Summary
Full Decision
ARBITRAL DECISION
I. REPORT
On 2 March 2018, A... and B..., taxpayers no. ... and ..., respectively, resident in ... no. ..., ...-... ..., municipality of Oliveira de Azeméis, requested, pursuant to the provisions of article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph a), of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January, which approved the Legal Regime of Arbitration in Tax Matters (hereinafter "LRATM"), and of Ordinance 112-A, of 22 March, the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal, in which the Tax and Customs Authority (hereinafter simply "Respondent" or "TCA") is the respondent, with a view to the declaration of illegality and consequent annulment of the additional IRS assessment no. 2017..., in the amount of €37,150.94 and respective Statement of Account Settlement, in the total amount of €49,716.50, all relating to the year 2015.
The request for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal was accepted by the Honourable President of CAAD and notified to the Respondent on 5 March 2018.
The Deontological Council appointed the undersigned as arbitrator, who communicated acceptance of the task within the applicable period.
On 27 April 2018, the Parties were duly notified of this appointment, and neither expressed willingness to challenge the arbitrator's appointment, in accordance with the combined provisions of article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraphs a) and b) of the LRATM and articles 6 and 7 of the Deontological Code.
In accordance with the provisions of article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraph c) of the LRATM, the singular arbitral tribunal was constituted on 17 May 2018. Called upon to respond, the TCA submitted a reply in which it requested that the petition for arbitral pronouncement be judged inadmissible due to lack of legal foundation, with the disputed tax acts remaining in the legal order and the respondent entity being absolved of the petition accordingly.
Summary of the Parties' Positions
a. Of the Claimants:
Pursuant to the petition for arbitral pronouncement, allegations and other requests submitted, the Claimants maintain that:
- The claimant husband initiated his professional activity as a banker on 06/11/1990, at Bank C..., S.A., subsequently designated D..., where he worked until 28/11/2004, the date on which he began working at E..., where he worked until 23/01/2015;
- Following the termination of the employment relationship with E..., the claimant husband entered into a service provision contract with F..., S.A.;
- When the claimant husband entered into the employment contract with E..., it was stipulated in clause 7 thereof that the Bank guaranteed seniority arising from service provision to other credit institutions;
- On the date of termination of the contract with D..., no compensation or indemnity was paid to the claimant husband for seniority;
- The claimant husband, as a banker, was always affiliated and unionized with the National Union of Banking Executives and Technicians, benefiting therefrom from the Banking Sector Collective Labour Agreement (the "CLA");
- The CLA provides, in clause 10, that "the worker's seniority is determined by counting service time provided to other institutions subscribing to this Agreement and the Collective Labour Agreement of the Banking Sector hereby revoked";
- Thus, in addition to the claimant husband's seniority having been respected in the contract with E..., this already resulted from the CLA of the banking sector;
- By termination of the employment contract with E..., the claimant husband received the amount of €159,732.14 and signed an agreement containing the following:
"Taking into consideration the applicable terms of Clause 17 of the Banking Sector CLAs and in view of the interpretation sustained in the rulings of the Central Administrative Court South of 11 May 2004 (Proc. 06002/01), 21 September 2010 (Proc. 03478/10), and 12 March 2013 (Proc. 5971/2012), the Parties mutually acknowledge their agreement in determining the seniority of the Employee with inclusion of the count of his service time in other credit institutions and financial companies, for the purposes of the provision in subparagraph b) of paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Income Tax Code for Individuals."
- Having regard to the nature of the indemnity received - compensation for termination of the employment contract - the claimant husband considers that the provisions of article 2, paragraph 4, subparagraph b) of the ITCI apply, considering a seniority of 25 years in the banking sector and an average remuneration over the last 12 months in the amount of €8,409.02 (later corrected to €7,857.90);
- Thus, the amount exempt from taxation in category A should total €210,225.50;
- To this extent, the TCA is incorrect in considering that only the years (11) worked at E... should be considered for purposes of seniority;
- On the other hand, also in determining the average remuneration of the last 12 months - relevant for determining the amount excluded from taxation - the TCA makes an error on the factual assumptions insofar as it considers an average remuneration of €6,949.74 instead of €7,857.90;
- Thus, even considering only 11 years of seniority, the amount subject to taxation would be €73,295.29 and not €83,285.00, as the TCA maintains;
- With regard to the contractual relationship with "F..., S.A.", the Claimants maintain that the services provided by the claimant husband do not fall specifically within the activity table of article 151 of the ITCI, and should therefore be classified as "other service providers" - classification 1519 and not, as the TCA contends, as "Consultant" - classification 1320;
- Consequently, the coefficient of 0.40 will not apply for purposes of determining taxable income under the IRS simplified regime, as sought by the Respondent;
- In these terms, the Claimants' declaration does not merit any correction in this regard either.
b. Of the Respondent:
In turn, pursuant to the reply and allegations presented, the Respondent contends that:
- The seniority to be counted for purposes of paragraph 4 of article 2 of the ITCI is the seniority with the entity owing the compensation for termination of the employment contract (11 years), and the seniority in previous employing entities should not be considered in the application of the aforesaid legal provision;
- In fact, it follows from the literal and systematic elements that the relevant concept of "seniority with the debtor entity" refers to the number of years with the entity with which the contract terminates - see also paragraph 10 of article 2 of the ITCI.
- Consequently, the "debtor entity" referred to in paragraph 4 of article 2 must be the "employing entity" mentioned in paragraph 10 of the same provision, which becomes explicit when paragraph 4 conditions the exclusion from taxation on the non-establishment of a new professional or business relationship within 24 months with the same "entity";
- Even if it were understood that the concept of seniority may emerge from the individual employment contract, through recognition by E... of seniority arising from work in other credit institutions, for all purposes, including tax purposes, the Claimants have not demonstrated that they had been granted, by E..., upon establishment of the employment relationship, for all legal purposes, the right to seniority in previous employing entities, in particular through attachment of the individual employment contract;
- And they have not done so because the individual employment contract did not grant the Claimant the right to seniority arising from service provision to other credit institutions for purposes of economic compensation for termination of the contract;
- In fact, the bank, in the aforesaid individual employment contract, guarantees seniority but only for the purposes set out in subparagraphs a) (pension fund of E..., namely for calculating the amount of the reform pension by disability) and b) (calculation of the reform pension);
- Additionally, in subparagraph c) of that provision it is stated that service time provided to other entities is not relevant for the calculation of length-of-service bonuses;
- Moreover, the Claimants cannot benefit from clause 17 of the CLA of the banking sector, to which reference is made in the Agreement for Revocation of the Employment Contract, because the CLA, in its clause 2, establishes that the agreement only binds the Credit Institutions and Financial Companies that subscribed to it and the workers in their service affiliated with the Unions of Bankers of the Centre, North and South and Islands, with the Claimant having failed to prove that he was affiliated with the Unions of Bankers of the Centre, North and South and Islands;
- It further alleges that, even if the Claimant had proven sufficient affiliation to the trade union, in accordance with the CLA, such Agreement would not apply to him in this case, insofar as, although E... subscribed to the CLA, it did so with the following caveat:
"In counting service time for any purposes arising from the CLA, there shall be counted only service time provided to the institutions themselves signatories of this caveat, plus possibly service time provided to other institutions or companies, but in that case, only if this results from an individual agreement between them and the worker." (cf. CLA in force for 2015, BTE no. 8 of 29/2/2012)
- On the other hand, with respect to the contract entered into with F..., S.A. and F..., S.A., it is held that the claimant husband provided, in an independent manner but subject to the regulations of the companies, and under their guidance and instructions, services of commercial relations, namely provision of information with a view to recruiting and advising clients, creating opportunities for expansion of financial intervention services, for which he received remuneration, depending on production achieved, in addition to a fixed monthly amount;
- As such, considering the description of code 70220 of section M of the Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities, the title of which is "Management Consulting, Scientific, Technical and Similar Activities" - and which includes financial management as a consulting, guidance and operational assistance activity for companies or bodies - it is concluded that he provided consulting services or possibly as an agent on commission;
- In these terms, the coefficient indicated for determining taxable income under the simplified regime should be corrected and, accordingly, €21,060.00 should be added to taxable income.
II. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
1. The Arbitral Tribunal is competent and was regularly constituted, in accordance with articles 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph a), 5 and 6, all of the LRATM.
2. The parties have legal personality and capacity, are legitimate and are legally represented, in accordance with articles 4 and 10 of the LRATM and article 1 of Ordinance no. 112-A/2011, of 22 March.
3. No exceptions have been invoked that need to be considered.
4. The proceedings are not affected by vices that would invalidate them.
III. REASONING
III.1. FACTUAL MATTERS
The factual matters relevant to the understanding and decision of the case, following critical examination of the documentary evidence attached to the initial petition, the administrative proceedings, the reply, the allegations and other statements of the Claimants and the Respondent, are established as follows:
A – Proven Facts
a. The claimant husband worked at D... between 06/11/1990 and 28/11/2004.
b. The claimant husband worked at E... between 01/12/2004 and 23/01/2015.
c. In the employment contract, it was agreed in clause 7 that:
"1. The Bank guarantees to the Second Party the seniority arising from service provision to other Credit Institutions, from 06/11/1990, documentarily proven, but only for the following purposes:
a) For purposes of the Pension Fund of E..., the First Party shall take into consideration the service time provided to other credit institutions, with the amount of the presumed disability reform pension being calculated in accordance with the regime provided for in the banking sector ACTV.
b) The part of the reform corresponding to service time provided by the Second Party to the First Party shall be calculated in accordance with Clause 6 of the Pension Plan of E....
c) The service time provided to other Credit Institutions prior to the signing of this contract shall likewise not be taken into account for calculation of the number of length-of-service bonuses."
d. E... subscribed to the CLA applicable to the banking sector, which provided that:
"This Collective Labour Agreement is applicable throughout the national territory, within the banking sector, and binds the Credit Institutions and Financial Companies that subscribe to it (hereinafter generically designated Credit Institutions or Institutions), as well as all workers in their service affiliated with the Unions of Bankers of the Centre, North and South and Islands, represented by the signatory FEBASE - Federation of the Financial Sector and hereinafter designated Unions, covering 26 employers and estimated at 54,300 the number of workers covered."
d. Notwithstanding, E... subscribed to the CLA with the following caveat:
"In counting service time for any purposes arising from the CLA, there shall be counted only service time provided to the institutions themselves signatories of this caveat, plus possibly service time provided to other institutions signatories of this caveat, plus possibly service time provided to other entities or companies, but in that case, only if this results from an individual agreement between them and the worker".
d. On 05/12/2014, the Claimant and E... signed an agreement for revocation of the employment contract, in which it was established, in paragraph 2 of Clause 18, as follows:
"Taking into consideration the applicable terms of Clause 17 of the Banking Sector CLAs and in view of the interpretation sustained in the rulings of the Central Administrative Court South of 11 May 2004 (Proc. 06002/01), 21 September 2010 (Proc. 03478/10), and 12 March 2013 (Proc. 5971/2012), the Parties mutually acknowledge their agreement in determining the seniority of the Employee with inclusion of the count of his service time in other credit institutions and financial companies, for the purposes of the provision in subparagraph b) of paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Income Tax Code for Individuals."
e. The claimant husband received, by termination of the employment contract, compensation of €159,732.14.
f. In the IRS declaration relating to 2015, the claimant husband excluded the totality of the compensation received from taxation, understanding that it was excluded from taxation in accordance with paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Income Tax Code.
g. The claimant husband earned, between February 2014 and December 2014, an average monthly salary of €6,949.74, corresponding to an annual total of €83,396.88, and in January 2015 a salary of €17,847.62.
m. The claimant husband entered into a contract with the company F..., S.A. for the provision of services for coordination of the commercial area involving contact with clients and potential clients, presentation of services and, as well as commercial monitoring of clients, to which corresponded the functions of Linked Agent.
B – Unproven Facts
No facts were given as unproven with relevance for the discussion of the case.
III.2. MOTIVATION
With regard to factual matters, the Tribunal does not have the duty to pronounce on all matters alleged, but rather the duty to select those relevant to the decision, taking into account the cause (or causes) of action that forms the basis of the petition presented by the Claimants.
With regard to the appreciation of evidence, the Tribunal formulates its judgment, in view of the principle of free appreciation, based on the examination and evaluation it makes of the means of proof brought to the proceedings and in accordance with its experience.
The Tribunal's conviction was thus founded on the documentary evidence attached to the file as well as on the positions taken by the Claimants and the Respondent.
III.3. ON THE LAW
1. THEMA DECIDENDUM:
The disputed issues in this case are as follows:
a) What value should be considered, in the present case, for purposes of exclusion from taxation in accordance with paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Income Tax Code?
b) What is the correct classification of the activity carried out by the claimant husband for F..., S.A., in particular for purposes of determining the coefficient applicable, under the simplified regime, for determining taxable income?
2. LEGAL REASONING:
In addressing the first question, it will be necessary to analyse (i) what the relevant period of seniority is and (ii) what the value of average remuneration is, to be considered for purposes of determining the amount excluded from taxation in accordance with paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Income Tax Code.
Subparagraph b) of paragraph 4 of article 2 of the ITCI provides that the following are subject to taxation, amounts received "(…) in the part exceeding the value corresponding to the average value of regular remuneration with the character of compensation subject to tax, earned in the last twelve months, multiplied by the number of years or fraction of seniority or of exercise of functions with the debtor entity (…)".
Considering the positions of the Claimants and the Respondent, as well as the established factuality, the question to which it is necessary to provide an answer will be, in sum, whether the concept of seniority relevant for purposes of the provision in subparagraph b) of paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Income Tax Code is limited to seniority with the debtor entity or whether, on the contrary, it may encompass seniority counted in previous employing entities, by force of instruments regulating the employment relationship.
Since the question is one of mere legal interpretation, two distinct - and opposed - lines of reasoning may be found, both with proper interpretive authority.
In favour of the thesis that does not limit the concept of seniority, for purposes of the IRS exclusion, to seniority with the debtor entity, the Central Administrative Court South has advanced this position in various rulings and, at least, the arbitral decision delivered in case 230/2016-T.
This line of reasoning understands, in sum, that, the concept of seniority not being defined in tax law, it is necessary to seek its meaning in the branch of law from which it originates – labour law – and should understand Collective Labour Agreements as sources of labour law.
This is also the position taken by the Claimants in the present case.
When reading the tax exclusion rule in question, defenders of this doctrine extract from the expression "number of years or fraction of seniority or of exercise of functions with the debtor entity, in other cases" two distinct models for counting excluded amounts, one invoking the concept of seniority (defined as already mentioned), and another the exercise of functions with the debtor entity.
That is, the present interpretation results in limiting the expression "with the debtor entity" to the rule relating to the exercise of functions, thus excluding such limitation from the rule applicable to seniority.
As far as we can tell, and with due respect for the previous case law, the Tribunal not being bound by a principle of precedent, it will be necessary to first question whether article 2 itself of the Income Tax Code, in its various paragraphs, does not require interpretation according to which seniority must also be determined in relation to the debtor entity and, additionally, and regardless of the answer to be given to the first question, whether the interpretation defended by the Respondent can even be considered in light of the constitutional principles governing the tax law relationship.
Beginning the interpretive exercise with the letter of the law, in observance of applicable legal precepts, we fully agree with the position defended in the arbitral decision delivered in case 505/2017-T, where it is stated that "(…) grammatically, the final reference to the «debtor entity» may also, without appreciable effort, refer to «seniority» («seniority … with the debtor entity»), being this a textually adequate way to express a legislative intention in the sense that the relevant seniority should also be, as is the case with regard to the «exercise of functions», that referring to the debtor entity.".
Notwithstanding the acknowledgment that the mere literal expression of the provision does not permit an unimpeachable conclusion regarding the meaning of the rule, the truth is that the systematic interpretation of the provision seems to point decisively to the sense that seniority must also be determined with the debtor entity of the income.
Otherwise, the rule contained in the latter part of the aforesaid subparagraph would be difficult to understand. In fact, by prohibiting a new relationship with "the same entity" (underlined and bolded), the law seems to refer, unequivocally, to the debtor entity of the income. It is not by accident that the law refers to entity (in the singular) and not entities. Thus, if the exclusion from taxation were to be understood as encompassing periods of work in other entities, even by Collective Labour Agreement, and the prohibition in the latter part of the rule were limited to a new employment relationship with the debtor entity of the income, the law would be permitting the establishment, within the 24-month period, of a new relationship with previous employing entities whose work time has been considered for purposes of the exclusion from taxation.
On the other hand, if the understanding sustained by the Respondent were to be upheld, it would permit the same person to benefit doubly from the aforesaid exclusion from taxation in a case like that advanced in the decision delivered in case 505/2017-T already referenced, and which we endorse, where a person worked 10 years in the service of an employing entity, left benefiting from the exclusion from taxation, and entered for a further 10 years in a new employing entity, benefiting from seniority of 20 years (by way of Collective Labour Agreement) and respective exclusion from taxation, thus doubling the benefit relating to the first 10 years of work.
Thus, as Manuel Faustino states, On the meaning and scope of the new wording of article 2, no. 4 of the ITCI, in Fiscality 13/14, "The administration cannot be opposed by the clauses (…) of the banking sector which impose, in the transfer of a worker between credit institutions, the counting of seniority time verified in the previous or previous credit institutions in which he has been an employee. As, all the more so, neither may it by any agreements which, with respect to the guarantee of benefits inherent to seniority, have been entered into between the worker and the employing entity. Without considerations which today could be provided by the subjective extension of the concept of employing entity operated by paragraph 10 of article 2, since that is based on relationships of dominance or group among companies, regardless of their geographical location, we reaffirm here the known guidance of the Tax Administration according to which the seniority time relevant is, only, the seniority time "acquired" with the entity with which the employment relationship is terminated, as literally follows from the law, there appearing to be no room for any other type of interpretation."
On this point, we fully agree with the understanding produced by G... and H..., in their study Annotation to the Ruling of the Central Administrative Court South on the seniority of the banking worker (for purposes of calculating the amount of compensation for termination of the employment contract not subject to taxation, in accordance with paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Income Tax Code), published in the Review of the Bar Association, no. 1, 2012, where it is stated, in particular, that "(…) it cannot but be admitted that the legislator intended the expression with the debtor entity to refer to the two realities which literally precede it - the situations of termination of the contract and the situations of cessation of the exercise of functions (…). We do not see, moreover, any reason why the legislator would have intended the concept to be applied in the first situation to be unjustifiably broader than in the second, creating a situation of inequality which, ultimately, could even undermine the constitutional principle (…). We hold, therefore, that the normative segment with the debtor entity (which is, and cannot but be, in our view, the entity which undertakes to pay the amounts whose tax treatment the rule establishes) refers to the two situations which precede it, and should be heeded in both situations, to the number of years or fraction of seniority with the debtor entity or to the number of years or fraction of exercise of functions with the debtor entity."
As such, without prejudice to any eventual, and relevant, discussion on the actual content of the extension of seniority sought by the Claimants, in particular as to whether the same could be alleged in this context having regard to the exclusion inserted by E... in the CLA in question here and the provisions in the individual employment contract and in the agreement for revocation of that same contract, it should be understood that article 2, paragraph 4, subparagraph b) of the Income Tax Code should be read in the sense that seniority for purposes of exclusion from taxation must be (can only be) assessed in relation to the debtor entity of the income in question.
That is, and answering the first question posed here, the seniority to be considered in the present case should be 11 years, as put forward by the Respondent, and not 25, as suggested by the Claimants.
Notwithstanding, it will still be necessary to assess the correct determination of the average value of regular remuneration with the character of compensation, as an essential element of determining the amount excluded from taxation within the scope of the legal provision here under analysis.
In this regard, it is necessary to recall that the Respondent considers as the average value of regular remunerations of the last 12 months the amount of €6,949.74, whereas the Claimants determine, for the same purpose, the value of €7,857.90.
Upon proper analysis of the calculation model of both, it is clear that the difference is justified by the fact that the Respondent did not consider, in its calculation, the amount earned by the claimant husband in January 2015, the last month of work provision.
Now, as the claimant husband rightly points out, the Central Administrative Court has already decided that, for the purpose of determining the amount excluded from taxation in accordance with the clause here under analysis, "Amounts relating to the right to holidays, holiday pay and Christmas bonus and shift allowance are included in the average remuneration (...)." (cf. ruling of the Central Administrative Court in Case 0627/13, of 01/10/2014)
As such, by not considering these values for determining the amount excluded from taxation, the Respondent incurred an error in the factual assumptions, which, given the nature of tax arbitration proceedings, cannot be remedied by the present tribunal.
In these terms, the present assessment, in the part relating to category A income, should be annulled on the basis of a defect in violation of law due to error in factual assumptions.
Notwithstanding the conclusion reached as to this question, it will always be necessary to analyse the second question underlying the assessment now disputed to the extent that the corrections in question are autonomous from each other.
It is therefore important to analyse the classification of the activity carried out by the claimant husband as a consultant, agent on commission, or as "other service providers".
This question assumes the greatest relevance because, with the claimant husband being covered by the simplified taxation regime for determining taxable income in category B, the determination of the coefficient applicable for ascertaining the net income of that category depends on it.
Specifically, the Respondent alleges that the claimant husband held, in accordance with the Internal Regulations of F..., the designation of "linked agent", which would imply the provision of consulting services in accordance with the provisions of article 294-A of the Securities Code.
From the information in the case file, in particular from what is referred to by the TCA in its reply, it is not possible to conclude that the Claimant exercised financial consulting activities as a linked agent in accordance with the provisions of the Securities Code.
Moreover, it is stated in this regard that it follows from the case file that, as confirmed by F... itself, the functions of the claimant husband involved "(…) coordination of the commercial area involving contact with clients and potential clients, presentation of services and, as well as commercial monitoring of clients (…)".
Accordingly, there is no express mention in the case file of the provision of consulting services by the Respondent within the scope of the service provision contract with F....
Considering that, in accordance with article 75 of the General Tax Law, the statements of taxpayers are presumed to be true and made in good faith and that the TCA failed to contradict such declarations, one cannot agree with the TCA when it classifies the Claimant as "Consultant" when the latter declared themselves in the IRS - 1519 - Other Service Providers
It is important to note in this regard that Ordinance no. 1011/2001, of 21 August, which approves the table of activities of article 151 of the Income Tax Code (ITCI) does not include any definition of what should be understood by "consultant".
The concept of consulting is, in fact, so broad that practically all activities could be considered as such.
However, this cannot be the meaning to be given to the expression contained in that list, especially when a residual category of "other service providers" is provided for.
Thus, it will be necessary to assess the material provision to which the claimant husband was obliged within the scope of the service provision contract in order to determine whether it falls within the scope of strict consulting, understood as advising an entity on its activity, or whether, on the contrary, and as appears to result from the case file, the activity materialized in the development and monitoring of clients of that entity.
Attempting to qualify as consulting any services that involve intellectual activity, as appears to result from the Respondent's understanding, would involve an illegitimate interpretive exercise given its scope and the relationship existing between the various activities provided for in the aforesaid list of activities.
As for classification as an agent on commission, this could even be the case.
However, the Claimant earned a fixed income and could possibly earn a variable commission.
Now, it does not appear from the case file that the Claimant earned any commissions, there being no distinction between fixed income and any variable income, with the TCA having failed to prove (or even invoke) the existence of such income.
To this extent, and having regard to the principles governing interpretive exercises in tax matters, the claimant husband should always be considered as "other service providers", the TCA being incorrect in its correction to the income obtained in category B and declared in 2015 of 52,650.00.
IV. DECISION
Based on the factual and legal grounds stated above and, in accordance with article 2 of the LRATM, the Arbitral Tribunal decides:
I) To judge the petition for arbitral pronouncement well-founded;
II) To annul the additional IRS assessment no. 2017... and respective Statement of Account Settlement, in the total amount of €49,716.50 (forty-nine thousand, seven hundred and sixteen euros and fifty cents) with the consequent reimbursement of the amounts unduly paid;
III) To condemn the Respondent to payment of compensatory interest due from the date of payment of the tax.
VALUE OF THE CASE: In accordance with the provisions of article 306, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 97-A, paragraph 1, subparagraph a), of the Code of Administrative Procedure and Taxation, and article 3, paragraph 2, of the Costs Regulation in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, the case is valued at €49,716.50 (forty-nine thousand, seven hundred and sixteen euros and fifty cents).
COSTS: Calculated in accordance with article 4 of the Costs Regulation in Tax Arbitration Proceedings and Table I attached thereto, in the amount of €2,142.00 (two thousand, one hundred and forty-two euros), to be borne by the Respondent having regard to the well-foundedness of the petition for arbitral pronouncement.
Lisbon, 16 January 2019
The Arbitrator,
José Calejo Guerra
Text prepared by computer, in accordance with paragraph 5 of article 131 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable by remission of subparagraph e) of paragraph 1 of article 29 of Decree-Law 10/2011, of 20 January.
The text of this decision complies with the orthographic agreement of 1990.
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