Process: 811/2014-T

Date: December 20, 2015

Tax Type: IUC

Source: Original CAAD Decision

Summary

Process 811/2014-T addresses the subjective liability for Single Circulation Tax (IUC) in a complex corporate succession scenario involving financial leasing contracts. The claimant, A (in liquidation), challenged IUC assessments totaling €6,294.26 for tax years 2009-2012, originally notified to company B, which was incorporated into company C in 2001, subsequently merged into the claimant in 2003. The central substantive issue concerns Article 3 of the IUC Code, which establishes that taxable persons are vehicle owners and creates a rebuttable presumption based on vehicle registration. The claimant argued it was no longer the owner of the vehicles subject to financial leasing contracts, having sold them before the tax assessments, and therefore lacked subjective tax liability. The Tax Authority raised two preliminary exceptions: (1) material incompetence of the arbitral tribunal, arguing that for gracious claims rejected on procedural grounds without merit assessment, the proper remedy is special administrative action rather than arbitral proceedings; and (2) lack of active legitimacy, contending the claimant failed to prove the disputed assessments related to contracts actually transferred through the corporate succession, as annexes listing the specific leasing contracts and vehicles were missing from the administrative file. The Authority acknowledged existing CAAD jurisprudence favorable to the claimant's substantive position but emphasized the absence of binding legal precedent in Portugal and highlighted competing case law requiring conclusive documentary evidence to rebut the registration-based presumption. The decision itself is not included in the provided excerpt, which concludes mid-argument during the response section.

Full Decision

ARBITRAL DECISION

I – REPORT

A… – …, SA – In Liquidation, taxpayer no. …, with registered office at …, Building …, Floor …, … …, filed a request for constitution of an arbitral tribunal in tax matters and a request for arbitral decision, pursuant to the provisions of articles 2.º no. 1 a) and 10.º no. 1 a), both of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January (Legal Regime for Arbitration in Tax Matters, briefly designated as RJAT), notified of the decisions rejecting gracious claims nos. …2014…, …2014…, …2014…, …2014…, …2014… and …2014…, hereby petitions the declaration of illegality of the acts of assessment of Single Circulation Tax (IUC) which are enumerated in Annex VIII of the Petition, to which reference is made and which are deemed to be fully reproduced, carried out by the Tax and Customs Authority and relating to the years 2009 to 2012, in the total amount of € 6,294.26, including compensatory interest.

The request for constitution of the arbitral tribunal was accepted by the President of the CAAD and automatically notified to the Tax and Customs Authority on 15-12-2014.

Pursuant to the provisions of articles 5.º, no. 2, al. a), 6.º, no. 1 and 11.º no. 1, al. a) of the RJAT, the Deontological Council designated as arbitrator of the singular arbitral tribunal the undersigned, who communicated acceptance of the office within the applicable period.

On 05-02-2015 the parties were duly notified of this designation and did not manifest an intention to reject the designation of the arbitrator, in accordance with articles 11.º no. 1 clauses a) and b) of the RJAT and articles 6.º and 7.º of the Deontological Code.

Thus, in accordance with the provision in clause c) of no. 1 of article 11.º of the RJAT, the singular arbitral tribunal was constituted on 20-11-2014.

By order of 21-04-2015, the tribunal dispensed with the meeting provided for in article 18.º of the RJAT, as well as final arguments.

The arbitral tribunal was regularly constituted and is materially competent, in light of the provision in articles 2.º, no. 1, clause a), and 30.º, no. 1, of DL no. 10/2011, of 20 January.

The parties have legal standing and capacity, are legitimate and are represented (arts. 4.º and 10.º, no. 2, of the same decree and art. 1.º of Order no. 112-A/2011, of 22 March).

The allegations sustaining the request for arbitral decision of the Claimant are, in summary, as follows:

Arguments of the Claimant

10.1 As a preliminary matter, the Claimant alleges its procedural legitimacy to present the request for arbitral decision relating to the assessments of the tax now disputed, notified to company B… – …, SA, for the reason that the aggregate of its assets, liabilities, rights and responsibilities were incorporated, in 2001, into the sphere of company C… – …, Lda., which, in turn, was incorporated, in 2003, by the present Claimant, in the context of a merger process, as evidenced by the supporting documents attached.

10.2 Accordingly, pursuant to article 65.º of the LGT, the Claimant is a legitimate party in the present proceedings.

10.3 The Claimant further alleges that the legal prerequisites for joinder of claims are met, in accordance with articles 104.º of the CPPT and article 3.º no. 1 of the RJAT.

10.4 The Claimant is a financial credit institution that was engaged in the conclusion of, among others, financial leasing contracts, with motor vehicles as the object thereof.

10.5 In the exercise of its activity, the Claimant concluded various financial leasing contracts which had as their object motor vehicles with the registration numbers better identified in the Attached Table which is attached as Annex VIII.

10.6 It happens, however, that upon the termination of these financial leasing contracts, the Claimant sold the respective motor vehicles to the taxpayers identified in the sales invoices, copies of which are attached as Annex IX.

10.7 Now, article 3.º of the CIUC provides that "the taxable persons of the tax are the owners of the vehicles."

10.8 By stating that "the taxable persons of the tax are natural or legal persons, whether public or private, in whose name the same are registered," article 3.º no. 1 of the Single Circulation Tax Code establishes a rebuttable presumption, as provided for in article 73.º of the LGT.

10.9 To rebut the presumption, the Claimant demonstrated that the ownership of the vehicle belongs to a third party, by presenting, for this purpose, the sales invoices of the vehicles at a time prior to when the tax assessment was made.

10.10 Thus, not considering the prerequisites that substantiate the tax law relationship to be met, in this case, the attribution to the Claimant of responsibility for the IUC in the fiscal years 2009 to 2012 and relating to the vehicles in question, the Tax and Customs Authority could never demand such tax from it due to manifest lack of subjective responsibility for its payment (articles 1.º, 3.º and 19.º of the CIUC).

10.11 It also invokes Arbitral Decisions nos. 26/2013-T, 27/2013-T and 246/2014-T, of this CAAD, in which a decision was made in an identical sense.

10.12 It concludes by requesting the annulment of the IUC assessments object of the present proceedings on the ground of erroneous qualification of the tax facts in accordance with articles 3.º and 19.º of the CIUC and article 99.º, al. a), of the CPPT.

Response of the Respondent

11.1 In its response, as a preliminary matter, the Respondent defends itself by exception, invoking improper impartiality of the procedural means because, in the context of gracious claims nos. …2014…, …2014…, …2014… and …2014… which are the immediate object of the request for arbitral decision, the Respondent did not pronounce itself on the merits of the request and consequently did not issue a judgment on the legality of the underlying tax acts.

11.2 Now, as the four decisions rejecting these claims did not proceed to an effective assessment of the legality of the acts of assessment of the IUC, due to lack of the procedural prerequisite of legitimacy of the present Claimant, then the means of reaction could never be the request for arbitral decision but rather the special administrative action.

11.3 Thus, the singular tribunal constituted is materially incompetent to assess and decide part of the object of the dispute which constitutes a dilatory exception preventing knowledge of the merits of the case, in accordance with article 576.º, nos. 1 and 2 of the CPC, by virtue of article 2.º, clause e) of the CPPT and article 29.º, no. 1, al. a) and e), of the RJAT.

11.4 It further adds that, regarding gracious claims nos. …2014… and …2014…, it should be said that the assessments were sent to company B… – …, SA.

11.5 Now, the Claimant alleges that all the assets of B… came to be integrated into the sphere of company C… – …, Lda, following a transfer contract concluded on 13 September 2001.

11.6 It is verified, however, that annexes 3 and 4 of the transfer contract which listed the financial leasing contracts and the vehicles subject to transfer do not appear in the administrative file nor in the request for arbitral decision, wherefore the Claimant failed to prove that the disputed assessments relate to financial leasing contracts transmitted by the transfer contract.

11.7 Which is equivalent to saying that the Claimant lacks procedural legitimacy, which constitutes a dilatory exception, in accordance with article 577.º, al. e), of the CPC, which gives rise to absolution from the instance, in accordance with article 278.º, no. 1, al. d) of the same legal text.

11.8 In the defense by contestation, the AT acknowledges the existence of the jurisprudence cited by the Claimant but recalls the non-existence of legal precedent in Portugal.

11.9 On the other hand, it recalls the existence of a relevant line of jurisprudence with respect to conclusive documentary proof to rebut the presumption contained in the registration (see cases nos. 126/2014-T and 220/2014-T).

11.10 In material terms, the AT understands that the tax legislator in establishing in article 3.º, no. 1 who are the taxable persons of the IUC established expressly and intentionally that these are the owners (or in the situations provided for in no. 2 the persons mentioned there), considering as such the persons in whose name the same are registered.

11.11 The legislator did not use the expression "it is presumed" as it could have done, for example, in the following terms: "the taxable persons of the tax are the owners of the vehicles, and it is presumed as such the natural or legal persons, whether public or private, in whose name the same are registered."

11.12 Thus, the wording of article 3.º of the CIUC corresponds to a clear choice of legislative policy embraced by the legislator, wherefore to understand that a presumption is established there would unequivocally be to carry out an interpretation against the law.

11.13 Accordingly, this understanding has already been adopted by the jurisprudence of our courts, transcribing, for this purpose, part of the judgment of the Administrative and Tax Court of Penafiel, issued in Case no. 210/13.0BEPNF. (See article 56.º of the Response)

11.14 On the systematic element of interpretation, the Claimant alleges that the solution upheld by the Claimant is intolerable, not finding the understanding endorsed by the latter any legal support. (Article 25.º of the Response)

11.15 Finally, bearing in mind the "ratio" of the parliamentary debates surrounding the approval of the present regime, it clearly results that the regime of automobile taxation approved establishes that the IUC "became due by the persons who appear in the registration as owners of the vehicles" (article 46.º).

11.16 It further adds that, admitting, by academic hypothesis, to be admissible the rebuttal of the presumption, it is still necessary to assess the documents joined by the Claimant.

11.17 It alleges, first of all, that the invoices alone do not constitute an appropriate document to prove the sale of the vehicles, since, being a bilateral contract, they do not reveal, by themselves, an essential and unequivocal declaration of intent on the part of the alleged purchaser.

11.18 Without prejudice, regarding the probative value of the invoices attached in Annex 7, the same are disputed for the existence of serious doubts as to their veracity, namely: (i) all invoices allegedly issued in the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 were issued by the Claimant still before its own constitution in 1998; The same happens with the invoices relating to the vehicles with the registration numbers …-…-…, …-…-…, …-…-…, …-…-…, …-…-… and …-…-…, even though issued in 1998, were issued on a date prior to the constitution of the company; all invoices allegedly issued in the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 were issued by the Claimant still before C…, Lda, acquired the respective rights by means of the transfer contract; all invoices allegedly issued in the years 2001 and 2002 were issued by the Claimant still before the merger by incorporation of C…, Lda even occurred; All invoices issued in the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 contain telephone numbers with 9 digits, postal codes with 7 digits and expression in euros when such realities are subsequent; etc...

11.19 All the inconsistencies detected lead to the conclusion that these documents cannot benefit from the presumption of truth to which article 75.º of the LGT refers.

11.20 As to responsibility for payment of judicial costs: it was not the Respondent who gave rise to the deduction of the request for arbitral decision but rather the Claimant who only alleged the alleged transmission of ownership after the assessment of the tax.

11.21 Consequently, the Claimant should be condemned to payment of the arbitration costs, in line with what was decided in a similar question in the context of Case no. 72/2013-T of this Arbitration Center.

Everything considered, it is necessary to render a final decision.

A. MATTER OF FACT

A.1. Facts deemed as proven

The Claimant is a financial credit institution that had as its social purpose the practice of operations permitted to banks, with the exception of the reception of deposits.

The Claimant incorporated by merger, in 2003, the company C… – …, Lda., which, in turn, acquired, in 2001, by transfer contract the aggregate of its assets, liabilities, rights and responsibilities from the company B… – …, S.A..

The company B… – …, SA, was notified of the official IUC assessments, attached as documents nos. 1 to 85.

From the notification of the official assessments, the Claimant presented the corresponding gracious claims which would be rejected.

B. ON THE LAW

OF THE EXCEPTION OF INCOMPETENCE OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

The questions of determination of the competence of the tribunals of priority knowledge and of ex officio knowledge, in accordance with articles 13º of the Code of Procedure in Administrative Tribunals (CPTA) and article 578º of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) by subsidiary application of article 29º of the Legal Regime for Arbitration in Tax Matters (RJAT), require, in light of the foregoing, assessment of the present dilatory exception.

The Respondent alleges that the present arbitral tribunal is materially incompetent to assess and decide the part of the dispute relating to the assessments object of gracious claims nos. …2014…, …2014…, …2014… and …2014…, which constitutes, as to this part of the request, a dilatory exception preventing knowledge of the merits of the case, in accordance with article 576.º, nos. 1 and 2 of the CPC, by virtue of article 2.º, clause e) of the CPPT and article 29.º, no. 1, al. a) and e), of the RJAT.

The Respondent raises the question of incompetence of the present arbitral tribunal for the same having as its immediate object the decision rejecting gracious claims nos. …2014…, …2014…, …2014… and …2014…, without there having been an effective assessment of the legality of the acts of assessment of the IUC, the mediate object of the request for arbitral decision.

It is necessary, for clarification of the decision, to properly frame the competence of the arbitral tribunals functioning in the CAAD.

The competence of the arbitral tribunals functioning in the CAAD is, in the first place, limited to the matters indicated in article 2.º, no. 1, of DL no. 10/2011, of 20 January (RJAT), whose no. 1, clause a) confers upon the arbitral tribunals competence for the assessment of the claim for declaration of illegality of acts of assessment and self-assessment of taxes.

In the second place, the competence of the arbitral tribunals is also limited by the terms to which the Tax Administration bound itself to that jurisdiction, through Order no. 112-A/2011, of 22 March, since article 4.º of the RJAT establishes that "the binding of the tax administration to the jurisdiction of the tribunals constituted under the terms of this law depends on an order of the members of the Government responsible for the areas of finance and justice, which establishes, in particular, the type and maximum value of the disputes covered".

Thus, article 2.º of Order 112-A/2011, of 22 March, determines the binding of the AT to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals functioning in the CAAD which have as their object the assessment of claims relating to taxes whose administration is entrusted to them referred to in no. 1 of article 2.º of Decree-Law no. 10/2011, of 20 January, with the exception of those expressly provided for in clauses a) to d) of this article.

It should be understood that the competence of the arbitral tribunals "is restricted to activity connected with acts of assessment of taxes, remaining outside its competence the assessment of the legality of administrative acts of total or partial rejection or of revocation of exemptions or other tax benefits, when dependent on recognition by the Tax Administration, as well as other administrative acts relating to tax questions which do not involve assessment of the act of assessment, to which clause p) of no. 1 of art. 97.º of the CPPT refers" (Jorge Lopes de Sousa, Commentary on the Legal Regime for Tax Arbitration in Guide to Tax Arbitration, Almedina, 2013, p. 105).

Moreover, as to what brings us here, "Regarding decisions rejecting gracious claims which, in light of the literal wording of article 102.º, no. 2, of the CPPT, will be contestable always through judicial review proceedings, one may see, for the judicial tax procedure, an exception to this division of the fields of application of the judicial review proceedings and the special administrative action. But, regarding the arbitral tribunals functioning in the CAAD that exception will be irrelevant, since it results from clause a) of no. 1 of article 2.º of the RJAT that, in relation to acts of assessment, self-assessment, withholding at source and payment on account, only the declaration of their illegality is included in its competence and not the assessment of the legality of acts which do not involve such assessment. That is, decisions rejecting gracious claims themselves cannot be assessed, in particular those which did not rule on the merits of the act of assessment which is the object of the claim..." (Idem, p. 125).

Now, in the present case, the gracious claims were rejected summarily for lack of legitimacy of the Claimant, wherefore it is clear that the Tax Administration did not assess the legality of the assessment.

For this reason, it must be considered that the present tribunal is incompetent to decide as petitioned by the Claimant regarding the official assessments object of gracious claims nos. …2014…, …2014…, …2014… and …2014….

In conclusion, this Arbitral Tribunal is materially incompetent to assess and decide partially the request object of the dispute sub judice, in accordance with articles 2.º, no. 1, clause a) and 4.º, no. 1, both of the RJAT and articles 1.º and 2.º, clause a), of Order no. 112-A/2011, which constitutes a dilatory exception preventing knowledge of the merits of the case, in accordance with article 576º, nos. 1 and 2 of the CPC by virtue of article 2º, clause e) of the CPPT and article 29º, no. 1, clauses a) and e) of the RJAT, which bars knowledge of the request and the absolution from the instance of the AT, in accordance with articles 576º, no. 2 and 577º, clause a) of the CPC, by virtue of article 29º, no. 1, clauses a) and e) of the RJAT.

OF THE EXCEPTION OF PROCEDURAL ILLEGITIMACY OF THE CLAIMANT

The Respondent further alleges the procedural illegitimacy of the Claimant for the official assessments not being addressed to it.

In accordance with the documentation presented by the Claimant, on 13 September 2001, a transfer contract was entered into between B… – …, S.A., and C… – …, Lda., through which "B…" transmitted its business and commercial establishment to "C…" (first clause of the contract).

In particular, no. 2 of First Clause of this contract specifies that the assets relating to the automobile leasing contracts contained in annex III (al. b)) and respective ownership of the vehicles (al. d)) contained in Annex IV attached to the transfer contract are transmitted.

These annexes were not, however, attached by the Claimant to the proceedings.

On 20 February 2002, B… – …, S.A., was dissolved (see Annex I of the Arbitral Petition).

Subsequently, on 11 December 2013, C… – …, Lda, was incorporated by the Claimant in a merger process.

It is known that the official assessments object mediate of the present request for arbitral decision were notified to the company B… – …, S.A., for being the company which appeared in the title of ownership of the vehicle.

Given that the annexes identifying the vehicles and respective financial leasing contracts contained in the transfer contract were not attached, the present tribunal cannot presume that the vehicles object of the present proceedings were transmitted by the company B… – …, S.A. to the company C… – …, Lda. Not being, in hypothetical terms, impossible the transmission to a third entity, on a date prior or subsequent to the execution of the transfer contract, the Claimant failed to prove that it effectively acquired, in the terms described, the ownership of the vehicles.

Not having, on the other hand, the registration of transmission of ownership of the vehicles been made on the date of execution of the transfer contract, it is legitimate to doubt whether the assessments may relate to other contracts and vehicles which were not the object of the transfer contract.

Having arrived here it is necessary to assess whether the Claimant has procedural legitimacy.

The plaintiff will be a legitimate party when it has a direct interest in suing (article 30.º of the CPC). Article 9.º of the CPTA tells us that the plaintiff (active legitimacy) is considered a legitimate party when it alleges to be a party to the contested material relationship. For this, "The burden falls upon the interested party to allege the facts that integrate its legitimacy..." (Jorge Lopes de Sousa, in the Code of Procedure and Tax Process, Volume I, 6th edition, annotation 2 to article 9.º, page 113).

Thus, not having the Claimant proved to be the legitimate holder of the financial leasing contracts and of the vehicles, it does not have procedural legitimacy to request the declaration of illegality of the acts of assessment above identified.

By the foregoing, the lack of procedural legitimacy constitutes a dilatory exception which gives rise to absolution from the instance, in accordance with article 577.º al. e) of the CPC, by virtue of article 2º, clause e) of the CPPT and article 29º, no. 1, clauses a) and e) of the RJAT, which bars knowledge of the request and the absolution from the instance of the AT, in accordance with articles 576º, no. 2 of the CPC, by virtue of article 29º, no. 1, clauses a) and e) of the RJAT.

The verification of the exceptions of partial incompetence of the arbitral tribunal and of illegitimacy of the Claimant, obviously leaves prejudiced the assessment of the other questions raised in the proceedings.

D. DECISION

In such terms, it is decided in this Arbitral Tribunal:

  1. To uphold the exception of material incompetence of the tribunal to know of the request for declaration of illegality of the official assessments object of gracious claims nos. …2014…, …2014…, …2014… and …2014… and, in consequence, to absolve partially the Respondent from the instance;

  2. To uphold the exception of procedural illegitimacy of the Claimant and to absolve the Respondent from the Instance;

  3. To judge, in consequence, prejudiced the knowledge of the question on the merits;

  4. To condemn the Claimant to payment of the costs of the proceedings, in the amount of € 612.00.

E. Value of the proceedings

The value of the proceedings is fixed at € 6,294.26, in accordance with article 97.º-A, no. 1, a), of the Code of Procedure and Tax Process, applicable by virtue of clauses a) and b) of no. 1 of article 29.º of the RJAT and of no. 2 of article 3.º of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings.

F. Costs

The value of the arbitration fee is fixed at € 612.00, in accordance with Table I of the Regulation of Costs in Tax Arbitration Proceedings, to be paid by the Claimant, since the request was entirely without merit, in accordance with articles 12.º, no. 2, and 22.º, no. 4, both of the RJAT, and article 4.º, no. 4, of the said Regulation.

Let it be notified.

Lisbon

20 December 2015

The Arbitrator

(Amândio Silva)

Frequently Asked Questions

Automatically Created

Who is liable for IUC payment when a company has undergone mergers and incorporations?
When a company undergoes mergers and incorporations, IUC liability follows the legal succession rules under Article 65 of the General Tax Law (LGT). In this case, when company B's assets were incorporated into company C (2001), and C was subsequently merged into company A (2003), the successor company (A) becomes procedurally legitimate to challenge tax assessments originally notified to the predecessor (B). However, the successor must prove that the specific assets and liabilities subject to taxation were actually transferred through the corporate succession. The Tax Authority may challenge this legitimacy if documentation proving the transfer of specific contracts and vehicles (such as annexes to transfer agreements) is missing from the administrative file.
Can a company in liquidation file an arbitral claim to challenge IUC tax assessments?
Yes, a company in liquidation can file an arbitral claim before CAAD to challenge IUC tax assessments. The arbitral tribunal confirmed it was regularly constituted and materially competent under Articles 2(1)(a) and 30(1) of Decree-Law 10/2011. The tribunal also verified that the parties have legal standing, capacity, legitimacy, and proper representation according to Article 4 and Article 10(2) of the RJAT. The fact that a company is in liquidation does not automatically bar it from pursuing arbitral proceedings to contest the legality of tax assessments, provided the procedural requirements are met and the company demonstrates active legitimacy for the specific claims being challenged.
What is the exception of incompetence in CAAD arbitral proceedings related to IUC?
The exception of incompetence in CAAD proceedings relates to whether the arbitral tribunal has material jurisdiction to hear the case. The Tax Authority argued that when gracious claims are rejected on purely procedural grounds (such as lack of legitimacy) without the administration assessing the merits or legality of the underlying tax acts, the proper legal remedy is a special administrative action in judicial courts, not arbitral proceedings before CAAD. This constitutes a dilatory exception under Article 576 of the Civil Procedure Code (applicable via Article 2(e) CPPT), which prevents the tribunal from examining the case merits. The exception invokes Article 29(1)(a) and (e) of RJAT, arguing CAAD lacks competence when prior administrative decisions did not rule on the tax acts' legality.
How does active illegitimacy affect the outcome of IUC arbitral tax disputes?
Active illegitimacy (lack of procedural legitimacy) constitutes a dilatory exception under Article 577(e) of the Civil Procedure Code that can result in absolution from the instance (dismissal without prejudice) pursuant to Article 278(1)(d) CPC. In IUC disputes involving corporate succession, the Tax Authority challenged the claimant's active legitimacy by arguing insufficient proof that the specific tax assessments related to financial leasing contracts and vehicles actually transferred through the 2001 incorporation. The Authority noted that Annexes 3 and 4 of the transfer contract, which should list the contracts and vehicles transferred, were missing from both the administrative file and the arbitral request. Without such documentation, the claimant cannot establish the legal nexus between the disputed assessments and the assets it acquired through succession, potentially leading to dismissal on procedural grounds.
What are the legal grounds for challenging IUC assessments from 2009 to 2012 before CAAD?
The legal grounds for challenging IUC assessments from 2009-2012 before CAAD include: (1) erroneous qualification of tax facts under Articles 3 and 19 of the IUC Code and Article 99(a) CPPT, arguing the claimant was not the vehicle owner when assessments were made; (2) rebuttal of the registration-based presumption under Article 3(1) CIUC through sales invoices proving vehicle transfer to third parties before assessment; (3) violation of subjective liability requirements, as the claimant demonstrated ownership had passed to purchasers; (4) joinder of claims under Article 104 CPPT and Article 3(1) RJAT for multiple related assessments; and (5) procedural legitimacy under Article 65 LGT based on corporate succession through the 2001 and 2003 mergers. The claimant relied on favorable CAAD jurisprudence (Decisions 26/2013-T, 27/2013-T, and 246/2014-T) supporting the position that financial leasing entities are not liable for IUC on vehicles already sold to third parties.