersigned, who communicated acceptance of the corresponding charge within the applicable time period.

4. On 15.01.2015 the parties were duly notified of this appointment, and neither manifested any desire to refuse the appointment of the arbitrator in accordance with the combined provisions of article 11, no. 1, paragraphs a) and b) of RJAT and articles 6 and 7 of the Deontological Code.

5. Thus, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph c) of no. 1 of article 11 of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January, in the wording introduced by Law No. 66-B/2012, of 31 December, the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 30.01.2015.

6. On 09-07-2015 the first meeting of the Tribunal took place, in accordance with and for the purposes of article 18 of RJAT, and minutes thereof were recorded, which are also attached to the court file.

7. At the commencement of the meeting, the floor was given to the Representatives of the Claimant and Respondent to express themselves on (i) procedural matters, (ii) any exceptions that should be examined and decided before the tribunal's consideration of the petition, (iii) the need for corrections to be made to the procedural documents presented, and (iv) the need to schedule a new meeting for the purposes of oral submissions.

8. Having heard the parties, and with their agreement, the Tribunal decided to dispense with the examination of witnesses and the production of final submissions.

9. The Tribunal designated 30.07.2015 for the pronouncement of the arbitral decision.

10. Orders extending the decision were issued on 29.07.2015, 01.10.2015 and 26.11.2015, under the authority of no. 2 of article 21 of RJAT.

11. The grounds of the Claimant's petition are as follows:

• In the scope of its financing activity in the automotive sector, the Claimant enters into financial leasing contracts, intended for the acquisition, by companies and individuals, of motor vehicles.

• The AT assessed the single vehicle circulation tax (IUC) against the Claimant and notified various assessment notices for IUC for the years 2013 and 2014.

• The Claimant invokes legitimacy with respect to the recourse against all assessment acts, although some were directed to the company B… – …, S.A., since the said company was dissolved, and those financial leasing contracts became part of the Claimant's portfolio of assets, and the Claimant assumed the rights and obligations inherent to the position of lessor.

• The same applies to the assessment acts directed to C… S.A. BRANCH IN PORTUGAL, previously designated D… – …, S.A., subsequently dissolved, whose assets and liabilities were incorporated into the Claimant.

• The Claimant chose to assess the IUCs in question, having paid the total amount of €3,315.12, the value that is hereby sought in these proceedings.

• Thus, the IUCs for the years 2013 and 2014 are at issue, relating to the vehicles identified in the administrative proceedings, which were subject to financial leasing contracts and with respect to which the Claimant assumes the status of lessee.

• According to the Claimant, at the time of registration of the respective motor vehicles, a financial leasing contract was in effect, that is, at the moment when the IUCs in question became due, pursuant to no. 3 of article 6 and no. 2 of article 4 of CIUC.

• During the term of the contract, the lessee maintains temporary enjoyment of the vehicle – which remains in the ownership of the Claimant – in exchange for remuneration to be paid to the Claimant in the form of lease payments, and may acquire the vehicle at the end of the contract, by paying a residual value.

• Therefore, it cannot be considered the taxpayer subject thereto.

• The Claimant invokes that the person who assumes the status of taxpayer subject of the IUC is the person who has at their disposal the right to use a vehicle – generating a certain level of pollution, wear on roads – that such taxpayer has an increased potential to cause damage to the environment and infrastructure.

• Having the determining criterion of taxation ceased to be exclusively engine displacement, now derived from "indicators of the polluting capacity of a vehicle".

• For the Claimant, "the Single Vehicle Circulation Tax does not have the vehicle, in itself, as the object of its incidence, but rather its use (in act or in potentia)", therefore, the corresponding obligation falls on the person or entity that has the potential use of the said motor vehicle.

• Thus, since, in a financial leasing contract, the lessor has exclusive enjoyment of the motor vehicle which is the subject of the contract, it is also incumbent upon the lessor to pay the tax.

• Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 149/95, of 25 June (amended by Decree-Laws 265/97, of 2 October, and 30/2008, of 25 February) defines financial leasing as "the arrangement by which one party undertakes, in exchange for remuneration, to cede to another the temporary enjoyment of a thing, movable or immovable, acquired or constructed at the latter's request, and which the lessee may purchase, after the agreed period, for a price fixed therein or determinable by simple application of the criteria fixed therein".

• Finally, it invokes that, because the motor vehicles whose IUC assessment is contested are subject to financial leasing contracts, it is to the lessees, and not to the lessor (even if the latter holds ownership of the vehicle), that the obligation to assess it falls.

• In light of the foregoing, it requests the allowance of the petition for arbitral pronouncement, in accordance with and for the purposes of Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January, following the procedure provided for in articles 17 et seq. and applying the effects mentioned in article 13 of the said legislation, and consequently, the declaration of illegality and consequent annulment of the 37 assessment acts relating to the IUC concerning the 36 identified vehicles, the reimbursement of the amount of € 3,315.12, relating to the tax and compensatory interest incorrectly paid by the Claimant, and the payment of indemnificatory interest, for the deprivation of the amount of € 3,315.12, in accordance with article 43 of the General Tax Law.

1. In response to the Claimant's petition, the AT:

The AT maintains the acts subject of the initial petition with the following grounds:

• The Claimant did not attach the financial leasing contracts when it could and should have done so, that is, in the petition for arbitral pronouncement, and now finds itself barred from the possibility of doing so at a later time, since the provisions of paragraph d) of no. 2 of article 10 of RJAT, approved by Decree-Law No. 10/2011, of 20 January, peremptorily determine that the petition for arbitral pronouncement must include "The elements of proof of the stated facts and the indication of the means of proof to be produced".

• In this context, the Tax and Customs Authority found itself prevented from analyzing the petition, with a view to possibly revoking the act, in accordance with no. 1 of article 13 of RJAT, with all its consequences.

• The Claimant is not correct, since, in the first place, even if it were concluded that we are dealing with financial leasing contracts entered into by the Claimant, it was always incumbent upon the latter to demonstrate that it had given due and full compliance with the ancillary obligation imposed by article 19 of CIUC.

• The Claimant failed to comply with the provisions of article 3 of CIUC, combined with the provisions of article 19 of the same code, in which it is established that "for the purposes of article 3 of this code (…), entities that proceed with financial leasing, operational leasing or long-term rental of vehicles are obligated to provide to the Tax Authority the data relating to the identification of users of the leased vehicles."

• The Claimant could only have exempted itself from the tax if it had complied with the specific obligation provided for in that provision of CIUC, and therefore, since the Claimant did not comply with that obligation, it must be concluded that it is, also for this reason, the taxpayer subject of the tax.

• The tax legislator, in establishing in article 3, no. 1, who the taxpayers of the IUC are, expressly and intentionally established that these are the owners (or in the situations provided for in no. 2, the persons named therein), such persons being those in whose name the vehicles are registered.

It bases its argument extensively in its response that the understanding advocated by the claimant derives from a skewed reading of the letter of the law:

• As the adoption of an interpretation that does not attend to the systematic element, violating the unity of the regime established throughout the CIUC, and,

• More broadly, throughout the entire legal-fiscal system;

• But also of an interpretation that ignores the ratio of the regime established in the article in question, and as well, throughout the CIUC.

• The legislator did not use the expression "are presumed to be", as it could have done, for example, in the following terms: the taxpayers of the tax are the owners of the vehicles, such persons being presumed to be the natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose name the vehicles are registered.

• For this purpose, the respondent draws upon examples from the legal system, as well as the explanatory memorandum relating to Legislative Proposal No. 118/X, that is, the proposal for comprehensive reform of automobile taxation.

• Even admitting that, from the perspective of the rules of civil law and real property registration, the absence of registration does not affect the acquisition of the status of owner and that registration is not a condition of validity of contracts with real effect, in accordance with what is established in CIUC (which in the case in question constitutes special law, which, in accordance with general rules of law, derogates the general norm), the tax legislator intended expressly and deliberately that those considered as owners, lessees, purchasers with reservation of ownership or holders of purchase option rights in long-term rental, be the persons in whose name the vehicles are registered.

• In these terms, the AT requests that the petition for arbitral pronouncement be considered inadmissible as to the acts of IUC assessment that are maintained.

II. SANITATION

1. The Tribunal is competent and regularly constituted, in accordance with articles 2, no. 1, paragraph a), 5 and 6, all of RJAT.

2. The parties have legal personality and capacity, are legitimate and legally represented, in accordance with articles 4 and 10 of RJAT and article 1 of Ordinance No. 112-A/2011, of 22 March.

3. The proceeding does not suffer from any nullities and no preliminary issues were raised that require examination.

4. Thus, the conditions are in place to examine the merits of the petition.

III. REASONING

III.A. PROVEN FACTS

Before proceeding to the examination of the merits questions, it is necessary to present the factual matter relevant to its understanding and decision, which, having examined the documentary evidence and the tax administrative proceeding attached to the court file and also taking into account the facts alleged, is established as follows:

• In the scope of its financing activity in the automotive sector, the Claimant enters into financial leasing contracts, intended for the acquisition, by companies and individuals, of motor vehicles.

• The AT assessed the single vehicle circulation tax (IUC) against the Claimant and notified various assessment notices for IUC for the years 2013 and 2014.

• The assessment acts directed to company B… – …, S.A. transfer to the legal sphere of the Respondent, since the said company was dissolved, and those financial leasing contracts became part of the Claimant's portfolio of assets, and the Claimant assumed the rights and obligations inherent to the position of lessor.

• The same applies to the assessment acts directed to C… S.A. BRANCH IN PORTUGAL, previously designated D… – …, S.A., subsequently dissolved, whose assets and liabilities were incorporated into the Claimant.

• Thus, the IUCs for the years 2013 and 2014 are at issue, relating to the vehicles identified in the administrative proceeding.

• The Claimant entered into financial leasing contracts concerning the vehicles identified in the proceeding, which are subject to the IUCs.

III.B UNPROVEN FACTS

There are no facts alleged or of which the Tribunal has official knowledge that are relevant to the decision and have not been established as proven.

III.C REASONING

The establishment of the factual matter was based on the administrative proceeding, documents attached to the initial petition or produced in the course of the present proceeding, and statements by the Claimant that are not contested by the Tax and Customs Authority.

III.D Regarding the Cumulation of Petitions

Considering the identity of the tax facts, the tribunal competent for the decision, and the grounds of fact and law invoked, nothing prevents, in light of articles 104 of CPPT and 3 of RJAT, the cumulation of petitions verified in this case.

III.E On the Law

a) Regarding the Elimination of the Presumption of Taxpayer Subject Status of IUC that Rests on the Claimant

In the petition for arbitral pronouncement, the Claimant invokes circumstances which, in its view, disqualify it from the status of taxpayer subject of the IUC with respect to the vehicles and taxation periods in question – the circumstance that, at the date to which the tax fact giving rise to the assessment refers, it had entered into financial leasing contracts concerning the respective vehicles, assuming the status of lessee thereof.

The Claimant thus understands that it is not the taxpayer subject of the IUC by virtue of the fact that the requirements for subjective incidence of the tax provided for in article 3 of CIUC, combined with articles 4 and 6 of the same Code, are not satisfied.

The core of the discussion underlying these proceedings concerns the definition of the subjective incidence of the IUC: according to the AT's thesis, the taxpayer subject of this tax is the person in whose name the vehicle is registered; for the Claimant, the rule of incidence provided for in no. 1 of article 3 of IUC establishes a presumption, derived from registration, that may be eliminated by virtue of the provisions of article 73 of the General Tax Law.

Thus, regarding the status of taxpayer subject of the tax obligation attributed to it, the Claimant alleges that, at the date of occurrence of the tax facts, it had entered into financial leasing contracts, so that those who enjoy exclusive use of the vehicle are the lessees, and not the Respondent, who assumes the position of lessor. As proof of its allegation, it attaches to the petition for arbitral decision copies of the financial leasing contracts entered into, relating to the vehicles on which the assessed IUCs bear.

Article 3 of CIUC, under the heading "subjective incidence", provides as follows:

1 – The taxpayers of the tax are the owners of the vehicles, such persons being those natural or legal persons, of public or private law, in whose name the vehicles are registered.

2 – Financial lessees, purchasers with reservation of ownership, as well as other holders of purchase option rights by force of the leasing contract are equated to owners.

With relevance to the decision to be rendered in the present proceeding, the issue to be analyzed thus centers on the interpretation of the rule of no. 1 of that article 3 of CIUC, for the purpose of determining who assumes the status of taxpayer subject of IUC due during the term of a financial leasing contract: whether the lessee or the leasing entity (even if owner).

Now, it is true that the legislator of CIUC chose motor vehicle registration as the structuring element of this tax (which results, from the outset, from article 6 of the code, relating to the definition of the generating fact of the tax obligation, whose no. 1 provides that it is constituted by ownership of the vehicle, as evidenced by registration in the national territory), and it is moreover from the elements of motor vehicle registration that the moment of commencement of the taxation period is extracted (article 4, no. 2, of CIUC), as well as the moment until which the tax is due (article 4, no. 3, of CIUC) and the respective taxable base (article 7 of CIUC), another question is that of the interpretation to be given to the rule of subjective incidence provided for in article 3 of CIUC, which must comply with general principles of interpretation of tax rules, not being limited solely to the normative environment created by the remaining rules of CIUC.

Pursuant to the provisions of article 73 of the General Tax Law, the presumptions established in rules of tax incidence always admit proof to the contrary. However, in order to detect the establishment of a presumption in a rule of tax incidence, must it always expressly provide for it, or may, on the contrary, a presumption be extracted from a rule of tax incidence that is not expressly stated therein?

For example, within the framework of the regulation of the Municipal Vehicle Tax, which the current IUC replaced, a presumption was established in express terms, with the law stating that "the tax is due by the owners of the vehicles, such persons being presumed, unless proof to the contrary, to be the persons in whose name the vehicles are registered or inscribed". Now, within the framework of CIUC, the legislator chose to replace the word "presumed" with the word "considered". Should that fact be considered in the manner defended by the AT, to the point of saying that the rule does not establish a presumption, but rather establishes that the owners of vehicles as such registered in motor vehicle registration are always the taxpayers of the tax?

This is not our interpretation of the legal text. Indeed, absent substantive reasons that would allow the detection of a reason for a change in the legislator's position on this point – that is, absent reasons to believe that the legislator actually intended to exclude the possibility of other persons, besides the owner of the vehicle, being taxpayers of the IUC, it seems to us that the said semantic change should be read as exactly that – merely a semantic change, with no impact on the rule that results from the legal text. Thus, we understand that the rule resulting from no. 1 of article 3 of CIUC continues to be a presumption of subjective incidence with respect to the owner of the vehicle as so registered with the Motor Vehicle Registration Authority, which does not exclude the possibility of proof to the contrary. Indeed, it seems to us that the rule established in no. 1 of article 3 of CIUC has the structure of a rule of presumption as described in article 349 of the Civil Code, that is, as an inference that the law, or the judge, draws from a known fact to establish an unknown fact. In the concrete case, the law draws from the known fact (ownership of the vehicle in accordance with motor vehicle registration) the presumption regarding the person who must bear the tax burden relating to the vehicle in question. However, it will always be possible for the owner registered in the register to eliminate the application to itself of the rule of incidence, provided that it proves that the taxpaying capacity that justifies the tax imposition belongs to another person, for example, on the basis of the sale of the vehicle at a moment prior to the occurrence of the tax fact, or the entering into of a financial leasing contract which the vehicle is the subject of, as is the case in question.

The presumptions of tax incidence may be eliminated through the contradictory procedure specifically provided for in article 64 of the Code of Administrative Tax Procedure, or alternatively, by way of administrative recourse or judicial challenge of the tax acts based thereon. In the present case, the Claimant did not use that specific procedure, so that the present petition for arbitral decision is the appropriate means to eliminate the presumption of subjective incidence of the IUC that supports the tax assessments whose annulment is the object of the petition, since it is a matter that falls within the material jurisdiction of this arbitral tribunal in accordance with articles 2 and 4 of RJAT.

As further developed in the Arbitral Decision rendered in Case No. 14/2013-T: "Examining the Portuguese legal system, we find countless rules that establish presumptions using the verb 'consider', many of which are used in the gerund ("considering" or even "being considered"). Examples of this are the rules enumerated below: In the Civil Code, among others, articles 314, 369 no. 2, 374 no. 1, 376 no. 2, 1629. In the Code of Industrial Property, we refer by way of example to article 98, where the term "considering" is also used in a presumptive context. Also in the tax legal system, the verb "to consider" can be found, namely the term "is considered" with a presumptive sense. As explained by Diogo Leite Campos, Benjamim Silva Rodrigues and Jorge Lopes de Sousa, in note no. 3 to article 73 of the General Tax Law, "presumptions in matters of tax incidence may be explicit, revealed by the use of the expression 'is presumed' or similar (…). However, presumptions may also be implicit in rules of incidence, in particular of objective incidence, when certain values of movable or immovable property are considered as constituting taxable matter, in situations where it is not impossible to ascertain the real value" (emphasis ours), then providing some examples of rules in which the verb "to consider" is used, such as in no. 2 of article 21 of CIRC happens, when it establishes that "for the purpose of determining taxable profit, the value of acquisition of capital gains obtained gratuitously is considered to be its market value and may not be less than that resulting from the application of the rules for determining taxable value provided for in the Stamp Tax Code". (emphasis ours). (…). Given that the legal system should form a coherent whole, the examples referred to above, accompanied by the indicated doctrine and case law, by appeal to the systematic element (context of the law and parallel passages), authorize the conclusion that it is not only when the verb "to presume" is used that we are dealing with a presumption, but also the use of other terms or expressions may serve as the basis for presumptions, namely the term "is considered", thus showing that the condition established in no. 2 of article 9 of the Civil Code is satisfied, which requires that legislative thought have in the letter of the law a minimum of verbal correspondence, even if imperfectly expressed." (in www.caad.pt).

As also referred to in the cited Arbitral Decision, the legislative intent of the IUC points in the direction of taxing actual owners or users of the vehicles, such as financial lessees, since they are the ones who have the polluting potential causing environmental costs to the community (see article 3, no. 1 and 2, of the Code of IUC).

Thus, the IUC seeks to burden taxpayers in measure of the environmental and road cost that they cause, in implementation of a general rule of tax equality, as expressed in its article 1.

Establishing article 3, no. 1 of CIUC a presumption, which may be eliminated, the entity that is inscribed in the register as owner of the vehicle and that, for that reason was considered by the AT as taxpayer subject of the tax, may present elements of proof aimed at demonstrating that the holder of the property is another person, to whom the property has been transferred.

Contrary to what is alleged by the Respondent, compliance or non-compliance with the provisions of article 19 of the Code of IUC, which obligates entities that proceed with financial leasing, operational leasing or long-term rental of vehicles to provide to the Tax Authority the data relating to the tax identification of users of the leased vehicles, does not eliminate the rebuttable character of the presumption under consideration, in conformity with the invoked article 73 of the General Tax Law.

Admitting the elimination of the presumption, it is now necessary to analyze whether in the case sub judice it is sufficient to eliminate the presumption contained in no. 1 of article 3 of CIUC.

In order to eliminate the presumption derived from the inscription of motor vehicle registration, the Claimant offers as elements relating to the vehicles now under consideration copies of the motor vehicle rental contracts without driver relating to the motor vehicles whose IUC assessments are contested.

Thus, it is verified that the vehicles in question, in the period now under consideration, were ceded to third parties, under the terms of financial leasing contracts.

In this way, the fulfillment of both no. 1 and no. 2 of article 3 of CIUC is ascertained.

The question that then arises is whether the verification of that no. 2 eliminates or does not eliminate the subjection resulting from no. 1.

See the Arbitral Decision of CAAD rendered in Case No. 232/2014-T:

"Being not a question of linear solution, as arguments may be elaborated for either of the possible senses of response, it is understood that the response to be given should be positive, that is, that in the event that there exists an "equated" person to owner, the subjection of that (of the owner) shall be eliminated, with only the "equated" person being the taxpayer subject of the tax.

This response appears necessary, it is considered, essentially and apart from anything else, for reasons of system coherence, taking into account, especially, that in the case of the Municipal Property Tax (see article 8, no. 2 and 3) tax subjection by a non-owner eliminates the subjection of the owner.

Thus, notwithstanding the distinct – and perhaps unfortunate – terminology used in CIUC, taking into account the interpretive criteria formulated in article 9 of the Civil Code, and in particular the lack of reasons why a reasonable legislator would regulate in distinct terms the equation to property in the cases of IUC and the Municipal Property Tax, it is understood that, indeed, the definition of the taxpayer subject of that tax shall be made, alternatively (and not cumulatively), in accordance with no. 1 or no. 2 of article 3 of the respective Code.

This understanding is further reinforced by the obligation established in article 19 of CIUC, which imposes on "entities that proceed with financial leasing" the obligation "to provide to the Tax Authority the data relating to the tax identification of users of the leased vehicles". Naturally, this obligation will only be understood, from the perspective that the leasing entities see their subjection eliminated by force of the leasing, since, if this were not the case, it would not make sense, as the AT could always charge the tax in question to the lessor, an entity which will, moreover, and as a rule, be more solvent than the lessee.

In this manner, with the vehicles in question in the financial leasing regime, the taxpayer subject of the respective IUC shall be the lessee, in accordance with no. 2 of article 3 of CIUC, and not the Claimant, as owner, in accordance with no. 1 of the same article.

What has been concluded does not prevent the circumstance that the Claimant may not have given due compliance with the provisions of the aforementioned article 19 of CIUC. Indeed – and as is clear – the sanction for non-compliance with any obligation that in this respect falls or fell to the claimant should always be sought in the Framework of the Regime of Tax Violations, and not, naturally, in the subjection to a tax".

Confirms and explains E… in the opinion attached by the Claimant as ANNEX D: "The aforementioned rules reveal exhaustively that the Single Vehicle Circulation Tax does not have the vehicle, in itself, as the object of its incidence, but rather its use (in act or in potentia)."

That is, we agree with the understanding of the said author when he states that "it is the polluting use that constitutes the environmental presupposition as it is this (…)" and that "the persons indicated in article 3, second part of the Code of IUC – financial lessees, purchasers with reservation of ownership, as well as other holders of purchase option rights by force of the leasing contract – are taxpayer subjects of the IUC".

In light of the foregoing, the assessments referred to in the present proceeding are erroneous in law and must, as such, be annulled.

b) Regarding the Admission of Financial Leasing Contracts

As already referred to in Arbitral Order dated 31.03.2015, considering the principles contained in articles 16 and 19, both of RJAT, and taking into account that they are documents relevant to the formulation of the decision, the attachment of the documents is admitted, thereby rejecting the intention of the AT not to admit them.

c) Regarding Indemnificatory Interest

Examining, under article 24, no. 5, of RJAT, the request for payment of indemnificatory interest in favor of the claimant (article 43 of the General Tax Law and article 61 of the Code of Administrative Tax Procedure):

In this regard, Arbitral Decision No. 26/2013-T, of 19/7/2013 (which dealt with a situation very similar to that now under consideration) recalled: "The right to indemnificatory interest referred to in the aforementioned General Tax Law rule presupposes that there has been paid tax in an amount greater than that due and that such arises from error, of fact or law, imputable to the services of the AT. […] even though it is recognized that the tax paid by the claimant is not due, because it is not the taxpayer subject of the tax obligation, thereby determining its reimbursement, it is not obliged that, in its origin, there be found the error imputable to the services, which determines such right [to indemnificatory interest] in favor of the taxpayer. Indeed, in proceeding to the assessment of the IUC considering the claimant as the taxpayer subject of this tax, the AT limited itself to giving compliance with the rule of no. 1 of article 3 of CIUC, which, as abundantly referred to above, imputes such status to persons in whose name the vehicles are registered."

Attending to this justification, with which we agree, it is concluded, also in the present case, by the inadmissibility of the aforementioned request for payment of indemnificatory interest.

IV. DECISION

In these terms, and with the grounds stated, the Arbitral Tribunal decides:

• To allow the petition for arbitral pronouncement, with the consequent annulment, with all legal effects, of the assessment acts contested and the reimbursement of the amounts incorrectly paid;

• To dismiss the petition insofar as it concerns the recognition of the right to indemnificatory interest in favor of the Claimant.

The value of the case is fixed at € 3,315.12 (three thousand, three hundred and fifteen euros and twelve cents), in accordance with paragraph a) of no. 1 of article 97-A of the Code of Administrative Tax Procedure, applicable by force of paragraphs a) and b) of no. 1 of article 29 of RJAT and no. 2 of article 3 of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings.

The value of the arbitration fee is fixed at € 612.00, in accordance with Table I of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, to be paid in full by the Claimant, in accordance with articles 12, no. 2, and 22, no. 4, both of RJAT, and article 4, no. 4, of the said Regulation.

Lisbon, 26 November 2015

The Arbitrator,

Guilherme W. d'Oliveira Martins

[1] See article 3, no. 1, of the Regulation of the Municipal Vehicle Tax, approved by Decree-Law No. 143/78, of 12 June.